{ "id": 9363846, "name": "WILLIAM MICHAEL BOYKIN, Plaintiff v. THOMAS RAY MORRISON, RUFUS AARON WILSON, JR. and WILLIE PERRY, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Boykin v. Morrison", "decision_date": "2001-12-28", "docket_number": "No. COA01-80", "first_page": "98", "last_page": "106", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 N.C. App. 98" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547215 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3-4", "parenthetical": "finding defendant's argument that the court's \"judgment\" herein must necessarily include medical expenses obtained by a non-party requires an unnecessarily restrictive application of G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914394 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150", "parenthetical": "finding defendant's argument that the court's \"judgment\" herein must necessarily include medical expenses obtained by a non-party requires an unnecessarily restrictive application of G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271146 ], "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/160/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "citing Weston v. J. L. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 263, 75 S.E.2d 800 (1912); 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, \u00a7 303-05; 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 377" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560879 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "citing Weston v. J. L. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 263, 75 S.E.2d 800 (1912); 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, \u00a7 303-05; 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565706, 8565678, 8565647, 8565744, 8565627 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0240-04", "/nc/288/0240-03", "/nc/288/0240-02", "/nc/288/0240-05", "/nc/288/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550315 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856", "parenthetical": "citing Hill v. Jones, 26 N.C. App. 168, 169, 215 S.E.2d 168, 169, cert denied, 288 N.C. 240, 217 S.E.2d 664 (1975)" }, { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435704 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571", "parenthetical": "citing Hill v. Jones, 26 N.C. App. 168, 169, 215 S.E.2d 168, 169, cert denied, 288 N.C. 240, 217 S.E.2d 664 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575577 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 S.E. 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11253396 ], "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/141/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567", "parenthetical": "citing with approval Harton v. Telephone Co., 141 N.C. 455, 462-63, 54 S.E. 299, 302 (1906)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2402972 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "citing with approval Harton v. Telephone Co., 141 N.C. 455, 462-63, 54 S.E. 299, 302 (1906)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 S.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600802 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567995 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552433 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871", "parenthetical": "citing State v, Lynch, 46 N.C. App. 608, 265 S.E.2d 491, rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.C. 479, 272 S.E.2d 349 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522018 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49", "parenthetical": "citing State v, Lynch, 46 N.C. App. 608, 265 S.E.2d 491, rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.C. 479, 272 S.E.2d 349 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 S.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607045 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-254", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a720-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(f)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 825, "char_count": 18994, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.503459360989951e-08, "percentile": 0.4466150343128113 }, "sha256": "ab86884dfb59150c7a684290924381c02d107392f94da737ecb3e9d2968354d9", "simhash": "1:13e04140543ba452", "word_count": 2968 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:14:25.013425+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "WILLIAM MICHAEL BOYKIN, Plaintiff v. THOMAS RAY MORRISON, RUFUS AARON WILSON, JR. and WILLIE PERRY, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nAllstate Insurance Company (\u201cAllstate\u201d), as an unnamed defendant, appeals from judgments entered upon the verdicts of the jury following bifurcated compensatory and punitive damage trials, order denying defendant\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment, order denying defendant\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and order awarding attorney\u2019s fees and costs to plaintiff. We find no prejudicial error.