{ "id": 11354849, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAECHEL SHAWN PATTERSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Patterson", "decision_date": "2001-09-18", "docket_number": "No. COA00-484", "first_page": "113", "last_page": "137", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 N.C. App. 113" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "526 U.S. 1075", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11166176, 11165953, 11166082, 11165698, 11166242, 11165829, 11166406, 11165764, 11166472, 11166118, 11166028, 11165904, 11166549, 11166367 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/1075-09", "/us/526/1075-05", "/us/526/1075-07", "/us/526/1075-01", "/us/526/1075-10", "/us/526/1075-03", "/us/526/1075-12", "/us/526/1075-02", "/us/526/1075-13", "/us/526/1075-08", "/us/526/1075-06", "/us/526/1075-04", "/us/526/1075-14", "/us/526/1075-11" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 867", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9538048, 9537729, 9538435, 9537923, 9538117, 9537989, 9537638, 9537860, 9538377, 9537799, 9538319, 9538197, 9537686, 9538264 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. 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Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 528, 419 S.E.2d 545, 552 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/1024-12", "/us/529/1024-08", "/us/529/1024-03", "/us/529/1024-10", "/us/529/1024-09", "/us/529/1024-04", "/us/529/1024-02", "/us/529/1024-05", "/us/529/1024-01", "/us/529/1024-06", "/us/529/1024-14", "/us/529/1024-11", "/us/529/1024-07", "/us/529/1024-13" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684944, 685053, 685084, 685045 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0153-04", "/nc/352/0153-01", "/nc/352/0153-03", "/nc/352/0153-02" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 1108", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11754464, 11753604, 11754374, 11754151, 11754759, 11753676, 11754000, 11754610, 11754294, 11753910, 11754679, 11754074, 11753719, 11754207 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/1108-11", "/us/517/1108-01", "/us/517/1108-10", "/us/517/1108-07", "/us/517/1108-14", "/us/517/1108-02", "/us/517/1108-05", "/us/517/1108-12", "/us/517/1108-09", "/us/517/1108-04", "/us/517/1108-13", "/us/517/1108-06", "/us/517/1108-03", "/us/517/1108-08" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11525121, 11525092, 11524582, 11524807, 11524710, 11525031, 11524847, 11524689, 11524884, 11524761, 11524635, 11524924, 11524734, 11524959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0900-14", "/us/522/0900-13", "/us/522/0900-01", "/us/522/0900-07", "/us/522/0900-04", "/us/522/0900-12", "/us/522/0900-08", "/us/522/0900-03", "/us/522/0900-09", "/us/522/0900-06", "/us/522/0900-02", "/us/522/0900-10", "/us/522/0900-05", "/us/522/0900-11" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139608 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 L. 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Ed. 2d 110", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "419 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500856 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" }, { "page": "693-94" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707105 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573188 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4759556 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535876 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" }, { "page": "215" }, { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 751, 291 S.E.2d 622, 625-26 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778861 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" }, { "page": "312" }, { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 751, 291 S.E.2d 622, 625-26 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" }, { "page": "926" }, { "page": "926" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867565 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73-74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "\"It is well established in North Carolina that a murder victim's statements falling within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule are highly relevant to show the status of the victim's relationship to the defendant.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798758 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "\"It is well established in North Carolina that a murder victim's statements falling within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule are highly relevant to show the status of the victim's relationship to the defendant.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103", "parenthetical": "noting with approval that fact-laden statements are usually purposeful and deliberate expressions of some state of mind" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656401 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "noting with approval that fact-laden statements are usually purposeful and deliberate expressions of some state of mind" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132086 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092797 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560474 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 347, 180 S.E.2d 745, 753 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2397685 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 347, 180 S.E.2d 745, 753 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" }, { "page": "526" }, { "page": "526-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 478", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53878 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" }, { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" }, { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "quoting Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973) (citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "quoting Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973) (citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092188 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685022 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001) (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001) (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155594 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558765 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542427 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 554", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517028 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685095, 684969, 685009, 684917, 685082 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0152-05", "/nc/352/0152-04", "/nc/352/0152-03", "/nc/352/0152-02", "/nc/352/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092887 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 L. Ed. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 528, 419 S.E.2d 545, 552 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131990 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 998", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6482113, 6482391, 6482780, 6483081, 6482542, 6482224, 6482481, 6482321, 6482871, 6482967, 6482681, 6483196, 6482589 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0998-01", "/us/434/0998-04", "/us/434/0998-09", "/us/434/0998-12", "/us/434/0998-06", "/us/434/0998-02", "/us/434/0998-05", "/us/434/0998-03", "/us/434/0998-10", "/us/434/0998-11", "/us/434/0998-08", "/us/434/0998-13", "/us/434/0998-07" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231", "parenthetical": "the State is not required to establish motive to prove guilt of first-degree murder" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572962 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "the State is not required to establish motive to prove guilt of first-degree murder" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1494036 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567442 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 723", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685067, 684993, 685011, 685108 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0680-04", "/nc/352/0680-03", "/nc/352/0680-01", "/nc/352/0680-02" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11079267 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 L. Ed. