{ "id": 11357582, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY C. LAMBERT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Lambert", "decision_date": "2001-10-02", "docket_number": "No. COA00-1133", "first_page": "360", "last_page": "370", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 N.C. App. 360" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11469402 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564174 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562242, 8562311, 8562285, 8562200, 8562330 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0263-02", "/nc/287/0263-04", "/nc/287/0263-03", "/nc/287/0263-01", "/nc/287/0263-05" ] }, { "cite": "212 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8526482 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4679649, 4682146, 4682983, 4680616, 4682706 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0303-03", "/nc/311/0303-04", "/nc/311/0303-05", "/nc/311/0303-02", "/nc/311/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526055 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" }, { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527759 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645-46" }, { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" }, { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519454 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" }, { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "resentencing required when trial court imposed sixty months' supervised probation on a felon sentenced to intermediate punishment without finding that the extended period of probation was necessary" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155590, 1155784, 1155950, 1155612, 1155742 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "resentencing required when trial court imposed sixty months' supervised probation on a felon sentenced to intermediate punishment without finding that the extended period of probation was necessary" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0644-03", "/nc/351/0644-02", "/nc/351/0644-01", "/nc/351/0644-04", "/nc/351/0644-05" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238396 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "resentencing required when trial court imposed twelve months' supervised and forty-eight months' unsupervised probation for reckless driving without finding that the extended period of probation was necessary" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11220395 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "resentencing required when trial court imposed twelve months' supervised and forty-eight months' unsupervised probation for reckless driving without finding that the extended period of probation was necessary" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565300 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569335 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561402 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182780 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9136521 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" }, { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 349", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12124278 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11335632 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" }, { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 L. Ed. 2d 864", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 1267", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6364245 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/1267-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765333 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530763 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "140", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559792 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" }, { "page": "91" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0083-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 934, "char_count": 24315, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.14217536724074e-07, "percentile": 0.9111996490915107 }, "sha256": "4e694e16e32080014ace101a2e7499bdc1601af3cf6a768e285033f8658db75d", "simhash": "1:8f4bd346766a1dd0", "word_count": 3903 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:58.205856+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and BIGGS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY C. LAMBERT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nDefendant Anthony C. Lambert was indicted for obtaining property by false pretenses and the unauthorized practice of law on 2 December 1996. The pertinent facts are as follows: On 2 July 1996, Rosa Harvey visited defendant\u2019s home and spoke with defendant about a divorce action. During their conversation, defendant told Ms. Harvey that he was a licensed attorney and agreed to draft her divorce documents for a fee of fifty dollars. The next day, during a meeting with Ms. Harvey and her fianc\u00e9, defendant presented the documents to her. Defendant also promised to provide Ms. Harvey with other necessary documents, but failed to deliver the documents to her by the morning of her district court appearance. The district court refused to grant Ms. Harvey a divorce because of the insufficient and incorrect documents prepared by defendant. Following the divorce hearing, the district court judge advised Ms. Harvey to speak with a detective at the Elizabeth City Police Department concerning her dealings with defendant.\nAs a result of the information provided by Ms. Harvey, defendant was charged with one count of obtaining property by false pretenses and one count of the unauthorized practice of law. On 4 March 1998, a jury found defendant not guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses, but convicted him of the unauthorized practice of law. Defendant received a sentence of forty-five days in jail, suspended for thirty-six months, with regular and special terms of probation. Defendant appealed.