{ "id": 9367692, "name": "LLOYD M. COCHRANE v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE", "name_abbreviation": "Cochrane v. City of Charlotte", "decision_date": "2002-02-19", "docket_number": "No. COA00-1368", "first_page": "621", "last_page": "630", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 N.C. App. 621" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "175 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561719 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9381059 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 135-4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(y)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 135-106", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(y)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-24", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(la)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-26", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "time taken off for military service" }, { "page": "(e)", "parenthetical": "unused sick leave" }, { "page": "(h)", "parenthetical": "employment with the General Assembly" }, { "page": "(1)", "parenthetical": "approved leaves of absence" }, { "page": "(o)", "parenthetical": "federal employment" }, { "page": "(p)", "parenthetical": "part-time service" }, { "page": "(s)", "parenthetical": "actual time of employment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(8)" }, { "page": "(8)" }, { "page": "(17)" }, { "page": "(14)" }, { "page": "(13)" }, { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 412", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(e)(6)" }, { "page": "(e)(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.42", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11243047 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "775" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436886 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.41", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(a)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.50", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(y)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(e)(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.41", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 716, "char_count": 21367, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2290314980781122e-07, "percentile": 0.7787840140486955 }, "sha256": "6e65aab174a4748006db3b737119a605735c4b5c1d4f3e127d61be2cc2f049cd", "simhash": "1:5e0b1740dfbb15dc", "word_count": 3292 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:14:25.013425+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge HUNTER concurs.", "Judge GREENE concurs in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "LLOYD M. COCHRANE v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "THOMAS, Judge.\nRespondent, the City of Charlotte (City), appeals a declaratory judgment finding a former police officer to be eligible for a special separation allowance.\nThe separation allowance is a monthly supplemental payment lasting up to seven years that is payable to officers who, among other requirements, retire before reaching age sixty-two.\nPetitioner, Lloyd M. Cochrane, Jr. (Cochrane), retired from the City of Charlotte police force on a disability retirement in 1983 under the Law Enforcement Officers\u2019 Retirement System (LEORS), governed by Chapter 143 of the North Carolina General Statutes. On 1 January 1986, all assets of LEORS were transferred to the Local Government Employees\u2019 Retirement System (LGERS), with members and beneficiaries of LEORS becoming members and beneficiaries of LGERS. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.50(b) (1999). Cochrane\u2019s benefits are therefore now payable by LGERS, governed by Chapter 128 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\nIn March, 2000, having never received the separation allowance, Cochrane filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the court to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.41. That section is titled \u201cSpecial separation allowance.\u201d\nThe City answered that an initial eligibility requirement for the allowance, before any other factors need be considered, is that the officer retire on a service retirement. Cochrane, the City argues, retired on a disability retirement and therefore is not among those eligible.\nAfter a hearing during the 27 July 2000 term of Mecklenburg County Superior Court, the trial court denied the City\u2019s motion for summary judgment and found Cochrane eligible for the special separation allowance under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 143-166.41 and 143-166.42. Section 143-166.42 extends the special separation allowance statute to law enforcement officers employed by the local government.\nThe trial court based its decision on a finding of ambiguities in Chapter 128. The trial court determined that: \u201cSince the statute is ambiguous regarding whether or not a police officer who is on disability retirement is a member of the retirement system while on disability, the Court resolves the ambiguity in favor of the Petitioner and finds that the term \u2018creditable service\u2019 includes the time spent on disability retirement as credit allowed under the retirement system and therefore, the Petitioner meets the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-166.41.