{ "id": 11438654, "name": "ANTOINETTE M. VADALA, Plaintiff v. RICHARD R. VADALA, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Vadala v. Vadala", "decision_date": "2001-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA00-205", "first_page": "478", "last_page": "482", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "145 N.C. App. 478" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239-40" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11205703 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789-90" }, { "page": "790" }, { "page": "789-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12127448 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(b)(8)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" }, { "page": "258-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527658 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548-49" }, { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521686 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080339 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 523, "char_count": 11399, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.353998389291128e-07, "percentile": 0.6341390945958625 }, "sha256": "005dfe56d47e15e4085bad87652a1373baf8e9509cc18a3c246943159d39d4d8", "simhash": "1:cb3ff424f57bee74", "word_count": 1891 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:14.256422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "ANTOINETTE M. VADALA, Plaintiff v. RICHARD R. VADALA, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nWe note that plaintiff\u2019s brief fails to comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure in several respects, and is therefore subject to dismissal for these violations. Nonetheless, as we feel that the issues in this case warrant our attention, we elect to review the matter pursuant to our discretionary powers under N.C.R. App. P. 2.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married for 34 years. During the marriage, the couple put significant amounts of their income toward their retirement, as they were hoping to retire in their early sixties. Over the years, the couple acquired approximately twenty-two different retirement accounts, to which they consistently contributed. Since their divorce, defendant has continued to put a substantial amount of his income into his retirement accounts. Plaintiff, however, contends that due to her lower income (which is approximately one-third of defendant\u2019s net income per month), and to her expenses (which account for all but approximately $170 of her net monthly pay), she is unable to retain the lifestyle to which she had been accustomed, namely: she will be forced to work much longer than she would have, had she continued to enjoy the standard of living to which she had become accustomed during her marriage, since she is unable to accumulate savings of an amount that would allow her to retire. As plaintiff was able to meet all of her monthly bills without the aid of alimony, the trial court denied her claim. Plaintiff appealed to this Court for further review.\nThe duties of the trial court regarding a claim for alimony can be found in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(c) (1999), entitled \u201cFindings of Fact.\u201d This section specifically states that the trial court \u201cshall set forth the reasons for its award or denial of alimony and, if making an award, the reasons for its amount\u201d and, with the exception of motions where the Rules of Civil Procedure do not require specific findings, that \u201cthe court shall make a specific finding of fact on each of the factors in subsection (b) of this section if evidence is offered on that factor.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(c) (emphasis added).\nThis provision is mandatory, and it is a vital part of the trial court\u2019s order. The trial court must make findings of fact that are sufficiently detailed to allow review. Rhew v. Rhew, 138 N.C. App. 467, 470, 531 S.E.2d 471, 473 (2000). \u201cThe trial court must at least make findings sufficiently specific to indicate that the trial judge properly considered each of the factors ... for a determination of an alimony award.\u201d Skamarak v. Skamarak, 81 N.C. App. 125, 128, 343 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1986), quoted in, Rhew v. Rhew, 138 N.C. App. 467, 470, 531 S.E.2d 471, 473 (2000). \u201c \u2018In the absence of such findings, appellate courts cannot appropriately determine whether the order of the trial court is adequately supported by competent evidence, and therefore such an order must be vacated and the case remanded for necessary-findings.\u2019 \u201d Rhew, 138 N.C. App. at 470, 531 S.E.2d at 473 (quoting Talent v. Talent, 76 N.C. App. 545, 548-49, 334 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985)).\nWe conclude that the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact in regards to the alimony portion of the order, and therefore, that we are unable to sufficiently review these findings of fact and the court\u2019s subsequent conclusions of law.\nAs stated above, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(c) requires the trial court to make sufficient findings on each of the factors listed in subsection (b). At the time of this trial, subsection (b) contained factors one through fifteen, with factor number sixteen taking effect in 1998. Therefore, our analysis is confined to the first fifteen factors.\nThe trial court must make sufficiently specific findings of fact on each factor listed in subsection (b) for which evidence is offered. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3(c). While we find evidence in the record to support findings on several factors in subsection (b), since we remand the case due to insufficient findings, we will not address each of these factors. Two of these factors, however, do merit further instruction.\nSpecifically, under factor (2), the trial court must consider the relative earnings and earning capacities of the spouses. The trial court did make findings as to plaintiffs income in its finding of fact number 1, however, this finding is not sufficiently detailed. Finding of fact number 1, reads: \u201cThe Plaintiff has been employed as a medical transcriptionist for fifteen years, and has a gross income of $2,075 per month; and, after taxes, her net income is $1,572 per month.\u201d This may be so, but we have no way to confirm or deny this finding as it gives no indication as to how it was calculated. Indeed, the parties themselves dispute this finding of fact with each arguing different methods for calculating this income. In addition, the trial court found no facts regarding defendant\u2019s income whatsoever.\nThe second factor that we need to address is factor number (8), which examines the standard of living to which the parties had grown accustomed during the marriage.\nIn order to be entitled to alimony, the party seeking alimony must establish that: \u201c(1) that party is a dependent spouse; (2) the other party is a supporting spouse; and (3) an award of alimony would be equitable under all the relevant factors.\u201d Barrett v. Barrett, 140 N.C. App. 369, 371, 536 S.E.2d 642, 644 (2000). A dependent spouse is one who is \u201cactually substantially dependent upon the other spouse for his or her maintenance and support or is substantially in need of maintenance and support from the other spouse.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1A(2) (1999). As this Court has said before, \u201c[i]n other words, the court must determine whether one spouse would \u2018be unable to maintain his or her accustomed standard of living, established prior to separation, without financial contribution from the other.\u2019 \u201d Rhew, 138 N.C. App. at 470, 531 S.E.2d at 473 (quoting Talent v. Talent, 76 N.C. App. 545, 548, 334 S.E.2d 256, 258-59 (1985)).\nIn its finding of fact number five, the trial court stated: \u201c[t]he Court considered the Plaintiff\u2019s contention that she needs to save for her retirement; however, the Court did not consider this \u2018need\u2019 in determining her status as a dependent spouse for purposes of alimony.\u201d Further, in its conclusion of law number four, the court concluded that \u201c[t]he Plaintiffs alleged \u2018need\u2019 to save for her retirement is not properly considered by the Court in accessing [sic] the Plaintiff\u2019s needs for alimony, nor in determining her status as a dependent spouse.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIt appears from these statements that the trial court felt it was unable to consider the parties\u2019 pattern of saving for their retirement. Recent case law, however, has determined that a pattern of savings may be considered by the court in determining alimony.\nThis Court recently held in Glass v. Glass, 131 N.C. App. 784, 789-90, 509 S.E.2d 236, 239 (1998), that an established pattern of contributing to a retirement or savings plan may be considered by the trial court in determining the parties\u2019 accustomed standard of living. Glass cautioned, however, that a party\u2019s savings should not be used to \u201creduce his or her support obligation to the other by merely increasing his or her deductions for savings plans,\u201d nor should a spouse be able to \u201cincrease an alimony award by deferring a portion of his or her income to a savings account,\u201d emphasizing that \u201cthe purpose of alimony is not to allow a party to accumulate savings.\u201d Glass, 131 N.C. App. at 790, 509 S.E.2d at 239-40.\nThen, in Rhew v. Rhew, 138 N.C. App. 467, 531 S.E.2d 471 (2000), (a case which we note, was decided by this Court after the trial court in the case sub judice had entered its order denying alimony), we clarified our holding in Glass, finding that although the parties\u2019 pattern of savings may not be determinative of a claim for alimony, the trial court must at least consider this pattern in determining the parties\u2019 accustomed standard of living.\nWe find Rhew analogous to the case now before us in several respects. In Rhew, the parties were found to have \u201cenjoyed a comfortable standard of living,\u201d and had \u201cbudgeted a sizeable portion of their income to savings and retirement accounts,\u201d as had the parties in the case at hand. Id. at 468, 531 S.E.2d at 472. Likewise, the trial court in Rhew had declined to consider the parties\u2019 pattern of savings in determining whether to award alimony. However, soon after the trial court had entered its order, Glass was decided, which found that the trial court could \u201c \u2018properly consider the parties\u2019 custom of making regular additions to savings plans as a part of their standard of living in determining the amount and duration of an alimony award.\u2019 \u201d Rhew, 138 N.C. App. at 473, 531 S.E.2d at 475 (2000) (quoting Glass, 131 N.C. App. 784, 789-90, 509 S.E.2d 236, 239 (1998)).\nThe Rhew Court went on to say:\nAlthough the Court in Glass properly identified the difficulty that might arise when a party increased or decreased his or her contribution to savings in order to manipulate an alimony award, no such problem exists here. Evidence was presented that established an historical pattern of such contributions, which satisfied the requirement in Glass that there be a custom of regular savings. Therefore, the trial court erred when it found in... its order that \u201cit appears that defendant has the ability to provide \u2018reasonable subsistence\u2019 for herself consistent with the parties\u2019 accustomed standard of living\u201d without considering contributions to savings.\nId. at 473, 531 S.E.2d at 475.\nSimilarly, inasmuch as it appears the trial court here felt it was unable to consider the parties\u2019 established pattern of savings in determining plaintiff\u2019s claim for alimony, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and remanded for reconsideration of this claim.\nUpon remand, the trial court shall review all relevant factors under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(b), including the parties\u2019 pattern of retirement savings as it pertains to the parties\u2019 accustomed standard of living pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3(b)(8), and make sufficient findings of fact as to the same.\nReversed and remanded.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Staton, Perkinson, Doster, Post, & Silverman, P.A., by Jonathan Silverman, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Cheshire, Parker, Schneider, Wells, & Bryan, by Jonathan McGirt, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANTOINETTE M. VADALA, Plaintiff v. RICHARD R. VADALA, Defendant\nNo. COA00-205\n(Filed 7 August 2001)\nDivorce\u2014 alimony \u2014 relative earnings and earning capacities\u2014 accustomed standard of living \u2014 established pattern of savings\nThe trial court erred by denying plaintiff wife\u2019s claim for alimony under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-16.3A(c) based on the fact that she was able to meet all of her monthly bills without the aid of alimony, because: (1) the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding the relative earnings and earning capacities of the spouses; and (2) the trial court improperly felt it was unable to consider the parties\u2019 established pattern of savings in determining the standard of living to which the parties had grown accustomed during the marriage.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 6 August 1999 by Judge Lee Gavin in Moore County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 February 2001.\nStaton, Perkinson, Doster, Post, & Silverman, P.A., by Jonathan Silverman, for plaintiff-appellant.\nCheshire, Parker, Schneider, Wells, & Bryan, by Jonathan McGirt, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0478-01", "first_page_order": 508, "last_page_order": 512 }