\nOn appeal, defendant contended that, because the jury acquitted him of obtaining property by false pretenses, he could not be guilty of the unauthorized practice of law. Defendant also argued that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence to support his conviction for the unauthorized practice of law, resulting in denial of his motion to dismiss. Defendant further assigned error to the jury instruction on the unauthorized practice of law and two special conditions of his probation: (1) the condition that defendant not file documents in any court without prior approval from his probation officer, and (2) the condition that defendant not practice as a paralegal or private investigator. A panel of this Court found no error in defendant\u2019s trial, but vacated in part the trial court\u2019s sentencing judgment and remanded defendant\u2019s case for resentencing.\nOn 22 May 2000, defendant appeared pro se at the resentencing hearing. Once again, the trial court imposed an intermediate punishment and sentenced defendant to forty-five days in jail, suspended for thirty-six months, with regular and special terms of probation. From this resentencing judgment, defendant appeals.\nDefendant brings forward five assignments of error, one challenging the trial court\u2019s failure to appoint counsel to represent defendant during resentencing and four relating to special conditions of probation, namely (1) the thirty-six months of supervised probation; (2) the condition that defendant is under curfew from 7:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. and may not leave his residence during that time without authorization from his probation officer; (3) the condition that defendant may file documents with the court only when the documents are signed and filed by a licensed attorney; and (4) the condition that defendant not practice as a paralegal. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate in part the trial court\u2019s resentencing judgment and remand defendant\u2019s case for resentencing.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by not appointing counsel for him at his resentencing hearing, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the United States Constitution. We disagree. The sources of an indigent person\u2019s right to appointed counsel are the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Jolly v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83, 90, 265 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1980), overruled on other grounds by McBride v. McBride, 334 N.C. 124, 431 S.E.2d 14 (1993), and Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel during trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); during the penalty phase of a capital case, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh\u2019g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984); and during every critical stage of a criminal proceeding where \u201csubstantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.\u201d Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336, 340 (1967).\nSentencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding during which the criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393, 402 (1977). In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that \u201cabsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial.\u201d Id. at 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 538. The Supreme Court in Argersinger emphasized imprisonment as the event triggering an absolute right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 91, 265 S.E.2d at 141. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that \u201cthe central premise of Argersinger \u2014 that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment \u2014 is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.\u201d Id. at 373, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 389. See also State v. Neeley, 307 N.C. 247, 297 S.E.2d 389 (1982).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-451 enumerates those actions and proceedings in which an indigent person is entitled to the services of counsel. Subdivision (1) is the only subdivision that applies to criminal proceedings, and defines the scope of an indigent\u2019s entitlement to court-appointed counsel. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 90, 265 S.E.2d at 141. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-451(a)(1) (1999) provides that\n(a) An indigent, person is entitled to services of counsel in the following actions and proceedings:\n(1) Any case in which imprisonment, or a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00), or more, is likely to be adjudged[.]\nThe language in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-451(a)(l) responds to the \u201cprecise holding of Argersinger, which states that the Sixth Amendment precludes imprisonment of a person for \u2018any offense,\u2019 however classified, unless he [is] represented by counsel at his trial. .. . [T]he right to appointed counsel [also] attaches in felony or misdemeanor cases where the authorized punishment exceeds a five hundred dollar fine.\u201d Jolly, 300 N.C. at 88, 265 S.E.2d at 140 (emphasis in original).