\u201d\nThe City appeals, arguing that under the plain language of both special separation allowance statutes, an initial requirement of eligibility is retirement on a service retirement. Cochrane, the City argues, fails to meet this fundamental requirement because he retired on a disability retirement. The City also contests the trial court\u2019s conclusions that: (1) the term \u201ccreditable service\u201d is ambiguous under section 143-166.41; and (2) Chapter 128 is ambiguous regarding whether an officer who is retired on a disability retirement is a \u201cmember\u201d or a \u201cbeneficiary\u201d of LGERS, and regarding whether that distinction makes a difference in this case.\nFor the reasons herein, we agree with the City that eligibility for the special separation allowance requires the officer to have retired on a basic service retirement.\nOn appeal, a trial court\u2019s findings of fact in a bench trial have the force of a jury verdict and are conclusive if supported by competent evidence. State v. Coronel, 145 N.C. App. 237, 250, 550 S.E.2d 561, 570 (2001). Conclusions of law drawn by the court from the facts found, however, involve legal questions and are always reviewable de novo by the appellate court. Mann Contr\u2019rs, Inc. v. Flair with Goldsmith Consultants-II, Inc., 135 N.C. App. 772, 775, 522 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1999).\nI.\nOur initial inquiry is whether Cochrane was precluded from consideration for the special separation allowance because he retired on a disability retirement.\nSection 143-166.41 provides:\n(a) [E]very sworn law-enforcement officer . . . employed by a State department, agency, or institution who qualifies under this section shall receive, beginning on the last day of the month in which he retires on a basic service retirement under the provisions of G.S. 135-5(a) or G.S. 143-166(y), an annual separation allowance equal to eighty-five hundredths percent (0.85%) of the annual equivalent of the base rate of compensation most recently applicable to him for each year of creditable service. The allowance shall be paid in 12 equal installments on the last day of each month. To qualify for the allowance the officer shall:\n(1) Have (i) completed 30 or more years of creditable service or, (ii) have attained 55 years of age and completed five or more years of creditable service; and\n(2) Not have attained 62 years of age; and\n(3) Have completed at least five years of continuous service as a law enforcement officer . . . immediately preceding a service retirement. Any break in the continuous service required by this subsection because of disability retirement . . . shall not adversely affect an officer\u2019s qualification to receive the allowance, provided the officer returns to service within 45 days after the disability benefits cease and is otherwise qualified to receive the allowance.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.41 (1999).\nEffective 1 January 1987, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.42 extended the coverage of the special separation allowance statute to law enforcement officers employed by local government:\nOn and after January 1, 1987, the provisions of G.S. 143-166.41 shall apply to all eligible law-enforcement officers . . . who are employed by local government employers, except as may be provided by this section. As to the applicability of the provisions of G.S. 143-166.41 to locally employed officers, the governing body for each unit of local government shall be responsible for making determinations of eligibility for their local officers retired under the provisions of G.S. 128-27(a) ....\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.42 (1999) (emphasis added). We note there is no assignment of error or contention by any party that section 143-166.42 is inapplicable to Cochrane because he retired prior to 1 January 1987, and therefore we do not address it.\nSection 128-27(a), referenced in the foregoing statute, is entitled \u201cService Retirement Benefits,\u201d and does not include disability retirement. Disability retirement has different requirements and is found in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-27(c), entitled \u201cDisability Retirement Benefits.\u201d Cochrane retired under 128-27(c), not 128-27(a).\nAdditionally, section 143-166.41 provides that the separation allowance begins on \u201cthe last day of the month in which [the officer] retires on a basic service retirement under the provisions of G.S. 135-5(a) or G.S. 143-166(y).\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.41(a) (1999) (emphasis added). Section 135-5(a) sets forth the service retirement benefits for the State retirement system. Section 143-166 has been repealed. Act of June 27th, 1985, ch. 479, sec. 196(t), para.(t), 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 412, 509. As with section 128-27(a), section 135-5(a) does not include disability retirement. The plain language of both special separation allowance statutes provides that the allowance is for former local and state law enforcement officers who retired on a basic service retirement and not, as Cochrane contends, a disability retirement.\nMoreover, in order to be eligible for the separation allowance, an officer must have completed five years of continuous service as a law enforcement officer \u201cimmediately preceding a service retirement.