\nI. Facts\nWilliam Michael Boykin (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) was driving his car on 25 December 1997 at approximately 4:00 a.m. Thomas Ray Morrison (\u201cMorrison\u201d) ran a red light and collided into plaintiff\u2019s car. Plaintiff exited his car, approached Morrison\u2019s vehicle, and observed him asleep and snoring. Plaintiff returned to his car to await police and ambulances dispatched to the scene. Approximately fifteen minutes later, Rufus Aaron Wilson, Jr. (\u201cWilson\u201d) drove his car into the intersection and collided with plaintiff\u2019s car which had remained in the intersection after the first collision. The second impact propelled plaintiff from his car onto the ground.\nAfter the second collision, Henry Battle (\u201cBattle\u201d) of the City-County Bureau of Investigation arrived at the scene to determine if Morrison had been driving while impaired. Battle\u2019s analysis revealed that Morrison\u2019s blood alcohol level was 0.0226. Morrison was subsequently convicted of driving while impaired.\nMorrison was uninsured. Plaintiff submitted a claim to his insurance provider, Allstate, for his damages pursuant to the \u201cuninsured motorist\u201d provisions contained in his policy. Allstate denied the claim. Plaintiff filed a complaint on 8 April 1998 against Morrison, Wilson, and Willie Perry, the owner of the car Wilson was driving, alleging negligence and demanding damages.\nOn 8 May 1998, Allstate intervened pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a720-279.21(f)(l) (1999) to provide a defense for Morrison in order to protect its interests. Allstate filed an answer, denying Morrison\u2019s negligence and asserting plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence as an affirmative defense, motions to transfer and sever.\nOn 24 August 1998, plaintiff filed an amended complaint to demand punitive damages. Allstate answered and again denied Morrison\u2019s negligence and asserted plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence.\nOn 30 December 1999, plaintiff settled his claims against Wilson and Perry during court ordered mediation. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his action against them. Plaintiff and Allstate did not reach a settlement. On 6 January 2000, Allstate filed a lump sum offer of judgment of $4,001.00, which plaintiff rejected. The trial court denied Allstate\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for punitive damages on 23 February 2000.\nOn 7 March 2000, the trial court entered a pre-trial order. Two days later, Allstate filed a stipulation of facts, which acknowledged that Morrison\u2019s negligence proximately caused the collision with plaintiff, but reserved the right to contest the issue of whether Morrison\u2019s negligence proximately caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nA bifurcated trial was held on 13 March 2000 for compensatory and punitive damages. Allstate did not offer any evidence during the compensatory damage phase. The trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s and Allstate\u2019s motions for directed verdicts at the close of all the evidence.\nThe following day, the jury awarded plaintiff $10,000.00 in compensatory damages and $17,500.00 in punitive damages. Allstate filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied. On 17 May 2000, the trial court awarded plaintiff $6,000.00 in attorney\u2019s fees and other costs in the amount of $759.42. Allstate appeals.\nII. Issues\nAllstate assigns error to the trial court\u2019s: (1) denying its motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages, (2) admitting evidence of punitive damages in the compensatory damage phase of a bifurcated trial, (3) refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of insulating or intervening negligence, and (4) awarding attorney\u2019s fees to plaintiff.\nIII. Partial Summary Judgment\nAllstate argues that plaintiff\u2019s policy excludes punitive damages in its uninsured motorist coverage, and that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages at trial.\nWhether Allstate\u2019s agreement with plaintiff provides for payment of punitive damages on behalf of the uninsured Morrison is irrelevant as to any issues at trial. The issues before the trial court were whether Morrison\u2019s negligence proximately caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries, the extent of plaintiff\u2019s damages, and whether Morrison\u2019s actions were sufficient to warrant punitive damages. Although entitled, Allstate did not file a declaratory judgment action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-254 (1931) to determine the extent of its rights and obligations under its insurance agreement with plaintiff. The trial court properly denied Allstate\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIV. Evidence of Punitive Damages\nAllstate assigns error in allowing evidence of Morrison\u2019s impairment, at the time of the collision with plaintiff, during the compensatory phase of the trial. The trial court granted Allstate\u2019s motion for a bifurcated trial, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-30 (1995). Allstate stipulated that Morrison\u2019s negligence was the proximate cause of the first collision. The only issue contested during the compensatory phase was whether defendant\u2019s negligence caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Allstate does not argue that prejudice resulted in the alleged error.