{ "id": 9128353, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JIMMY HARRIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harris", "decision_date": "2002-03-19", "docket_number": "No. COA00-899", "first_page": "398", "last_page": "405", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "149 N.C. App. 398" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135841, 135938, 135760, 135894, 135895 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0396-04", "/nc/353/0396-05", "/nc/353/0396-03", "/nc/353/0396-01", "/nc/353/0396-02" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441303 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549203 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519288 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793223 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 F.2d 414", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1167108 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/664/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778082 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Tucker, 317 N.C. 532, 543, 346 S.E.2d 417, 423 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308803 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Tucker, 317 N.C. 532, 543, 346 S.E.2d 417, 423 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0243-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 827, "char_count": 17204, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.050042922922503e-08, "percentile": 0.5046618548031179 }, "sha256": "5b7b2ffcc69a772932404fe9790eea3c6bcd916a263bd13fa7aeb748603d957d", "simhash": "1:2b635c26173fbcda", "word_count": 2807 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:06:37.161258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JIMMY HARRIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nAt approximately nine o\u2019clock on the night of 31 October 1998, Benita Gregory (\u201cBenita\u201d) went to visit defendant (who lived a few houses away from Benita) while her brother babysat Benita\u2019s seven-year-old disabled son, Nathaniel. When two hours had passed and Benita had not returned home, Benita\u2019s brother took Nathaniel over to defendant\u2019s house. Upon entering defendant\u2019s house, Nathaniel found his mother drinking and arguing with defendant. Benita told Nathaniel to leave the room in which she and defendant were arguing and to go into the kitchen. The argument continued and ultimately resulted in Benita falling to the floor. In the course of these events Benita received a severe head injury. Although Benita was bleeding and had difficulty talking or getting up from the floor, she indicated she did not want anyone to call for help.\nDefendant took Benita to the hospital at approximately eight o\u2019clock the next evening (1 November 1998). Defendant told medical personnel that Benita had fallen and hit her head. The initial examination at the hospital revealed that Benita had suffered \u201can acute cerebral event.\u201d Over the next several hours, Benita\u2019s condition quickly deteriorated and she soon became unresponsive. She was eventually declared dead on 3 November 1998.\nThe police began their investigation on 2 November 1998 when medical personnel reported that Benita was in critical condition. Nathaniel was the first person interviewed. At that time, Nathaniel stated that he saw his mother arguing and wrestling with defendant just before she fell, hitting her head on a heater in defendant\u2019s living room. However, when the police interviewed Nathaniel again on 4 November 1998, he said that defendant had hit his mother in the head with a hammer. Nathaniel also said that he was scared of defendant and was afraid that defendant would do something to him if he talked about the incident.\nDefendant fully cooperated with the police investigation, which included consenting to interviews, searches, and agreeing to tests. Defendant was first questioned by the police on 2 November 1998 and, consistent with Nathaniel\u2019s original statement, he also said that Benita had fallen and hit her head on a kerosene heater. When the police went to defendant\u2019s house two days after the incident, they found no signs of cleanup. Blood was still on the floor and on defendant\u2019s mattress. A hammer with some blood and a strand of hair on it was also found on the floor. Laboratory analysis later confirmed that the blood on the floor and the mattress belonged to Benita. The blood on the hammer belonged to defendant, but the strand of hair was consistent with Benita\u2019s hair. There were no fingerprints on the hammer. No blood or hair was found on the heater.\nA warrant was issued for defendant\u2019s arrest on 3 November 1998 for first-degree murder of Benita. Defendant promptly surrendered himself upon being informed about the warrant. In a statement made following his arrest, defendant said that Benita had threatened to hit him with a tequila bottle on the night of 31 October 1998 and that he had swung his walking stick at Benita in self-defense causing her to fall. Defendant assumed that he had hit her in the head. However, when a detective reminded defendant that in an earlier statement he had said that Benita fell on a heater, he replied, \u201cI don\u2019t know. I was scared.\u201d\nDuring his pre-trial incarceration, defendant was afflicted with severe psychiatric and physical health issues. During all times to this action, defendant was on disability and received medications for a serious heart problem and brain damage with partial paralysis, which required him to use a walking stick. Prior to trial, defendant was hospitalized on three occasions. Nevertheless, he was declared competent to stand trial after receiving the necessary medication.\nThe day before opening arguments, defendant was rushed to the hospital for treatment of high blood pressure and apparent over-medication. Although defense counsel informed the trial court of defendant\u2019s overmedication, the presiding judge, Judge Hollis M. Owens, Jr. (\u201cJudge Owens\u201d), did not hold a competency hearing. A similar situation arose in the middle of the trial.\nDuring the trial, the State called Nathaniel as one of its witnesses. Nathaniel testified that he never actually saw defendant pick up a hammer. However, he did see defendant hit Benita in the head with a hammer as defendant said, \u201cYou f \u2014 king bitch, I\u2019m going to kill you.