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.41(a)(3) (1999). The subsection goes on to state that disability retirement will not adversely affect the continuous service requirement, \u201cprovided the officer returns to service within 45 days after the disability benefits cease and is otherwise qualified to receive the allowance.\u201d Id. If disability retirement did not affect the continuous service requirement, such language would not be needed. Here, Cochrane did not return to work.\nII.\nAlthough we agree with the City that Cochrane does not qualify for the allowance because he did not retire on a service retirement, we proceed to address the trial court\u2019s conclusions: (1) that the term \u201ccreditable service\u201d is ambiguous under section 143-166.41 and includes time spent on disability retirement; and (2) that statutory ambiguities exist regarding a disability retiree\u2019s status as a member or beneficiary and whether the distinction affects eligibility for the separation allowance.\nThe definition of \u201ccreditable service\u201d is first found in section 143-166.41 itself, which provides:\nAs used in this section, \u201ccreditable service\u201d means the service for which credit is allowed under the retirement system of which the officer is a member. . . .\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166.41(b) (1999). Cochrane receives his disability retirement benefits from LGERS. LGERS defines \u201ccreditable service\u201d at N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21(8), which provides:\n\u201cCreditable service\u201d shall mean \u201cprior service\u201d plus \u201cmembership service\u201d for which credit is allowable as provided in G.S. 128-26.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21(8) (1999). Section 128-26 does not allow creditable service for disability retirement. Instead, the statute credits service for actual time of employment, and also details the circumstances under which an employee may purchase creditable service. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-26(a) (1999) (time taken off for military service); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-26(e) (unused sick leave); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-26(h) (employment with the General Assembly); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-26(1) (approved leaves of absence); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-26(o) (federal employment); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-26(p) (part-time service); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-26(s) (actual time of employment).\nMoreover, the time Cochrane spent on disability retirement qualifies as neither \u201cprior service\u201d nor \u201cmembership service\u201d under section 128-21(8). Prior service is \u201cservice of a member rendered before ... he becomes a member of the System.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21(17) (1999). Membership service is \u201cservice as an employee rendered while a member of the Retirement System.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21(14) (1999). Cochrane\u2019s time on disability retirement is not service rendered before he became, or while he was, a member of LGERS.\nSection 128-21(13) defines \u201cmember\u201d as \u201cany person included in the membership of the Retirement System as provided in G.S. 128-24.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21(13). Section 128-24, entitled \u201cMembership,\u201d provides that, \u201cThe membership of this Retirement System shall be composed as follows: (1) All employees entering or reentering the service of a participating employer after the date of participation in the Retirement System of the employer.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. 128-24(1) (1999). Membership is also contingent on continuing in that employment or, if employment has been terminated other than by retirement, on leaving one\u2019s accumulated contributions in LGERS. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-24(la) (1999). A member ceases to be a member only if he \u201cwithdraw[s] his accumulated contributions or should he become a beneficiary or die.\u201d Id. A beneficiary of LGERS is statutorily defined as \u201cany person in receipt of a pension, an annuity, a retirement allowance or other benefit as provided by this Article.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21(6) (1999). Cochrane is in receipt of a disability retirement allowance. He is, therefore, a beneficiary. Consequently, his time spent on disability is not counted toward creditable service.\nCochrane also contends that officers on a disability retirement should be given \u201ccreditable service\u201d because the term was used to calculate disability benefits. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166, which is now repealed, was used to calculate Cochrane\u2019s disability retirement income. The statute provided in pertinent part:\n[[T]he officer] shall receive a disability retirement equal to one and fifty-five one hundredths percent (1.55%) of his average final compensation... multiplied by the number of years of creditable service which he would have had if he had continued in service until his 55th birthday.