{
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    "judges": [
      "Judge HUNTER concurs.",
      "Judge MARTIN concurs in part and dissents in part."
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    "parties": [
      "BEATRICE WOODY, Plaintiff v. THOMASVILLE UPHOLSTERY INCORPORATED, Employer, SELF-INSURED (Helsman-Management Services, Inc., Servicing Agent), Defendant"
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        "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nThomasville Upholstery (defendant) appeals from the 13 January 2000 \u201cOpinion and Award\u201d of the Full Industrial Commission (the Full Commission), awarding Beatrice Woody (plaintiff) temporary total disability benefits, medical expenses, and attorney\u2019s fees, and imposing sanctions upon defendant for violating a discovery order. We affirm.\nThe Opinion and Award of the Full Commission sets forth twenty-four findings of fact. Because the first nine findings provide a helpful summary of the relevant underlying facts in this case, we set them forth here in substantial part:\n1. Plaintiff was a fifty year old female at the time of the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner. Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1988 and worked as a Customer Service Manager prior to the Fall of 1993. In October 1993, plaintiff was transferred to the position of Marketing Assistant. In this position, plaintiff demonstrated strong administrative skills and won several awards ....\n2. In the spring of 1993, defendant hired Ms. Sharon Bosworth as General Manager of Marketing and Design. Ms. Bosworth was hired for her ability to design new lines of upholstered furniture. The new designs that Ms. Bosworth produced for defendant resulted in a substantial increase in defendant\u2019s income.\n3. Shortly after Ms. Bosworth was hired, defendant determined that she did not possess adequate administrative skills and did not demonstrate any desire to develop them. Administrative skills were needed in conjunction with the creative work Ms. Bosworth performed .... To resolve this dilemma, defendant assigned plaintiff as Ms. Bosworth\u2019s assistant to perform administrative duties.\n4. Prior to her reassignment, plaintiff had reported directly to Mr. Bob Walters, the new company president. Mr. Walters assured plaintiff that if the transfer was not successful plaintiff would be moved to another position and that her employment with defendant was secure. Plaintiff was also informed of the importance to defendant\u2019s success in the furniture industry of having Ms. Bosworth\u2019s designs distributed to the other departments in a timely fashion.\n5. In her new position, plaintiff was required to obtain specifications of new designs from Ms. Bosworth after which plaintiff was to distribute them to the necessary departments. Initially plaintiff and Ms. Bosworth worked well together, and plaintiff had no difficulties in obtaining the information she needed from Ms. Bosworth. Subsequently, for reasons unknown to plaintiff, Ms. Bosworth stopped providing her with the information concerning the new designs. Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to obtain the needed information by leaving memos and telephone messages with Ms. Bosworth.\n6. As time progressed, the relationship between Ms. Bosworth and plaintiff deteriorated. In her dealings with plaintiff, Ms. Bosworth\u2019s tone was short and harsh. Ms. Bosworth cursed at plaintiff and berated her by calling plaintiff \u201cdumb\u201d and \u201cstupid.\u201d Additionally, Ms. Bosworth instructed the employees supposedly supervised by plaintiff to report to her (Ms. Bosworth) rather than to plaintiff because plaintiff did not know what she was doing.\n7. Due to Ms. Bosworth [sic] behavior, plaintiff grew frustrated and worried over the inability to adequately perform the requirements of her job. Plaintiffs job became more stressful and her repeated attempts to resolve the problems with Ms. Bosworth were not successful. In contrast, plaintiff had managed the stress associated with her former position with defendant and was able to resolve prior problems.\n8. Ms. Jan Comer, defendants [sic] human resources manager, was informed by plaintiff of the problems with Ms. Bosworth. Ms. Comer was played a tape of a conversation between plaintiff and Ms. Bosworth. Having heard the contents of this taped conversation, Ms. Comer corroborated plaintiffs testimony that Ms. Bosworth cursed at plaintiff, had called her a \u201cbitch,\u201d and that Ms. Bosworth was insulting in her tone. Based upon these and other workplace examples, Ms. Comer was of the opinion that Ms. Bosworth was emotionally unstable.\n[9]. Ms. Comer played the tape in question for Mr. Walters and discussed with him the need for professional counseling for Ms. Bosworth. Plaintiff also personally informed Mr. Walters of the problems with Ms. Bosworth. Plaintiff was informed by Mr. Walters that any workplace issues or problems would be resolved and that her employment with defendant was not in jeopardy. Mr. Walters further indicated to plaintiff that he would discuss the situation with Ms. Bosworth. However, Mr. Walters\u2019 discussions with Ms. Bosworth regarding plaintiffs concerns only worsened the situation, resulting in increased pressure and stress on plaintiff. Additionally, Mr. Walters promoted Ms. Bosworth to vice-president on 27 May 1994 and Ms. Comer was fired after expressing her views concerning Ms. Bosworth\u2019s conduct.