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      "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and THOMAS concur."
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    "parties": [
      "DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff v. MACK BLUE and BRENDA BLUE, Defendants DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff v. PIERCE B. IRBY, et al., Defendants"
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      {
        "text": "EAGLES, Chief Judge.\nThe North Carolina Department of Transportation (\u201cNCDOT\u201d) and Mack Blue, Brenda Blue, and Pierce Irby (collectively, \u201cdefendants\u201d) each appeal from the trial court\u2019s orders denying NCDOT\u2019s motion to strike defendants\u2019 second defense, granting NCDOT\u2019s motion to dismiss defendants\u2019 counterclaims, granting defendants\u2019 motion to consolidate cases for purposes of discovery and G.S. \u00a7 136-108 hearing, denying defendants\u2019 motion to join necessary parties, allowing in part defendants\u2019 motion to modify the trial court\u2019s previous order, and allowing defendants\u2019 motion to certify this matter for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54. After a careful review of the record, briefs, and arguments of counsel, we affirm.\nNCDOT has a program for improving transportation, which includes enlarging and constructing highways, known as the Transportation Improvement Program (\u201cTIP\u201d). See G.S. \u00a7 143B-350(f)(4). One TIP project, designated TIP R-210, was a transportation project intended to improve portions of United States Highway 1 from south of State Road 1853 near Lakeview, North Carolina, to State Road 1180 near Sanford, North Carolina. Planning for TIP R-210 began in 1989, and funding for the project was to be provided by the State. Throughout the planning process, NCDOT held public hearings and accepted public input on TIP R-210.\nIn 1991, NCDOT prepared and published a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (\u201cDEIS\u201d) evaluating the environmental impact of various alternative routes for TIP R-210. Thereafter, on 22 April 1992, NCDOT issued a news release announcing its selection of the route designated \u201cAlternative A\u201d for TIP R-210. Then, on 1 December 1995, NCDOT prepared and published a Final Environmental Impact Statement (\u201cFEIS\u201d), as required by the North Carolina Environmental Policy Act (\u201cNCEPA\u201d), G.S. \u00a7 113A-1 et seq., approving the selection of \u201cAlternative A.\u201d Ultimately, on 21 March 1996, the U.S. Federal Highway Administration (\u201cFHWA\u201d) approved NCDOT\u2019s selection of \u201cAlternative A\u201d as the \u201cenvironmentally preferred alternative\u201d and issued a Record of Decision (\u201cROD\u201d) affirming its approval on that date.\nDefendants each owned property located within the right-of-way of \u201cAlternative A.\u201d After the selection of \u201cAlternative A,\u201d NCDOT entered into negotiations with each defendant in an attempt to agree upon acceptable purchase prices for their parcels of land. After these negotiations failed, NCDOT filed separate condemnation actions against each defendant on 26 July 1999. On 26 October 1999, defendant Irby filed his answer and counterclaim, and thereafter, on 23 November 1999, defendants Mack and Brenda Blue filed their answers and counterclaims. In their answers and counterclaims, defendants alleged as a defense that NCDOT \u201cengaged in arbitrary and capricious agency action and [] abused its agency discretion\u201d (\u201cdefendants\u2019 second defense\u201d) and as a counterclaim that NCDOT violated NCEPA and the National Environmental Policy Act (\u201cNEPA\u201d), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 4321 el seq., by preparing an inadequate FEIS, inter alia.\nDefendants filed a motion to consolidate these cases for purposes of discovery and hearings. Subsequently, NCDOT filed motions to dismiss defendants\u2019 counterclaims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) and motions to strike defendants\u2019 second defense pursuant to Rule 12(f). Defendants then filed a motion to join as necessary parties NCDOT Secretary David McCoy and NCDOT Project Development and Environmental Analysis Branch Manager William D. Gilmore. A hearing was held on all pending motions during the 28 February 2000 Civil Session of Moore County Superior Court, the Honorable Catherine C. Eagles presiding. By order entered 10 March 2000, the trial court denied NCDOT\u2019s motion to strike defendants\u2019 second defense, granted NCDOT\u2019s motion to dismiss defendants\u2019 counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), granted defendants\u2019 motion to consolidate cases for purposes of discovery and G.S. \u00a7 136-108 hearing, and denied defendants\u2019 motion to join necessary parties. In response to the order, defendants filed a motion to modify order, or in the alternative, to certify this matter for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54. After a hearing on this motion, Judge Eagles entered a second order on 30 May 2000 making a minor modification to her previous order and certifying this matter for immediate appeal. NCDOT and defendants appeal.