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166(y) (emphasis added).\nThe statutory language Cochrane refers to is used solely for the calculation of the amount of the disability benefit payment. When calculating the amount, an officer is given the benefit of assuming he would have had creditable service until age 55. There is no statutory support for the contention that the above language is to be used in determining the number of years of creditable service. The statutory definition of \u201ccreditable service\u201d does not refer to the calculation of disability benefits. Time spent on disability retirement does not qualify as \u201ccreditable service\u201d and cannot be credited toward the thirty years of creditable service that is required under section 143-166.41(a)(l).\nIII.\nCochrane further contends that, even if there is a distinction between service retirement and disability retirement, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-27(e)(6) eventually dissolves the distinction by converting his disability retirement to a service retirement upon the earliest date on which he would have qualified for an unreduced service retirement allowance. We disagree.\nSection 128-27(e)(6) specifies that a disability beneficiary is entitled to a service retirement allowance on the \u201cdate on which he would have qualified for an unreduced service retirement allowance.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-27(e)(6) (1999). It does not grant creditable service for the years spent on disability, however. Had the General Assembly intended to give creditable service to local law enforcement officers for time spent on disability retirement, it could have used the language utilized for those in the State retirement system:\n[ T]he long-term disability benefit is payable so long as the beneficiary is disabled until the earliest date at which the beneficiary is eligible for an unreduced service retirement allowance from the Retirement System, at which time the beneficiary would receive a retirement allowance calculated on the basis of the beneficiary\u2019s average final compensation at the time of disability as adjusted to reflect compensation increases subsequent to the time of disability and the creditable service accumulated by the beneficiary, including creditable service while in receipt of benefits under the Plan.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 135-106(b) (emphasis added). Likewise, the General Assembly could have expressly stated in the provisions under \u201cCreditable Service\u201d its intention to grant creditable service for time spent on disability retirement. The General Assembly did not, but such language was included in the provisions of the State retirement system. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 135-4(y) (1999).\nIV.\nCochrane does raise a public policy issue. He argues that public policy mandates inclusion of disabled officers among those eligible for the special separation allowance. Whether or not we agree that they should be included as part of a preferred public policy, however, is irrelevant. Our authority is limited. \u201cIt is critical to our system of government and the expectation of our citizens that the courts not assume the role of legislatures.\u201d State v. Arnold, 147 N.C. App. 670, 673, 557 S.E.2d 119, 121 (2001). Normally, questions regarding public policy are for legislative determination. See Martin v. Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 41, 175 S.E.2d 665, 671 (1970).\nCochrane does not argue that the General Assembly exceeded its constitutional limits. Under statutes properly enacted by our General Assembly, Cochrane is not eligible for the special separation allowance. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed.\nREVERSED.\nJudge HUNTER concurs.\nJudge GREENE concurs in a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "THOMAS, Judge." }, { "text": "GREENE, Judge,\nconcurring in the result.\nI agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that Cochrane did not retire under a service retirement pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 128-27(a) and 135-5(a) and is thus ineligible for the special separation allowance authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 143-166.41 and 143-166.42 but write separately to address two aspects of the majority\u2019s analysis.\nSection 143-166.41(a) provides that \u201cevery sworn law-enforcement officer . . . shall receive, beginning on the last day of the month in which he retires on a basic service retirement under the provisions of G.S. 135-5(a) or G.S. 143-166(y), an annual separation allowance [(special separation allowance)],\u201d provided the law-enforcement officer shall:\n(1) [h]ave (i) completed 30 or more years of creditable service or, (ii) have attained 55 years of age and completed five or more years of creditable service-, and\n(3) [h]ave completed at least five years of continuous service as a law enforcement officer . . . immediately preceding a service retirement.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-166.41 (a) (1999) (emphasis added).