\nAs to the merits of plaintiffs claim, the Full Commission entered the following Conclusions of Law:\n1. Plaintiffs salary and average weekly wage at the time of her termination on 22 June 1994 yields the maximum compensation rate for 1994, $466.00 per week. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(5).\n2. Plaintiffs employment with defendant caused her depression and exposed her to an increased risk of developing this condition as compared to members of the general public not so employed. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53(13). Because plaintiffs fibromyalgia was caused or significantly aggravated by her depression, it was also caused by her employment with defendant. Id.-, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6).\n3. As the result of her depression and fibromyalgia, plaintiff is entitled [] to be paid by defendant temporary total disability compensation at the rate of $466.00 per week for the period of 23 June 1994 through the present and continuing until such time as she returns to work or further order of the Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29.\n4. As the result of her depression and fibromyalgia, plaintiff is entitled to have defendant pay all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25.\n5. Pursuant to Industrial Commission Rule 802, defendant\u2019s failure to comply with Deputy Commissioner Glenn\u2019s 5 August 1997 Order Compelling Discovery subjects it to the imposition of sanctions. Accordingly, defendant is assessed an additional attorney\u2019s fee in the amount of $2,585.00 for the time and effort expended by counsel for plaintiff on this issue. N.C.R. Civ. P. 37.\nAccordingly, the Full Commission awarded plaintiff temporary total disability benefits beginning 23 June 1994, the cost of all medical expenses, attorney\u2019s fees of 25% of the compensation due plaintiff, $2,585.00 in sanctions, and costs. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.\nOn appeal, defendant presents thirty-eight assignments of error condensed into five arguments for our review. The first three arguments pertain to defendant\u2019s violation of a discovery order and the procedural history surrounding that issue. The fourth argument pertains to the alleged impartiality of the Deputy Commissioner who first entered an \u201cOpinion and Award\u201d in the case. The fifth and final argument pertains to the sufficiency of the evidence to support plaintiff\u2019s claim.\nI. DISCOVERY ORDER\nA. Procedural History\nWe first set forth a review of the following additional procedural history occurring prior to entry of the initial Opinion and Award by Deputy Commissioner George T. Glenn, II on 31 August 1998. On 4 October 1996, plaintiff moved the Commission, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-80 (1999), to allow plaintiff to request that defendant produce certain documents consisting of notes made by an employee of defendant while interviewing other employees. Plaintiff acknowledged in the motion that the notes she sought were generally protected from discovery by N.C.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (Rule 26(b)(3)), but asserted that she was unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of these materials by other means, and was therefore entitled to receive a copy of these statements pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3). In response to plaintiffs motion, defendant wrote a letter to Deputy Commissioner William Haigh dated 21 January 1997 asserting that the notes were prepared in anticipation of litigation and that, contrary to plaintiffs contention, plaintiff was able to obtain the information contained in the notes by deposing the employees herself or by issuing subpoenas to them directing them to appear at the hearing.\nDeputy Commissioner Haigh entered an order on 31 January 1997 granting plaintiffs motion for permission to request documents pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 34. Deputy Commissioner Haigh further ordered defendant to produce the documents upon receipt of plaintiffs request, or to object within 15 days of receipt of plaintiffs request. On 1 April 1997, plaintiff sent defendant a \u201cRequest for Documents,\u201d requesting defendant to provide plaintiff with copies of \u201cstatements of Thomasville Upholstery employees taken by Dave Masters in 1994.\u201d In response, defendant filed an \u201cObjection to Request for Documents\u201d on 15 April 1997, again contending that the documents requested were protected from discovery by Rule 26(b)(3). Upon review of defendant\u2019s objection, Executive Secretary Tracey H. Weaver entered an order on 24 June 1997 denying plaintiffs request for production of documents.\nPlaintiff appealed the order and argued in a \u201cMemorandum of Law\u201d that the interviews were conducted by Dave Masters, and that because Masters is not an attorney, the notes from those interviews did not constitute work product. In response, defendant filed a brief arguing that the interviews were conducted by Masters at the request of defendant\u2019s attorneys in anticipation of litigation, and that Masters was an agent of defendant when he took the notes. Deputy Commissioner Glenn heard from the parties on this matter on 28 July 1997 and ordered defendant to turn over the notes in question for in camera inspection, which defendant did. After reviewing the documents, Deputy Commissioner Glenn entered an order on 5 August 1997 directing defendant to produce the notes in question to plaintiff by 6 August 1997. Defendant did not comply with the order by 6 August 1997. On 8 August 1997, defendant filed a \u201cNotice of Appeal to the Full Commission \u2014 or, in the alternative \u2014 Motion for Reconsideration.