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 919", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333, 12198, 11591, 11947, 12143, 11920, 12019, 11860, 11540, 11863, 11865, 11387, 11837, 12062 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0919-14", "/us/508/0919-12", "/us/508/0919-13", "/us/508/0919-02", "/us/508/0919-09", "/us/508/0919-11", "/us/508/0919-08", "/us/508/0919-06", "/us/508/0919-04", "/us/508/0919-05", "/us/508/0919-03", "/us/508/0919-01", "/us/508/0919-10", "/us/508/0919-07" ] }, { "cite": "422 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507655 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "897" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554614 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "taking of property was an \"afterthought\" and did not constitute a \"continuous chain of events\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "taking of property was an \"afterthought\" and did not constitute a \"continuous chain of events\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867648 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "\"to deter . . . killings from occurring during the commission of ... a dangerous felony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793180 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "\"to deter . . . killings from occurring during the commission of ... a dangerous felony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "234 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571236 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500856 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1768, "char_count": 59484, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.906345654086237e-07, "percentile": 0.9019556738636113 }, "sha256": "582c2e4146637ec77cb2ae7ba0420840b8ee3e4b3b4a202c8a2a1b7e66b873e7", "simhash": "1:636a61227649df33", "word_count": 9894 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:58.205856+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McGEE concurs.", "Judge GREENE concurs in the result with a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAECHEL SHAWN PATTERSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nDefendant, Maechel Shawn Patterson, was indicted for first degree murder on 7 December 1998 in the death of Bobby Wayne Andrews, Jr. (\u201cthe victim\u201d). Defendant was tried non-capitally and found guilty of first degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. On 28 October 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison.\nThe State introduced into evidence defendant\u2019s confession, which tended to show that defendant and the victim had been involved in a homosexual relationship for several years prior to the victim\u2019s death. On the afternoon of 30 September 1998, defendant visited the victim\u2019s residence on the corner of Wharton Street, in Washington, North Carolina. The victim had told defendant he was welcome to stop by at anytime. When defendant arrived at the victim\u2019s residence, the victim was eating a sandwich. Defendant did not join him, because defendant had been using crack cocaine that day and was not hungry. Defendant left the victim\u2019s house between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. with plants that the victim had given him.\nAfter leaving the victim\u2019s house, defendant drove by the home of Chris Elks (\u201cElks\u201d). Elks was not home, so defendant went to visit John and Denise Tufte (\u201cthe Tuftes\u201d), to whom defendant was trying to sell an insurance policy. Defendant ate supper with the Tuftes, the Tuftes purchased and signed for an insurance policy from defendant, and defendant left around 10:30 p.m. Defendant then went back to Elks\u2019 house, where defendant claims the two of them shared one-sixteenth of an ounce of crack cocaine: Elks denied sharing crack cocaine with defendant on 30 September 1998, but corroborated that defendant had visited him on that night.\nDefendant left Elks\u2019 house and returned home between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Defendant lay down for an hour-and-a-half, but was unable to sleep. Defendant left his house and returned to the victim\u2019s house between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. Defendant knocked on the front door, the victim let him in, and the two of them went back to the victim\u2019s bedroom. The victim got back into bed, while defendant sat on the floor and smoked some marijuana that belonged to the victim.\nAround 5:00 a.m., the victim\u2019s alarm went off and both men reached up to cut it off. The victim then lay back down. Defendant, knowing the victim had to be at work at Lowe\u2019s at around 6:00 a.m., grabbed a cane from the corner of the bedroom and began poking the victim in the back and telling him to wake up. Defendant was aware that the cane he had grabbed contained a sword on the inside. As defendant poked the victim, the cover came off the end of the cane and defendant stuck the sword into the victim\u2019s back. Realizing he had stuck the sword through the victim\u2019s body, defendant immediately pulled it out. The victim sat up, faced defendant, and asked, \u201cWhat the f \u2014 k are you doing?\u201d Defendant, realizing the victim was going to die, stabbed him again, this time in the chest. The victim fell back onto the bed, making noises but unable to speak.\nDefendant then picked up a towel and wiped down the cane and the sword to remove his fingerprints. Defendant also wiped down the front doorknob and anything else he thought he had touched while in the house. He then laid the sword and the cane on the floor at the foot of the bed. After removing his fingerprints from everything he had touched, defendant took the the box of marijuana and smoking pipe he had been using, both of which belonged to the victim, and returned to his own home around 5:30 a.m. Defendant did not call EMS or try to help the victim in any way prior to leaving the victim\u2019s house.\nThe State also introduced the following evidence which tended to corroborate defendant\u2019s confession: Evelyn Respess (\u201cRespess\u201d), who had known the victim for ten years and was being paid to clean his house once each month, called the victim\u2019s house several times on the evening of 30 September 1998 and the morning of 1 October 1998. The victim\u2019s phone line was continuously busy, which worried Respess, because she knew the victim had telephone call-waiting. Respess drove to the victim\u2019s house on the morning of 1 October 1998, knocked on the door and rang the doorbell, but received no answer. Respess then let herself in, walked back to the victim\u2019s bedroom, and discovered the victim\u2019s dead body. The telephone was off the hook and a sharp object lay at the foot of the bed. Respess called 911 from her car phone and the police responded. Respess further testified that she knew defendant and that she also knew that the victim was a homosexual.\nJ.T. Sheppard (\u201cSheppard\u201d) testified that while visiting Ronald Dando, who lived next door to the victim, on 30 September 1998 between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., he observed defendant carrying plants from the victim\u2019s house and placing them in his white pickup truck, which Sheppard had seen parked at the victim\u2019s house on several occasions. Sheppard also saw defendant\u2019s truck at the victim\u2019s house late that evening, but testified that it was not there at 7:00 a.m. on the morning of 1 October 1998.\nRonald Dando (\u201cDando\u201d) testified that he saw defendant\u2019s truck parked at the victim\u2019s house when he returned home late on 30 September 1998. Dando also testified that he observed the headlights of a vehicle backing out of the victim\u2019s driveway between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. on 1 October 1998. A vehicle returned a short time later, but did not stay very long.\nDenise Tufte testified that defendant came to her house around 9:15 p.m. on 30 September 1998, stayed for dinner, and sold the Tuftes an insurance policy. Defendant did not appear unusual or act like he was under the influence of anything that evening. Before leaving around 10:15 p.m., defendant told the Tuftes that he was not selling much insurance and the lack of income was causing stress in his marriage. According to Mr. Tufte, defendant returned a week or two later trying to sell some coins and mentioned that he was the suspect in a murder case. Defendant also told the Tuftes that he had a cocaine problem and that he needed treatment.\nChris Elks testified that defendant was at his house until 11:30 or 12:00 on the night of 30 September 1998, but that the two of them did not use cocaine. Elks also testified that defendant was at his house on 2 October 1998 when a news report about the victim\u2019s death was shown on the television. Defendant stated, \u201cI was just at the guy\u2019s [victim\u2019s] house.\u201d Defendant also told Elks that the victim had given him some plants and had promised to give him an entertainment center.