\nAt the outset, we note that these appeals are interlocutory in nature. \u201cAn interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). Here, the trial court\u2019s orders did not dispose of the entire case; instead, the orders left pending NCDOT\u2019s condemnation actions against defendants. As further action by the trial court is pending to settle and determine the entire controversy, the trial court\u2019s orders are interlocutory.\n\u201cGenerally, there is no right of immediate appeal from an interlocutory order.\u201d Abe v. Westview Capital, 130 N.C. App. 332, 334, 502 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998). However, appeals from interlocutory orders raising issues of sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review. See Price v. Davis, 132 N.C. App. 556, 558-59, 512 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1999). Here, NCDOT asserts that the defense of sovereign immunity bars defendants\u2019 second defense and counterclaims. Accordingly, this appeal warrants immediate appellate review.\nAt the heart of both NCDOT\u2019s appeal and defendants\u2019 cross-appeal is the propriety of the trial court\u2019s treatment of defendants\u2019 second defense and defendants\u2019 counterclaims. First, we address the trial court\u2019s denial of NCDOT\u2019s motion to strike defendants\u2019 second defense pursuant to Rule 12(f). Next, we address the trial court\u2019s grant of NCDOT\u2019s motion to dismiss defendants\u2019 counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).\nAs to the trial court\u2019s denial of NCDOT\u2019s motion to strike defendants\u2019 second defense, NCDOT argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. After careful review of this issue, we affirm the trial court.\nUnder Rule 12(f), the trial court \u201cmay order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, irrelevant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(f). A motion under Rule 12(f) is a device to test the legal sufficiency of an affirmative defense. See Trust Co. v. Akelaitis, 25 N.C. App. 522, 525, 214 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1975). \u201cIf there is any question as to whether an issue may arise, the motion [under Rule 12(f)] should be denied.\u201d Shellhorn v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 38 N.C. App. 310, 316, 248 S.E.2d 103, 108 (1978).\nDefendants\u2019 second defense alleges that NCDOT engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct and abused its agency discretion. In condemnation proceedings, \u201c[e]ach owner is entitled to defend upon the ground his property does not qualify for the purpose intended, or that its selection was the result of arbitrary or capricious conduct on the part of the taking agency.\u201d Redevelopment Commission v. Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 225, 128 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1962).\nNevertheless, NCDOT asserts the defense of sovereign immunity. \u201cSovereign immunity is a theory or defense established to protect a sovereign or state as well as its officials and agents from suit in certain instances.\u201d Vest v. Easley, 145 N.C. App. 70, 73, 549 S.E.2d 568, 572 (2001). Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, \u201c[t]he State of North Carolina is immune from suit unless and until it expressly consents to be sued.\u201d State v. Taylor, 322 N.C. 433, 435, 368 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1988).\nHere, NCDOT acquired title to defendants\u2019 land pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 136-19. Section 136-19 \u201cempowers [NCDOT] to acquire title to land that it deems necessary for the construction or maintenance of roads.\u201d Ferrell v. Dept. of Transportation, 334 N.C. 650, 655, 435 S.E.2d 309, 313 (1993). \u201cIn enacting this statutory scheme, the legislature has implicitly waived [NCDOT\u2019s] sovereign immunity to the extent of the rights afforded in [G.S.] \u00a7 136-19 [].\u201d Id. Consequently, NCDOT may not avail itself of this defense here.\nAdditionally, we note that defendants further alleged as part of their second defense that NCDOT\u2019s conduct in condemning their land was arbitrary and capricious based in part on NCDOT\u2019s alleged violations of NCEPA and NEPA. Significantly, TIP R-210 is a state project. The project was to be constructed with North Carolina Highway Trust Funds, and, as defendants alleged, NCDOT \u201cshifted funds so that [TIP R-210] will be built without federal funds.\u201d\n\u201cThe requirements of NEPA are inapplicable to the state. NEPA has no application to a project unless [] the action is federal.\u201d Buda v. Saxbe, 406 F.Supp. 399, 402 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) (citations omitted). Moreover, \u201cNEPA... by its express language operates only upon federal agencies, and imposes no duties on the States or on municipalities, except to the extent that a non-federal entity is found to be acting in partnership with the federal government.