{ "id": 9380836, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANGEL SANCHEZ, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sanchez", "decision_date": "2001-12-18", "docket_number": "No. COA00-1075", "first_page": "619", "last_page": "627", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 N.C. App. 619" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "525 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11076342 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 U.S. 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 634256 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96-7" }, { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/495/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574388 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11329017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "401", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339173 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 170", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195904 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135904, 135622, 135751, 135918, 135862 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0454-01", "/nc/353/0454-05", "/nc/353/0454-04", "/nc/353/0454-02", "/nc/353/0454-03" ] }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442902 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523319 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 491", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195479 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 221", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959006 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "holding that the officers were justified in approaching defendant's vehicle with pistols drawn when suspect was described as \"armed and dangerous\"" }, { "page": "616", "parenthetical": "holding that the officers were justified in approaching defendant's vehicle with pistols drawn when suspect was described as \"armed and dangerous\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558310 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135935 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805", "parenthetical": "quoting White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 804", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918308 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809", "parenthetical": "quoting White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122945 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328", "parenthetical": "holding that the informant's tip carried sufficient \"indicia of reliability\" to justify an investigatory stop even if insufficient to support an arrest or search warrant" }, { "page": "305", "parenthetical": "holding that the informant's tip carried sufficient \"indicia of reliability\" to justify an investigatory stop even if insufficient to support an arrest or search warrant" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 L. Ed. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 923", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11321283, 11320708, 11321126, 11320806, 11320621, 11320526, 11321333, 11320981, 11321048, 11321209, 11321407, 11320895 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0923-10", "/us/455/0923-03", "/us/455/0923-08", "/us/455/0923-04", "/us/455/0923-02", "/us/455/0923-01", "/us/455/0923-11", "/us/455/0923-06", "/us/455/0923-07", "/us/455/0923-09", "/us/455/0923-12", "/us/455/0923-05" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716341 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69-70" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 872", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 1129", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 328608, 328291, 325380, 324260, 327492, 326437, 325616, 325522, 328084, 324441, 327099, 322908, 325693, 324766, 327647 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/1129-06", "/us/516/1129-07", "/us/516/1129-03", "/us/516/1129-05", "/us/516/1129-14", "/us/516/1129-09", "/us/516/1129-15", "/us/516/1129-12", "/us/516/1129-01", "/us/516/1129-10", "/us/516/1129-13", "/us/516/1129-04", "/us/516/1129-08", "/us/516/1129-11", "/us/516/1129-02" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2502284 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11095125 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 889, "char_count": 21024, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.656232965970304e-07, "percentile": 0.8903055737998624 }, "sha256": "807c03b1727f59d806239c903c6899d5acc1804876a359be111fc26ea48d3ed0", "simhash": "1:8accbd6a069a2706", "word_count": 3344 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:07:10.251034+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge THOMAS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANGEL SANCHEZ, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nAngel Sanchez, Jr., (\u201cdefendant\u201d) was convicted of trafficking in cocaine by possession and transportation and conspiracy to traffick in cocaine. Defendant appeals.\nThe State\u2019s evidence presented at trial tended to show the following: On 5 October 1995, Detective Joseph Walls (\u201cDetective Walls\u201d) of the Narcotics Division of the Kernersville Police Department, received information from an informant that defendant intended to transport cocaine from Miami to Greensboro on 7 October 1998 by airplane. The informant identified himself as Robert Segura (\u201cSegura\u201d). Segura admitted using and dealing cocaine for defendant in Kemersville and indicated that he \u201cwanted out of the situation.\u201d He stated that he and his wife were in danger and the situation was \u201cgetting too big too quick.\u201d Segura, therefore, informed Detective Walls that defendant would either fly into the Greensboro airport with the cocaine or that the cocaine would arrive via next day mail. Segura also provided Detective Walls with the following information: (1) that defendant would likely have the cocaine secreted in blueprint tubes; (2) the name of the air carrier, the flight number and the arrival and departure time; (3) the name of defendant\u2019s traveling companion, Regina Cardo (\u201cCardo\u201d); (4) that Frank (\u201cFrank\u201d) and Mary Ann (\u201cMary Ann\u201d) Devita (collectively, \u201cthe Devitas\u201d) would meet defendant at the Greensboro airport; (5) descriptions of the Devitas\u2019 vehicles; (6) that Frank did not have a valid driver\u2019s license; (7) identified several people who would receive the cocaine from defendant; (8) that the Devitas possessed firearms; and (9) that on prior occasions, defendant has possessed plastic explosives.