\nDr. Thomas Clark, III, associate chief medical examiner for the State of North Carolina and a forensic pathologist, performed the autopsy on the victim, which revealed a shallow stab wound to the left side of the victim\u2019s chest and a deeper stab wound to the left side of the victim\u2019s back. This wound to the back, which Dr. Clark determined to be the cause of death, ran through the victim\u2019s left lung and aorta, under his right lung, and into his liver. Dr. Clark testified that the sword found in the victim\u2019s bedroom could have caused the victim\u2019s wounds, and that the wounds could have been inflicted by someone seated on the floor. Dr. Clark\u2019s autopsy also revealed a hairline fracture of the seventh rib, which Dr. Clark believed could have occurred near the time of death. In Dr. Clark\u2019s opinion, the victim\u2019s wounds were intentionally inflicted. Additional evidence will be set forth hereinafter where pertinent.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the first degree murder charge. This motion was denied. Defendant chose not to introduce any evidence, and renewed his motion to dismiss, which was again denied.\nOn appeal to this Court, defendant makes several arguments. After reviewing the record, transcript, briefs, and oral arguments of counsel, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nI.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to State Bureau of Investigation (\u201cSBI\u201d) Special Agents Kelly Moser (\u201cMoser\u201d) and Phil Brinkley (\u201cBrinkley\u201d) (collectively, \u201cthe agents\u201d) at the Pitt County Mental Health Center on 9 October 1998. Defendant also assigns error to the admission of a drawing he made in connection with his statements to the agents. An evidentiary hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was held during a recess in jury selection on 25 October 1999. The next day, in open court, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. On appeal, defendant argues that his statements should have been excluded from evidence because they were made while defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation and had not been advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant also contends the statements were not voluntary.\nFollowing the evidentiary hearing, the trial court made detailed findings of fact with regard to defendant\u2019s interview with Agents Moser and Brinkley, which we summarize: At approximately 7:00 p.m. on 9 October 1998, Agents Moser and Brinkley went to the Pitt County Mental Health Detox Facility looking for defendant. Upon arrival, the agents saw defendant sitting outside, smoking and talking with other patients. The agents went inside the facility, identified themselves, and learned from the supervisor on duty that defendant was there by voluntary commitment. The supervisor advised defendant that the agents were there to talk with him, and defendant agreed to speak with the agents. The agents and defendant entered a small conference room, where defendant was told he could stop the agents\u2019 questioning and leave the room at anytime. Defendant was advised that the agents were not there to arrest him, and defendant was not restrained in any way. The agents advised defendant that they were there to get any information he may have about the death of the victim, Bobby Wayne Andrews, Jr., so that they could relay defendant\u2019s side of the story to the district attorney so the district attorney could decide how to handle the case. The agents advised defendant that they could make no promises to him related to the handling of the case. The agents did not advise defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant told the agents he had voluntarily committed himself earlier that day and that he had not taken any drugs in the last twenty-four hours. Defendant made statements about not wanting to go to jail, not having any intent, and wanting treatment for his drug problem.\nDuring the interview, defendant\u2019s sisters came into the room and told defendant he should not be talking with the agents. Defendant left the interview room with his sisters, but told the agents that he wanted them to wait for him in the parking lot. Defendant talked to his sisters in his private room at the facility, then went out to the parking lot, where he made his statements to the agents and drew a diagram and wrote a note describing his involvement in the victim\u2019s death. His sisters were present in the parking lot when defendant made his statements. According to the agents, defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any drug or narcotics. Defendant was not arrested after giving his statement. There were no threats, promises, or coercion on the part of Agents Moser and Brinkley. The agents did not inquire of any staff person at the Detox Center as to defendant\u2019s physical or mental condition, proceeding only on their personal observations of defendant. Based on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that defendant\u2019s statements were given in a non-custodial interview.\nThe trial court also made findings of fact concerning whether defendant\u2019s statements were voluntary. Specifically, the trial court found that the agents did not promise, threaten, or coerce defendant into making his statements; defendant appeared coherent in his responses to the agents\u2019 questions; defendant had an opportunity to confer privately with his sisters prior to making his statements; defendant told the agents he had not taken any drugs in the last twenty-four hours; defendant was in voluntary commitment at the Detox Center and could leave if he so desired; and the agents were granted permission by the supervisor at the Detox Center to speak to defendant prior to questioning him. Based on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that defendant\u2019s statements were voluntary. The trial court therefore denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\n\u201cIt is well established that the standard of review in evaluating a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u201c \u2018are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u2019 \u201d \u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001) (citations omitted)). However, the determination of whether a defendant was in custody, based on those findings of fact, is a question of law that is fully reviewable by this Court. State v. Briggs, 137 N.C. App. 125, 128, 526 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2000). Likewise, a trial court\u2019s conclusion that a defendant\u2019s statements were voluntary is a conclusion of law that is fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994).\nIt is well established that Miranda warnings are required only when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation. State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 661, 483 S.E.2d 396, 404, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court defined \u201ccustodial interrogation\u201d as \u201cquestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.\u201d Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966). \u201c[T]he appropriate inquiry in determining whether a defendant is \u2018in custody\u2019 for purposes of Miranda is, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether there was a \u2018formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u2019 \u201d Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828 (quoting State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997).\nOur review of the record, in its entirety, reflects that defendant had voluntarily committed himself to the Pitt County Mental Health Center, and voluntarily agreed to speak with SBI Agents Moser and Brinkley about the death of Bobby Wayne Andrews, Jr. Defendant was told that the agents had no intention of arresting him, and that they were only there to get his side of the story concerning what happened to the victim so that it could be relayed to the district attorney for a decision on how to handle the case. Defendant was not restrained in any way, and was told that he could end the interview at anytime by telling the agents he wished to stop and simply walking out of the examination room. Defendant informed the agents that he had voluntarily committed himself earlier that day, and that he had not used drugs in the last twenty-four hours. Defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs at that time.\nAfter being asked by the agents to give his side of the story, defendant responded, \u201cIt didn\u2019t matter how you looked at it, either way, it was still murder.\u201d The agents reiterated to defendant that they would not know what the charges would be until his side of the story was relayed to the district attorney, so a decision could be made on what, if any, charges there would be. During the questioning, defendant asked the agents several times whether it would be possible for him to serve any jail time he received in a treatment facility. The agents told defendant those decisions were up to the district attorney and that they could not give defendant any promises regarding where any jail time would be spent.