\u201d Town of North Hempstead v. Village of North Hills, 482 F.Supp. 900, 903 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (citations omitted); see also Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971).\nThe record reveals that some federal funds were spent on planning for TIP R-210; that NCDOT planned to build and design the project to meet federal standards; and that NCDOT left open the option to later request federal funds for the project. However, \u201cuse of limited federal funding during the planning and design stage of a highway project does not constitute \u2018major federal action\u2019 \u201d invoking NEPA. Hawthorn Environmental Presero. Ass\u2019n v. Coleman, 417 F.Supp. 1091, 1099 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff\u2019d per curiam, 551 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, \u201cearly coordination or compliance with the eligibility requirements for federal funding, or designing a project so as to preserve the option of federal funding in the future, standing alone, will not convert a project into a \u2018major federal action\u2019 \u201d within the purview of NEPA. Southwest Williamson County Community v. Slater, 67 F.Supp.2d 875, 884-85 (M.D. Tenn. 1999), aff\u2019d and remanded, 243 F.3d 270 (6th Cir. 2001). Because no major federal action was involved in TIP R-210, we hold that NEPA was inapplicable to NCDOT, a state agency, in this project. Consequently, defendants are barred from raising alleged violations of NEPA in this action.\nAs for the alleged NCEPA violations, this Court has held that in condemnation proceedings, a landowner\u2019s failure to assert a violation of NCEPA as a defense in their answer constitutes a waiver. See State v. Williams and Hessee, 53 N.C. App. 674, 680-81, 281 S.E.2d 721, 726 (1981). Here, defendants raised the defense in their answer. Thus, defendants are not precluded by the doctrine of waiver from proceeding with their defense that NCDOT\u2019s alleged violations of NCEPA made the condemnation of their land arbitrary and capricious.\nHowever, \u201c[a]dministrative and judicial review of an environmental document is incidental to, and may only be undertaken in connection with, review of the agency action. No other review of an environmental document is allowed.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 113A-13 (emphasis added). Significant for purposes of this appeal is. the fact that the environmental documents (the DEIS, the FEIS, and the ROD) were all prepared during NCDOT\u2019s planning and selection of \u201cAlternative A\u201d for TIP R-210. NCDOT\u2019s selection of \u201cAlternative A\u201d was separate and distinct from its action in condemning defendants\u2019 land, which is the basis of its complaint here. Pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 113A-13, these environmental documents may be reviewed only in connection with review of NCDOT\u2019s selection of \u201cAlternative A\u201d for TIP R-210 \u2014 the agency action for which they were created, and not NCDOT\u2019s condemnation of defendants\u2019 land. Thus, while defendants are entitled to a review of whether NCDOT\u2019s condemnation action was arbitrary and capricious, defendants may not obtain judicial review of the environmental documents created during the planning and selection of \u201cAlternative A\u201d as part of the judicial review of the condemnation.\nAccordingly, NCDOT is deemed to have waived its sovereign immunity in this condemnation action. Additionally, \u201callegations of arbitrary and capricious conduct or of abuse of discretion on the part of [NCDOT] render the issue subject to judicial review.\u201d Dept. of Transportation v. Overton, 111 N.C. App. 857, 859, 433 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1993). Nevertheless, defendants may not raise NEPA nor obtain judicial review of the environmental documents at issue as part of their defense in this action. Thus, we affirm that part of the trial court\u2019s order denying NCDOT\u2019s motion to strike defendants\u2019 second defense.\nNow, we turn to the trial court\u2019s grant of NCDOT\u2019s motion to dismiss defendants\u2019 counterclaims which allege violations of NCEPA and NEPA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Defendants contend that the court erred in dismissing these counterclaims based on the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cNCAPA\u201d), G.S. \u00a7 150B-1 et seq. After careful review of this issue, we affirm.\nWhen reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule. 12(b)(1), a trial court may consider and weigh matters outside the pleadings. See Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 493, 495 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1998). However, if the trial court confines its evaluation to the pleadings, the court must accept as true the plaintiff\u2019s allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. We note that this Court\u2019s review of an order granting a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is de novo, \u201cexcept to the extent the trial court resolves issues of fact and those findings are binding on the appellate court if supported by competent evidence in the record.