{ "id": 9081701, "name": "BEVERLY A. RUFFIN, Employee-Plaintiff v. COMPASS GROUP USA, Employer, CNA INSURANCE CO., Insurer, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Ruffin v. Compass Group USA", "decision_date": "2002-06-04", "docket_number": "No. COA01-18", "first_page": "480", "last_page": "489", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 N.C. App. 480" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357894 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170012 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11091829 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080920 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143677 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486154, 2483507, 2484885, 2484376, 2484444 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0337-05", "/nc/324/0337-01", "/nc/324/0337-02", "/nc/324/0337-03", "/nc/324/0337-04" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526693 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169811 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917128 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575582 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556426, 2559318, 2557847, 2557592, 2559291 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0737-03", "/nc/339/0737-05", "/nc/339/0737-04", "/nc/339/0737-01", "/nc/339/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525497 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" }, { "page": "707" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11654971 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "no matter how great the injury, if it occurred under normal working conditions and the employee was injured while performing his regular duties in the usual and customary manner, no accident has occurred" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521413 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "no matter how great the injury, if it occurred under normal working conditions and the employee was injured while performing his regular duties in the usual and customary manner, no accident has occurred" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "\"once an activity, even a strenuous or otherwise unusual activity, becomes a part of the employee's normal work routine, an injury caused by such activity is not the result of an interruption of the work routine or otherwise an 'injury by accident' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524140 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550", "parenthetical": "\"once an activity, even a strenuous or otherwise unusual activity, becomes a part of the employee's normal work routine, an injury caused by such activity is not the result of an interruption of the work routine or otherwise an 'injury by accident' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548849 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527613 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571994, 8571950, 8572020, 8571925, 8572058 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0556-03", "/nc/306/0556-02", "/nc/306/0556-04", "/nc/306/0556-01", "/nc/306/0556-05" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525314 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624486 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574378 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779479 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565668 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "\"Expert testimony on a state of facts not supported by the evidence is inadmissible.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563238 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "\"Expert testimony on a state of facts not supported by the evidence is inadmissible.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622633 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571", "parenthetical": "citing Jackson v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 272 N.C. 697, 158 S.E.2d 865 (1968); Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E.2d 96 (1947); Gladson v. Piedmont Stores, 57 N.C. App. 579, 292 S.E.2d 18, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 556, 294 S.E.2d 370 (1982" }, { "page": "570" }, { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357894 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "citing Jackson v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 272 N.C. 697, 158 S.E.2d 865 (1968); Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E.2d 96 (1947" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526693 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 941, "char_count": 22670, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.7791814927422824e-07, "percentile": 0.8350025426192801 }, "sha256": "86dd650a0c756d49a341efc6dd6a824f48e4b2e1187e49b6ece5e9c47fb1baf0", "simhash": "1:37a02c6ae46f4a5e", "word_count": 3665 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:10.836930+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge HUDSON concurs.", "Judge TYSON dissents." ], "parties": [ "BEVERLY A. RUFFIN, Employee-Plaintiff v. COMPASS GROUP USA, Employer, CNA INSURANCE CO., Insurer, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nCompass Group USA (\u201cemployer\u201d) and CNA Risk Management Co. (\u201ccarrier\u201d) (collectively \u201cdefendants\u201d) appeal from an opinion and award entered by the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cFull Commission\u201d) awarding Beverly Ruffin (\u201cplaintiff\u201d) workers\u2019 compensation benefits. We affirm.\nPertinent facts and procedural history include the following: Plaintiff worked as a vendor, servicing vending machines in Rocky Mount, North Carolina. Her duties consisted of loading and unloading food supplies and soft drinks from her truck and stocking vending machines. Additionally, plaintiff was responsible for re-supplying cola machines with syrup. When a handcart was inaccessible, plaintiff was also responsible for manually carrying eight to ten cases of soda and lifting forty-pound boxes of syrup. Plaintiff operated the same vending route for a year; however, in April 1998, her route changed. Although plaintiff\u2019s normal job duties were not altered by her new route, there was a significant change in the amount of her work load including longer hours and more lifting and straining than her job normally required.\nOn 9 May 1998, plaintiff pulled a forty-pound box of syrup from the truck. As she lifted the box, plaintiff felt a cramp in her left shoulder blade. The next morning, plaintiff experienced pain in her left shoulder and numbness in her left arm and fingers. Plaintiff reported to the emergency room with complaints of \u201cpain in her left side of her upper back\u201d and was referred to Carolina Regional Orthopaedics. On 21 May 1999, plaintiff was examined by Dr. David C. Miller (\u201cDr. Miller\u201d), a spine specialist. Dr. Miller reviewed plaintiffs MRI which revealed pre-existing problems including an unusual curvature of the spine and disc herniations and concluded that the 9 May 1999 injury aggravated these pre-existing conditions. Dr. Miller further stated that the aggravation of plaintiffs herniated disc resulted in nerve impingement which caused plaintiffs neck and left shoulder pain. After surgery, plaintiff returned to work with restrictions against repeated lifting of more than forty pounds.\nPlaintiff filed a claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. On 22 January 1999, a hearing was held before Deputy Commissioner Amy L. Pfeiffer. In an opinion filed 17 November 1999, Deputy Commissioner Pfeiffer denied plaintiffs claim, concluding that plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission and with one member dissenting, the Full Commission reversed the opinion and award of the Deputy Commissioner and made the following pertinent finding of fact:\n12. On 9 May 1998, plaintiff suffered an injury resulting from a specific traumatic incident which arose out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer, and which aggravated a pre-existing condition of her cervical spine.\nThe Commission concluded that plaintiff suffered a \u201ccompensable injury in the form of the aggravation of a pre-existing condition as a direct result of a specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of her employment\u201d with defendants. From this opinion and resulting award, defendants appeal.\nIn the first assignment of error, defendants contend that the Full Commission erred when it found as a fact and concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff suffered a compensable back injury resulting from a \u201cspecific traumatic injury\u201d arising out of and during the course of employment. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree.\nFirst we note that in reviewing an opinion and award entered by the Full Commission, our inquiry is limited to two questions: (1) whether there is any competent evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, and (2) whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, likewise, support its conclusions of law. See Simmons v. N.C. Dept. of Transp., 128 N.C. App. 402, 405-06, 496 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1998). \u201cThe findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal, if there is any competent evidence to support them, and even if there is evidence that would support contrary findings.\u201d Fish v. Steelcase, