{ "id": 9364175, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANGELA LOGNER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Logner", "decision_date": "2001-12-28", "docket_number": "No. COA00-1262", "first_page": "135", "last_page": "140", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 N.C. App. 135" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "490 So.2d 1308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7597595 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "extended Belton to justify a search where a driver was arrested twenty to thirty feet away from the vehicle" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/490/1308-01" ] }, { "cite": "717 F.2d 864", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11958620 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Belton applied to intoxicated defendant stumbling about outside the vehicle" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/717/0864-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 A.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7367983 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Belton limited to situations where officers confront or at least initiate confrontation while defendant is occupying the vehicle" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/632/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "984 F.2d 155", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10510207 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Belton applies only where officers initiate contact while defendant is in the vehicle" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/984/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144", "parenthetical": "citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 U.S. 454", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722898 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" }, { "page": "775" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/453/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522153 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 752", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1772077 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684996, 684903, 685077, 684891, 684989 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0677-02", "/nc/352/0677-03", "/nc/352/0677-04", "/nc/352/0677-05", "/nc/352/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11078493 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 U.S. 89", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/379/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 L. Ed. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 1130", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6514720, 6514787, 6515012, 6514326, 6514583, 6514649, 6514877, 6514494 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/1130-05", "/us/409/1130-06", "/us/409/1130-08", "/us/409/1130-01", "/us/409/1130-03", "/us/409/1130-04", "/us/409/1130-07", "/us/409/1130-02" ] }, { "cite": "471 F.2d 848", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 269146 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/471/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 F.2d 706", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1899177 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709", "parenthetical": "citing Taylor v. Arizona, 471 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130, 35 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/719/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338811 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 F.3d 843", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11101310 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 335 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/250/0843-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9784512, 9783616, 9783489, 9784931, 9785068, 9784364, 9784782, 9784238, 9785236, 9783863, 9783992, 9784122, 9784638 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1165-08", "/us/531/1165-02", "/us/531/1165-01", "/us/531/1165-11", "/us/531/1165-12", "/us/531/1165-07", "/us/531/1165-10", "/us/531/1165-06", "/us/531/1165-13", "/us/531/1165-03", "/us/531/1165-04", "/us/531/1165-05", "/us/531/1165-09" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685022 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "quoting Stale v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000) (citations omitted), cert. denied, Brewington v. North Carolina, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "quoting Stale v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000) (citations omitted), cert. denied, Brewington v. North Carolina, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 682, "char_count": 14050, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.4060163258904917e-07, "percentile": 0.8777154575421192 }, "sha256": "ac6f4e4b7634b95ec460f6de8db5e4428bc1dc849ad45d8eebb32889797dc289", "simhash": "1:026f2573630f91ee", "word_count": 2304 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:14:25.013425+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUDSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANGELA LOGNER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment sentencing her to prison for possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and for being a habitual felon. We affirm.\nAt approximately five o\u2019clock on the morning of 29 May 1998, four Durham police officers were dispatched to a disturbance on Guthrie Avenue in Durham, North Carolina. Upon arrival, Officer Laura Clayton (\u201cOfficer Clayton\u201d) noticed two vehicles parked one behind the other. Timothy Gurley (\u201cGurley\u201d) was in the driver\u2019s seat and Pam Parker (\u201cParker\u201d) was in the front passenger\u2019s seat of one of the vehicles (\u201cvehicle one\u201d). Defendant was in the driver\u2019s seat and her cousin, Tracy Logner (who is not involved in this action), was in the front passenger\u2019s seat of the second vehicle (\u201cvehicle two\u201d). Officer Clayton shined her flashlight into vehicle one and saw a tan, rock-like substance on the floorboard, which she believed to be an illegal substance. Officer Clayton also immediately recognized Gurley and knew that there were outstanding warrants for his arrest.\nGurley and Parker were both asked to exit vehicle one while defendant and her cousin remained in vehicle two. After exiting vehicle one, Parker began yelling at Officer Clayton in an attempt to \u201cdistract\u201d her. At that time, Gurley began fighting one of the officers before breaking away and running from the officer. As all the officers started chasing him, Officer Clayton realized that she had not secured the suspicious substance in vehicle one. When the officer turned around to retrieve the suspicious substance, she saw Parker get into the rear passenger seat of defendant\u2019s vehicle (vehicle two).\nDefendant attempted to pull off in vehicle two, but Officer Clayton stopped the vehicle before it left the scene. She removed Parker from the back seat and took her to a marked patrol car. After securing Parker in the patrol car, Officer Clayton asked if she could search defendant\u2019s vehicle. Defendant refused to grant permission for the search. Nevertheless, Officer Clayton and another officer searched the passenger compartment of defendant\u2019s vehicle. The officers found a rock of crack cocaine and a black film canister with cocaine residue in the vehicle\u2019s back seat. They also found two crack pipes under the floor mats of both the driver\u2019s seat and front passenger\u2019s seat, as well as a filter used in crack pipes between the driver\u2019s seat and the driver\u2019s door.\nDefendant was indicted on 29 May 1998 for possession of cocaine and possession of drag paraphernalia. Defendant was also indicted for being a habitual felon because, prior to the present case, defendant had been convicted of attempted common law robbery on 6 November 1991 and possession of a controlled substance on both 5 November 1996 and 21 February 1997. She waived her Miranda rights and signed a statement admitting the cocaine and drug paraphernalia were hers, but stating that her cousin had no knowledge of what was in the vehicle.\nOn 14 January 1999, defendant filed a motion to suppress, accompanied by a supporting affidavit, all the evidence obtained during the search of her vehicle on 29 May 1998. Defendant argued that the search was illegal and in violation of her rights under both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. (Defendant also filed a motion in limine on 11 February 1999 to prohibit the State from entering into evidence her signed admission statement, and defendant rejected a plea arrangement from the State on 18 February 1999.) The motion to suppress was later denied on 11 May 1999 after an evidentiary hearing before Judge Orlando F. Hudson (\u201cJudge Hudson\u201d).\nOn 13 May 1999, Judge Hudson presided over defendant\u2019s trial in the Durham County Superior Court. A jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges, and defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 112 to 144 months. Defendant appeals this judgment.\nNew counsel was appointed to handle defendant\u2019s appeal of the guilty verdicts. The new counsel also filed a motion for appropriate relief on 18 May 1999 asking the court to set aside defendant\u2019s sentence and grant a new sentencing hearing because her previous counsel did not introduce testimonial evidence that would support the finding of mitigating factors. Judge Hudson heard this motion on 17 April 2000 and granted it. After a resentencing hearing, defendant\u2019s sentence was amended to a prison term of 80 to 105 months.\nDefendant\u2019s numerous assignments of error all essentially argue that the trial court\u2019s verdict should be set aside and a new trial ordered because the court improperly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress all the evidence obtained from the unlawful search and seizure of defendant\u2019s vehicle after Parker was removed from the vehicle. \u201c[T]he standard of review in evaluating a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u2018are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u2019 \u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (quoting Stale v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000) (citations omitted), cert. denied, Brewington v. North Carolina, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001)). Thus, we must not disturb the trial court\u2019s conclusions if they are supported by the court\u2019s factual findings. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E.2d 618 (1982).\nBased on defendant\u2019s assigned errors, the major issue before this Court on appeal is whether the search and seizure was lawful. However, in order to address this issue we must determine: (I) whether Parker was lawfully arrested prior to the vehicle search and (II) whether she was an occupant of defendant\u2019s vehicle at the time of her arrest. We find that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because Parker was an occupant of defendant\u2019s vehicle and the search of that vehicle was incident to her arrest.\nI.\nFirst, we address whether Parker was lawfully under arrest prior to the search of defendant\u2019s vehicle. \u201cThe test for determining whether an individual is in custody or under arrest is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the \u2018suspect\u2019s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.\u2019 \u201d Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 850 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 335 (1984)). Our courts have further held that the subjective intent of the arresting officer can provide \u201csome evidence that the action taken was an arrest \u2014 but in and of itself it is not controlling.\u201d United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706, 709 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Taylor v. Arizona, 471 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130, 35 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1973)). Finally, in order to make a lawful arrest the officer must determine whether at the moment the arrest was made \u201cthe facts and circumstances within [the officer\u2019s] knowledge and of which [the officer] had reasonably trustworthy information [were] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.\u201d Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145 (1964) (citations omitted).\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court had competent evidence to support its finding that Parker was placed under arrest by Officer Clayton prior to the search of defendant\u2019s vehicle. The evidence showed that Officer Clayton first saw Parker in vehicle one, which appeared to have drugs on the floorboard. Next, Parker tried to distract the officer to give Gurley an opportunity to escape. Officer Clayton then saw Parker get into defendant\u2019s vehicle and attempt to leave the scene. The officer removed Parker and secured her in the back seat of a marked patrol car. Although she did not directly tell Parker she was being placed under arrest at that time, Officer Clayton testified that it was her intention, by these actions, to place Parker under arrest. Based on this evidence, including the subjective intent of the officer, the trial court properly made findings of fact which supported the conclusion that Parker was under arrest prior to the search and seizure. Furthermore, the arrest was lawful because the facts and circumstances leading up to the arrest were sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that Parker had committed an offense.\nII.\nSecond, we address whether the trial court had competent evidence to support its finding that Parker was an occupant of defendant\u2019s vehicle, thus allowing the vehicle to be searched incident to Parker\u2019s arrest. We hold that it did.\nGenerally, warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See State v. Coplen, 138 N.C. App. 48, 530 S.E.2d 313, cert. denied, 352 N.C. 677, 545 S.E.2d 438 (2000). However, a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Ghimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Under this exception, if the search is incident to a lawful arrest, an officer may \u201cconduct a warrantless search of the arrestee\u2019s person and the area within the arrestee\u2019s immediate control.\u201d State v. Thomas, 81 N.C. App. 200, 210, 343 S.E.2d 588, 594 (1986).\nNew York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), extended a search incident to a lawful arrest to vehicles. In Belton, the United States Supreme Court held that \u201cwhen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.\u201d Id. at 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 775. It is now well established that a passenger compartment search may consist of \u201cthe entire interior of the vehicle, including the glove compartment, the console, or any other compartment, whether locked or unlocked, and all containers found within the interior.\u201d State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 144, 446 S.E.2d 579, 587 (1994) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981)).\nOur case law provides no clear definition of \u201coccupant\u201d with respect to a vehicle search incident to an arrest. However, of those jurisdictions that have defined \u201coccupant,\u201d many have interpreted Belton to hold that an arrestee is an occupant of a vehicle if the police arrest or make initial contact with the defendant while the defendant is inside the vehicle. See United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1993) (Belton applies only where officers initiate contact while defendant is in the vehicle); Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383 (D.C. 1993) (Belton limited to situations where officers confront or at least initiate confrontation while defendant is occupying the vehicle). Some jurisdictions have further extended Belton to hold that one can be an occupant even if an officer does not arrest or make initial contact with the person while he or she is physically inside the vehicle. See United States v. Schecter, 717 F.2d 864 (3rd Cir. 1983) (Belton applied to intoxicated defendant stumbling about outside the vehicle); State v. McLendon, 490 So.2d 1308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (extended Belton to justify a search where a driver was arrested twenty to thirty feet away from the vehicle).\nBased on the facts in the present case, we find no need to consider those authorities that broadly interpret Belton because there is competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that Parker was physically inside defendant\u2019s vehicle. As stated earlier, the evidence showed that Officer Clayton saw Parker get into defendant\u2019s vehicle and attempt to leave the scene. The officer\u2019s removal of Parker from that vehicle and then placing her inside the patrol car signified her arrest. The subsequent search of defendant\u2019s vehicle was incident to Parker\u2019s arrest. Thus, the officers were lawfully entitled to conduct a warrantless search of defendant\u2019s vehicle and seize the cocaine and drug paraphernalia found within.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we find that the trial court properly admitted evidence obtained from the lawful search and seizure of defendant\u2019s vehicle after Parker\u2019s arrest.\nNo error.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUDSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.", "H. Wood Vann, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANGELA LOGNER\nNo. COA00-1262\n(Filed 28 December 2001)\n1. Arrest\u2014 warrantless \u2014 probable cause\nAn individual was placed under arrest by an officer prior to the search of defendant\u2019s vehicle, and the arrest was lawful because the circumstances leading up to the arrest were sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that the individual had committed an offense, where the officer first saw the individual in a second vehicle and observed what appeared to be drugs on the floor of that vehicle; the officer knew there were outstanding warrants for the arrest of the driver of the second vehicle; the individual tried to distract the officer to give her companion an opportunity to escape; the officer then saw the individual get into the back seat of defendant\u2019s vehicle, which atempted to leave the scene; the officer then removed the individual from defendant\u2019s vehicle and placed her in a marked patrol car; and the officer testified that she intended by these actions to place the individual under arrest.\n2. Search and Seizure\u2014 automobile \u2014 drugs\u2014motion to suppress \u2014 search incident to lawful arrest\nThe trial court did not err in a possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress all evidence obtained from a warrantless search of defendant\u2019s automobile after an individual was removed from the automobile, because the individual was an occupant of defendant\u2019s automobile and the search of that automobile was incident to her lawful arrest.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 May 1999 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 October 2001.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.\nH. Wood Vann, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0135-01", "first_page_order": 165, "last_page_order": 170 }