{ "id": 9378012, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN HENRY STITT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stitt", "decision_date": "2001-11-06", "docket_number": "No. COA00-1063", "first_page": "77", "last_page": "85", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 N.C. App. 77" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554416 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4721300 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135802, 135759, 135846, 135958 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0279-02", "/nc/353/0279-03", "/nc/353/0279-01", "/nc/353/0279-04" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" }, { "page": "868-69", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497226 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 S.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571617, 571620, 571690, 571723, 571691 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0240-02", "/nc/349/0240-03", "/nc/349/0240-04", "/nc/349/0240-01", "/nc/349/0240-05" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11651585 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521564 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4723040, 4722917, 4722387, 4724410, 4724508 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0610-02", "/nc/313/0610-05", "/nc/313/0610-04", "/nc/313/0610-03", "/nc/313/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 400", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718277, 4723663, 4722611, 4724215, 4722937 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0513-05", "/nc/313/0513-03", "/nc/313/0513-02", "/nc/313/0513-04", "/nc/313/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484", "parenthetical": "holding that inconsistency in the evidence goes to credibility of the evidence and that it is within province of jury to determine weight to be accorded the evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526251 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100", "parenthetical": "holding that inconsistency in the evidence goes to credibility of the evidence and that it is within province of jury to determine weight to be accorded the evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518633 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2571494 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572551, 8572522, 8572458, 8572502, 8572474 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0590-05", "/nc/305/0590-04", "/nc/305/0590-01", "/nc/305/0590-03", "/nc/305/0590-02" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 N.C. App. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523675 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/56/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358259 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0179-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 860, "char_count": 21327, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.37913948868477e-08, "percentile": 0.44216187893579895 }, "sha256": "b259cedbff238726accd3943031758ddab789976988faa2f9f226613afd16dba", "simhash": "1:82dffe22365e28e5", "word_count": 3533 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:07:10.251034+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUDSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN HENRY STITT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nJohn Henry Stitt (\u201cdefendant\u201d) was charged and convicted of one count of felony possession of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), one count of resisting a public officer, and one count of being an habitual felon. Defendant received a prison sentence of 144 to 182 months for the two felony charges, and a sentence of sixty days for the misdemeanor offense of resisting a public officer. Defendant appeals from judgments entered against him on 31 March 2000. We hold there was no error at trial.\nThe evidence tended to establish the following facts. On 23 October 1998, defendant was walking on Spring Hill Drive in Union County at some time after midnight. Deputy Bill Shaw of the Union County Sheriffs Office was sitting in his patrol car when he saw defendant. Deputy Shaw was aware that there was an outstanding warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest, and therefore got out of his car and directed defendant to \u201ccome to the car.\u201d Defendant complied and walked to the patrol car. At that time, defendant was wearing a light blue ball cap with a \u201cdark blue bill\u201d and a \u201cUNC Ram, Tar Heel emblem on it.\u201d Deputy Shaw ordered defendant to place his hands on the car, and as Deputy Shaw began to place handcuffs on defendant, defendant broke away and started running. Deputy Shaw chased after defendant and, while chasing him, observed defendant fall and then get up and continue running. Deputy Shaw also fell when he reached the same spot, tripping over a go-cart. Upon falling to the ground, Deputy Shaw noticed defendant\u2019s hat on the ground, but when he got up he continued to chase defendant. When Deputy Shaw saw defendant disappear into the woods, he stopped chasing defendant, returned to where they had both fallen, and picked up defendant\u2019s hat. He discovered a small, off-yellow, rock substance in the hat at that time, which he took to his car and placed in an evidence bag. Deputy Shaw wrote the date, 23 October 1998, on the evidence bag. However, when the evidence bag was sent to the State Bureau of Investigation (\u201cSBI\u201d), Deputy Shaw mistakenly wrote the date 28 October 1998 on the SBI submission sheet accompanying the evidence bag. The SBI performed a chemical analysis on the substance and determined that it was cocaine.\nThe pertinent procedural history is as follows. Prior to trial, on 13 July 1999, defendant filed a \u201cRequest for Voluntary Discovery,\u201d requesting the State to produce all discoverable materials pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-902(a) and 15A-903 (1999), including \u201c[a]ny physical evidence\u201d and \u201c[a]ny tangible objects, such as . . . personal property possessed by Defendant.