{ "id": 9379009, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTOINNE LAMONT MORRIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Morris", "decision_date": "2001-11-20", "docket_number": "No. COA00-1224", "first_page": "247", "last_page": "254", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 N.C. App. 247" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545420 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11466647 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731888 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563216 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 L. Ed. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"All that is required to support convictions for a felony offense [rape] and related felony murder 'is that the elements of the underlying offense and the murder occur in a time frame that can be perceived as a single transaction.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 835", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9489058, 9489509, 9489574, 9489290, 9489387, 9489132, 9489679, 9489168, 9489105, 9489200, 9489334, 9489623, 9489435, 9489244 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"All that is required to support convictions for a felony offense [rape] and related felony murder 'is that the elements of the underlying offense and the murder occur in a time frame that can be perceived as a single transaction.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0835-01", "/us/528/0835-11", "/us/528/0835-12", "/us/528/0835-07", "/us/528/0835-09", "/us/528/0835-03", "/us/528/0835-14", "/us/528/0835-04", "/us/528/0835-02", "/us/528/0835-05", "/us/528/0835-08", "/us/528/0835-13", "/us/528/0835-10", "/us/528/0835-06" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571533 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149", "parenthetical": "applying continuous doctrine to felony murder and sexual offense where court held whether victim was alive or dead when sexual offense occurred is immaterial because \"the sexual act was committed during a continuous transaction that began when the victim was alive.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554806 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597", "parenthetical": "armed robbery and murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512329 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566", "parenthetical": "armed robbery and murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478", "parenthetical": "holding the doctrine of continuous transaction applies to murder/arson cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2504523 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "holding the doctrine of continuous transaction applies to murder/arson cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-39", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658786 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/169/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" }, { "page": "854" }, { "page": "853" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11079078 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 L. Ed. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 874", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11370144, 11370364, 11369992, 11369514, 11370058, 11369710, 11369904, 11369777, 11370289, 11369845, 11369564, 11369631 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0874-10", "/us/444/0874-12", "/us/444/0874-08", "/us/444/0874-01", "/us/444/0874-09", "/us/444/0874-04", "/us/444/0874-07", "/us/444/0874-05", "/us/444/0874-11", "/us/444/0874-06", "/us/444/0874-02", "/us/444/0874-03" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" }, { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566992 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774041 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554-55" }, { "page": "555" }, { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566071 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0077-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 803, "char_count": 17738, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.8356617620753603e-07, "percentile": 0.8989881263347785 }, "sha256": "b0b77b7453df3712ba00819b5a1fd1d238900c937138cdab8c53239adc2cefb8", "simhash": "1:38694dace4262250", "word_count": 2947 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:07:10.251034+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge HUDSON concurs.", "Judge WALKER dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTOINNE LAMONT MORRIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nAntoinne Lamont Morris (defendant) was indicted for second degree rape and second degree kidnapping on 15 September 1997. A jury found defendant guilty of both charges. Defendant was sentenced on 8 June 2000 to consecutive terms of 100 to 129 months in prison for the second degree rape charge, and twenty-nine to forty-four months in prison for the second degree kidnapping charge. Defendant appeals.\nEvidence presented by the State at trial tended to show that the victim saw defendant in the cafeteria between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon at West Mecklenburg High School in Charlotte, North Carolina on 18 August 1997, the first day of school. The victim recognized defendant because she had attended summer school with him and also had previously dated his cousin. Defendant asked the victim if she would follow him to a friend\u2019s house because he thought something was wrong with his car, and she agreed.