\nCochrane argues that even if there is a distinction between a disability and a service retirement, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-27(e)(6) operates to transform a law-enforcement officer\u2019s disability retirement into a service retirement. I agree. According to the statute, \u201ca beneficiary in receipt of a disability retirement allowance until the earliest date on which he would have qualified for an unreduced service retirement allowance shall thereafter . . . (iii) be considered a beneficiary in receipt of a service retirement allowance.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 128-27(e)(6) (1999). \u201c[A] beneficiary in receipt of a disability retirement allowance,\u201d id., is, as the majority implicitly concedes, a beneficiary of a disability retirement plan. Likewise, \u201ca beneficiary in receipt of a service retirement allowance,\u201d id., must necessarily be a beneficiary of a service retirement plan. Thus, a disability retirement is transformed into a service retirement when the requisite qualifications are met, as occurred in this case in respect to Cochrane\u2019s disability retirement.\nCochrane further contends a person on disability retirement can accrue creditable service. \u201c[C]reditable service\u201d is defined as \u201cthe service for which credit is allowed under the retirement system of which the officer is a member.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-166.41(b) (1999). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-166(y), which was used to calculate Cochrane\u2019s disability retirement income, gives credit for \u201cthe number of years of creditable service which he would have had if he had continued in service until his 55th birthday.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-166(y) (1981) (repealed 1985). Thus, \u201ccreditable service,\u201d in the context of section 143-166.41, includes actual service as well as service a law-enforcement officer could have performed but for his disability and can be accrued during a person\u2019s disability retirement. Assuming Cochrane was a member of the disability retirement system at the time his disability benefits were calculated, the time spent on disability retirement, until Cochrane\u2019s 55th birthday, counts as creditable service under section 143-166.41.\nThus, I believe, Cochrane met his burden of showing that he is in receipt of a service retirement and accrued creditable service during his years on disability retirement. He nevertheless fails to overcome the requirement that a law-enforcement officer seeking the special separation allowance must \u201cretire[] on a basic service retirement.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-166.41(a) (1999) (emphasis added). To retire means to \u201cwithdraw from one\u2019s occupation.\u201d American Heritage College Dictionary 1165 (3d ed. 1993). For Cochrane, this occurred when he assumed a disability retirement, not when his disability retirement was transformed into a service retirement. Consequently, for this reason, I agree with the majority that Cochrane is not eligible for the special separation allowance.\n. The majority holds that once Cochrane\u2019s disability retirement commenced, his status changed from a member of the retirement system to a beneficiary.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "GREENE, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "DeVore, Acton & Stafford, P.A., by Fred W. DeVore, III, for petitioner-appellee.", "Assistant City Attorney Hope A. Root for respondent-appellant.", "Special Deputy Attorney General Alexander McC. Peters, Amicus Curiae for The Board of Trustees of the North Carolina Local Government Employees\u2019 Retirement System, the Teachers\u2019 and State Employees\u2019 Retirement System of North Carolina, and of the Retirement Systems Division, Department of State Treasurer." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LLOYD M. COCHRANE v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE\nNo. COA00-1368\n(Filed 19 February 2002)\nPolice Officers\u2014 special separation allowance \u2014 disability retirement \u2014 service retirement\nThe trial court erred in a declaratory judgment action by finding that plaintiff former police officer was eligible for a special separation allowance under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143-166.41 and 143-166.42, because: (1) the officer retired on a disability retirement, and an initial requirement of eligibility is retirement on a basic service retirement; (2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 128-26 does not allow creditable service for disability retirement; and (3) the time the officer spent on disability retirement does not qualify as either prior service or membership service under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 128-21(8).\nJudge Greene concurring in a separate opinion.\nAppeal by respondent from judgment entered 22 August 2000 by Judge L. Oliver Noble, Jr. in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2001.\nDeVore, Acton & Stafford, P.A., by Fred W. DeVore, III, for petitioner-appellee.\nAssistant City Attorney Hope A. Root for respondent-appellant.\nSpecial Deputy Attorney General Alexander McC. Peters, Amicus Curiae for The Board of Trustees of the North Carolina Local Government Employees\u2019 Retirement System, the Teachers\u2019 and State Employees\u2019 Retirement System of North Carolina, and of the Retirement Systems Division, Department of State Treasurer." }, "file_name": "0621-01", "first_page_order": 651, "last_page_order": 660 }