\n\u201cVerdicts and judgments are not to be set aside for mere error and no more. To accomplish this result it must be made to appear not only that the ruling complained of is erroneous, but also that it is material and prejudicial, and that a different result likely would have ensued, with the burden being on the appellant to show this.\u201d Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N.C. 159, 178, 74 S.E.2d 634, 649 (1953) (citations omitted).\nPresuming error, Allstate has not shown prejudice and we will not speculate whether such error was prejudicial. This assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Insulating or Intervening Negligence\nAllstate contends it was entitled to a jury instruction on insulating or intervening negligence. The second collision occurred approximately fifteen minutes after Morrison collided into plaintiff\u2019s car. Allstate asserts that the evidence is conflicting regarding whether Morrison or Wilson caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Allstate argues that \u201c[t]here is sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to defendant . . . from which jurors might have reasonably inferred that Morrison\u2019s negligence had ended, resulting in no injury to plaintiff, and that Wilson\u2019s negligence, which occurred after the passing of ten to fifteen minutes, was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\u201d We disagree.\n\u201cThe trial court must give the instructions requested, at least in substance, if they are proper and supported by evidence.\u201d Haymore v. Thew Shovel Co., 116 N.C. App. 40, 49, 446 S.E.2d 865, 871 (1994) (citing State v, Lynch, 46 N.C. App. 608, 265 S.E.2d 491, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 301 N.C. 479, 272 S.E.2d 349 (1980)).\nThe law of intervening negligence provides that under certain circumstances another sufficiently independent act, unassociated with defendant\u2019s initial negligence, may insulate defendant from liability. David A. Logan and Wayne A. Logan, North Carolina Torts, \u00a7 7.30 at 166 (1996). \u201cThe test is not to be found merely in the degree of negligence of the intervening agency, but in its character\u2014 whether it is of such an extraordinary nature as to be unforeseeable.\u201d Rattely v. Powell, 223 N.C. 134, 136, 25 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1943) (citations omitted).\n[ W]here a horse is left unhitched in the street and unattended, and is maliciously frightened by a stranger and runs away: but for the intervening act, he would not have run away and the injury would not have occurred; yet it was negligence of the driver in the first instance which made the runaway possible.\nHairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 310 N.C. 227, 236, 311 S.E.2d 559, 567 (1984) (citing with approval Harton v. Telephone Co., 141 N.C. 455, 462-63, 54 S.E. 299, 302 (1906)).\nWilson\u2019s act was not sufficiently independent of, and unassociated with, Morrison\u2019s initial negligence of colliding into plaintiff\u2019s car, to insulate Morrison from liability. Morrison could reasonably foresee that Wilson would strike plaintiff\u2019s car after he disabled it in the middle of the street. Wilson\u2019s colliding into plaintiff\u2019s car was a foreseeable intervening act and was associated with Morrison\u2019s initial negligence. We hold that the requested instruction was not supported by the evidence. The trial court properly denied the request. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVI. Attorney\u2019s Fees\nAllstate contends that it was error to award attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 arguing that \u201cthe \u2018judgment for recovery of damages\u2019 exceeds $10,000.\u201d This issue requires us to determine whether the phrase \u201cjudgment for recovery of damages\u201d in G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 contemplates combining both punitive and compensatory damage awards in calculating whether the \u201cjudgment for recovery of damages is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or less . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21 (1986).\n\u201cThe general rule in this State is that, in the absence of statutory authority therefor, a court may not include an allowance of attorneys\u2019 fees as part of the costs recoverable by the successful party to an action or proceeding.\u201d In re King, 281 N.C. 533, 540, 189 S.E.2d 158, 162 (1972) (citations omitted).\nG.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 is an exception to the general rule and allows the trial court to award reasonable attorney\u2019s fees in certain cases. Thorpe v. Perry-Riddick, 144 N.C. App. 567, 571, 551 S.E.2d 852, 856 (July 3, 2001) (citing Hill v. Jones, 26 N.C. App. 168, 169, 215 S.E.2d 168, 169, cert denied, 288 N.C. 240, 217 S.E.2d 664 (1975)). The statute provides:\nIn any personal injury or property damage suit, or suit against an insurance company under a policy issued by the defendant insurance company and in which the insured or beneficiary is the plaintiff, upon a finding by the court that there was an unwarranted refusal by the defendant insurance company to pay the claim which constitute the basis of such suit, instituted in a court of record, where the judgment, for recovery of damages is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or less, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the litigant obtaining a judgment for damages in said suit, said attorney\u2019s fees to be taxed as a part of the court costs.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1 (emphasis supplied).\nAllstate contends that the \u201clegislature used the term \u2018damages,\u2019 clearly aware of the existence of both compensatory damages and punitive damages. It also used the words \u2018in any personal injury or property damage suit,\u2019 which would encompass all of the damages recovered . . . .\u201d Allstate cites no authority or reasoning in support of its contention. Allstate also argues that the \u201clanguage of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, and as such requires no construction by this Court.\u201d We agree with Allstate that the language of the statute is clear. To assign Allstate\u2019s meaning to the statute, however, ignores: (1) the remedial nature of the statute, and (2) precedent that the definition of the term \u201cdamages,\u201d by itself, does not include punitive damages.\nOur Supreme Court has held that G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 is a remedial statute, and \u201cbeing remedial, should be construed liberally to accomplish the purpose of the Legislature and to bring within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope.\u201d Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 239, 200 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1973) (citing Weston v. J. L. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 263, 75 S.E.2d 800 (1912); 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, \u00a7 303-05; 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 377). \u201cThe obvious purpose of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1 is to provide relief for a person who sustained injury or property damage in an amount so small that, if he must pay counsel from his recovery, it is not economically feasible to bring suit on his claim.\u201d Thorpe at 571, 551 S.E.2d at 856. (emphasis supplied) (citing Hicks at 239, 200 S.E.2d at 42).\nFirst, to construe the phrase \u201cjudgment for recovery of damages\u201d to include punitive damages awards would, in the aggregate, decrease the number of cases to which the statute would apply. Precedent requires us to include all cases fairly falling within the statute\u2019s intended scope. This Court concludes that Allstate\u2019s construction unnecessarily restricts its application. See e.g. West Through Farris v. Tilley, 120 N.C. App. 145, 150, 461 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1995) (finding defendant\u2019s argument that the court\u2019s \u201cjudgment\u201d herein must necessarily include medical expenses obtained by a non-party requires an unnecessarily restrictive application of G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1)\nSecond, including punitive damages to calculate the statute\u2019s applicability would reward a defendant\u2019s egregiously wrongful acts. A defendant who acts merely negligently and damages a plaintiff in the amount of $10,000.00 in compensatory damages may be required to pay plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees. On the other hand, a defendant who acts egregiously and wrongfully and who damages a plaintiff in the exact amount of $10,000.00 in compensatory damages, and who is also punished by the jury with punitive damages of any dollar amount, could not be required to pay plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees under the statute. The more culpable defendant obtains the benefit of not having to pay plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees even though that defendant damaged the plaintiff to the same extent as the defendant who acted merely negligent. The only difference being the latter defendant\u2019s more egregious actions. The main purpose of G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 is to provide relief for a person who sustains damages in an amount so small that, if he would have to pay his attorney from the recovery, it would not be economically feasible to bring suit, not to reward a defendant\u2019s willful and wanton conduct.