\nDetective Walls and the other officers of the Kernersville Police Department (collectively \u201cthe officers\u201d) verified the information provided by Segura. The officers checked the criminal histories of Segura and the defendant. They obtained a photograph of defendant, verified the flight information and confirmed the Devitas\u2019 vehicle ownership. The officers also ran a license check which revealed that, in fact, Frank did not have a driver\u2019s license. On 7 October 1998, Detective Walls placed the Devita residence and the airport under surveillance. The Devitas drove to the Greensboro airport where they met defendant and Cardo during the morning of 7 October 1998, as forecasted by Segura. When Frank left the airport with Mary Ann, Cardo, and defendant, the officers followed the car.\nJust two houses short of the Devitas\u2019 home, Detective Walls and seven officers stopped the Devitas\u2019 station wagon. Working in pairs, the officers removed the occupants from the vehicle. One officer placed the defendant and the occupants of the vehicle on the ground and handcuffed them while another officer covered the occupants with his handgun. The officers then frisked the occupants and searched the station wagon for weapons.\nHaving determined that there were no weapons, the officers put away their handguns and uncuffed the defendant and the occupants of the vehicle. No individual remained in cuffs for more than five minutes. Detective Walls then spoke to each occupant of the vehicle separately, informing each that they were suspected of possessing cocaine. Detective Walls asked permission to search the vehicle and the belongings in the vehicle. Frank consented to the search of the station wagon, Cardo consented to the search of her purse, and defendant consented to the search of his briefcase.\nThe officers searched the station wagon, Cardo\u2019s purse, and defendant\u2019s briefcase but found no cocaine. However, they found several items that corroborated Segura\u2019s statement that the cocaine might arrive by overnight mail. This included a receipt in Cardo\u2019s purse dated 1 October 1998 for a post office box in her name at Mailbox Etc., Kernersville, NC. In defendant\u2019s unlocked briefcase the officers found two documents: a check stub dated 7 October 1998 showing payment to Mailbox, Etc., for a Federal Express package and a ledger showing several of the names previously provided by Segura. The officers did not seize the items but instead copied the information verbatim. The officers then returned the items to defendant and Cardo. The stop and search lasted approximately forty-five (45) minutes. Before permitting the four to leave, a citation was issued to Frank for driving without a license.\nDetective Walls then asked Frank if he could search his nearby residence. After negotiating the number of officers permitted to enter his home, Frank consented to the search. The officers did not find any cocaine; however, they discovered several handguns and assault rifles.\nOn 8 October 1998, the day following the stop, Detective Walls assigned two officers to watch the Devita home while he and another officer waited at Mailbox Etc. Later that morning, Federal Express delivered a package to the Devita home. Detective Walls immediately ordered \u201ca freeze\u201d of the Devita home while he secured a search warrant. While Detective Walls left to obtain a search warrant, the officers remained inside the house to monitor the residence. One officer remained upstairs with the Devitas while another officer remained with the defendant and Cardo in the basement. Although they did not search the house, the officers observed empty Federal express packages and a plate of \u201cwhite powder residue\u201d located downstairs.\nAfter Detective Walls arrived with the warrant, the officers searched the entire house, including the basement. In a closet located at the bottom of the stairs, an officer found two blueprint tubes that contained cocaine. Together, the tubes held 496 grams of cocaine.\nPrior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the items recovered from his briefcase and from the Devita residence. After a lengthy voir dire, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Defendant was subsequently convicted as charged. Defendant appeals.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his briefcase. Specifically, defendant argues that the actions of the Kemersville Police Department during the traffic stop of the Devita vehicle far exceeded the allowable scope of an investigatory stop. Thus, defendant contends that probable cause was therefore necessary to support the resulting search. These arguments are without merit.\nThe scope of appellate review of an order suppressing evidence is strictly limited. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). This Court must determine whether the trial judge\u2019s findings of facts are supported by competent evidence. Id. Factual findings which are supported by competent evidence are deemed binding on appeal. Id. \u201cWhile the trial court\u2019s factual findings are binding if sustained by the evidence, the court\u2019s conclusions based thereon are reviewable de novo on appeal.\u201d State v. Parker, 137 N.C. App. 590, 594, 530 S.E.2d 297, 300 (2000).\nThe Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 20 of Article I of the North Carolina Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 506-07, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510 (1992), cert denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 133 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1996). They apply to \u201cseizures of the person, including brief investigatory detentions such as those involved in the stopping of a vehicle.\u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 69-70 (1994). \u201cA court must consider \u2018the totality of circumstances\u2014 the whole picture\u2019 in determining whether reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists.\u201d Id. (quoting U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 923, 71 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1982)). To determine whether the information relied on by the officers in the instant case was sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, we must probe the reliability and content of the informant\u2019s tip.