\nDefendant Lambert\u2019s resentencing hearing was not a critical stage of the criminal proceeding in which he was entitled to counsel. At trial, defendant was represented by counsel through the sentencing phase and received a suspended sentence with regular and special terms of probation. On defendant\u2019s first appeal, this Court in an unpublished opinion found no error in defendant\u2019s trial, but vacated in part the trial court\u2019s sentencing judgment and remanded defendant\u2019s case for resentencing, consistent with the panel\u2019s opinion that the trial court erred in delegating a judicial function to defendant\u2019s probation officer. State v. Lambert, No. COA98-1222, slip op. at 9-10 (N.C. App. Nov. 16, 1999). On remand, the trial court only addressed the issue of how to modify the special condition of probation that defendant not file documents in any court without prior approval from his probation officer. Thus, during resentencing, none of defendant\u2019s substantial rights were at stake. The trial court was not likely to either sentence defendant to an active term of imprisonment or fine defendant five hundred dollars or more. Therefore, we determine that none of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were violated during resen-tencing because under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-451, defendant was not entitled to counsel.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court failed to make the mandatory inquiry under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 (1999) before allowing him to represent himself at his resentencing hearing. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 provides that\n[a] defendant may be permitted at his election to proceed in the trial of his case without the assistance of counsel only after the trial judge makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant:\n(1) Has been clearly advised of his right to the assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of counsel when he is so entitled;\n(2) Understands and appreciates the consequences of this decision; and\n(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.\nDefendant correctly argues that this inquiry is required in every case in which the defendant has a right to counsel but waives that right. \u201c[N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 15A-1242 sets forth the prerequisites necessary before a defendant may waive his right to counsel and elect to represent himself at trial.\u201d State v. Gerald, 304 N.C. 511, 517, 284 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1981) (footnote omitted). Defendant\u2019s argument fails because under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-451, defendant was not entitled to counsel at his resentencing hearing. Since defendant could not waive a right to counsel he did not have in the first place, the trial court was not required to make the inquiry mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242. Defendant\u2019s first assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court, particularly the length of supervised probation for thirty-six months, is disproportionate to the crime for which defendant was convicted and violative of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While we agree with defendant that the trial court erred by ordering a thirty-six-month term of probation, we do not agree with defendant that his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime of the unauthorized practice of law. Where the sentence ultimately imposed falls within statutory limits prescribed for the offense, we defer to the wisdom of our Legislature regarding the appropriateness of the minimum or maximum punishment. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 598, 300 S.E.2d 689, 698 (1983). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343.2(d) (1999) prescribes lengths of probation under the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act and provides that\n[u]nless the court makes specific findings that longer or shorter periods of probation are necessary, the length of the original period of probation for offenders sentenced under Article 81B shall be as follows:\n(2) For misdemeanants sentenced to intermediate punishment, not less than 12 nor more than 24 months;\nIf the court finds at the time of sentencing that a longer period of probation is necessary, that period may not exceed a maximum of five years.\nIn the present case, the trial court found that defendant had a prior conviction level of 2, and sentenced him to an intermediate punishment for committing a Class 1 misdemeanor by placing him on probation for thirty-six months. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343.2(d), such a term of probation was within the discretion of the trial court; however, an examination of the record and transcript of the hearing reveals that the trial court failed to make the required findings of fact that a longer term of probation was necessary. Accordingly, we vacate this condition of defendant\u2019s probation and remand this portion of defendant\u2019s case for resentencing. The trial court must reduce defendant\u2019s probation to the statutory period of twelve to twenty-four months or enter appropriate findings of fact that a longer period of probation is necessary. See State v. Cardwell, 133 N.C. App. 496, 516 S.E.2d 388 (1999) (resentencing required when trial court imposed twelve months\u2019 supervised and forty-eight months\u2019 unsupervised probation for reckless driving without finding that the extended period of probation was necessary); and State v. Hughes, 136 N.C. App. 92, 524 S.E.2d 63 (1999), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 644, 543 S.E.2d 878 (2000) (resentencing required when trial court imposed sixty months\u2019 supervised probation on a felon sentenced to intermediate punishment without finding that the extended period of probation was necessary).\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by imposing the condition of probation that defendant remain under curfew and not be away from his place of residence from 7:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. because the condition is \u201cunreasonable, oppressive, unduly burdensome and has no relationship to the crime of which defendant was convicted for [sic].