\nIn addition to G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 being remedial in nature, this Court has previously interpreted the word \u201cdamages\u201d not to include punitive damages. In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 34 N.C. App. 96, 100, 237 S.E.2d 341, 345 (1977), the defendants contended that the word \u201cdamages\u201d included compensatory and punitive damages. Id. This Court disagreed. We explained that:\n[ t]he commonly accepted definition of the term \u2018damages\u2019 does not include punitive damages. ... \u2018In its legal sense the word \u2018damages\u2019 is defined as meaning the compensation which the law will award for an injury done; a compensation, recompense, or satisfaction in money for a loss or injury sustained; and the most common meaning of the term is compensation for actual injury.\u2019 Punitive damages are not compensation for injuries sustained.\nId. (citations omitted).\nWe hold that the word \u201cdamages\u201d as used in G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 applies only to the compensatory damage amounts when determining whether the judgment amount is equal to or less than $10,000.\nHere, the trial court did not segregate the attorney\u2019s fees awarded between G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 6-21.1 or 6-21.5, or Rules 36 or 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. In light of our holding it is unnecessary to consider, and we do not reach, Allstate\u2019s other arguments concerning G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5 or Rules 36 or 37.\nWe find no prejudicial error in the trial court\u2019s judgments and orders.\nNo prejudicial error.\nJudges MARTIN and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "E. Gregory Stott for plaintiff-appellee.", "Smith and Heiskell, P.C., by Christopher N. Heiskell, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM MICHAEL BOYKIN, Plaintiff v. THOMAS RAY MORRISON, RUFUS AARON WILSON, JR. and WILLIE PERRY, Defendants\nNo. COA01-80\n(Filed 28 December 2001)\n1. Insurance\u2014 automobile \u2014 uninsured motorist \u2014 motion for partial summary judgment \u2014 punitive damages\nThe trial court did not err in an action arising out of two automobile accidents by denying unnamed defendant insurance company\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages even though the insurance company contends that plaintiff\u2019s policy excludes punitive damages in its uninsured motorist coverage, because: (1) whether the insurance company\u2019s agreement with plaintiff provides for payment of punitive damages on behalf of the uninsured driver is irrelevant as to any issues at trial; and (2) although entitled, the insurance company did not file a declaratory judgment action under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-254 to determine the extent of its rights and obligations under its insurance agreement with plaintiff.\n2. Trials\u2014 bifurcated \u2014 compensatory phase \u2014 evidence of punitive damages\nThe trial court did not err in an action arising out of two automobile accidents by admitting evidence of punitive damages, including the uninsured driver\u2019s impairment, in the compensatory phase of a bifurcated trial under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 ID-30 because unnamed defendant insurance company failed to meet its burden to show prejudice or that a different result likely would have ensued.\n3. Motor Vehicles\u2014 automobile accident \u2014 instruction on doctrine of insulating or intervening negligence\nThe trial court did not err in an action arising out of two automobile accidents by refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of insulating or intervening negligence, because: (1) the second accident was not sufficiently independent of, and unassociated with, the uninsured driver\u2019s initial negligence of colliding into plaintiffs car, to insulate the uninsured driver from liability; (2) the uninsured driver could reasonably foresee that the second driver would strike plaintiffs car after he disabled it in the middle of the street; and (3) the second driver\u2019s colliding into plaintiff\u2019s car was a foreseeable intervening act and was associated with the uninsured driver\u2019s initial negligence.\n4. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 automobile accident\nThe trial court did not err in an action arising out of two automobile accidents by awarding attorney fees to plaintiff under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1, because: (1) the main purpose of the statute is to provide relief for a person who sustains damages in an amount so small that it would not be economically feasible to bring suit if he would have to pay his attorney from the recovery; (2) including punitive damages to calculate the statute\u2019s applicability would reward a defendant\u2019s egregiously wrongful acts; and (3) the word \u201cdamages\u201d as used in the statute applies only to the compensatory damage amounts when determining whether the judgment amount is equal to or less than $10,000.\nAppeal by unnamed defendant from judgments entered 11 May 2000 by Judge Henry W. Hight and order awarding costs and attorney\u2019s fees entered 17 May 2000 in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 October 2001.\nE. Gregory Stott for plaintiff-appellee.\nSmith and Heiskell, P.C., by Christopher N. Heiskell, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0098-01", "first_page_order": 128, "last_page_order": 136 }