{ "id": 9129262, "name": "BELINDA M. STORCH and JULIUS CLEMONS STORCH, III, Plaintiffs v. WINN-DIXIE CHARLOTTE, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Storch v. Winn-Dixie Charlotte, Inc.", "decision_date": "2002-03-19", "docket_number": "No. COA01-375", "first_page": "478", "last_page": "482", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "149 N.C. App. 478" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "38 S.E. 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1901, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659664 ], "year": 1901, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/128/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4722697, 4725936, 4721340, 4722525, 4724158 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0612-03", "/nc/313/0612-05", "/nc/313/0612-01", "/nc/313/0612-02", "/nc/313/0612-04" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267-68", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526819 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564057 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24, fn.2" }, { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2484550 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417-18, fn.2" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0415-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 452, "char_count": 9589, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7484453726838901 }, "sha256": "dae8876abe406972bf9bba6637935c47f04ad9ac9e3cf830dea7a6d300bc293f", "simhash": "1:2b6b37721462859d", "word_count": 1593 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:06:37.161258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "BELINDA M. STORCH and JULIUS CLEMONS STORCH, III, Plaintiffs v. WINN-DIXIE CHARLOTTE, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nPlaintiffs are the parents of Jason Paul Storch, who died in a single car accident on 19 September 1998 in Avery County. Plaintiffs brought this action under Chapter 18B, Article 1A of the North Carolina General Statutes, North Carolina\u2019s Dram Shop Act, alleging that Jason, who was eighteen years old at the time of his death, was intoxicated after having consumed alcohol which he purchased from defendant\u2019s store in Boone, N.C. prior to the fatal accident. Plaintiffs sued in their individual capacities, alleging they have suffered damages as a result of defendant\u2019s negligent sale of alcohol to Jason and are \u201caggrieved parties\u201d within the meaning of the Act. Defendant filed answer denying it sold or furnished alcohol to Jason and alleging affirmative defenses. Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment were denied, and the issues were tried by a jury. The jury found that plaintiffs were injured as a result of defendant\u2019s sale of alcoholic beverages to an underage person and awarded damages in the amount of $50,000 to each plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment on the jury\u2019s verdict and denied defendant\u2019s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for a new trial. Defendant appeals.\nThe sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the parents of an underage person who dies from iryuries proximately resulting from his operation of a motor vehicle while impaired after consuming alcoholic beverages sold or furnished to him in violation of G.S. \u00a7 18B-302(a) may be \u201caggrieved parties\u201d within the meaning of G.S. \u00a7 18B-120 et seq., North Carolina\u2019s \u201cDram Shop Act.\u201d We answer affirmatively.\nArticle 1A of Chapter 18B of the North Carolina General Statutes authorizes a claim by an \u201caggrieved party\u201d for damages for injury proximately caused by the negligent selling of alcoholic beverages to an underage person. G.S. \u00a7 18B-121 provides:\nAn aggrieved party has a claim for relief for damages against a permittee or local Alcoholic Control Board if:\n(1) The permittee or his agent or employee or the local board or its agent or employee negligently sold or furnished an alcoholic beverage to an underage person; and\n(2) The consumption of the alcoholic beverage that was sold or furnished to an underage person caused or contributed to, in whole or in part, an underage driver\u2019s being subject to an impairing substance within the meaning of G.S. 20-138.1 at the time of the injury; and\n(3) The injury that resulted was proximately caused by the underage driver\u2019s negligent operation of a vehicle while so impaired.\nAn \u201caggrieved party\u201d is defined as \u201ca person who sustains an injury as a consequence of the actions of the underage person, but does not include the underage person . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 18B-120(1). Because the underage person is expressly excluded from the definition of \u201caggrieved party\u201d in G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(1), his personal representative is also excluded and may not maintain an action for wrongful death under the Dram Shop Act, since the personal representative may only bring a claim which could have been brought by the decedent if he had lived. Clark v. Inn West, 324 N.C. 415, 379 S.E.2d 23 (1989).\nIn Clark v. Inn West, supra, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the personal representative of the estate of an underage person who died as a result of injuries sustained in an accident caused by his impaired driving after the consumption of alcohol could maintain an action under the Dram Shop Act. As noted above, the Court held that because G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2 provides for the survivor-ship of claims by a personal representative only if such claim could have been brought by the decedent if he had lived, and the underage person is expressly excluded from the definition of an \u201caggrieved party\u201d contained in G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(1), the personal representative could not maintain an action under G.S. \u00a7 18B-121. Notably, however, even though the question of the standing of the parent of an underage person to maintain such an action, individually, was not before the Court, the Court noted that a parent of the underage person is not expressly excluded from the definition of an \u201caggrieved party.