\nAn informant\u2019s tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 305 (1990) (holding that the informant\u2019s tip carried sufficient \u201cindicia of reliability\u201d to justify an investigatory stop even if insufficient to support an arrest or search warrant). \u201cAlthough reasonable suspicion is less stringent than probable cause, it nevertheless requires that statements from tipsters carry some \u2018indicia of reliability^]\u2019 \u201d State v. Watkins, 120 N.C. App. 804, 809, 463 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1995) (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309).\nIn evaluating the reliability of an informant\u2019s tip, due weight must be given to the informant\u2019s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge as highly relevant factors in determining whether an informant\u2019s tip is sufficient from the totality of circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 543 (1983). There must also exist sufficient police corroboration of the tip before the stop is made. If reasonable suspicion exists before the stop is made, there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 207, 539 S.E.2d 625, 630 (2000).\nIn this case, a review of the facts establishes that the tip provided by Segura was sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. First, Segura spoke to Detective Walls in person, revealing his identity and admitting to using and dealing cocaine with defendant. Though the informant in the present case had not previously been relied on by the officers, the face-to-face encounter provided Detective Walls an opportunity to assess his reliability and demeanor. Second, Segura provided specific details concerning not only existing conditions but also predictions of defendant\u2019s future behavior. He indicated that defendant and Cardo would fly from Miami to Greensboro on 7 October 1998 on a particular flight, and that the Devitas would pick up defendant and Cardo at the airport. He stated that the cocaine would arrive by next day mail in Kernersville. Segura also provided the names of several people who would receive cocaine from defendant.\nBased upon the information the officers received from Segura, Detective Walls verified the air carrier, flight number, arrival time, departure time, and traveling companion. The officers also verified the Devita\u2019s residence and vehicle and defendant\u2019s description and criminal history. Detective Walls recognized several names of the persons who Segura alleged would receive cocaine from defendant. Lastly, the officers corroborated Segura\u2019s report that Frank did not possess a valid driver\u2019s license. Based on this information and corroboration, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe the tip was accurate and reliable, and that the investigatory stop of the vehicle was justified.\nWe next determine whether following the stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle, the officers\u2019 actions exceeded the scope of an investigatory stop. Defendant argues that because the actions of the officers exceeded the scope of a valid investigatory stop, such as in drawing weapons and using handcuffs, the defendant\u2019s consent to search was involuntary. We disagree.\nAn investigatory stop must be \u201cbased on specific and articulable facts, as well as rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.\u201d Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70. If upon detaining the individual, the officer\u2019s personal observations confirm that criminal activity may be afoot and suggest that the person detained may be armed, the officer may frisk him as a matter of self-protection. State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 210, 195 S.E.2d 502, 507 (1973). The United States Supreme Court has held that in conducting Terry stops, the investigating officers may take steps reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo and to protect their safety including the drawing of weapons. See U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 616 (1985) (holding that the officers were justified in approaching defendant\u2019s vehicle with pistols drawn when suspect was described as \u201carmed and dangerous\u201d). The scope of the intrusion varies with the facts and circumstances of each case. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983). However, an investigative detention should last no longer than is necessary to \u201ceffectuate the purpose of the stop.\u201d Id.\nIn this case, the officers were justified in making a show of force to protect themselves when the suspect was considered armed and dangerous. Through the information provided by Segura, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was armed and dangerous and that criminal activity may be afoot. First, Segura informed the officers that Frank was driving without a valid driver\u2019s license. The officers verified this information which provided reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Second, Segura informed the officers that defendant might be heavily armed and might possess explosives. On voir dire Detective Walls testified that the officers-conducted a felony traffic stop for their safety where they placed the occupants of the vehicle in handcuffs, placed them on the ground, searched them for weapons, and then searched the vehicle for weapons.\nOnce the officers ensured their safety, they uncuffed the defendant and the occupants of the vehicle and put away their own handguns. Thus, defendant and the occupants of the vehicle spent no more than five minutes in handcuffs. Based on these facts, we hold that the officers were justified in making a limited investigative detention of defendant and the occupants of the vehicle and this detention did not exceed the scope of an investigatory stop.\nMoreover, defendant\u2019s consent to search his briefcase was not the product of coercion. The State has the burden of proving that a consent to search was voluntarily given. State v. Morroco, 99 N.C. App. 421, 429, 393 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1990). When a defendant\u2019s detention is lawful, the State need only show \u201cthat defendant\u2019s consent to the search was freely given, and was not the product of coercion.\u201d State v. Munoz, 141 N.C. App. 675, 683, 541 S.E.2d 218, 223, cert. denied, 353 N.C. 454, 548 S.E.2d 534 (2001).\nIn the instant case, the facts demonstrate no coercion by the officers in obtaining defendant\u2019s consent. Once the officers determined that there were no explosives or weapons in the vehicle, the handcuffs were removed. Detective Walls then asked defendant for permission to search his briefcase and defendant unequivocally responded \u201cyes.