\u201d On 29 March 2000, the day before trial, the State notified defendant for the first time that it was in possession of defendant\u2019s hat. Defendant filed a \u201cMotion to Continue\u201d asking the court for additional time in order to inspect the hat and to prepare for trial. Defendant also filed a \u201cMotion in Limine\u201d asking the court to exclude the hat as evidence. The trial court conducted a hearing and found that the State had failed to produce the hat during discovery without justification. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion in limine and ordered that the hat would be inadmissible as evidence; however, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to continue.\nOn appeal, defendant presents six assignments of error, accompanied by six corresponding arguments, for our review. Defendant has abandoned a seventh assignment of error by failing to present it in his brief. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(a). Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue. Generally, a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to continue will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Brooks, 83 N.C. App. 179, 183, 349 S.E.2d 630, 633 (1986). Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to continue constitutes an abuse of discretion because it deprived him of an opportunity to inspect the hat for exculpatory evidence. However, a continuance is proper in such circumstances only \u201cif there is a belief that material evidence will come to light and such belief is reasonably grounded on known facts,\u201d whereas \u201ca mere intangible hope that something helpful to a litigant may possibly turn up affords no sufficient basis for delaying a trial.\u201d State v. Pollock, 56 N.C. App. 692, 693-94, 289 S.E.2d 588, 589, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 305 N.C. 590, 292 S.E.2d 573 (1982). Defendant\u2019s intangible hope, not based on known facts, that an inspection of the hat would provide exculpatory evidence is insufficient to warrant a reversal here.\nMoreover, the trial court was not obligated to grant defendant\u2019s motion to continue as a result of the State\u2019s failure to produce the hat during discovery. In response to the State\u2019s failure to produce the hat, the trial court prohibited the State from introducing the hat in evidence at trial. This remedy is one of the permissible remedies set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-910 (1999), and \u201c[t]he choice of sanction, if any, rests within the discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Browning, 321 N.C. 535, 539, 364 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1988). Defendant has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the trial court in choosing to grant the motion in limine and deny the motion to continue. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by allowing Deputy Shaw to refer to the hat at trial because such testimony violated the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion in limine. We disagree. In the first place, the trial court\u2019s order provided only that the hat itself would not be admissible in evidence, and did not prohibit the State from offering testimony regarding the hat. Nor was it error for the trial court to refuse to sanction the State by prohibiting any testimony regarding the hat. As noted above, the decision of whether to impose sanctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-910, and which sanctions to impose, is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is not reviewable on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 747-48, 370 S.E.2d 363, 372 (1988). Here, presuming that defendant realized that he had lost his hat while escaping from Deputy Shaw on 23 October 1998, defendant must have known that the charge against him \u2014 that he possessed a controlled substance on that date \u2014 could only have resulted from Deputy Shaw discovering the cocaine in his hat. Thus, defendant had ample reason to know from the outset that the hat was an integral part of the incident and that Deputy Shaw would likely testify about the hat at trial. The court\u2019s decision not to sanction the State by prohibiting testimony about the hat was therefore not an abuse of discretion. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by admitting in evidence the SBI lab report, identifying the substance as cocaine, because there is a variance between the allegation that defendant possessed the substance on 23 October 1998, and the SBI submission sheet which refers to narcotics obtained on 28 October 1998. Defendant argues that, because of the variance between the date of the alleged offense and the date on the SBI submission sheet, the SBI lab report should have been excluded from evidence because it \u201cbears no relevance to an offense occurring on October 23, 1998.\u201d Defendant also states in his brief that his argument \u201cdoes not depend on the chain of custody,\u201d but relates only to the relevance of the SBI lab report and its admissibility.\n\u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C.R. Evid. 401. We believe the SBI lab report was \u201crelevant evidence\u201d and was properly admitted. Deputy Shaw testified: that he found the substance in defendant\u2019s hat and placed it in a clear evidence bag and sealed the bag; that he wrote the date of the offense, 23 October 1998, on the evidence bag, and then inadvertently wrote the date 28 October 1998 on the SBI submission sheet because the \u201c3\u201d on the evidence bag looked like an \u201c8\u201d; that he sent the evidence bag to the SBI on 11 January 1999 in an envelope with his initials; and that the evidence was in his sole care, custody and control between the time he found the substance and the time he sent it to the SBI. Special Agent Irvin Lee Allcox of the SBI Crime Laboratory in Raleigh testified as an expert witness to the following: that the sealed evidence bag containing the evidence was received by the SBI on 14 January 1999 and was analyzed on 15 January 1999; that the chemist who analyzed the evidence prepared a lab report, and the results of the analysis showed the substance to be a free-base form of cocaine, commonly referred to as \u201ccrack cocaine\u201d; and that the evidence was then placed back in the evidence bag which was sealed and returned to the Union County Sheriff\u2019s Office.