\u201d\nFollowing Nathaniel\u2019s testimony, the State moved under Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence (\u201cRule 404(b)\u201d) to introduce evidence from three witnesses concerning the nature of the relationship between defendant and Benita. Over defendant\u2019s objections, Judge Owens admitted this evidence as tending to show a common scheme, as well as the absence of an accident and a negation of self-defense. Thereafter, the witnesses (Cathy Lane, Geraldine Jordan, and Diane Hall) testified about an argument between Benita and defendant that took place approximately three months prior to her death. Even though none of the witnesses saw the beginning of this argument, they each testified to seeing defendant push and shove Benita several times during the argument. They also saw a baseball bat which, during the course of the argument, was in the possession of each party and was used by each party to hit defendant\u2019s vehicle. Finally, all three witnesses testified that they had not seen Benita act aggressively towards or threaten defendant during this incident or any other.\nDr. John Butts (\u201cDr. Butts\u201d), Chief Medical Examiner for the State of North Carolina, testified as a medical expert for the State. Dr. Butts had performed Benita\u2019s autopsy on 5 November 1998. The autopsy revealed that swelling and bruising of Benita\u2019s brain had prevented the flow of blood to her brain, which caused brain damage and an acute stroke to the right side of her brain. In Dr. Butts\u2019 opinion, the swelling and bruising of Benita\u2019s brain was caused by a blunt force impact to the right side of her head. He also opined that the bruise pattern was consistent with a blow from a hammer and not a heater. However, a neurologist testified that there was a small possibility that a stroke of this type could have been caused by Benita\u2019s history of diabetes, obesity, and heart disease.\nDefendant testified that he had known Benita for no more than five months before her death and had not had a romantic or sexual relationship with her during that time (although Benita had told her friends otherwise). As to the circumstances surrounding Benita\u2019s death, defendant testified as follows: On the night of 31 October 1998, Benita arrived at defendant\u2019s house by herself sometime after 9:30 p.m. and had three or four shots of tequila. When Nathaniel arrived at defendant\u2019s house two hours later, defendant asked Benita to leave. She became very upset and tried to hit defendant with a tequila bottle. Defendant knocked the bottle out of her hand with his walking stick. Benita, appearing both upset and drunk, turned to leave, but stumbled sideways. She fell over and hit her head on a kerosene heater. Benita told defendant she was alright, but was tired and did not want to go home. Defendant reluctantly let her spend the rest of the night on his floor. Defendant did not see any blood until the next afternoon when he splashed water on Benita\u2019s face to wake her up. Defendant took Benita to the hospital a few hours later.\nPrior to defendant\u2019s cross-examination, Judge Owens ruled that the State could impeach defendant with a 1984 conviction in Florida for felony aggravated battery against his then wife by the use of a bullwhip. This conviction was defendant\u2019s only prior conviction and was more than ten years old. Judge Owens admitted this evidence under Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence (\u201cRule 609\u201d) on the grounds that the old conviction combined with other evidence demonstrated a pattern of behavior and that defendant\u2019s credibility was central to the resolution of his case. Defense counsel timely objected and excepted to the court\u2019s ruling.\nOn 19 November 1999, a jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. Judge Owens sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals this judgment.\nBy defendant\u2019s first assignment of error he argues the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to cross-examine him about his 1984 conviction in Florida for felony aggravated battery. We agree.\nRule 609 allows for the impeachment of a witness during cross-examination by offering evidence of that witness\u2019 prior criminal conviction^). See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609(a) (1999). Rule 609 also states:\nEvidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.\n\u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609(b).\nA defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions \u201care not to \u2018be considered as substantive evidence that [defendant] committed the crimes\u2019 for which he is presently on trial by characterizing him as \u2018a bad man of a violent, criminal nature . . . clearly more likely to be guilty of the crime charged.\u2019 \u201d State v. Carter, 326 N.C. 243, 250, 388 S.E.2d 111, 116 (1990) (quoting State v. Tucker, 317 N.C. 532, 543, 346 S.E.2d 417, 423 (1986)). In fact, our Supreme Court has held that \u201c[t]he only \u2018legitimate purpose\u2019 for admitting a defendant\u2019s past convictions is to cast doubt upon his veracity[.]\u201d Id. Thus, the most probative type of prior conviction admissible for impeachment purposes is \u201can offense that indicates a lack of veracity, such as fraud, forgery or perjury.\u201d United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 418-19 n.6 (4th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).\nDuring the trial, the court allowed the State to cross-examine defendant about his more than ten-year-old conviction for felony aggravated battery. After a careful review of the record and transcript, it appears highly probable that the jury would have found sufficient evidence to convict defendant of Benita\u2019s murder without evidence of the 1984 conviction having been introduced. However, since this stale conviction sheds no light on defendant\u2019s veracity, but instead characterizes defendant as a woman abuser and a violent person who would have been likely to hit Benita in the head with a hammer, there is a strong possibility that the introduction of this prior conviction caused the jury to find defendant guilty of first-degree murder rather than a lesser crime. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence of defendant\u2019s conviction in 1984 should not have been admitted because the substantial likelihood of prejudice outweighed the minimal impeachment value of the evidence.