\u201d Defendant purported to appeal the order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-85 (1999) and Industrial Commission Workers\u2019 Compensation Rule 701 (Rule 701).\nPlaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. On 11 August 1997, the Docket Director for the Commission notified defendant that the order from which defendant purported to appeal was interlocutory, that defendant\u2019s purported appeal would be treated as an exception to the interlocutory order, and that defendant would be entitled to appeal the order only after a final Opinion and Award had been issued.\nOn 29 August 1997, plaintiff filed a \u201cReceipt of Witness Statements,\u201d acknowledging receipt of the notes in question from defendant. Defendant then filed a \u201cMotion to Recuse and for a New Hearing \u2014 And\u2014Alternative Motion to Dispense with Discovery Sanctions Hearing \u2014 And\u2014Alternative Motion to Recuse as to the Discovery Sanctions Proceeding.\u201d Deputy Commissioner Glenn denied these motions at a hearing on 21 November 1997 and scheduled a hearing for 12 January 1998 to address whether defendant would be held in contempt or subjected to sanctions for failing to comply with the discovery order by 6 August 1997. Defendant then filed an appeal from the denial of these motions, purporting to rely upon Industrial Commission Workers\u2019 Compensation Rule 703 (Rule 703), and requesting a hearing. The Chairman of the Commission responded by sending a letter to defendant stating that, although defendant \u201craised some serious points about the nature of this hearing,\u201d such points \u201cshould be more properly raised before Deputy Commissioner Glenn at the hearing in order for him to rule on these matters.\u201d The Chairman also stated: \u201cDepending on the outcome of the hearing, these matters can certainly be appealed to the Full Commission for its reconsideration.\u201d Having set forth this additional procedural history, we now turn to the substance of defendant\u2019s arguments.\nB. Analysis\nIn its first argument, defendant contends that the 5 August 1997 order, compelling defendant to produce the notes in question to plaintiff by 6 August 1997, was contrary to law. We believe the issue raised in this argument has been rendered moot. Our Supreme Court has explained the mootness doctrine as follows:\nWhenever, during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed, for courts will not entertain or proceed with a cause merely to determine abstract propositions of law.\nIn re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979). Here, in arguing that the order compelling discovery was contrary to law, defendant essentially seeks a ruling from this Court that defendant should not have been compelled to produce the documents because they were entitled to the protection provided by Rule 26(b)(3). However, because defendant has produced the documents in question, the relief defendant seeks cannot be granted. See Willis v. Power Co., 291 N.C. 19, 30, 229 S.E.2d 191, 198 (1976) (stating that compliance with an order compelling discovery renders moot any challenge to the validity of that order). We also note that defendant acknowledges in its brief that \u201c[t]he Court cannot undo the harm that was done,\u201d apparently conceding that the relief it seeks in its first argument cannot be provided by this Court.\nIn its second argument, defendant contends that the 5 August 1997 order entered by the Deputy Commissioner was immediately appealable. It is well-established that, \u201c[a)s a general rule, an order compelling discovery is not immediately appealable because it is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right which would be lost if the ruling is not reviewed before final judgment.\u201d Mack v. Moore, 91 N.C. App. 478, 480, 372 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1988), disc. review denied, 323 N.C. 704, 377 S.E.2d 225 (1989). However, where a party is found to be in contempt or is otherwise sanctioned for noncompliance with a discovery order, the party may be entitled to immediate appeal of that order. See Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 163-64, 522 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1999), disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 150, 544 S.E.2d 228 (2000). Here, there is no indication that defendant was adjudged to be in contempt or sanctioned until, at the very earliest, the hearing on 12 August 1997 (at which time it appears, as discussed in more detail below, that the Deputy Commissioner may have intended a single evidentiary ruling to constitute a sanction for failure to comply with the discovery order). Thus, at the time defendant purported to appeal the discovery order, that order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable because defendant had not been adjudged in contempt and no sanctions had been imposed upon defendant.\nIn sum, we believe that the validity of the discovery order has been rendered moot, and that the discovery order was not immediately appealable. However, even assuming arguendo that the order compelling defendant to produce the documents in question was error, and that it should have been immediately appealable, defendant has failed to indicate how production of the documents in question could have prejudiced defendant. Defendant\u2019s first five assignments of error (corresponding to arguments one and two) are therefore overruled.