\u201d There is no evidence that defendant at any time objected to the search. Moreover, the officers did not use coercive tactics in obtaining defendant\u2019s consent to search the briefcase. We agree with the trial court that the evidence supports a finding that the consent was voluntarily given. The subsequent search was therefore lawful and this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s finding that he lacked standing to object to the search of the Devita home. Further, defendant contends that the search warrant was issued without probable cause. These arguments are without merit.\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis on standing is whether a person has a \u201cconstitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.\u201d Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 177, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 223 (1984). \u201cThe Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those expectation^] that society is prepared to recognize as \u2018reasonable.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 587 (1967)). In order for defendant to establish standing to contest the search of the premises, he must show that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401 (1978) (emphasis added). However, when a defendant fails to assert a property or pos-sessory interest in the property searched, or a showing of circumstances giving rise to his reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched, he fails in his burden of proving standing. State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 298, 306, 261 S.E.2d 860, 865 (1980).\nDefendant, relying on Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1985), contends that he has standing to object to the issuance of the search warrant on the grounds that he was an overnight guest. We disagree.\nThe United States Supreme Court has recognized that \u201cstatus as an overnight guest alone is enough to show that [defendant] has an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.\u201d Olson, 495 U.S. at 96-7, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 93. We are cognizant of Minnesota v. Olson; however, we decline to extend Olson to the present case because defendant has failed to show that \u201che personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.\u201d Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373, 379 (1998).\nThe facts indicate that defendant was temporarily residing in a living area located in the basement area which was connected to the garage and a laundry room. The laundry room was separated by a door to the basement and garage area. The contraband was found under the stairwell located in the laundry room. Defendant has not presented any evidence or alleged any facts which would support a finding that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the contraband hidden under the stairwell which was a common area in the Devita residence. At most the evidence presented established that defendant was legitimately on the premises; however, this fact standing alone does not create the requisite expectation of privacy that would permit him to assert a Fourth Amendment violation.\nHaving held that defendant lacked standing to object to the search, we do not address defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge THOMAS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General William McBlief, for the State.", "Lawrence J. Fine for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANGEL SANCHEZ, JR.\nNo. COA00-1075\n(Filed 18 December 2001)\n1. Evidence\u2014 investigatory stop \u2014 informant\u2019s tip \u2014 contraband in briefcase \u2014 motion to suppress\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his briefcase during an investigatory stop of a vehicle based on reliable and accurate information the police received from an informant\u2019s tip, because: (1) the informant spoke to the detective in person, revealing his identity and admitting to using and dealing cocaine with defendant; (2) although the informant had not been previously relied upon by officers, the face-to-face encounter provided the detective with an opportunity to assess the informant\u2019s reliability and demeanor; (3) the informant provided specific details concerning not only existing conditions, but also predictions of defendant\u2019s future behavior; and (4) there was sufficient police corroboration of the tip before the stop was made.\n2. Search and Seizure\u2014 investigatory stop \u2014 scope \u2014 show of force \u2014 officers drawing weapons \u2014 occupants of vehicle put in handcuffs\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine case by concluding that the officers\u2019 actions did not exceed the scope of an investigatory stop even though the officers made a show of force by drawing their weapons and placed the occupants of the vehicle in handcuffs, because: (1) the officers were justified in order to protect themselves when the suspect was considered armed and dangerous based on information provided by an informant; (2) the occupants of the vehicle were uncuffed and the officers put away their handguns once the officers ensured their safety; and (3) defendant\u2019s consent to the search of his briefcase was not a product of coercion and was voluntarily given.\n3. Search and Seizure\u2014 home of another \u2014 overnight guest\u2014 standing\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine case by finding that defendant lacked standing to object to the search of his coparticipant\u2019s home where contraband was found under the stairwell located in the laundry room even though defendant contends he was an overnight guest temporarily residing in a living area located in the basement area which was connected to the garage and a laundry room, because: (1) defendant has failed to show that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched and that his expectation was reasonable; and (2) at most, the evidence established that defendant was legitimately on the premises.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 24 February 2000 by Judge James Webb in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 August 2001.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General William McBlief, for the State.\nLawrence J. Fine for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0619-01", "first_page_order": 649, "last_page_order": 657 }