\nWe do not believe that the date on the SBI submission sheet has the effect of creating a variance between the charged offense and the evidence presented at trial. Rather, the date on the submission sheet merely amounts to an inconsistency in the evidence presented at trial. The State offered a reasonable explanation for the inconsistency in the evidence, and the jury was entitled to accept or reject that explanation. See State v. Upright, 72 N.C. App. 94, 100, 323 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1984) (holding that inconsistency in the evidence goes to credibility of the evidence and that it is within province of jury to determine weight to be accorded the evidence), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 513, 329 S.E.2d 400, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 610, 332 S.E.2d 82 (1985). We hold that the SBI submission sheet constituted relevant evidence and was properly admitted, and that any inconsistency in the evidence went to the credibility of the evidence and not to its admissibility. This assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his fourth assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing certain testimony to be elicited by the State on redirect examination of Deputy Shaw. Specifically, defendant argues that Deputy Shaw was not questioned on either direct or cross-examination regarding the duration of time that elapsed between the time that Deputy Shaw stopped chasing defendant and the time that he picked up defendant\u2019s hat. Thus, defendant argues, the court erred in overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the following question put to Deputy Shaw by the State on redirect examination: \u201cHow much time passed between the time that you got to that tree line and ... turned around and came back?\u201d After the court overruled defendant\u2019s objection, Deputy Shaw responded, \u201c[m]aybe three minutes at the most.\u201d This redirect examination was not erroneous. \u201cAlthough the rule is that redirect examination cannot be used to repeat direct testimony or to introduce an entirely new matter, the trial judge has discretion to permit counsel to introduce relevant evidence which could have been, but was not brought out on direct.\u201d State v. Locklear, 60 N.C. App. 428, 430, 298 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1983). There was no abuse of that discretion here where the subject of the redirect examination simply involved an additional detail about the incident in question, and where the incident had already been addressed in depth during direct and cross-examination. This assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his next assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence during the habitual felon phase of the trial three \u201ctranscript of plea\u201d forms relating to defendant\u2019s three prior felony convictions. Defendant argues that the transcripts contained irrelevant and highly prejudicial information about defendant\u2019s criminal history, which information created unfair prejudice in the minds of the jurors and should have been excluded pursuant to Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. See N.C.R. Evid. 403 (\u201cRule 403\u201d). The State in its brief argues only that defendant\u2019s assignment of error should be deemed abandoned pursuant to Rule 28(b)(5) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure as a result of defendant\u2019s failure to cite any authority. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5) (\u201cRule 28(b)(5)\u201d).\nWe first note that the State\u2019s reading of Rule 28(b)(5) has previously been rejected by this Court. Rule 28(b)(5) states, in pertinent part, \u201c[assignments of error not set out in the appellant\u2019s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.\u201d This rule sets out two scenarios in which an assignment of error may be deemed abandoned: (1) where it is not set out in the appellant\u2019s brief, or (2) where no reason or argument is stated or authority cited in support of the assignment of error. Strader v. Sunstates Corp., 129 N.C. App. 562, 567, 500 S.E.2d 752, 755, disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 240, 514 S.E.2d 274 (1998). \u201cThe first requires the party to direct the court to the appropriate assignment of error in the record and the second requires the party to cite authority or to make a legal argument for the extension or modification of the law.\u201d Id. at 567-68, 500 S.E.2d at 755 (emphasis added). The State\u2019s interpretation of the rule, that an assignment of error is necessarily deemed abandoned if no authority is cited, cannot be endorsed because it \u201cwould inhibit the ability of parties to bring cases of first impression before the appellate courts.\u201d Id. at 568, 500 S.E.2d at 755.\nHere, our research indicates that there is no existing authority directly supporting defendant\u2019s argument that certain information, appearing in the transcript of plea forms admitted during the habitual felon phase, was prejudicial to defendant and should have been excluded by the trial court pursuant to Rule 403. For this reason, defendant\u2019s failure to cite authority in support of this proposition does not result in abandonment of the assignment of error. It is sufficient that defendant has stated an argument, especially since defendant has properly cited to the rule that he would have us extend to this context, namely Rule 403.\nHowever, we find the assignment of error to be without merit. Section 14-7.5 of our General Statutes requires that \u201can habitual felon trial be held subsequent and separate from the principal felony trial, and that an habitual felon indictment be revealed to the jury only upon conviction of the principal felony offenses.\u201d State v. Wilson, 139 N.C. App. 544, 548, 533 S.E.2d 865, 868, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 279, 546 S.E.2d 394 (2000); see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.5 (1999). As this Court has previously explained,\nthe bifurcated procedure set forth in G.S. \u00a7 14-7.5, separating the principal felony trial from the habitual felon proceeding, avoids possible prejudice to the defendant and confusion by the jury considering the principal felony with issues not pertinent to guilt or innocence of such offense, notably the existence of the prior convictions necessary for classification as an habitual felon, and further precludes the jury from contemplating what punishment might be imposed were defendant convicted of the principal felony and subsequently adjudicated an habitual felon.