\nIn its third argument (corresponding to assignments of error five, six and seven), defendant contends that the manner in which the Deputy Commissioner imposed sanctions upon defendant was erroneous, and that the Full Commission therefore erred in affirming these sanctions. This argument, in turn, is based upon two contentions. First, defendant contends that the Deputy Commissioner erred in calculating the sanctions against defendant based upon six days of noncompliance with the 5 August 1997 order rather than one day of noncompliance. Statements made by the Deputy Commissioner at the 12 January 1998 hearing do appear to indicate that he viewed defendant\u2019s noncompliance to have started on 6 August 1997. Defendant contends, however, that noncompliance did not begin until defendant received the 11 August 1997 letter from the Docket Director informing defendant that its appeal was interlocutory.\nDefendant has not cited any authority for the proposition that an appeal to the Full Commission from a discovery order entered by a Deputy Commissioner stays the effect of the order. Here, by letter filed 8 August 1997, defendant purported to appeal from the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s 5 August 1997 order (ordering defendant to produce the documents by 6 August 1997). Subdivision (1) of Rule 703 provides that a ruling on a motion to reconsider, if \u201cmade in a summary manner, without detailed findings of fact,\u201d may be appealed by requesting a hearing within 15 days of receipt of the ruling. Rule 703 does not provide that the effect of a challenged order is automatically stayed by an appeal from that order, but only that a Commissioner or Administrative Officer may enter an order staying the effect of an order. See Rule 703(2). Thus, because the discovery order instructed defendant to produce the documents by 6 August 1997, and because the effect of this order was not stayed as a result of defendant\u2019s purported appeal, we do not believe the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s imposition of sanctions upon defendant for noncompliance based upon a calculation of six days constituted an abuse of discretion.\nDefendant also contends that the Deputy Commissioner failed to provide defendant proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions at the 12 August 1997 hearing. Defendant argues that at the 12 August 1997 hearing, the Deputy Commissioner first determined that sanctions would be addressed at a later hearing, but then proceeded to impose sanctions at the hearing. Upon reviewing the transcript from the 12 August 1997 hearing, it does appear that, despite the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s statement that he would hold a hearing to address sanctions at a later date, at least one of his rulings at the outset of the hearing (that Mr. Masters could be called as a witness by plaintiff but not by defendant) was intended to constitute a sanction against defendant for failure to comply with the discovery order. Defendant cites the following proposition in support of its argument:\nNotice and an opportunity to be heard prior to depriving a person of his property are essential elements of due process of law which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution.\nMcDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 448, 450 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1994). We believe that at the time of the 12 August 1997 hearing, defendant had received sufficient notice of the possibility of the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with the 5 August 1997 discovery order, and that defendant had received a sufficient opportunity to be heard on the matter. Moreover, any sanctions imposed upon defendant at the 12 August 1997 hearing did not constitute a deprivation of property (such as a monetary fine). Therefore, we find no violation of defendant\u2019s due process rights as a result of the Full Commission\u2019s ruling affirming the sanctions imposed upon defendant. Assignments of error five, six and seven are overruled.\nII. RECUSAL\nIn its fourth argument (corresponding to assignments of error eight through twelve), defendant contends that the Full Commission erred in affirming the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to recuse. Industrial Commission Workers\u2019 Compensation Rule 615 is entitled \u201cDisqualification of a Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner,\u201d and provides as follows:\nIn their discretion, Commissioners or Deputy Commissioners may recuse themselves from the hearing of any case before the Industrial Commission. For good cause shown, a majority of the Full Commission may remove a Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner from hearing a case.\nHaving carefully reviewed the entire record in this case, we hold that Deputy Commissioner Glenn did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to recuse, and that it was not error for the Full Commission to affirm the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s denial of the motion to recuse. Accordingly, assignments of error eight through twelve are overruled.\nIII. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE\nIn defendant\u2019s fifth and final argument in its brief (corresponding to assignments of error twelve through thirty-eight), defendant contends that the Opinion and Award of the Full Commission is not supported by competent evidence in the record. Specifically, defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that plaintiff\u2019s fibromyalgia and depression are compensable occupational diseases because it did not show that: (1) these diseases are characteristic of plaintiff\u2019s particular trade, occupation or employment; (2) working as a marketing manager in the furniture industry subjected plaintiff to an increased risk of contracting these diseases; and (3) there is a causal connection between the diseases and plaintiff\u2019s employment.