\u201d Clark, 324 N.C. at 417-18, fn.2, 379 S.E.2d at 24, fn.2. The Court went on to examine the definition of \u201cinjury\u201d contained in G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(2) and concluded that the statute \u201cdoes not preclude recovery for loss of support by their underage child, if the underage child in fact supported the parents.\u201d Id. at 418, 379 S.E.2d at 24.\nThe Court\u2019s analysis with respect to the parent\u2019s standing to bring the action as individuals was unnecessary to its decision and, as dictum, is not binding precedent. In re University of North Carolina, 300 N.C. 563, 576, 268 S.E.2d 472, 480 (1980). Nevertheless, such analysis is directly relevant to the issue before us and we adopt it. \u201cA remedial statute must be construed broadly, in light of the evils sought to be remedied and the objectives to be attained.\u201d Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 379, 325 S.E.2d 260, 267-68 (1985) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985). Thus, we hold that a parent of an underage driver injured or killed as a, result of such underage driver\u2019s negligent operation of a motor vehicle due to impairment resulting from the consumption of alcohol may be an \u201caggrieved party\u201d within the meaning of G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(1) so as to have standing to maintain an action under the Dram Shop Act if such parent suffers an injury as a proximate result of the negligent selling of alcoholic beverages to the underage person.\nThe term \u201cinjury\u201d under the statute\nincludes, but is not limited to, personal injury, property loss, loss of means of support, or death. Damages for death shall be determined under the provisions of G.S 28A-18-2((b). Nothing in G.S. 28A-18-2(a) or subdivision (1) of this section shall be interpreted to preclude recovery under this Article for. . . death on account of injury to or death of the underage person . . . . \u201d\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 18B-120(2) (emphasis added). Clearly, under subsection (2), a parent of an underage person killed as a result of his own impaired driving would be an \u201caggrieved party\u201d to the extent the parent\u2019s automobile was damaged as a consequence of the underage person\u2019s impaired driving and would have standing to maintain an action under G.S. \u00a7 18B-121. In addition, the last sentence of subsection (2) expressly renders inapplicable the limitation of G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(a) restricting the right of recovery of damages for death of the underage person to the personal representative. Indeed, as the Supreme Court must have recognized in its analysis of the statute in Clark, if the last sentence of subsection (2) were interpreted otherwise, G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(a) would preclude a parent from recovering for loss of support by the underage child.\nSubsection (2) provides that damages for death be determined as directed by G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(b). As applicable to the parent of the underage person, \u201cinjury\u201d would include funeral expenses of the underage person, G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(b)(3), as well as damages for loss of services, G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(b)(4)b, society, companionship, etc., G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(b)(4)c, and loss of support. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 18B-120(2); Clark, supra. Thus, even though an action for wrongful death is reserved to the personal representative of the decedent and a parent, individually, may not maintain a wrongful death action for death of his or her child, Killian v. R.R., 128 N.C. 261, 38 S.E. 873 (1901), damages under G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(b) may be available, in a completely distinct claim under the Dram Shop Act to the parent of an underage child who negligently drove a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and died from injuries sustained as a proximate result thereof.\nIn summary, we hold that a parent of an underage person who dies from injuries proximately resulting from his operation of a motor vehicle while impaired after consuming alcohol negligently sold by a permittee may be included within the class of persons known as \u201caggrieved parties\u201d under G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(1), and may recover damages for his or her \u201cinjury,\u201d including damages pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(b).\nNo error.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Bums & Boughman, by Ronnie M. Mitchell and Coy E. Brewer, Jr., for plaintiff - appellees.", "Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.R, by Dayle A. Flammia and Bryan T. Simpson, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BELINDA M. STORCH and JULIUS CLEMONS STORCH, III, Plaintiffs v. WINN-DIXIE CHARLOTTE, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA01-375\n(Filed 19 March 2002)\nAlcoholic Beverages\u2014 Dram Shop claim \u2014 parent of underage impaired driver\nThe trial court correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in an action under the Dram Shop Act by the parents of an intoxicated eighteen-year-old who died in a single car accident. A parent of an underage person who dies from injuries proximately resulting from his operation of a motor vehicle while impaired after consuming alcohol negligently sold by a permittee may be included within the class of people known as \u201caggrieved parties\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(1) and may recover damages for his or her \u201cinjury,\u201d including damages pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(b).\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 4 April 2000, judgment entered 28 July 2000, and order entered 21 September 2000 by Judge B. Craig Ellis in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 2002.\nMitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Bums & Boughman, by Ronnie M. Mitchell and Coy E. Brewer, Jr., for plaintiff - appellees.\nTeague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.R, by Dayle A. Flammia and Bryan T. Simpson, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0478-01", "first_page_order": 512, "last_page_order": 516 }