\u201d See id.\nHere, defendants attach their NCEPA and NEPA claims as counterclaims to NCDOT\u2019s condemnation actions. Through these counterclaims, defendants \u201cchallenge[] [NCDOT\u2019s] selecting [Alternative A to build\u201d TIP R-210 and allege that NCDOT violated both NCEPA and NEPA by preparing an inadequate FEIS, inter alia. The North Carolina Environmental Policy Act (\u201cNCEPA\u201d), G.S. \u00a7 113A-1 et seq., sets forth our State\u2019s environmental policy. Likewise, the National Environmental Policy Act (\u201cNEPA\u201d), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 4321 et seq., sets forth the environmental policy of our federal government. NCEPA and NEPA are \u201c[s]imilar.\u201d D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation \u00a7 12.02[1] (2nd ed. 2001).\n\u201cThe primary purpose of both the state and federal environmental statutes is to ensure that government agencies seriously consider the environmental effects of each of the reasonable and realistic alternatives available to them.\u201d Orange County v. Dept. of Transportation, 46 N.C. App. 350, 383, 265 S.E.2d 890, 911 (1980). Both acts require that government agencies \u2014 in North Carolina, those state agencies planning to spend public money on governmental projects \u2014 must issue environmental impact statements (\u201cEIS\u201d) to \u201cprovide a full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and [] inform decision-makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the environment.\u201d 1 N.C.A.C. \u00a7 25.0601; see also G.S. \u00a7 113A-4(2); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 4332(C).\nNotably, neither NCEPA nor NEPA contain explicit judicial review provisions. Nevertheless, federal courts \u201chave long recognized that [they] have jurisdiction over NEPA challenges pursuant to the [federal] APA,\u201d 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 702. Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 630-31 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass\u2019n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 1999); N.C. Alliance for Transp. Reform v. D.O.T., 151 F.Supp.2d 661, 678 (M.D.N.C. 2001). Likewise, this Court has adopted the view that judicial review of an alleged NCEPA violation is available under the NCAPA\u2019s judicial review provisions, particularly G.S. \u00a7 150B-43. See Citizens Roadways v. Dept. of Transp., 145 N.C. App. 497, 550 S.E.2d 253 (2001); Orange County, 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890. Again, we note that since TIP R-210 was a state project, NEPA is inapplicable here. See Buda v. Saxbe, 406 F.Supp. 399, 402.\nThe NCAPA \u201cestablishes a uniform system of administrative rule making and adjudicatory procedures for agencies\u201d and \u201capplies to every agency\u201d unless an agency is expressly exempted. G.S. \u00a7 150B-l(a) and (c). Under the administrative hearing provisions of the NCAPA,\nany dispute between an agency and another person that involves the person\u2019s rights, duties, or privileges . . . should be settled through informal procedures. ... If the agency and the other person do not agree to a resolution of the dispute through informal procedures, either the agency or the person may commence an administrative proceeding to determine the person\u2019s rights, duties, or privileges, at which time the dispute becomes a \u2018contested case.\u2019\nG.S. \u00a7 150B-22. The administrative hearing provisions of this act (G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 150B-22 to 150B-42) apply to all agencies and all proceedings except those expressly exempted. See Empire Power Co. v. N.C. Dept. of E.H.N.R., 337 N.C. 569, 586, 447 S.E.2d 768, 778 (1994). The General Assembly has expressly named the particular agencies exempted from the NCAPA and specified the extent of each such exemption. See id. at 587, 447 S.E.2d at 779.\n\u201c \u2018The Department of Transportation, except as provided in G.S. 136-29 (construction contract claims)\u2019 is expressly exempt from the contested case provisions.\u201d Citizens Roadways, 145 N.C. App. at 497, 499, 550 S.E.2d at 255 (quoting G.S. \u00a7 150B-l(e)(8)). Consequently, defendants \u201ccannot petition for a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (\u201cOAH\u201d) in this case.\u201d Id. Nevertheless, judicial review of agency decisions in Superior Court, pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 150B-43, is proper in certain cases where no prior proceeding was held before the OAH. See id.; see also Charlotte Truck Driver Training School v. N.C. DMV, 95 N.C. App. 209, 212, 381 S.E.2d 861, 862-63 (1989); Hedgepeth v. N. C. Div. of Servs. for the Blind, 142 N.C. App. 338, 345, 543 S.E.2d 169, 173 (2001).\nSection 150B-43 of the NCAPA provides aggrieved parties an avenue for judicial review of adverse agency determinations. Before seeking review of an adverse agency determination under \u00a7 150B-43, a party must satisfy five requirements: \u201c(1) the person must be aggrieved; (2) there must be a contested case; (3) there must be a final agency decision; (4) administrative remedies must be exhausted; and (5) no other adequate procedure for judicial review can be provided by another statute.