{ "id": 9131221, "name": "ELIZABETH DESPATHY, Plaintiff v. WILFRED DESPATHY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Despathy v. Despathy", "decision_date": "2002-04-02", "docket_number": "No. COA01-436", "first_page": "660", "last_page": "663", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "149 N.C. App. 660" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793216, 793197, 793171, 793173, 793241 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0419-02", "/nc/341/0419-01", "/nc/341/0419-05", "/nc/341/0419-04", "/nc/341/0419-03" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11913943 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538080, 2538689, 2537376, 2537868, 2537009 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0615-05", "/nc/336/0615-01", "/nc/336/0615-04", "/nc/336/0615-02", "/nc/336/0615-03" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523151 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" }, { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552552 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/11/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522057 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524276 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0787-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 424, "char_count": 7643, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0793453809105805e-07, "percentile": 0.5620783296632352 }, "sha256": "bb633c3d89b0931f9fc85816c10bbecb05624e75054aadb3002ef4011c0c2744", "simhash": "1:656ac28e387feaf7", "word_count": 1237 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:06:37.161258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "ELIZABETH DESPATHY, Plaintiff v. WILFRED DESPATHY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nOn 4 August 1999, Elizabeth Despathy (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) filed a complaint against her husband, Wilfred Despathy (\u201cdefendant\u201d), in Buncombe County District Court seeking, among other relief, a divorce from bed and board and equitable distribution of the marital assets. The parties thereafter submitted for approval by the trial court twenty-three stipulations regarding equitable distribution, including the following:\n10. The 1967 Buick.\nThis car is in Wife\u2019s possession and should be distributed to Wife.\nNo lien.\n11. The 1970 Buick.\nThis car is in Husband\u2019s possession and should be distributed to Husband.\nNo lien.\nThe trial court approved the stipulations. In its equitable distribution judgment filed 30 January 2001, however, the trial court deviated from the stipulations, awarding the 1970 Buick to plaintiff and the 1967 Buick to defendant. In a document entitled \u201cLetter of Opinion,\u201d the trial judge informed the parties\u2019 attorneys that he would \u201cdistribute the more valuable \u201967 Buick to [defendant], and the \u201970 Buick to [plaintiff]\u201d because \u201c[defendant] is the collector, and because it helps reduce the final Distributive Award [plaintiff] will owe to him.\u201d Defendant now appeals to this Court.\nThe dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court was obligated under the terms of the pre-trial stipulations to award the 1967 Buick automobile to plaintiff and the 1970 Buick automobile to defendant. Under the facts of the present case, we conclude that the trial court was not bound by the stipulations, and we therefore affirm the order of the trial court.\nThe division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing by the appellant of abuse of that discretion. See Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N.C. App. 787, 790, 338 S.E.2d 567, 569-70 (1986). \u201c[T]he trial court\u2019s rulings in equitable distribution cases receive great deference and may be upset only if they are so arbitrary that they could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 162, 344 S.E.2d 100, 104 (1986).\nNorth Carolina General Statutes section 1A-1, Rule 16, allows a trial judge \u201cin his discretion [to] direct the attorneys for the parties [in any action] to appear before him for a conference.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 16(a) (1999). Further,\n[i]f a conference is held, the judge may make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 16 (a)(7) (1999). \u201cAn admission in a pleading or a stipulation admitting a material fact becomes a judicial admission in a case and eliminates the necessity of submitting an issue in regard thereto to the jury.\u201d Crowder v. Jenkins, 11 N.C. App. 57, 62, 180 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1971). Judicial admissions \u201care binding on the pleader as well as the court.\u201d Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Oldham, 113 N.C. App. 490, 493, 439 S.E.2d 179, 181, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 615, 447 S.E.2d 412 (1994); see also Buie v. High Point Associates Ltd. Partnership, 119 N.C. App. 155, 158, 458 S.E.2d 212, 215 (noting that judicial admissions are conclusive upon the parties and the trial judge), disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 419, 461 S.E.2d 755 (1995).\nDefendant argues that the stipulations entered into between the parties regarding ownership of the Buick vehicles were binding and conclusive upon the trial court, and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to abide by the terms of the stipulations. Plaintiff contends that it was within the trial court\u2019s discretion to deviate from the pre-trial order and award plaintiff the less valuable automobile. We agree with plaintiff.\nThe purpose of a stipulation is to \u201climit[] the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 16 (a)(7). The normal effect of a stipulation by the parties is the \u201c \u2018withdraw[al] [of] a particular fact from the realm of dispute.\u2019 \u201d Crowder, 11 N.C. App. at 62, 180 S.E.2d at 486 (quoting Stansbury, N.C. Evidence 2d \u00a7 166).\nThe language of the stipulations disputed by the parties in the present case, however, failed to definitively dispose of the issue of ownership of the Buick vehicles. Rather than assigning ownership of the automobiles to one party or the other, the stipulations stated that the 1967 Buick \u201cshould be distributed to Wife\u201d and that the 1970 Buick \u201cshould be distributed to Husband\u201d (emphasis added). As such, the stipulations regarding the automobiles did not remove the issue of their distribution from dispute, and under the plain language of the stipulations, the trial court was not bound to abide by the parties\u2019 suggestions concerning distribution of the vehicles. The equivocal nature of the stipulations is even more apparent when contrasted with the other stipulations contained in the pre-trial order. For example, the parties stipulated that all \u201c[personal property.... [h]as been divided equally.\u201d The trial court therefore did not address the issue of the parties\u2019 personal property in its equitable distribution judgment, as that issue had been properly \u201cwithdrawn from the realm of dispute.\u201d Further stipulations listed various assets and debts of the parties, followed by the words \u201cDISTRIBUTION: HUSBAND.\u201d Accordingly, the trial court assigned such assets and debts to defendant. Thus, if the parties had desired to remove from the trial court\u2019s consideration the issue of ownership of the Buick automobiles, they could have done so. Because the language of the stipulations regarding the automobiles was permissive rather than mandatory, we hold that the trial court could properly award the automobiles according to its discretion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges BRYANT and SMITH concur.\n. In so holding, we note that the better practice would have been for the trial judge to have immediately notified the parties of his intent to modify the distributive award when he realized that an equitable distribution of the marital assets required a slight deviation from the apparent desires of the parties as reflected in the pre-trial stipulations, thus allowing the parties the opportunity to re-evaluate and potentially revalue the marital assets in order to reach a final award amenable to both sides.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Carol B. Andres for plaintiff appellee.", "Cecilia Johnson for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ELIZABETH DESPATHY, Plaintiff v. WILFRED DESPATHY, Defendant\nNo. COA01-436\n(Filed 2 April 2002)\nDivorce\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 deviation from stipulations\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in an equitable distribution case by deviating from the parties\u2019 stipulations that a 1967 Buick \u201cshould be distributed to wife\u201d and a 1970 Buick \u201cshould be distributed to husband,\u201d because: (1) the language of the stipulations disputed by the parties in the present case failed to definitively dispose of the issue of ownership of the vehicles since the language was permissive rather than mandatory; and (2) the parties could have removed this issue from the trial court\u2019s consideration if they desired to do so.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 30 January 2001 by Judge Earl J. Fowler in Buncombe County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 January 2002.\nCarol B. Andres for plaintiff appellee.\nCecilia Johnson for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0660-01", "first_page_order": 694, "last_page_order": 697 }