\u201d We disagree. The challenged condition of probation is permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b1)(3c) (1999), which provides in pertinent part:\n(bl) Special Conditions. \u2014 In addition to the regular conditions of probation specified in subsection (b), the court may, as a condition of probation, require that during the probation the defendant comply with one or more of the following special conditions:\n(3c) Remain at his or her residence unless the court or the probation officer authorizes the offender to leave for the purpose of employment, counseling, a course of study, or vocational training.\nDefendant contends that nothing in the record supports the imposition of this condition as related to the crime of the unauthorized practice of law, and that the condition is not reasonably related to his rehabilitation. To support this argument, defendant relies on the \u201creasonably related\u201d standard articulated in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b1)(10) (1999). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(bl)(10), \u201cthe trial court may in addition to the statutorily described conditions impose \u2018any other conditions . . . reasonably related to [defendant\u2019s] rehabilitation.\u201d State v. Harrington, 78 N.C. App. 39, 48, 336 S.E.2d 852, 857 (1985).\nThe language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(bl)(10) operates as a check on the discretion of trial judges in devising special conditions of probation other than those enumerated in the statute. State v. Parker, 55 N.C. App. 643, 645-46, 286 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1982). However, when the trial judge imposes one of the special conditions of probation enumerated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(bl), the condition need not be reasonably related to defendant\u2019s rehabilitation because the Legislature has deemed all those special conditions appropriate to the rehabilitation of criminals and their assimilation into law-abiding society. Parker, 55 N.C. App. at 646, 286 S.E.2d at 368. In this case, the challenged condition of probation is not a creation of the trial court, but rather one of those appropriate and reasonable conditions of probation expressly authorized by the Legislature under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(bl)(3c). We conclude that defendant\u2019s argument is without merit and overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by imposing as a condition of probation that he file documents with the court only when the documents were signed and filed by a licensed attorney whose signature was affixed thereto. Defendant maintains that this condition violates his constitutional right of access to the courts, and is unreasonable and beyond the power of the trial court to devise. We agree that the trial court erred by imposing this condition, but disagree with defendant as to why the trial court erred.\nIt is the settled policy of this Court that when a case can be disposed of on appeal without reaching the constitutional issue, it is to be first disposed of on non-constitutional grounds. Burwell v. Griffin, 67 N.C. App. 198, 209, 312 S.E.2d 917, 924, appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 303, 317 S.E.2d 678 (1984).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(c) (1999) mandates that\n[a] defendant released on supervised probation must be given a written statement explicitly setting forth the conditions on which he is being released. If any modification of the terms of that probation is subsequently made, he must be given a written statement setting forth the modifications.\nHere, the trial court orally modified the original terms of defendant\u2019s probation in light of the Court of Appeals\u2019 remand order:\nThe Court: ... I believe the only thing [the Court of Appeals] said I couldn\u2019t do was require him not to file papers. . . .\n\u2756 * * *\nThe Court: With regard to that during the [thirty-six] month period of probation he may file documents with the clerk of Superior Court when it has been \u2014 when it is filed by an attorney, a licensed attorney practicing law in the State of North Carolina, filed on his behalf by a licensed attorney practicing law in North Carolina. Or has been reviewed by a licensed attorney practicing law in North Carolina who has affixed his signature thereto.\nThe trial court\u2019s recital does not appear anywhere in the written record on appeal, including the text of the trial court\u2019s resentenc-ing judgment. The record on appeal is completely devoid of any evidence that defendant was served with a written copy of this particular condition of probation, so this condition is invalid as prescribed by the trial court. Oral notice to defendant of his conditions of probation is not a satisfactory substitute for the written statement required by statute. State v. Suggs, 92 N.C. App. 112, 113, 373 S.E.2d 687, 688 (1988). Accordingly, we vacate this condition of defendant\u2019s probation and remand this portion of defendant\u2019s case for resentencing.\nWe emphasize that our ruling today does not determine the propriety or reasonableness of this contested condition of defendant\u2019s probation. However, we note that the right to counsel guaranteed to all criminal defendants by the federal and state constitutions implicitly gives a defendant the right to refuse counsel and conduct his or her own defense pro se. State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 353-54, 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980). Integral to a defendant\u2019s right to proceed pro se is his ability to prepare and. submit legal documents to the trial court. This Court is well aware that the trial court has substantial discretion in devising conditions of probation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b1)(10). Harrington, 78 N.C. App. at 48, 336 S.E.2d at 857. Nevertheless, any condition which violates defendant\u2019s constitutional rights is per se unreasonable and beyond the power of the trial court to impose. State v. Simpson, 25 N.C. App. 176, 180, 212 S.E.2d 566, 569, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 263, 214 S.E.2d 436 (1975).