\u201d Huang v. N.C. State University, 107 N.C. App. 710, 713, 421 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1992).\nFirst, \u201c \u2018[p]erson aggrieved\u2019 means any person or group of persons of common interest directly or indirectly affected substantially in his or its person, property, or employment by an administrative decision.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 150B-2(6). Clearly, defendants are \u201caggrieved\u201d because (1) they own land within the proposed route for \u201cAlternative A\u201d for TIP R-210, (2) they \u201casserted their position as taxpayers,\u201d and (3) they share a sufficient geographical nexus to \u201cAlternative A\u201d for TIP R-210 so that they may be expected to suffer whatever adverse environmental effects TIP R-210 may have. See Orange County, 46 N.C. App. 350, 360-62, 265 S.E.2d 890, 899.\nSecond, a contested case is \u201c(1) an agency proceeding, (2) that determines the rights of a party or parties.\u201d Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 424-25, 251 S.E.2d 843, 850 (1979). NCEPA broadens \u201cthe definition of \u2018contested case\u2019 and expand[s] the scope of procedural remedies available under [the NCAPA], including the right to judicial review\u201d provided in G.S. \u00a7 150B-43. Orange County, 46 N.C. App. at 375, 265 S.E.2d at 907. When violations of NCEPA are alleged, NCDOT\u2019s decision concerning location of a highway gives rise to a contested case under the NCAPA. See id. at 374-76, 265 S.E.2d at 906-07. Here, defendants, as aggrieved parties, alleged that NCDOT violated NCEPA in the process of selecting the \u201cAlternative A\u201d location for TIP R-210. Consequently, based on our precedent in Orange County, defendants have a contested case.\nWe note that since we decided Orange County in 1980, the General Assembly has exempted NCDOT from the contested case provisions of the NCAPA, except as provided in G.S. \u00a7 136-29. See 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 418, \u00a7 2; G.S. \u00a7 150B-l(e)(8). Nonetheless, a contested case hearing, from which NCDOT is expressly exempt, \u201cis distinguishable from a contested case.\u201d Community Psychiatric Ctrs. v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 514, 515, 405 S.E.2d 769, 770 (1991). A contested case\nextends beyond an adjudicatory hearing to include \u201cany agency proceeding, by whatever name called, wherein the legal rights, duties and privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing.\u201d\nId. (quoting Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Authority v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 83 N.C. App. 122, 124, 349 S.E.2d 291, 292 (1986)). Defendants did not have an adjudicatory hearing before NCDOT here; however, NCDOT did hold public hearings on TIP R-210. Nevertheless, NCDOT\u2019s exemption from the contested case provisions of the NCAPA does not affect the fact that defendants have a \u201ccontested case\u201d for purposes of satisfying Huang v. N.C. State University, 107 N.C. App. 710, 421 S.E.2d 812.\nThird, in determining whether a particular agency action is final, \u201c[t]he core question is whether the agency has completed its deci-sionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the parties.\u201d Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797, 120 L. Ed. 2d 636, 648 (1992) (U.S. Supreme Court analyzing final agency action under the federal APA and 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 704). We note that TIP R-210 was a state project to be constructed with North Carolina Highway Trust Funds. In a case where only state highway funds are involved,\nan action to challenge the sufficiency of the environmental impact statement would be ripe when the Board of Transportation approved the location of the highway corridor following the preparation of a final environmental impact statement [FEIS],\nOrange County, 46 N.C. App. at 367, 265 S.E.2d at 903. Here, NCDOT approved the location of \u201cAlternative A\u201d for TIP R-210 and published a FEIS on 1 December 1995. At this point, NCDOT had completed the decision making process and the result directly affected the parties. As such, NCDOT\u2019s action was sufficiently final when it issued the FEIS on 1 December 1995. See Warren County v. State of N.C., 528 F.Supp. 276, 284 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (issuance of EIS was final agency determination).\nWe recognize that there is a disagreement between the parties as to whether the ROD constituted NCDOT\u2019s final agency decision in the case before us. \u201c[I]t appears well-established that a [FEIS] or the ROD issued thereon constitute the \u2018final agency action\u2019. . . .\u201d Sierra Club, 120 F.3d 623, 631. \u201cFinal agency action\u201d refers to the issuance of a \u201cfinal agency decision.