\n\u201cFor a disability to be compensable under our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, it must be either the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment or an \u2018occupational disease.\u2019 \u201d Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 51, 283 S.E.2d 101, 105 (1981). By the express language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53 (1999), only the diseases and conditions enumerated therein shall be deemed to be occupational diseases within the meaning of the Act. Because neither fibromyalgia nor depression is specifically mentioned in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53, the issue is whether these two diseases fall within subsection (13) of the statute, which defines an \u201coccupational disease\u201d as\n[a]ny disease . . . which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13). Our Supreme Court has interpreted this language as requiring three elements in order to prove that a disease is an \u201coccupational disease\u201d: (1) the disease must be characteristic of and peculiar to the claimant\u2019s particular trade, occupation or employment; (2) the disease must not be an ordinary disease of life to which the public is equally exposed outside of the employment; and (3) there must be proof of causation (proof of a causal connection between the disease and the employment). See Hansel, 304 N.C. at 52, 283 S.E.2d at 105-06 (citing Booker v. Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 468, 475, 256 S.E.2d 189, 196, 200 (1979)). Furthermore, in Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983), our Supreme Court explained what is required to establish the first two elements:\nTo satisfy the first and second elements it is not necessary that the disease originate exclusively from or be unique to the particular trade or occupation in question. All ordinary diseases of life are not excluded from the statute\u2019s coverage. Only such ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed equally with workers in the particular trade or occupation are excluded. Thus, the first two elements are satisfied if, as a matter of fact, the employment exposed the worker to a greater risk of contracting the disease than the public generally. The greater risk in such cases provides the nexus between the disease and the employment which makes them an appropriate subject for workmen\u2019s compensation.\nId. at 93-94, 301 S.E.2d at 365 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\nHere, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:\n14. As the result of the situation at work and her relationship with Ms. Bosworth, plaintiff began to experience symptoms of depression in the spring of 1994. Plaintiff felt as though she was losing her mind and informed others, including management, that \u201cthis situation was killing her.\u201d Plaintiff felt demeaned, embarrassed, humiliated, worthless and believed that Ms. Bosworth was attempting to get rid of her. Prior to her assignment with Ms. Bosworth, plaintiff had not experienced these types of psychological symptoms.\n15. Additionally, as the result of the situation at work and her relationship with Ms. Bosworth, plaintiff began to experience adverse physical ailments in the spring of 1994. Plaintiff experienced chronic pain and fatigue, severe headaches, extreme joint and muscle pain, chemical allergies and problems with sleeping. Prior to her assignment with Ms. Bosworth, plaintiff had not experienced these types of adverse physical ailments.\n16. As the result of her physical problems, plaintiff sought treatment on 18 May 1994 from Dr. Wodecki, a specialist in internal medicine and rheumatology. Dr. Wodecki examined plaintiff and diagnosed her as having fibromyalgia.\n17. Following her initial examination by Dr. Wodecki, plaintiff continued working for defendant until 22 June 1994, when she was fired. On 24 June 1994, plaintiff returned to Dr. Wodecki who hospitalized plaintiff due to a severe flare-up of her fibromyalgia and severe depression. Dr. Wodecki also referred plaintiff to Dr. Patricia Hill, a psychiatrist.\n18. Dr. Wodecki opined that depression can cause or significantly aggravate fibromyalgia. As for plaintiffs condition, Dr. Wodecki opined that her depression was caused by her employment related stress and that her fibromyalgia was significantly aggravated by her depression.\n19. Dr. Patricia Hill first examined plaintiff on 30 June 1994. Following her examination of plaintiff, Dr. Hill found that plaintiff was grossly impaired by major depression. Dr. Hill opined that plaintiffs depression was related to severe workplace stress associated with her relationship with Ms. Bosworth and to her termination by defendant. Dr. Hill further opined that plaintiff\u2019s employment with defendant exposed her to an increased risk of developing major depression as compared to members of the general public not so employed. . . .\n20. The employment related stress experienced by plaintiff as Ms. Bosworth\u2019s assistant was not the normal type of stress that an employee would experience in a position with defendant or any other employer. Plaintiffs employment with defendant caused the development of her depression and exposed her to an increased risk of developing severe depression as compared to the general public not so employed.