\nDespite our decision to grant defendant a new trial based on his first assignment of error, we also address defendant\u2019s second assignment of error because of the likelihood of it becoming an issue in a retrial. Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s decision to admit evidence concerning the \u201cball bat incident\u201d between him and Benita violated Rule 404(b). We disagree.\nRule 404(b) governs the admissibility of a defendant\u2019s prior bad acts. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1999). This rule states, in part, that:\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nId.\nIn applying Rule 404(b), our Supreme Court has consistently held \u201cthat a defendant\u2019s prior assaults on the victim, for whose murder defendant is presently being tried, are admissible for the purpose of showing malice, premeditation, deliberation, intent or ill will against the victim.\u201d State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 229, 461 S.E.2d 687, 703 (1995) (citations omitted). In the case sub judice, evidence of the \u201cball bat incident\u201d provided by the witnesses included testimony that defendant pushed and shoved Benita while she begged him to leave her alone. This evidence of defendant\u2019s prior assault on Benita, likewise tends to establish malice, premeditation, deliberation, intent and ill will on the part of defendant. Thus, the evidence is relevant to an issue other than defendant\u2019s character. We therefore hold that evidence of the \u201cball bat incident\u201d was admissible under Rule 404(b).\nFurthermore, this Court has held that \u201c[w]hen prior incidents are offered for a proper purpose, the ultimate test of admissibility is whether they are sufficiently similar and not so remote as to run afoul of the balancing test between probative value and prejudicial effect set out in Rule 403.\u201d State v. West, 103 N.C. App. 1, 9, 404 S.E.2d 191, 197 (1991). Admission of evidence under Rule 403 is a matter generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Abuse will only be found where the trial court\u2019s ruling is \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 379, 428 S.E.2d 118, 133 (1993).\nThe trial court in the present case made no specific finding that the probative value of evidence relating to the \u201cball bat incident\u201d outweighed its prejudicial effect. However, as long as the procedure followed by the trial court demonstrates that a Rule 403 balancing test was conducted, a specific finding is not required. See State v. Washington, 141 N.C. App. 354, 367, 540 S.E.2d 388, 397-98 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 396, 547 S.E.2d 427 (2001). Here, the record and trial transcript indicate that the court determined the \u201cball bat incident\u201d was not too remote in time as to run afoul of the balancing test because the incident occurred only a few months prior to Benita\u2019s death and tended to show a common plan or scheme, absence of accident, and tended to negate self-defense. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the \u201cball bat incident\u201d because the evidence was more probative than prejudicial.\nSince we reverse the trial court for the improper admission of the stale conviction, we see no need to address defendant\u2019s third assignment of error regarding whether the court erred in not holding a hearing to determine his competency since the circumstances would likely be entirely different on a retrial. However, for the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court and grant defendant a new trial.\nNew trial.\nJudges GREENE and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. There was some evidence that Benita may have been afraid the Department of Social Services might take Nathaniel away from her if they discovered that she had been drinking.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Philip A. Lehman, for the State.", "Rudolf Maher Widenhouse & Fialko, by Andrew G. Schopler,for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JIMMY HARRIS\nNo. COA00-899\n(Filed 19 March 2002)\n1. Evidence\u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 stale conviction\u2014 felony aggravated battery\nThe trial court erred in a first-degree murder prosecution by permitting the State to cross-examine defendant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609 about his 1984 conviction in Florida for felony aggravated battery, because: (1) the stale conviction sheds no light on defendant\u2019s veracity, but instead characterizes defendant as a woman abuser and a violent person who would have been likely to hit the victim in the head with a hammer; (2) there is a strong possibility that the introduction of this prior conviction caused the jury to find defendant guilty of first-degree murder rather than a lesser crime; and (3) the substantial likelihood of prejudice outweighed the minimal impeachment value of the evidence.\n2. Evidence\u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 ball bat incident\u2014 assault\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by admitting evidence under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) concerning a \u201cball bat incident\u201d between defendant and the victim, including testimony that defendant pushed and shoved the victim while she begged defendant to leave her alone, because: (1) this evidence of defendant\u2019s prior assault on the victim tends to establish malice, premeditation, deliberation, intent, and ill-will on the part of defendant; (2) the evidence is relevant to an issue other than defendant\u2019s character; and (3) the incident was not too remote in time as to run afoul of the balancing test since the incident occurred only a few months prior to the victim\u2019s death and tended to show a common plan or scheme, absence of accident, and tended to negate self-defense.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 November 1999 by Judge Hollis M. Owens, Jr. in Graham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 November 2001.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Philip A. Lehman, for the State.\nRudolf Maher Widenhouse & Fialko, by Andrew G. Schopler,for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0398-01", "first_page_order": 432, "last_page_order": 439 }