\u201d See Howell v. Morton, 131 N.C. App. 626, 634, 508 S.E.2d 804, 809 (1998). Under the Federal-Aid Highways Act (\u201cFAHA\u201d), 23 U.S.C. \u00a7 101 et seq., FHWA has final approval authority over a state agency\u2019s FEIS, and FHWA memorializes approval of that FEIS and project location by issuing a ROD. See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass\u2019n, 174' F.3d 180, 184. However, \u201c[a]pproval Of the [FEIS] is not a[] [FHWA] Action . . . and does not commit the [FHWA] to approve any future grant request to fund the preferred alternative.\u201d 23 C.F.R. \u00a7 771.125 (e); see also 23 C.F.R. \u00a7 771.113 (b). Here, NCDOT submitted the FEIS to FHWA for location approval to preserve the State\u2019s option of obtaining federal funding in the future. FHWA\u2019s subsequent issuance of the ROD did not change the nature of TIP R-210, a state project, into a federal project. Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, we hold that the FEIS, not the ROD, was NCDOT\u2019s final agency decision.\nFourth, \u201cas a general rule a party must exhaust all applicable administrative remedies before filing in the superior court.\u201d Jackson v. Dept. of Administration, 127 N.C. App. 434, 436, 490 S.E.2d 248, 249 (1997). NCEPA has no language providing a party with a right to challenge a FEIS. However, the parties have at least two administrative remedies available. See Orange County, 46 N.C. App. at 376-77, 265 S.E.2d at 907-08 (one available administrative remedy, 1 N.C.A.C. \u00a7 25.0106 (the right to petition the Governor), cited in Orange County has since been repealed).\nFor instance, citizens have the opportunity to participate \u201cin the agency\u2019s decision making process\u201d by filing comments, requesting a public hearing, and speaking at the public hearing. See Empire Power Co. v. N.C. Dept. of E.H.N.R., 112 N.C. App. 566, 572-73, 436 S.E.2d 594, 599 (1993), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768 (1994); see also 1 N.C.A.C. \u00a7 25.0604 (Public Hearing). Here, defendants had the opportunity to participate in NCDOT\u2019s decision making process. The record reflects that many citizens did participate by filing comments and speaking at NCDOT hearings. However, the record is unclear as to whether these defendants actually participated; although, the record does show that defense counsel did actively participate.\nAdditionally, G.S. \u00a7 136-62 provides that \u201c[t]he citizens of th[is] State shall have the right to present petitions to the board of county commissioners, and through the board to [NCDOT], concerning additions to the system and improvement of roads.\u201d While the record is not clear as to whom the petition was presented, the record does reflect that a citizens\u2019 petition in opposition to \u201cAlternative A\u201d for TIP R-210 was before NCDOT. Accordingly, we hold that the available administrative remedies were exhausted here.\nFinally, no other adequate procedure for judicial review of defendants\u2019 NCEPA challenge was provided by any other statute. Defendants contend that G.S. \u00a7 136-108 provides an adequate procedure for judicial review of their counterclaims. Section 136-108 provides that in condemnation proceedings, the trial court may hold a hearing to \u201cdetermine any and all issues raised by the pleadings other than the issue of damages....\u201d Defendants contend that their NCEPA challenge is an issue that may be heard and determined in such a hearing. However, the environmental documents at issue were prepared for the administrative process by which NCDOT selected \u201cAlternative A\u201d for TIP R-210, not for the condemnation proceeding. Because review of an environmental document may be undertaken only in connection with review of the agency action for which the document was prepared, see G.S. \u00a7 113A-13 and 1 N.C.A.C. \u00a7 25.0605(f), section 136-108 does not provide an adequate procedure for judicial review of defendants\u2019 NCEPA challenge. The NCAPA does provide for judicial review.\nIn sum, defendants have satisfied the five requirements for judicial review of an adverse agency determination under G.S. \u00a7 150B-43. Pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 150B-45,\n[t]o obtain judicial review of a final decision under this Article, the person seeking review must file a petition in the Superior Court of Wake County or in the superior court of the county where the person resides.\nThe person seeking review must file the petition within 30 days after the person is served with a written copy of the decision. A person who fails to file a petition within the required time waives the right to judicial review under this Article.\nDefendants failed to file a petition with the superior court within thirty days of NCDOT\u2019s publication of the FEIS on 1 December 1995. In fact, defendants did not file any claim with the superior court until they filed their counterclaims in 1999 \u2014 over three years after NCDOT\u2019s publication of the FEIS.