\nAt the apartment, defendant went upstairs and when he came back down, the victim asked him for a drink of water. He went into the kitchen and fixed her some water, then returned upstairs. Defendant called the victim to come upstairs, and he began to rub her shoulders and breasts. The victim was uncomfortable, walked downstairs, and told defendant she was about to leave. Defendant pushed her away from the door. When she attempted to leave a second time, defendant punched her in the face, and she blacked out. When the victim awoke, defendant was on top of her. She was not wearing her shorts or underwear. She screamed for defendant to get off and began hitting and scratching him. Defendant hit her in the face again, and she lost consciousness. She awoke the next morning around 6:00 a.m. in the storage closet outside the apartment. She was wearing only a tank top and felt sore all over her body. She tried to yell but her tongue was stuck to the bottom of her mouth. She managed to kick open the door and crawl to a neighbor\u2019s apartment. The neighbors found her hysterical and difficult to understand. They found clothes for her to wear and called the police.\nCharlotte-Mecklenburg Police Officer R.L. Matthews responded to the call. Officer Matthews found the victim difficult to understand. She appeared to be in a drugged state, but she did not smell of alcohol. The victim was transported to Carolinas Medical Center where she was examined by Tina Haning, a registered nurse, who prepared a sexual assault kit. She was also examined by Dr. Douglas Swanson. The victim gave a statement to the police which was substantially similar to the information she gave to both the nurse and doctor. The police prepared a photographic lineup and presented it to the victim the next day in the hospital. She immediately identified defendant as the perpetrator.\nLenora Barbour, a Crime Scene Search technician, searched the apartment where the alleged incident occurred and found a white plastic trash bag in the laundry area containing a pair of underwear, a pair of shorts, a soiled sanitary napkin, a possibly blood-stained towel, and a used condom.\nAt trial, defendant admitted he had lied to the police in an earlier interview when he stated he had not been with the victim on 18 August 1997, had not taken her to his friend\u2019s house, and had not engaged in sexual intercourse with her, either consensually or forcibly. Defendant testified at trial that he had asked the victim to come to his friend\u2019s house; they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse; he stopped having sex with the victim when he realized she was having her menstrual cycle; when he left the apartment, he left her alone in his friend\u2019s bedroom; and he did not place her into the storage closet. He testified he had earlier lied to the police because he was seventeen at the time, scared, and he did not trust the police, nor feel they would believe his story. Defendant\u2019s mother testified she saw her son late in the afternoon of 18 August 1997, but she did not see any scratches on his neck. Defendant\u2019s friend, Anthony Thame, corroborated defendant\u2019s testimony that defendant picked up Thame about 2:15 p.m. after school on 18 August 1997.\nDefendant first argues the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of second degree kidnapping because the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find each element of the crime charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt; specifically, the evidence was insufficient to show defendant confined or restrained the victim for the purpose of facilitating the rape. We agree.\n\u201cIt has long been the law of this state that a defendant must be convicted, if convicted at all, of the particular offense charged in the warrant or bill of indictment.\u201d State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 100, 107, 253 S.E.2d 890, 894, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 874, 62 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1979). An \u201cindictment will not support a conviction for a crime unless all the elements of the crime are accurately and clearly alleged in the indictment.\u201d State v. Brooks, 138 N.C. App. 185, 192, 530 S.E.2d 849, 854 (2000). A motion to dismiss based on a fatal variance in the indictment \u201cis based on the assertion, not that there is no proof of a crime having been committed, but that there is none which tends to prove that the particular offense charged in the bill has been committed. In other words, the proof does not fit the allegation.\u201d State v. Gibson, 169 N.C. 318, 322, 85 S.E. 7, 9 (1915).\nKidnapping is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-39(a) (1999):\nAny person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person . . . shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint, or removal is for the purpose of:\n(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony[.]\nThe indictment for second degree kidnapping stated defendant kidnapped the victim \u201cfor the purpose of facilitating the commission of a felony.\u201d The indictment made no mention of facilitating defendant\u2019s flight following the commission of a felony. At trial, the State again asserted only that the kidnapping facilitated the felony of second degree rape.\nIn Faircloth, the defendant forced the victim from a parking lot with a knife, drove her to a secluded area, robbed her, and raped her. The police arrived and arrested him before he could attempt an escape. The defendant was indicted for and convicted of second degree kidnapping for the purpose of facilitating flight. However, our Supreme Court held the evidence showed a kidnapping for the purpose of facilitating rape, not facilitating the flight following the rape. The Court therefore reversed the trial court\u2019s judgment. Faircloth, 297 N.C. at 108, 253 S.E.2d at 895.