\nWilson, 139 N.C. App. at 548, 533 S.E.2d at 868-69 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Todd, 313 N.C. 110, 117, 326 S.E.2d 249, 253 (1985)). Here, the plea transcripts in question were admitted only after defendant was convicted of the offenses of felony possession of cocaine and resisting a public officer. Moreover, \u201c[i]n all cases where a person is charged . . . with being an habitual felon, the record or records of prior convictions of felony offenses shall be admissible in evidence, but only for the purpose of proving that said person has been convicted of former felony offenses.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.4 (1999) (emphasis added). Defendant has failed to explain how the admission of prior plea transcripts during the habitual felon phase of the trial could have created prejudice or confused the jury in such a way as to affect the jury\u2019s verdict on whether defendant had been convicted of certain former felony offenses. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his final argument, defendant contends that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of Deputy Shaw\u2019s testimony identifying the substance found in defendant\u2019s hat as cocaine. The testimony in question consisted of Deputy Shaw\u2019s statement that he found \u201c[a]n off yellow rock substance which [he] thought to be a cocaine, crack cocaine.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objection to this testimony. Defendant acknowledges that this assignment of error has merit only if it is first determined that the SBI lab report, identifying the substance as cocaine, should have been excluded from evidence. This is because, if the SBI evidence was properly admitted, there is no reasonable possibility that the admission of Deputy Shaw\u2019s statement affected the outcome of the trial, since such testimony would be merely cumulative of the SBI evidence. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1999); State v. Jones, 329 N.C. 254, 259, 404 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1991). Since we have determined that the SBI lab report was properly admitted, this assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.\nNo error.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUDSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General John R Barkley, for the State.", "Bobby Khan for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN HENRY STITT\nNo. COA00-1063\n(Filed 6 November 2001)\n1. Criminal Law-continuance to examine withheld evidence\u2014 denied-intangible hope of exculpatory evidence-insufficient\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance for defendant to examine evidence withheld by the State (a hat) after granting a motion in limine to exclude the hat. Defendant\u2019s intangible hope, not based on known facts, that an inspection of the hat would provide exculpatory evidence is insufficient to warrant reversal.\n2. Discovery\u2014 testimony about excluded evidence\u2014 permissible\nThe trial court did not err in a cocaine prosecution by allowing testimony about the hat in which the cocaine was found after excluding the hat because the State had failed to produce it during discovery. The decision of whether to impose sanctions and which sanctions to impose is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Presuming that defendant realized that he had lost his hat while escaping, he must have known that the charge against him could only have resulted from discovery of the cocaine in the hat, and he had ample reason to know that the hat was an integral part of the incident and that the deputy would likely testify about the hat. The court\u2019s decision not to sanction the State by prohibiting that testimony was not an abuse of discretion. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-910.\n3. Evidence\u2014 SBI admission sheet \u2014 discrepancy in date\nThe trial court did not err in a cocaine prosecution by admitting an SBI lab report where defendant was alleged to have possessed the narcotics on 23 October 1998 and the SBI admission sheet referred to narcotics obtained on 28 October 1998. Any inconsistency went to the credibility of the evidence and not to its admissibility.\n4. Evidence\u2014 redirect examination \u2014 scope \u2014 detail not elicited on direct or cross\nThe court did not abuse its discretion in a cocaine prosecution by allowing on redirect examination certain testimony which defendant contended was beyond the scope of direct or cross-examination. The trial judge has the discretion to permit relevant evidence which could have been brought out on direct examination; in this case, the subject of the redirect examination was an additional detail about an incident which had been addressed in depth during direct and cross-examination.\n5. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 no citation to authority \u2014 case of first impression\nAn assignment of error was not deemed abandoned where defendant did not cite authority in support of his argument because there was no such authority. It was sufficient that defendant stated an argument; otherwise, the ability of parties to bring cases of first impression would be inhibited.\n6. Sentencing\u2014 habitual felon \u2014 admission of prior plea transcripts\nThere was no error in the admission of prior plea transcripts in the habitual felon phase of a trial where the transcripts were admitted only after defendant\u2019s conviction of the principal crimes. Defendant failed to explain how the admission of the transcripts confused the jury or created prejudice in such a way as to affect their verdict.\n7. Evidence\u2014 cocaine \u2014 deputy\u2019s opinion \u2014 lab report subsequently admitted\nThere was no prejudice in a cocaine prosecution in the admission of a deputy\u2019s opinion that he found in defendant\u2019s hat a substance which he thought was crack cocaine where a lab report identifying the substance as cocaine was properly admitted.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 31 March 2000 by Judge Sanford L. Steelman, Jr. in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 September 2001.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General John R Barkley, for the State.\nBobby Khan for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0077-01", "first_page_order": 107, "last_page_order": 115 }