\nLastly, defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing the condition of probation that \u201c[defendant] not engage in the practice [as a] paralegal or be permitted to engage in any work as a private investigator and surrender to the probation officer any license or permit as to either of these occupations.\u201d Defendant urges this Court to hold the challenged condition invalid as to his ability to practice before the Social Security Administration because paralegal work before the Administration is not itself criminal and is governed by federal, not state, law. We do not find defendant\u2019s argument persuasive.\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court has held that one panel of the Court of Appeals may not overrule the decision of another panel on the same question in the same case. N.C.N.B. v. Virginia Carolina Builders, 307 N.C. 563, 566-67, 299 S.E.2d 629, 631-32 (1983). Defendant\u2019s previous appeal challenged the exact same condition of probation prohibiting defendant from practicing as a paralegal and private investigator. In Lambert, slip op. at 9-10, this Court upheld the trial court\u2019s special condition of probation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(a) (Cum. Supp. 1998), which gives the trial court authority to impose conditions of probation \u201creasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.\u201d The first panel decided that the contested condition bore some relation to defendant\u2019s offense, and that the condition was aimed at preventing defendant from engaging in similar offenses. Lambert, slip op. at 10. Where one panel of this Court has decided an issue, a subsequent panel is bound by that precedent unless it has been overturned by a higher court. Heatherly v. Indus. Health Council, 130 N.C. App. 616, 621, 504 S.E.2d 102, 106 (1998). Defendant\u2019s final assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we vacate in part the trial court\u2019s resentencing judgment and remand defendant\u2019s case for resentencing consistent with this opinion.\nVacated in part, and remanded for resentencing.\nJudges MARTIN and BIGGS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kristine L. Lanning, for the State.", "Anthony Lambert, pro se, defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY C. LAMBERT\nNo. COA00-1133\n(Filed 2 October 2001)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 resentencing \u2014 probation conditions\u2014 no right to counsel\nThe trial court did not err by not appointing counsel for a resentencing hearing for the unauthorized practice of law because the resentencing in this case was not a critical stage of the criminal proceeding where the trial court, on remand from the Court of Appeals, only addressed the issue of how to modify the special condition of probation that defendant not file documents in any court without prior approval of his probation officer, and the trial court was not likely to either sentence defendant to an active term of imprisonment or fine defendant five hundred dollars or more. N.C.G. S. \u00a7 7A-451(a)(l).\n2. Sentencing\u2014 resentencing \u2014 pro se representation \u2014 required inquiry not made\nThe trial court did not err by not making the inquiry required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242 before allowing defendant to represent himself at a resentencing hearing because defendant was not entitled to counsel at the hearing.\n3. Probation and Parole\u2014 term longer than statutory period \u2014 no findings\nThe trial court erred at a resentencing for the unauthorized practice of law by ordering a term of probation longer than the statutorily prescribed period without making the required findings that a longer term of probation was necessary. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1343.2(d).\n4. Probation and Parole\u2014 probation \u2014 condition\u2014curfew\u2014 relation to rehabilitation\nThe trial court did not err when sentencing defendant for the authorized practice of law by imposing as a condition of probation that defendant remain in his residence from 7:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. The challenged condition is permitted by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1343(bl) (1999); the legislature has deemed all of the special conditions enumerated by the statute appropriate to the rehabilitation of criminals and their assimilation into a law-abiding society and the condition need not be reasonably related to defendant\u2019s rehabilitation.\n5. Probation and Parole\u2014 conditions \u2014 written notice required\nThe trial court erred when sentencing defendant for the unau: thorized practice of law by imposing as a condition of probation that defendant file documents with the court only when the documents were signed and filed by a licensed attorney. The record on appeal was devoid of any evidence that defendant was served with a written copy of this particular condition of probation; oral notice of conditions of probation is not a satisfactory substitute for the written statement required by statute.\n6. Appeal and Error\u2014 probation condition \u2014 earlier decision in same case by different panel \u2014 binding\nThe trial court did not err when sentencing defendant for the unauthorized practice of law by imposing as a condition of probation that defendant not work as a private investigator or paralegal. This condition of probation was upheld in the earlier unpublished opinion in this case; one panel of the Court of Appeals may not overrule the decision of another panel on the same question in the same case.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 22 May 2000 by Judge William C. Griffin, Jr., in Pasquotank County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 August 2001.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kristine L. Lanning, for the State.\nAnthony Lambert, pro se, defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0360-01", "first_page_order": 392, "last_page_order": 402 }