\nDefendant\u2019s questioning was interrupted when defendant left the interview room and went to his private room to talk with his sisters. Defendant told the agents as he exited the interview room that he would be back shortly to continue talking with them. When defendant returned to the interview room, he asked the agents if they could come back the following morning. The agents told defendant they could not come back and that they wished he would tell them the truth so that it could be relayed to the district attorney as soon as possible. The agents once again explained to defendant that he did not have to make any statement, and that they just wanted his side of the story so that it could be relayed to the district attorney for a decision on what, if any, charges were to be filed.\nAfter five or ten minutes, defendant\u2019s sisters again entered the interview room, and defendant again left with them. Defendant told the agents to wait for him in the parking lot of the facility, and that his sisters would be gone soon. The agents went outside and waited on defendant approximately fifty yards from the front door of the facility. After about twenty minutes, defendant came out to the parking lot, and again asked about the possibility of serving time in a treatment facility. The agents again stated they could make no promises regarding charges and sentencing. After a few minutes passed, defendant told the agents he would tell them the truth. At that time, one of defendant\u2019s sisters asked if he should contact a lawyer first. Agent Moser explained that defendant would have to make that decision himself. Defendant was asked if he wanted his sisters present while he explained what happened, and defendant said that was fine. Defendant then told the agents it was an accident and began explaining how he had stabbed the victim. At this time, defendant indicated he wanted a soft drink, so Agent Brinkley went to the store to buy defendant a drink. While Agent Brinkley was gone, defendant explained to Agent Moser in detail what had happened on the night of the victim\u2019s death. During the questioning, defendant never requested a lawyer.\nBased on the foregoing, we conclude that the record contains ample competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact. We also conclude that the evidence does not indicate that defendant\u2019s freedom of movement was restrained in any way to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Defendant had voluntarily committed himself to the Detox Center, was told by the agents that he was free to leave at anytime, and volunteered to meet the agents in the parking lot of the facility, where his statements were given. Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant was not in custody when he made his statements to Agent Moser, and Miranda warnings were not required. We now consider whether defendant\u2019s statements were voluntary.\nIn determining whether a defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary and \u201c \u2018the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,\u2019 \u201d we also examine \u201cthe totality of the circumstances.\u201d State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994) (quoting Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973) (citation omitted). Factors to be considered in this inquiry include:\nwhether defendant was in custody, whether he was deceived, whether his Miranda rights were honored, whether he was held incommunicado, the length of the interrogation, whether there were physical threats or shows of violence, whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the familiarity of the declar-ant with the criminal justice system, and the mental condition of the declarant.\nId. Defendant\u2019s age and the deprivation of food or sleep may also be considered. See Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 862.\nApplying these principles to the case at hand, we conclude that the trial court correctly concluded that defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary. The trial court found as fact that defendant had voluntarily committed himself to the Detox Center. Defendant was not placed in custody prior to, during, or after the interview. Defendant was told he was free to leave at anytime and defendant was not restrained in any way. Defendant appeared coherent in his responses to the agents\u2019 questions, and defendant specifically told the agents he had not used drugs in the last twenty-four hours. The agents wore civilian clothes and displayed no weapons. Defendant had an opportunity to confer privately with his sisters prior to making his statements to the agents. The agents did not promise, threaten, or coerce defendant in any way. These findings are supported by competent evidence in the record.\nDefendant argues that during the course of questioning Agent Moser made statements that contained implicit promises of leniency or escape from prosecution which gave defendant hope of a lighter punishment if defendant confessed. The record reflects that Agent Moser stated the following during his conversation with defendant:\nI explained to him [the defendant] that we would not know exactly what any charges would be until he explained his side of the story so that that could be relayed to the D.A.\u2019s office, to the district attorney, so that a good decision could be made on what if any charges there would be in the case.\nDefendant contends that State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975), is controlling in light of this comment and compels the conclusion that defendant\u2019s confession was the product of a hope of benefit from confessing and, therefore, not freely and voluntarily given. We disagree.\nIn Pruitt, the investigating officers \u201crepeatedly told defendant that they knew that he had committed the crime and that his story had too many holes in it; that he was \u2018lying\u2019 and that they did not want to \u2018fool around.\u2019 \u201d Pruitt, 286 N.C. at 458, 212 S.E.2d at 102. They also told him that they \u201cconsidered [him] the type of person \u2018that such a thing would prey heavily upon\u2019 and that he would be \u2018relieved to get it off his chest.\u2019 \u201d Id. The Court found that under these circumstances the defendant\u2019s confessions \u201cwere made under the influence of fear or hope, or both, growing out of the language and acts of those who held him in custody.\u201d Id. at 458, 212 S.E.2d at 102-03. We find the facts in Pruitt distinguishable from those in the instant case, and, therefore, we do not consider Pruitt controlling.\nWe agree with defendant that Agent Moser\u2019s statement \u201cwhat if any charges there would be in the case\u201d taken in isolation could be interpreted to contain an implicit promise that defendant would be treated more favorably if he confessed to the murder. However, taken in context, it does not mandate a conclusion that defendant\u2019s statements were coerced. We note that defendant asked the agents on several occasions if he would be able to serve any jail time he received in a treatment facility. The agents repeatedly explained to defendant that they could not make any promises regarding charges or sentencing, and that all they could do was relay defendant\u2019s side of the story to the district attorney. We find that the agents\u2019 repeated assertions that they could make defendant no promises in regard to sentencing leads to the conclusion that defendant was not led to believe that the criminal justice system would treat him more favorably if he confessed to the murder.\nLooking to the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that defendant\u2019s statements were \u201cthe product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.\u201d Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 862. However, we deem it appropriate to reiterate Justice Mitchell\u2019s statement for our Supreme Court in State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 291 S.E.2d 653 (1982):\nWe caution the law enforcement officers of the State ... that they should always be circumspect in any comment they make to a defendant, particularly in connection with any confession the defendant is to give or has given. The better practice would be for law enforcement officers not to engage in speculation of any form with regard to what will happen if the defendant confesses.\nBranch, 306 N.C. at 110, 291 S.E.2d at 659-60.\nHaving concluded that the trial court was correct in its determination that defendant was not in custody when his statements were given, and that defendant\u2019s statements were voluntary, we overrule this assignment of error.\nII.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing Agent Moser to testify that defendant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs, narcotics, alcohol or any other controlled substance when defendant spoke to the agents at the Pitt County Detox Center. Specifically, defendant argues that this opinion testimony lacked a sufficient foundation and was not rationally based on the observations of the witness. We do not agree.