{ "id": 9081284, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM NOLAN PATTERSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Patterson", "decision_date": "2002-05-21", "docket_number": "No. COA01-448", "first_page": "393", "last_page": "399", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 N.C. App. 393" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503720, 2506356, 2504598, 2505815, 2505849 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0669-05", "/nc/332/0669-01", "/nc/332/0669-02", "/nc/332/0669-03", "/nc/332/0669-04" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527705 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510473, 2510410, 2512553, 2508442 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0617-04", "/nc/330/0617-03", "/nc/330/0617-01", "/nc/330/0617-02" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522184 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305596 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813", "parenthetical": "allowing evidence that the defendant had sexually abused not only the victim, but also her stepsister" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523857 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "allowing evidence that the defendant had sexually abused not only the victim, but also her stepsister" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515260 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358000 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1494036 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567442 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514171 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358107 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204-05" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572384 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8546976 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39-40" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503720, 2506356, 2504598, 2505815, 2505849 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0669-05", "/nc/332/0669-01", "/nc/332/0669-02", "/nc/332/0669-03", "/nc/332/0669-04" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527705 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472-73" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0468-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 717, "char_count": 13596, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1077193646190259e-07, "percentile": 0.7627145443614667 }, "sha256": "d87556dc20199b73521df6e509e7426a027e07770744ae14ec24ef1dae689790", "simhash": "1:6c3f9620713f277a", "word_count": 2217 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:10.836930+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McGEE concurs.", "Judge GREENE dissenting in part." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM NOLAN PATTERSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "THOMAS, Judge.\nDefendant, William Nolan Patterson, was convicted in a jury trial of first-degree statutory rape, two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense, two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, felonious incest between near relatives, crime against nature, and two counts of felonious child abuse.\nHe sets forth two assignments of error in his appeal: (1) the trial court erred by allowing testimony of his previous bad acts into evidence; and (2) the trial court sentenced him in a manner not authorized by law. For the reasons discussed herein, we find no error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: On 15 January 1998, Officer Susan Scearce with the Cumberland County Sheriff\u2019s Department presented a drug-abuse program at an elementary school. As she was preparing to leave, a student, \u201cL,\u201d asked to speak with her in the hallway. L told Scearce that: (1) she was hungry; (2) she and her siblings were not being fed because her father, defendant, sold their groceries to buy drugs; (3) the family regularly did not have water or power; (4) defendant had threatened her to not talk to social workers; (5) defendant beat her and her siblings; and (6) defendant used crack cocaine and abused alcohol.\nSubsequently, L was taken to the sheriffs department, where she disclosed that defendant sexually abused her. She said defendant had sexual relations with her in a number of ways, in both her bed and his.\nDuring the course of the investigation, defendant\u2019s wife, Shirley Patterson (Mrs. Patterson), stated that defendant\u2019s actions with their daughters had concerned her. L\u2019s sister, \u201cI,\u201d stated that defendant also sexually abused her until she was twelve or thirteen and began \u201crunning away from home and not coming home certain nights.\u201d Defendant is the natural father of both girls.\nDr. Sharon Cooper, a forensic pediatrician, examined L and determined that she had symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and physical characteristics of having been sexually abused.\nThe charges in this case relate only to the abuse of L.\nDefendant testified during the trial and denied the claims of his daughters. Nevertheless, he was convicted and sentenced as follows: (a) 300 to 369 months for first-degree statutory rape and first-degree statutory sexual offense in 98 CRS 13337; (b) 16 to 20 months for indecent liberties with a child and felonious incest between near relatives in 98 CRS 13338; (c) 300 to 369 months for first-degree statutory sexual offense in 98 CRS 13339; (d) 25 to 39 months for felonious child abuse in 98 CRS 13340; (e) 25 to 39 months for felonious child abuse and indecent liberties with a child in 98 CRS 13341. All sentences were to run consecutively. The trial court dismissed the charge of crime against nature in 98 CRS 13340. Defendant appeals.