\nWe hold that defendants\u2019 contention that they were not properly served with a written copy of NCDOT\u2019s decision is unavailing. The regulations under NCEPA allow for notice of a FEIS by publication. See 1 N.C.A.C. \u00a7 25.0605(c) (\u201cNotice shall also be given in the Environmental Bulletin,\u201d which is published bi-monthly by the Department of Administration\u2019s State Clearinghouse); 1 N.C.A.C. \u00a7 25.0212. The record shows that NCDOT issued a news release announcing the selection of \u201cAlternative A\u201d for TIP R-210. This news release was followed by NCDOT\u2019s publication of the FEIS on 1 December 1995. Unlike defendants\u2019 contentions concerning notice and service of the ROD, defendants do not raise any notice challenges regarding the FEIS. Accordingly, we hold that the record supports the conclusion that defendants knew or should have known of NCDOT\u2019s action by 1 December 1995.\nDefendants\u2019 failure to timely comply with the NCAPA\u2019s judicial review requirements is sufficient basis to affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal of their counterclaims. See Citizens Roadways, 145 N.C. App. 497, 550 S.E.2d 253 (affirming trial court\u2019s dismissal of complaint against NCDOT alleging violations of NCEPA filed over thirty days after NCDOT\u2019s issuance of a Finding of No Significant Impact (\u201cFONSI\u201d)). Accordingly, we affirm that part of the trial court\u2019s order dismissing defendants\u2019 counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).\nHaving carefully reviewed the remainder of the issues addressed by NCDOT and defendants in their briefs, we conclude that the trial court did not err. Therefore, we affirm the remainder of the trial court\u2019s orders.\nAffirmed.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and THOMAS concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "EAGLES, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney Generals Fred Lamar and Lisa C. Glover, for the State.",
      "Cunningham, Dedmond, Petersen & Smith, LLP, by F. Marsh Smith, and Moser, Schmidly, Mason & Roose, LLP, by Stephen S. Schmidly, for defendants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff v. MACK BLUE and BRENDA BLUE, Defendants DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff v. PIERCE B. IRBY, et al., Defendants\nNo. COA00-995\n(Filed 18 December 2001)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 sovereign immunity defense \u2014 substantial right\nAlthough the trial court\u2019s orders in a condemnation proceeding case are interlocutory based on the fact that the orders left pending the Department of Transportation\u2019s condemnation actions against defendants, appeals from interlocutory orders raising issues of sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.\n2. Eminent Domain\u2014 highway condemnation \u2014 arbitrary and capricious conduct \u2014 abuse of discretion \u2014 sovereign immunity defense\nThe trial court did not err in a condemnation proceeding by denying the Department of Transportation\u2019s (DOT) motion to strike under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(f) defendant property owners\u2019 second defense alleging that DOT engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct and abused its agency discretion even though DOT asserted the defense of sovereign immunity and defendants may not raise the National Environmental Policy Act for a state project, nor may it obtain judicial review of the environmental documents at issue as part of their defense in this action, because: (1) DOT acquired title to defendants\u2019 land under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-19; and (2) the legislature has implicitly waived DOT\u2019s sovereign immunity to the extent of the rights afforded in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-19.\n3. Eminent Domain\u2014 highway condemnation \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 judicial review of adverse agency determination\nThe trial court did not err in a condemnation proceeding by granting the Department of Transportation\u2019s (DOT) motion to dismiss defendants\u2019 counterclaims alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the North Carolina Environmental Policy Act (NCEPA) based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1), because: (1) although defendants have satisfied the three requirements for judicial review of an adverse agency determination under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-43, defendants failed to file a petition with the superior court within thirty days of DOT\u2019s publication of the Final Environmental Impact Statement on 1 December 1995 as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-45; and (2) the record supports the conclusion that defendants knew or should have known of DOT\u2019s action by 1 December 1995.\nAppeal by plaintiff and defendants from orders entered 10 March and 30 May 2000 by Judge Catherine C. Eagles in Moore County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 August 2001.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney Generals Fred Lamar and Lisa C. Glover, for the State.\nCunningham, Dedmond, Petersen & Smith, LLP, by F. Marsh Smith, and Moser, Schmidly, Mason & Roose, LLP, by Stephen S. Schmidly, for defendants."
  },
  "file_name": "0596-01",
  "first_page_order": 626,
  "last_page_order": 640
}