\nOn voir dire, Agent Moser twice answered in the negative when asked whether during the interview defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs, narcotics, alcohol, or any other controlled substance. At trial, Agent Moser was again asked the question and again responded in the negative. Based on the following, we conclude the trial court properly admitted Agent Moser\u2019s opinion testimony.\nThe rule concerning admissibility of opinion testimony by lay witnesses provides:\nIf the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 (1999). Additionally, it is a well-settled rule that a lay person may give his opinion as to whether a person is under the influence of an intoxicating substance so long as that opinion is based on the witness\u2019 personal observation. State v. Lindley, 286 N.C. 255, 258, 210 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1974). Likewise, a police officer is allowed to give his opinion of the defendant\u2019s mental capacities at the time of a confession. State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 523, 467 S.E.2d 12 (1996).\nIn the instant case, Agent Moser not only observed defendant outside the Detox Center talking to other individuals, but also conducted a face-to-face interview with defendant both inside the interview room and outside in the parking lot of the facility. Agent Moser was able to describe defendant\u2019s actions and responses to questions over an extended period of time. Defendant explained to Agent Moser that he understood he did not have to speak with the agents if he so chose. Defendant also told the agents that he had not taken any drugs in the last twenty-four hours. These facts axe sufficient to support the conclusion that Agent Moser\u2019s opinion that defendant was not under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of his confession was rationally based on Agent Moser\u2019s perception of defendant at the time of the confession. \u201cFurthermore, it was necessary that he give his opinion as to defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of the confession to help determine a crucial fact in issue, that is, that defendant voluntarily gave the statement to police.\u201d Id. at 538, 467 S.E.2d at 21. Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nIII.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce into evidence photographs of the victim\u2019s body, in that they were repetitious, prejudicial, and inflammatory.\n\u201cWhether to admit photographic evidence requires the trial court to weigh the probative value of the photographs against the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant.\u201d State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 387, 459 S.E.2d 638, 650 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108, 134 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1996); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1999). \u201cThis determination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court\u2019s ruling should not be overturned on appeal unless the ruling was \u2018so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)).\n\u201c \u2018Photographs are usually competent to be used by a witness to explain or illustrate anything that it is competent for him to describe in words.\u2019 \u201d State v. Watson, 310 N.C. 384, 397, 312 S.E.2d 448, 457 (1984) (quoting State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 347, 180 S.E.2d 745, 753 (1971)). \u201cPhotographs of a homicide victim may be introduced even if they are gory, gruesome, horrible or revolting, so long as they are used for illustrative purposes and so long as their excessive or repetitious use is not aimed solely at arousing the passions of the jury.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 284, 372 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1988).\nOver defendant\u2019s objection, the State introduced eight photographs showing all or a portion of the victim\u2019s body and used these photographs to illustrate the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses. Having examined the photographs, we are of the opinion that none of them are particularly gruesome or inflammatory. Further, all of the photographs were relevant to illustrate the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses and were not excessive or repetitious. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s ruling was \u201cso arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Id. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 526-27. Consequently, this assignment of error is overruled.\nIV.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting highly prejudicial hearsay evidence tending to show defendant did not like the fact that the victim would not allow defendant to move in with him. We disagree.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s first witness, Evelyn Respess, was asked whether she had ever had a conversation with the victim about defendant wanting to move into the victim\u2019s residence with him. Defense counsel immediately objected on hearsay grounds, but the State countered by arguing that testimony of such a conversation was admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. The State further proffered that Respess\u2019 testimony would demonstrate defendant was upset and angry at the fact the victim would not let him move in. Defendant\u2019s objection was overruled, and Respess testified as follows:\nQ. What did Wayne [the victim] say to you in the course of this conversation?\nA. He said, \u201cShawn wants to move in here, and I\u2019ve told him, no, I don\u2019t want him to, and he don\u2019t like it.\u201d\nQ. That he, Shawn [defendant], didn\u2019t like it?\nA. (Witness nods affirmatively.)\nQ. Did he tell you he got angry and upset\u2014\nMr. Harrell: Objection. Leading.\nThe Court: Sustained.\nQ. Just that he didn\u2019t like it.\nA. He didn\u2019t like it.\nDefendant argues that the victim\u2019s statement to Evelyn Respess should not have been admitted because the statement is merely a recitation of remembered facts and does not demonstrate the victim-declarant\u2019s own state of mind at the time.\n\u201c \u2018Hearsay\u2019 is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 801(c) (1999). Under N.C. R. Evid. 802, hearsay is generally not admissible; however, numerous exceptions to this rule exist, including N.C. R. Evid. 803(3), which allows admission of \u201c[a] statement of the declarant\u2019s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition . . . but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. . . .\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 803(3) (1999). \u201cSuch a statement must also be relevant to a fact at issue in the case (Rule 402) and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact (Rule 403).\u201d State v. Jones, 137 N.C. App. 221, 227, 527 S.E.2d 700, 704, disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 153, 544 S.E.2d 235 (2000).\nIn this case, defendant argues that the victim\u2019s statements should not have been admitted because the statements were recitations of remembered facts and not statements about the victim\u2019s existing state of mind, emotions, sensation, or physical condition. However, \u201cour courts have repeatedly found admissible under Rule 803(3) a declarant\u2019s statements of fact that indicate her state of mind, even if they do not explicitly contain an accompanying statement of the declarant\u2019s state of mind.\u201d Id.\nIn State v. Brown, 350 N.C. 193, 513 S.E.2d 57 (1999), our Supreme Court held that a decedent\u2019s factual statements about the status of his marriage exposed how he felt about the marriage and were therefore state-of-mind statements, despite the fact that he did not explicitly state how he felt about the situation. The Court also held that the statements corroborated a possible motive for the defendant\u2019s act of murder. Moreover, the decedent\u2019s statements in Brown rebutted testimony by the defendant that her marriage to the victim was a happy marriage.\nIn the instant case, the victim\u2019s statement that defendant wanted to move in with him, that the victim had told defendant that he did not want defendant to move in, and that defendant did not like it, are arguably no more than recitations of fact. However, as in Brown, these facts tend to show the victim\u2019s state of mind as to his relationship with defendant and were therefore admissible under Rule 803(3). See State v. Exum, 128 N.C. App. 647, 655, 497 S.E.2d 98, 103 (1998) (noting with approval that fact-laden statements are usually purposeful and deliberate expressions of some state of mind). Specifically, these facts tend to show that the victim did not want defendant to move in with him, and that the victim was aware that defendant did not like that fact. Further, since the victim\u2019s statements shed light on his relationship with defendant, they were relevant under Rule 402. See State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313, 335, 471 S.E.2d 605, 618 (1996) (\u201cIt is well established in North Carolina that a murder victim\u2019s statements falling within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule are highly relevant to show the status of the victim\u2019s relationship to the defendant.