\nBy his first assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting, over his objection, evidence of his prior bad acts of abusing I. We disagree.\nRule 404 of the North Carolina Evidence Code provides, in pertinent part:\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C.R. Evid. 404(b). In the instant case, the trial judge gave a limiting instruction to the jury concerning I\u2019s allegations that included the following statements:\nThe Court: I specifically instruct you that you may not consider this evidence as evidence of the fact that the defendant is a bad person and therefore, he is more likely to have committed the offenses which are now before us. But I instruct you that you may consider the evidence only to the extent that you find it bears on the issues or questions of the defendant\u2019s intent or modus operandi, mode of operation, as it relates to the allegations in this case involving [L] Patterson.\nDo each of you understand that [instruction? If you do understand that instruction, please indicate that by raising your hands.\n(All hands raised.)\nThe Court: Let the record reflect that all twelve members responded affirmatively.\nAnd members of the Jury, I again instruct you that if you believe the evidence, you may consider it only for the limited purpose for which it has been received in this case, and for no other purpose.\nIn State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 604, 365 S.E.2d 587, 593, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 102 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1988), our Supreme Court held: \u201cIt is not necessary that the modus operandi of the crime the state seeks to have admitted rise to the level of unique or bizarre.\u201d The similarities between the past crimes and the crimes the state seeks to prove must simply support the reasonable inference that the same person committed both the earlier and later crimes. Id. Here, there was ample evidence presented in the testimony of L and I of the types of abuse, including fellatio, sexual intercourse, and digital manipulation of the vaginal and anal areas, to conclude that defendant committed similar sexual crimes against them. In overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the introduction of the evidence, the trial court found that defendant abused I from age six to fourteen and that he abused L when she was eleven; that both girls were his biological children; that the abuse occurred in the victims\u2019 bedrooms and in other places in their home; that the pattern of abuse with both children was similar; and that defendant threatened both victims not to reveal the acts he forced them to commit. Clearly, the similarities support the inference that the same person committed the offenses.\nFor evidence to be admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), however, the trial court must also determine whether the risk of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence. State v. Schultz, 88 N.C. App. 197, 202, 362 S.E.2d 853, 857 (1987), aff'd, 322 N.C. 467, 368 S.E.2d 386 (1988). \u201cNorth Carolina courts have been consistently liberal in admitting evidence of similar sex offenses in trials on sexual crime charges.\u201d State v. Jacob, 113 N.C. App. 605, 608, 439 S.E.2d 812, 813 (1994) (allowing evidence that the defendant had sexually abused not only the victim, but also her stepsister) (citing State v. McCarty, 326 N.C. 782, 785, 392 S.E.2d 359, 361 (1990)). Although the evidence was harmful to defendant\u2019s case, the risk of undue prejudice did not outweigh its probative value. We therefore reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nBy defendant\u2019s second assignment of error, he argues he was sentenced in a manner not authorized by law in that the trial court read and considered Department of Social Services (DSS) documents from Harnett and Cumberland counties, and from the State of Pennsylvania, that were not provided to the defense. We disagree.\nThis Court will not disturb a judgment because of the sentencing procedures utilized unless an abuse of discretion prejudicial to the defendant or conduct offending the public sense of fair play can be shown. State v. Stone, 104 N.C. App. 448, 453, 409 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1991), disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 617, 412 S.E.2d 94 (1992). In sentencing, the trial court may rely on circumstances brought out at trial. State v. Flowe, 107 N.C. App. 468, 472-73, 420 S.E.2d 475, 478, disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 669, 424 S.E.2d 412 (1992).\nBefore trial, defendant filed a Motion for Production of Confidential Records that required the trial court to review in camera several confidential DSS documents regarding L and I for exculpatory evidence. The trial court did so, and disclosed any arguably exculpatory evidence to both parties. Then, at the sentencing phase of the trial, defendant requested that the trial court consider the mitigating factor that he had been gainfully employed. The only evidence of defendant\u2019s employment was his own testimony. The trial court, however, found that DSS\u2019s records rebutted defendant\u2019s evidence.\nAccording to DSS documents, defendant was receiving assistance for his children from either Pennsylvania or North Carolina from at least 1982 to the present. In fact, they indicated that all monies received by the family came from DSS in one form or another. There was also ample testimony that the Patterson family frequently went hungry and that defendant would sell their groceries in order to purchase drugs.\nDefendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion or that the public sense of fair play was offended. Defendant himself had asked the trial court to review the DSS documents. He was given ample opportunity to present his evidence, including any that showed error in the DSS records. His failure to present copies of employment records, pay stubs, income tax returns, or other evidence of prior employment was not due to any restriction imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, we reject this argument and find no error.\nNO ERROR.\nJudge McGEE concurs.\nJudge GREENE dissenting in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "THOMAS, Judge." }, { "text": "GREENE, Judge,\ndissenting in part.\nI dissent because I believe the trial court erred in considering for sentencing purposes information contained in records that had not been presented into evidence either at trial or at the sentencing hearing. As to the remainder of the majority opinion, however, I fully concur.\nAlthough the formal rules of evidence do not apply in a sentencing hearing, such a hearing \u201cmust be fair and just\u201d and provide the defendant with an \u201ceffective way of contradicting [any] damaging and prejudicial information.\u201d State v. Locklear, 34 N.C. App. 37, 39-40, 237 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1977), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 294 N.C. 210, 241 S.E.2d 65 (1978); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1334(b) (2001). As a general proposition, the sentencing judge is permitted to consider any \u201ccircumstances brought out at trial.\u201d State v. Flowe, 107 N.C. App. 468, 472-73, 420 S.E.2d 475, 478, disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 669, 424 S.E.2d 412 (1992).\nIn this case, the sentencing judge considered, in evaluating the credibility of defendant\u2019s request for a mitigating factor, certain Department of Social Services (DSS) records that had been presented to the trial court during the trial for in camera review but which had not been presented into evidence or otherwise been made available to defendant. The sentencing judge, after reviewing these records in camera, noted that defendant\u2019s trial testimony relating to his employment history was \u201cclearly rebutted by the [DSS] records.\u201d Defendant questioned the trial court\u2019s procedure in reviewing the records on the ground that his \u201ccredibility ha[d] been challenged by records\u201d he had not seen. After advising defendant he could \u201ctake it up on appeal,\u201d the sentencing judge sentenced defendant without granting him the benefit of the requested mitigating factor.\nAs the information in the DSS records was not evidence in defendant\u2019s trial, it was not within the scope of Flowe. Furthermore, it was not \u201cfair and just\u201d to allow the sentencing judge to consider this information, which was damaging and prejudicial, as defendant had no effective method or opportunity to contradict it. See State v. Midyette, 87 N.C. App. 199, 204-05, 360 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1987), aff\u2019d, 322 N.C. 108, 366 S.E.2d 440 (1988) (new sentencing hearing required where trial court conducted an in camera victim input session and pronounced judgment without ensuring that all information received by the trial court had been known to the defendant and without the defendant having had an opportunity to explain or refute the information).\nTherefore, I would vacate the sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.\n. Defendant testified at trial he had a positive employment history and during the sentencing hearing requested a finding in mitigation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(e) (19) (2001).", "type": "dissent", "author": "GREENE, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Thomas O. Lawton, III, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "John T. Hall for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM NOLAN PATTERSON\nNo. COA01-448\n(Filed 21 May 2002)\n1. Evidence\u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 modus operandi\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for first-degree statutory rape, incest, and other crimes by admitting evidence of defendant\u2019s prior abuse of the victim\u2019s sister as bearing on modus operandi. The similarities between the abuse charged and the prior abuse of the victim\u2019s sister supported the inference that the same person committed the crimes, and the risk of undue prejudice did not outweigh its probative value.\n2. Sentencing\u2014 social services documents \u2014 not provided to defendant \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing defendant for first-degree statutory rape, incest, and other crimes by considering DSS records which were not provided to the defense where defendant had filed a motion for production of confidential records that required that the court review confidential DSS documents in camera, the court disclosed any arguably exculpatory evidence to both parties, and defendant requested at sentencing a mitigating factor which was rebutted by the records. Defendant was given ample opportunity to present his evidence, including any that showed error in the records; his failure to do so was not due to any restriction imposed by the trial court.\nJudge Greene dissenting in part.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 August 2000 by Judge Gregory A. Weeks in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 February 2002.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Thomas O. Lawton, III, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nJohn T. Hall for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0393-01", "first_page_order": 423, "last_page_order": 429 }