{ "id": 8550402, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES RICHARD CALDWELL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Caldwell", "decision_date": "1972-08-02", "docket_number": "No. 7226SC417", "first_page": "342", "last_page": "345", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "15 N.C. App. 342" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "127 S.E. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569760 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 784", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771730 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 S.E. 2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560200 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.Ct. 2287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 L.Ed. 2d 860", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12043280, 12043226 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0948-02", "/us/403/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 S.E. 2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559907 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 A.L.R. 567", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 A.L.R. 870", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560114 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0268-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 455, "char_count": 8525, "ocr_confidence": 0.531, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3673558173891322e-07, "percentile": 0.6375802218584945 }, "sha256": "9c25a8a80d996c922a569d3357b493a427be3a452b3516da956edb06b9c9bede", "simhash": "1:36ffb18387119b3e", "word_count": 1415 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:26:51.335715+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Vaughn and Graham concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES RICHARD CALDWELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nOn the voir dire examination concerning his in-custody confession, defendant admitted that before he confessed the officers had given him the Miranda warnings and he had signed a written waiver of his rights. He testified that he did not read or \u201cexactly understand\u201d the statement which he signed, and testified that he confessed only because one of the officers told him that if he did so, the officer would tell the judge that defendant \u201ccooperated\u201d and it would \u201cmake it a lot easier\u201d on him. The officer denied making any such promise. Upon conflicting evidence, the trial judge made full findings of fact concerning the circumstances under which defendant\u2019s confession was made, found that defendant had been fully advised and fully understood his contitutional rights, found that no promises or threats of any kind were made to him, and determined that defendant gave his statement freely and voluntarily and without hope of reward. The trial judge\u2019s findings, being supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on this appeal, State v. Barber, 278 N.C. 268, 179 S.E. 2d 404, and the judge committed no error in allowing evidence of defendant\u2019s confession to be introduced before the jury.\nNor do we think that defendant suffered any prejudicial error when the judge, after allowing the State to introduce defendant\u2019s signed confession as an exhibit, permitted the officer to whom it was given to read it to the jury in the course of his testimony concerning it. The contents of the confession were not thereby unduly emphasized.\nAppellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that before they could give any consideration to defendant\u2019s confession they must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. While the courts of some jurisdictions hold that such an instruction is required, such has never been the law in North Carolina. Annot., Voluntariness of confession admitted by court as question for jury, 85 A.L.R. 870, Supplemented in 170 A.L.R. 567. \u201cUnder North Carolina procedure, voluntariness is a preliminary question to be passed on by the trial judge in the absence of the jury.\u201d State v. Hill, 276 N.C. 1, 170 S.E. 2d 885, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 948, 29 L.Ed. 2d 860, 91 S.Ct. 2287. \u201cIf the judge determines the proffered testimony is admissible, the jury is recalled, the objection to the admission of the testimony is overruled, and the testimony is received in evidence for consideration by the jury. If admitted in evidence, it is for the jury to determine whether the statements referred to in the testimony of the witness were in fact made by the defendant and the weight, if any, to be given such statements if made. Hence, evidence as to the circumstances under which the statements attributed to defendant were made may be offered or elicited on cross-examination in the presence of the jury. Admissibility is for determination by the judge unassisted by the jury. Credibility and weight are for determination by the jury unassisted by the judge.\u201d State v. Walker, 266 N.C. 269, 145 S.E. 2d 833. This has long been established as the law in this jurisdiction, State v. Dick, 60 N.C. 440, and the trial judge in the present case correctly instructed the jury in accordance with it.\nFinally, defendant contends that the two counts in the bill of indictment arise out of but one single criminal act and that to charge him with two offenses constitutes a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution which Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 23 L.Ed. 2d 707, 89 S.Ct. 2056, held applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not agree with appellant\u2019s major premise. The offense of breaking and entering was completed when the victim\u2019s house was unlawfully entered. The larceny of personal property thereafter was a completely separate offense, conviction of which required proof of other facts. Defendant has not twice been put in jeopardy for the same offense. Moreover, defendant here has no standing even to raise the question; no judgment was entered on the charge contained in the second count and no appeal will lie in that case. \u201cWhere prayer for judgment is continued and no conditions are imposed, there is no judgment, no appeal will lie, and the case remains in the trial court for appropriate action upon motion of the solicitor.\u201d State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E. 2d 337.\nThe result is: In the case in which defendant is charged in the second count of the bill of indictment with the crime of larceny, the attempted appeal is dismissed and the cause is remanded to the superior court. In the judgment imposed upon defendant\u2019s conviction of the crime charged in the first count of the bill of indictment, we find\nNo error.\nJudges Vaughn and Graham concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Robert Morgan by Associate Attorney George W. Boylan for the State.", "Don Davis for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES RICHARD CALDWELL\nNo. 7226SC417\n(Filed 2 August 1972)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 76 \u2014 voluntariness of confession \u2014 findings of court conclusive on appeal\nThe trial judge\u2019s findings with respect to the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s confession were supported by competent evidence and hence conclusive on appeal.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 74 \u2014 reading of confession to jury\nPermitting the officer to whom it was given to read defendant\u2019s confession to the jury did not constitute prejudicial error by giving undue emphasis to the confession.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 76\u2014 admissibility of confession .\u2014 determination by the court and not by the jury\nThe trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that before they could give any consideration to defendant\u2019s confession they must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was voluntary, as the admissibility of a confession is for determination by the judge unassisted by the jury.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 26 \u2014 double jeopardy \u2014 two offenses \u2014 same transaction\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the two counts in the bill of indictment arose out of but one single criminal act and that to charge him with two offenses constituted a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment was untenable, since the offense of breaking and entering and the offense of larceny of personal property were completely separate offenses committed one after the other and not simultaneously, and since conviction of each offense required proof of different facts.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 142 \u2014 prayer for judgment continued \u2014 no appeal lies\nOn a verdict finding defendant guilty of felonious larceny, prayer for judgment was continued and defendant appealed; however, where prayer for judgment is continued and no conditions are imposed, there is no judgment, no appeal will lie, and the case remains in the trial court for appropriate action upon motion of the solicitor.\nAppeal by defendant from Friday, Judge, 29 November 1971 Schedule \u201cA\u201d Criminal Session of Superior Court held in Mecklenburg County.\nIn a two-count indictment defendant was charged with (1) felonious breaking and entering and (2) felonious larceny. He pleaded not guilty to both charges. The State\u2019s evidence was in substance as follows: The owner of the dwelling described in the indictment testified that when he left his home to go to work on the morning of 7 June 1971, the doors and windows were locked. When he returned home in the afternoon, the wire was torn on the screen door on the back porch, the hook inside the screen door was unlatched, glass on the door leading from the porch into the kitchen was broken out, and the hook inside that door was unlatched and the door left open. A shotgun, valued at $150.00, two boxes of shells, and two pairs of shoes were missing from the residence. Fingerprints identified as the defendant\u2019s were found on a pane of the glass broken from the kitchen door. Defendant\u2019s confession was admitted in evidence after the trial judge heard evidence on voir dire and found that the confession had been freely and voluntarily made.\nDefendant did not introduce evidence. The jury found him guilty as charged in both counts of the indictment. On the verdict finding defendant guilty of felonious breaking and entering, judgment was entered sentencing defendant to prison as a youthful offender, for a term of not less than two nor more than five years. On the verdict finding defendant guilty of felonious larceny, prayer for judgment was continued. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Robert Morgan by Associate Attorney George W. Boylan for the State.\nDon Davis for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0342-01", "first_page_order": 366, "last_page_order": 369 }