\nSimilarly, in Brooks, the defendant was indicted for and convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of facilitating assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Our Court held that \u201cin order for the State to prove kidnapping as alleged in the indictment, the evidence at trial must have shown that defendant kidnapped [the victim] before he shot her.\u201d Brooks, 138 N.C. App. at 192, 530 S.E.2d at 854. We found no such evidence was presented at the trial. Our Court found defendant confined and restrained the victim only after he shot her. The defendant successfully argued under these facts the \u201conly theory of kidnapping available to the State was that it was done \u2018to facilitate [defendant\u2019s] flight\u2019 following the commission of a felony.\u201d Brooks at 190, 530 S.E.2d at 853. However, the defendant was not indicted for this charge. Consequently, our Court reversed defendant\u2019s kidnapping conviction.\nIn the case before us, the evidence presented shows the victim was confined in the apartment living room, she was knocked unconscious, she awoke once to find defendant on top of her and her clothes removed, she was knocked unconscious again, and when she awoke a second time, she was locked in the storage closet outside. The evidence presented could possibly show defendant kidnapped the victim for the purpose of facilitating the flight from the commission of a felony; however, this crime was not charged. There is no evidence defendant removed the victim to the storage closet for the purpose of raping her there. All of the physical evidence of a rape was found inside the apartment. While there was testimony that the victim kicked her way out of the storage closet, there was no evidence of a struggle or a rape inside the storage closet.\nThe State argues the evidence is sufficient to show the kidnapping facilitated the rape under the continuous transaction doctrine. The continuous transaction doctrine has been applied where the defendant has committed a murder and within a short period surrounding the murder also committed arson, an armed robbery, a sex offense, a rape, or a kidnapping. See State v. Campbell, 332 N.C. 116, 120, 418 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1992) (holding the doctrine of continuous transaction applies to murder/arson cases); State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 566, 411 S.E.2d 592, 597 (1992) (armed robbery and murder); State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 434, 407 S.E.2d 141, 149 (1991) (applying continuous doctrine to felony murder and sexual offense where court held whether victim was alive or dead when sexual offense occurred is immaterial because \u201cthe sexual act was committed during a continuous transaction that began when the victim was alive.\u201d); State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 449, 509 S.E.2d 178, 192 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 145 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1999) (\u201cAll that is required to support convictions for a felony offense [rape] and related felony murder \u2018is that the elements of the underlying offense and the murder occur in a time frame that can be perceived as a single transaction.\u2019 \u201d). Our Supreme Court has defined the doctrine stating a \u201ckilling is committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of another felony when there is no break in the chain of events between the felony and the act causing death, so that the felony and homicide are part of the same series of events, forming one continuous transaction.\u201d State v. Wooten, 295 N.C. 378, 385-86, 245 S.E.2d 699, 704 (1978).\nOur Courts have also held in order to elevate a sexual offense or rape charge to first degree sexual offense or first degree rape, a defendant must use a weapon or cause serious bodily injury as part of a continuous transaction involving the sex offense or rape. See State v. Whittington, 318 N.C. 114, 347 S.E.2d 403 (1986). Also, the threat of a deadly weapon and a taking of personal property from someone must be part of a continuous transaction in order to constitute armed robbery. See State v. McDonald, 130 N.C. App. 263, 502 S.E.2d 409 (1998).\nHowever, our Courts have not applied the continuous transaction doctrine to instances involving rape and kidnapping like the situation we have before us. While these two acts occurred close in time, they were not inseparable or concurrent actions. All of the elements of the rape were completed before defendant removed the victim to the storage closet.\nThe State also relies on State v. Kyle, 333 N.C. 687, 694, 430 S.E.2d 412, 415-16 (1993), in arguing that \u201cto facilitate\u201d means \u201cto make easier.\u201d Therefore, any act which makes the commission of the felony easier will support a conviction of facilitating the felony. In Kyle, the kidnapping made the eventual murder easier because it prevented the victim from escaping. While we agree with this theory of the State\u2019s argument and its definition of \u201cto facilitate,\u201d the facts in the case before us do not support this theory. While there is little question defendant\u2019s actions made his flight from the scene easier and was an attempt to cover up his act, the removal of the victim to the storage closet in no way made defendant\u2019s rape of her easier, as all the elements of rape were completed before the removal. Again, defendant\u2019s actions possibly would support a conviction of second degree kidnapping for the purpose of facilitating his flight from the commission of a rape; however, the State has failed to carry its burden in proving defendant\u2019s actions facilitated defendant\u2019s commission of the actual rape. As the evidence does not support the charge stated in the indictment, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the second degree kidnapping charge should have been granted, and we are required to reverse his conviction for second degree kidnapping.