\nThe Full Commission also entered the following Conclusion of Law:\n2. Plaintiffs employment with defendant caused her depression and exposed her to an increased risk of developing this condition as compared to members of the general public not so employed. . . . Because plaintiffs fibromyalgia was caused or significantly aggravated by her depression, it was also caused by her employment with defendant.\nOn appeal from an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission, findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by any competent evidence in the record, even if there is evidence that would support findings to the contrary. See Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998), reh\u2019g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999). \u201cThe evidence tending to support plaintiffs claim is to be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.\u201d Id. Having carefully reviewed the evidence in the record, we hold that there is competent evidence to support the Full Commission\u2019s findings of fact.\nSpecifically, the testimony of Dr. Wodecki (plaintiffs treating physician) and the testimony of Dr. Hill (a psychiatrist who treated plaintiff) supports finding of fact number 20 that \u201cPlaintiffs employment with defendant caused the development of her depression and exposed her to an increased risk of developing severe depression as compared to the general public not so employed.\u201d During his deposition, Dr. Wodecki responded in the affirmative to a lengthy hypothetical question posed by plaintiffs counsel, indicating that the conditions of plaintiff\u2019s employment exposed her to a greater risk of developing depression and fibromyalgia than members of the public not exposed to such conditions. Similarly, Dr. Hill testified that plaintiff\u2019s employment exposed her to a greater risk of developing depression than the general public.\nHaving determined that the findings of fact are supported by the evidence, we turn to the Full Commission\u2019s conclusions of law, which we review de novo. See Snead v. Carolina Pre-Cast Concrete, Inc., 129 N.C. App. 331, 335, 499 S.E.2d 470, 472, cert. denied, 348 N.C. 501, 510 S.E.2d 656 (1998). As to the first two elements required for an occupational disease, we hold that the findings support the conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s employment exposed her to a greater risk of contracting depression and, as a result, fibromyalgia than the public generally. Moreover, we disagree with defendant that plaintiffs \u201cemployment\u201d may accurately be characterized as simply \u201cworking as a marketing manager in the furniture industry.\u201d Plaintiffs employment, as an assistant to the general manager of marketing and design for a furniture upholstery company, involved: (1) an extremely stressful and verbally abusive relationship with her emotionally unstable supervisor, which caused plaintiff to feel demeaned, embarrassed, humiliated, and worthless; and (2) a workplace environment in which plaintiff justifiably felt powerless over the situation and betrayed by her employer because her employer appeared to care more about the supervisor\u2019s financial value to the company than her abusive treatment of employees. In drawing this conclusion, we are mindful that the Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is to be construed liberally in favor of awarding benefits. See Harrell v. Harriet & Henderson Yarns, 314 N.C. 566, 336 S.E.2d 47 (1985); Barnhardt v. Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966). Based upon this fundamental principle, we conclude that the term \u201cemployment\u201d in Booker, Hansel, and Rutledge must be interpreted as referring to a plaintiff\u2019s particular job, rather than to the type of job.\nWe further hold that the findings support the conclusion that there was a causal connection between plaintiff\u2019s depression (and the resulting fibromyalgia) and her employment, the third element required for an occupational disease. Therefore, we affirm the opinion and award of the Full Commission, concluding that plaintiff\u2019s depression and fibromyalgia are compensable occupational diseases.\nAffirmed.\nJudge HUNTER concurs.\nJudge MARTIN concurs in part and dissents in part.\n. We note that defendant\u2019s letter purports to appeal the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s order pursuant to Rule 701(1). However, Rule 701(1) addresses appeals taken pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-85 (1999), which section contemplates only reviews of awards, and not reviews of orders. Thus, defendant\u2019s purported appeal should have been made pursuant to Rule 703, and not Rule 701.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HUDSON, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, Judge,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the evidence and the Commission\u2019s findings support its conclusions that plaintiff\u2019s employment exposed her to a greater risk of contracting depression and fibromyalgia than the public generally and that her depression and fibromyalgia are compensable occupational diseases.\nAlthough the majority correctly cites the definition of an occupational disease, as contained in G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13), and our Supreme Court\u2019s interpretation of the statute, as contained in Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979) and further explained in Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983), I do not believe the majority or the Commission has correctly applied the law to the facts as found by the Commission. Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff\u2019s job-related stress caused her depression and aggravated her fibromyalgia, such facts cannot support the conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s mental and physical conditions were occupational diseases as defined by the statute. The findings indicate merely that plaintiff suffered from depression and fibromyal-gia after being placed in the unfortunate position of working for an abusive supervisor, which can occur with any employee in any industry or profession, or indeed, in similar abusive relationships outside the workplace. Therefore, I do not believe plaintiff\u2019s conditions can be construed as \u201ccharacteristic of and peculiar to\u201d her particular employment; they are ordinary diseases, to which the general public is equally exposed outside the workplace in everyday life. See Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 93, 301 S.E.2d at 365 (\u201cOnly such ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed equally with workers in the particular trade or occupation are excluded.\u201d) In my view, to hold these conditions to be occupational diseases compensable under G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13), under the facts of this case, stretches beyond the intent of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Thus, I would reverse the award of compensation.\nI concur with the majority with respect to the results reached as to defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error.",
        "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part",
        "author": "MARTIN, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mary F. Pyron, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Morris, York, Williams, Surles & Barringer, L.L.P., by Thomas E. Williams and Stephen Kushner, and Orbock, Bowden, Ruark & Dillard, by Maureen T. Orbock, for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BEATRICE WOODY, Plaintiff v. THOMASVILLE UPHOLSTERY INCORPORATED, Employer, SELF-INSURED (Helsman-Management Services, Inc., Servicing Agent), Defendant\nNo. COA00-830\n(Filed 18 September 2001)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 discovery order \u2014 documents provided \u2014 mootness\nAn appeal from a discovery order in a workers\u2019 compensation action was moot where defendant had produced the documents in question.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 discovery order \u2014 no sanctions at that time\nAn appeal from a discovery order by a deputy commissioner in a workers\u2019 compensation case was interlocutory and not immediately appealable because defendant had not been held in contempt and sanctioned at that time.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 violation of discovery order\u2014 appeal to Full Commission \u2014 no automatic stay\nDiscovery sanctions in a workers\u2019 compensation action were not improperly calculated where defendant contended that noncompliance did not begin until its appeal to the full Commission was denied as interlocutory. Rule 703 provides only that a stay may be entered, not that the effect of a challenged order is automatically stayed by appeal from that order.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 discovery violations \u2014 sanctions \u2014 notice and opportunity to be heard\nThere was no violation of defendant\u2019s due process rights in a workers\u2019 compensation hearing where defendant received sufficient notice of the possibility of the imposition of sanctions for violating a discovery order and sufficient opportunity to be heard. Moreover, the sanctions imposed at this hearing did not constitute a deprivation of property.\n5. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 motion to recuse \u2014 denied\nA deputy commissioner did not abuse his discretion by denying defendant\u2019s motion to recuse in a workers\u2019 compensation action, and the Full Commission did not err by affirming the deputy commissioner.\n6. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 depression and fibromyalgia\u2014 job related stress \u2014 greater risk than general public\nThe Industrial Commission in a workers\u2019 compensation case properly found that plaintiff experienced abnormal job stress and properly concluded that plaintiffs depression and fibromyalgia were compensable occupational diseases where the Commission\u2019s findings were supported by the medical testimony that the conditions of plaintiff\u2019s employment exposed her to a greater risk than the public and the findings support the conclusion that there was a causal connection between plaintiff\u2019s depression and fibromyalgia and her employment. The term \u201cemployment\u201d must be interpreted as referring to a particular job rather than to the type of job. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13).\nJudge Martin concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by defendant from Opinion and Award entered 13 January 2000 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 May 2001.\nMary F. Pyron, for plaintiff-appellee.\nMorris, York, Williams, Surles & Barringer, L.L.P., by Thomas E. Williams and Stephen Kushner, and Orbock, Bowden, Ruark & Dillard, by Maureen T. Orbock, for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0187-01",
  "first_page_order": 219,
  "last_page_order": 234
}