\u201d). Finally, the statements rebutted defendant\u2019s claim in his confession that he and the victim were not having any type of disagreement or argument prior to the night of the victim\u2019s death. Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nV.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss made at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all the evidence. First, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support first degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation. Second, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of felony murder, in that (1) the only evidence of robbery, the underlying felony upon which the felony murder conviction was based, was defendant\u2019s extrajudicial confession, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to show that the victim\u2019s death and the taking of the victim\u2019s property were part of a continuous transaction. We disagree.\nIn ruling on a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996). \u201cSubstantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Id. \u201cIf there is substantial evidence-whether direct, circumstantial, or both-to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\u201d State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1988). \u201cIn ruling on a motion to dismiss, \u2018the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from that evidence.\u2019 \u201d Crawford, 344 N.C. at 73-74, 472 S.E.2d at 926 (quoting State v. Saunders, 317 N.C. 308, 312, 345 S.E.2d 212, 215 (1986)).\n\u201cFirst-degree murder is the unlawful killing \u2014 with malice, premeditation and deliberation \u2014 of another human being.\u201d State v. Arrington, 336 N.C. 592, 594, 444 S.E.2d 418, 419 (1994); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17 (1999). \u201cPremeditation means that defendant formed the specific intent to kill the victim for some length of time, however short, before the actual killing.\u201d Id. \u201cDeliberation means that defendant carried out the intent to kill in a cool state of blood, \u2018not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by lawful or just cause or legal provocation.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 170, 321 S.E.2d 837, 843 (1984)). \u201cOrdinarily, premeditation and deliberation must be proved by circumstantial evidence.\u201d State v. Saunders, 317 N.C. 308, 312, 345 S.E.2d 212, 215 (1986).\nIn determining whether a killing was done with premeditation and deliberation, the following circumstances are to be considered:\n\u201c \u2018(1) want of provocation on the part of the deceased, (2) conduct and statements of the defendant before and after the killing, (3) threats made against the victim by the defendant, (4) ill will or previous difficulty between the parties, and (5) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner.\u2019 \u201d\nCrawford, 344 N.C. at 74, 472 S.E.2d at 926 (quoting State v. Saunders, 317 N.C. 308, 313, 345 S.E.2d 212, 215 (1986) (quoting State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 751, 291 S.E.2d 622, 625-26 (1982))).\nTaken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence in the instant case tended to show the following: Defendant stabbed the victim in the back, and, upon realizing the victim would die, defendant stabbed the victim again, this time in the chest. Prior to leaving the victim\u2019s home, defendant removed his fingerprints from the sword and every other object he had touched while in the victim\u2019s home, and took some marijuana and a smoking pipe belonging to the victim. The victim suffered a shallow stab wound to the left side of the chest, as well as a stab wound to the left side of the back that caused significant damage to the victim\u2019s left lung and aorta, and also damaged the victim\u2019s diaphragm and liver. The victim also suffered a cut on his right thumb and a fractured rib. There was no evidence that the victim provoked the stabbing. Defendant and the victim had been involved in a homosexual relationship for several years, and the victim had recently rejected defendant\u2019s request to move in with the victim, angering and upsetting defendant.\nWe conclude that the circumstantial evidence in this case, taken as a whole, was sufficient to permit the jury reasonably to infer that defendant murdered the victim with premeditation and deliberation. The other elements of murder being clearly present, the judge did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of murder in the first degree based on malice, premeditation and deliberation.\nDefendant also argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction of felony murder because there is no evidence of robbery, the underlying felony upon which the felony murder conviction was based, apart from defendant\u2019s extrajudicial confession.\nIt is settled law in this State that a conviction cannot be sustained upon a naked, uncorroborated extrajudicial confession. State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 690, 304 S.E.2d 579, 584 (1983). There must be independent proof, either direct or circumstantial, of the corpus delicti of the crime in order for the conviction to be sustained. Id. However, in Franklin, the Supreme Court held \u201cthat independent proof of the underlying felony in a felony murder prosecution is not necessary where a confession, otherwise corroborated as to the murder, includes sufficient facts to support the existence of the felony.\u201d Id. at 693-94, 304 S.E.2d at 586.\nIn the instant case, defendant confessed to stabbing the victim in the back, and, after realizing the victim would die, stabbing him again in the chest. Defendant also confessed to taking the victim\u2019s marijuana and smoking pipe. Defendant\u2019s confession was corroborated by substantial independent evidence. The State presented evidence of defendant\u2019s presence at the victim\u2019s home on the morning of the vie-tim\u2019s death, which corroborated defendant\u2019s confession concerning his whereabouts during that same time period. The State also presented evidence of the number and location of the victim\u2019s stab wounds, the location of the towel, sword, and cover near the foot of the victim\u2019s bed, and the absence of defendant\u2019s fingerprints in the victim\u2019s house; all evidence which corroborated defendant\u2019s statement of the stabbing and his actions afterwards. Although there was no independent evidence of armed robbery, the State\u2019s evidence provided sufficient corroboration of the victim\u2019s murder to make defendant\u2019s entire confession trustworthy. Therefore, defendant\u2019s confession is sufficient evidence of felony murder if, as the State contends, the victim\u2019s death occurred during the perpetration of robbery.\n\u201cA murder . , . which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any . . . robbery . . . shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree . . . N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17 (1999). \u201cThe evidence is sufficient to support a charge of felony murder based on the underlying offense of armed robbery where the jury may reasonably infer that the killing and the taking of the victim\u2019s property were part of one continuous chain of events.\u201d State v. Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 529, 419 S.E.2d 545, 552 (1992).\n\u201cWhere there is a continuous transaction, the temporal order of the killing and the taking is immaterial. Provided that the theft and the killing are aspects of a single transaction, it is immaterial whether the intent to commit the theft was formed before or after the killing.\u201d\nState v. Morganherring, 350 N.C. 701, 734, 517 S.E.2d 622, 641 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1024, 146 L. Ed. 2d 322 (2000) (quoting State v. Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 528, 419 S.E.2d 545, 552 (1992)).\nHere, the evidence shows that upon stabbing the victim, defendant immediately grabbed a towel and began trying to remove his fingerprints from anything he had touched. Defendant then took the victim\u2019s marijuana and smoking pipe, which defendant had been using, and left the victim\u2019s house. There was no evidence that defendant left the victim\u2019s house after the stabbing and returned later to steal the victim\u2019s property. Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that defendant\u2019s murder and subsequent robbery of the victim were all part of one transaction. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence of armed robbery to support the felony murder charge in this case.\nVL\nIn the instant case, the trial court submitted the following possible verdicts: guilty of first degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation and deliberation; guilty of first degree murder under the felony murder rule; guilty of second degree murder; and not guilty. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation and deliberation, and under the felony murder rule. Defendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s failure to submit the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, arguing the evidence supported a finding that defendant did not act with malice.\n\u201cVoluntary manslaughter occurs \u2018when one kills intentionally but does so in the heat of passion suddenly aroused by adequate provocation or in the exercise of self-defense where excessive force is utilized or the defendant is the aggressor.\u2019 \u201d State v. Jarrett, 137 N.C. App. 256, 263, 527 S.E.2d 693, 698, disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 152, 544 S.E.2d 233 (2000) (citation omitted). However, \u201c[a]ny error in the trial court\u2019s failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter was rendered harmless by the jury\u2019s verdict finding that defendant had acted with malice, premeditation and deliberation.\u201d Id. \u201cThe finding of premeditation, deliberation and malice required for a first-degree murder conviction precludes the possibility of the same jury finding the defendant guilty of a lesser manslaughter charge.\u201d Id. (quoting State v. Exxum, 338 N.C. 297, 301, 449 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1994)). Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nVII.\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error in failing to intervene ex mero motu when the prosecutor argued to the jury that \u201cthe State of North Carolina is each and every one of you,\u201d in that this put the jurors in an adversarial role instead of an impartial one. We disagree.\nDuring his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:\nNow, one of the things that Judge Tilghman will tell you is that the burden of proof in this case is on the State, or on the people of North Carolina, really, if you will, because you must first I think ask yourself who is the State of North Carolina. Is it me? Am I the State? Jim Hunt, is he the State? Jim Martin before him? No. I submit to you that the State of North Carolina is each and every one of you and the rest of your friends and neighbors in this county and the other counties throughout this state. Maybe we ought to refer to the case as People versus Maechel Shawn Patterson.\nDefendant contends that this argument impermissibly placed the jury in an adversarial role against defendant.\nWe begin by noting that prosecutors are generally granted wide latitude in the scope of their argument, and the conduct of the arguments of counsel is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Small, 328 N.C. 175, 400 S.E.2d 413 (1991). \u201cIn order for defendant to be granted a new trial, the error must be sufficiently grave that it is prejudicial.\u201d Id. at 185, 400 S.E.2d at 418 (quoting State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 537, 231 S.E.2d 644, 651 (1977)). Further, the North Carolina Supreme Court has said that \u201c \u2018the impropriety of the argument must be gross indeed in order for this Court to hold that a trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero mo tu an argument which defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard it.\u2019 \u201d State v. Gell, 351 N.C. 192, 211, 524 S.E.2d 332, 345, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 867, 148 L. Ed. 2d 110 (2000) (quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979). Thus, \u201c[i]n order to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu, a \u2018defendant must show that the prosecutor\u2019s comments so infected the trial with unfairness that they rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 45, 506 S.E.2d 455, 467 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1161, 144 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1999)). Defendant has not done so in this case.\nDefendant argues that, by equating the members of the jury to the State of North Carolina, the prosecutor severely prejudiced defendant by aligning the jurors with the State and against defendant. However, the courts of this State have repeatedly stated that it is proper to urge the jury to act as the voice and conscience of the community. See State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 153, 505 S.E.2d 277, 297 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1075, 143 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1999); State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 396, 488 S.E.2d 769, 786 (1997). Therefore, defendant\u2019s final assignment of error is overruled.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudge McGEE concurs.\nJudge GREENE concurs in the result with a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." }, { "text": "GREENE, Judge,\nconcurring in the result.\nI believe (I) the killing and robbery of the victim did not form one continuous transaction, and it was therefore error to submit a felony murder instruction to the jury; (II) the testimony of Respess regarding the victim\u2019s statements to her was inadmissible hearsay; and (III) neither of these errors require a new trial. As I otherwise fully concur with the majority, I join the majority in affirming Defendant\u2019s conviction for first-degree murder.\nI\nOur statutes specifically provide that a murder \u201ccommitted in the perpetration . . . of. . . robbery . . . shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17 (1999). This is commonly known as the felony murder doctrine and traditionally required the homicide occur subsequent to or during the commission of the underlying felony. See 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide \u00a7 67 (1999) (death must \u201cbe caused by an act in [the] course of or in furtherance of the [underlying] felony\u201d); State v. Squire, 292 N.C. 494, 511, 234 S.E.2d 563, 573 (there must be no break in the chain of events leading from the initial felony to the act causing death), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 998, 54 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1977). Although the original rationale for the felony murder doctrine remains intact, State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 658, 666, 462 S.E.2d 492, 498 (1995) (\u201cto deter . . . killings from occurring during the commission of ... a dangerous felony\u201d), our courts have more recently held \u201cthe temporal order of the killing and the felony is immaterial\u201d and neither does it matter that the intent to commit the felony may have been formed after the killing, provided the killing and the commission of the felony constitute one continuous transaction, State v. Roseborough, 344 N.C. 121, 127, 472 S.E.2d 763, 767 (1996). The two events are not considered continuous if there is any \u201cbreak in the chain of events.\u201d State v. Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 529, 419 S.E.2d 545, 552 (1992).\nIn this case, the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, reveals defendant, some thirty minutes after he killed the victim and attempted to clean his fingerprints from the premises, picked up the box of marijuana and smoking pipe as he was leaving the house. There is no evidence defendant formed his intent to take the items before the murder. The intent was formed just as he was leaving the premises some thirty minutes after the killing and after defendant sought to remove his fingerprints from the premises and, thus, does not constitute a taking occurring as part of a single transaction beginning with the killing of the victim. See State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 102, 261 S.E.2d 114, 119 (1980) (taking of property was an \u201cafterthought\u201d and did not constitute a \u201ccontinuous chain of events\u201d). To hold otherwise in this case would be an abuse of the felony murder doctrine and this type of abuse, if sanctioned by the courts, could lead to its abrogation. See 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton\u2019s Criminal Law \u00a7 149, at 306 (15th ed. 1994) (felony murder doctrine eliminated in England and limited in some United States jurisdictions). The trial court thus erred in submitting a jury instruction on felony murder.\nII\n\u201cEvidence tending to show the victim\u2019s state of mind is admissible [as an exception to the hearsay rule] so long as the victim\u2019s state of mind is relevant to the case at hand.\u201d State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 314, 406 S.E.2d 876, 897 (1991). Evidence of the victim\u2019s state of mind includes evidence indicating \u201cthe victim\u2019s mental condition by showing the victim\u2019s fears, feelings, impressions or experiences.\u201d State v. Walker, 332 N.C. 520, 535, 422 S.E.2d 716, 725 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 919, 124 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1993). However, statements relating only factual events and \u201cmade in isolation, unaccompanied by a description of [the victim\u2019s] emotionfs],\u201d generally fall outside the scope of Rule 803(3). State v. Lathan, 138 N.C. App. 234, 240, 530 S.E.2d 615, 621, disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 680, 545 S.E.2d 723 (2000).\nIn this case, the testimony of Respess was unaccompanied by descriptions of the victim\u2019s emotions or mental state and instead reflected only defendant\u2019s mental state. Thus, it was error for the trial court to admit these statements into evidence.\nIII\nThe error in submitting the felony murder instruction does not require a new trial because I agree with the majority there was sufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s alternative determination defendant was guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation. See State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 606, 365 S.E.2d 587, 594, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 102 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1988).\nThe error in allowing Respess to offer her testimony about the comments of Andrews does not entitle defendant to a new trial as he was not prejudiced by their admission. Defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial because without the testimony of Respess there is no showing Defendant had a motive for the killing. The State, however, was not required to develop a motive as there was undisputed evidence defendant killed the victim. See State v. Heavener, 298 N.C. 541, 548, 259 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1979) (the State is not required to establish motive to prove guilt of first-degree murder).", "type": "concurrence", "author": "GREENE, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Francis W. Crawley, for the State.", "McCotter, McAfee & Ashton, PLLC, by Rudolph A. Ashton, III, and Kirby H. Smith, III, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAECHEL SHAWN PATTERSON\nNo. COA00-484\n(Filed 18 September 2001)\n1. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 motion to suppress \u2014 voluntariness\u2014custody\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements he made to State Bureau of Investigation Special Agents at the Pitt County Mental Health Center and a diagram defendant drew for the agents with a note describing his involvement in the victim\u2019s death, because: (1) the agents did not promise, threaten, or coerce defendant into making his statements; (2) defendant appeared coherent in his responses to the agents\u2019 questions; (3) defendant had an opportunity to confer privately with his sisters prior to making his statements; (3) defendant told the agents he had not taken any drugs in the last twenty-four hours; (4) defendant was in voluntary commitment at the Detox Center and could leave if he so desired; (5) the agents were granted permission by the supervisor at the Detox Center to speak to defendant prior to questioning him; (6) defendant had voluntarily agreed to speak to the agents about the victim\u2019s death; and (7) defendant was not in custody or restrained in any way and was told that he could end the interview at any time by telling the agents he wished to stop.\n2. Evidence\u2014 opinion testimony \u2014 confession\u2014not under influence of drugs, narcotics, or alcohol\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by allowing an S.B.I. agent to testify that defendant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs, narcotics, or alcohol or any other controlled substance when defendant spoke to agents at the Pitt County Detox Center about the victim\u2019s death, because: (1) a lay person may give his opinion as to whether a person is under the influence of an intoxicating substance so long as that opinion is based on the witness\u2019s personal observation; (2) a police officer is allowed to give his opinion of the defendant\u2019s mental capacities at the time of a confession; and (3) it was necessary for the agent in this case to give his opinion as to defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of the confession to help with the determination that defendant voluntarily gave the statement to police.\n3. Evidence\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 photographs of victim\u2019s body\nThe trial court\"did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder case by allowing the State to introduce into evidence eight photographs of the victim\u2019s body, because: (1) none of the photographs were particularly gruesome or inflammatory; and (2) all of the photographs were relevant to illustrate the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses and were not excessive or repetitious.\n4. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 state-of-mind exception \u2014 relevancy\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by admitting hearsay evidence of the victim\u2019s statements tending to show that defendant did not like the fact that the victim would not allow defendant to move in with him, because: (1) the evidence was admitted under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(3) to demonstrate the victim\u2019s state of mind as to his relationship with defendant; (2) the statements were relevant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 to shed light on the victim\u2019s relationship with defendant; and (3) the statements rebutted defendant\u2019s claim in his confession that he and the victim were not having any type of disagreement or argument prior to the night of the victim\u2019s death.\n5. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 premeditation and deliberation \u2014 malice\u2014sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder based on malice, premeditation, and deliberation because the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the State reveals that: (1) defendant stabbed the victim in the back with a sword and, upon realizing that the victim would die, stabbed the victim again; (2) prior to leaving the victim\u2019s home, defendant removed his fingerprints from the sword and every other object he had touched while in the victim\u2019s home, and took some marijuana and a smoking pipe belonging to the victim; (3) there was no evidence the victim provoked the stabbing; and (4) defendant and the victim had been involved in a homosexual relationship for several years and the victim had recently rejected defendant\u2019s request to move in with the victim, which angered and upset defendant.\n6. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 felony murder \u2014 robbery \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder based on felony murder with robbery serving as the underlying felony, because: (1) defendant\u2019s confessions that he stabbed the victim in the back and stabbed the victim again after realizing he would die, and that he took the victim\u2019s marijuana and smoking pipe, were corroborated by substantial independent evidence; and (2) a reasonable juror could infer that defendant\u2019s murder and subsequent robbery of the victim were all part of one transaction.\n7. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 failure to submit voluntary manslaughter\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by failing to submit the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, because the jury\u2019s finding of premeditation, deliberation, and malice required for a first-degree murder conviction precludes the possibility that the same jury would find defendant guilty of a lesser manslaughter charge.\n8. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 equating members of jury to the State of North Carolina\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a first-degree murder case by failing to intervene ex mero motu when the prosecutor during his closing argument equated members of the jury to the State of North Carolina, because it is proper to urge the jury to act as the voice and conscience of the community.\nJudge Greene concurring in the result.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment and commitment entered 28 October 1999 by Judge Carl L. Tilghman in Beaufort County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 April 2001.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Francis W. Crawley, for the State.\nMcCotter, McAfee & Ashton, PLLC, by Rudolph A. Ashton, III, and Kirby H. Smith, III, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0113-01", "first_page_order": 145, "last_page_order": 169 }