\nWe need not address defendant\u2019s, remaining assignments of error.\nDefendant\u2019s conviction for second degree kidnapping is reversed.\nJudge HUDSON concurs.\nJudge WALKER dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." }, { "text": "WALKER, Judge,\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which reverses defendant\u2019s conviction for second degree kidnapping.\nI am unable to reconcile the facts of this case with those of our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in State v. Hall, 305 N.C. 77, 286 S.E.2d 552 (1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Diaz, 317 N.C. 545, 346 S.E.2d 488 (1986). In Hall, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery, kidnapping and assault. The kidnapping portion of the indictment charged that the defendant had moved the victim to facilitate the commission of the felony of armed robbery. The evidence showed that the defendant and a co-defendant, who was armed with a pistol, robbed a service station where the victim worked as a night attendant. After emptying the cash register and removing $40 from the victim, the defendant forced the victim into his car, drove him nearly five miles and left him on the side of the interstate highway. Id. at 79-80, 286 S.E.2d at 554-55.\nDefendant argued that the crime of armed robbery was complete when his co-defendant pointed the pistol at the victim and attempted to take his property; therefore, any movement of the victim was for the purpose of facilitating flight and not to facilitate the commission of the armed robbery. The Court rejected this argument refusing to find a bright line distinction between the various motives listed in the kidnapping statute:\nThe purposes specified in G.S. 14-39(a) are not mutually exclusive. A single kidnapping may be for the dual purposes of using the victim as a hostage or shield and for facilitating flight, or for the purposes of facilitating the commission of a felony and doing serious bodily harm to the victim. So long as the evidence proves the purpose charged in the indictment, the fact that it also shows the kidnapping was effectuated for another purpose enumerated in G.S. 14-39(a) is immaterial and may be disregarded.\nId. at 82, 286 S.E.2d at 555.\nHere, the evidence shows that defendant, during the course of the rape, twice rendered the victim unconscious and moved her to the storage closet. When the victim awoke the next morning, she was wearing only a tank top. However, the defendant contends that all of the elements of rape were complete prior to his movement of the victim to the storage closet. In so doing, he attempts to make the same bright line distinction between \u201cfacilitating the commission of any felony\u201d and \u201cfacilitating flight\u201d that was specifically rejected in Hall. \u201c[T]he fact that all of the essential elements of a crime have arisen does not mean the crime is no longer being committed. That the crime was \u2018complete\u2019 does not mean it was completed.\u201d Id. at 82-83, 286 S.E.2d at 556 (citation omitted). Thus, the jury could have concluded that defendant\u2019s acts constituted one continuous transaction such that the crime of rape, although complete in the apartment, was not completed until the victim was removed to the storage closet. Indeed, the logical extension of defendant\u2019s argument leads to a conclusion that a defendant could never be convicted of kidnapping under a facilitating the commission of a rape theory if the \u201cmovement, confinement, or restraint\u201d of the victim occurs after the sexual act. I respectfully decline to make such a bright line distinction.", "type": "dissent", "author": "WALKER, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jennie Wilhelm Man, for the State.", "Public Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Julie Ramseur Lewis, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTOINNE LAMONT MORRIS\nNo. COA00-1224\n(Filed 20 November 2001)\nKidnapping\u2014 second degree \u2014 variance between charge and proof\nA defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a second degree kidnapping charge should have been granted where the indictment stated that defendant kidnapped the victim for the purpose of facilitating a felony but did not mention facilitating flight following the commission of a felony, and the State asserted only kidnapping to facilitate second degree rape at trial. The evidence showed that the victim was confined in an apartment living room, knocked unconscious, awoke to find her clothes removed and defendant on top of her, was knocked unconscious again, and awoke locked in a storage closet outside. All of the elements of rape were completed before defendant removed the victim to the storage closet and there was no evidence that defendant removed the victim to the storage closet for the purpose of raping her there. The continuous transaction doctrine does not apply because the two acts were not inseparable or concurrent. While defendant\u2019s actions made his flight easier and may have supported a conviction of second degree kidnapping for the purpose of facilitating flight, the State failed to carry its burden of proving that defendant\u2019s action facilitated defendant\u2019s commission of the rape.\nJudge Walker dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 June 2000 by Judge Timothy S. Kincaid in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 September 2001.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jennie Wilhelm Man, for the State.\nPublic Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Julie Ramseur Lewis, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0247-01", "first_page_order": 277, "last_page_order": 284 }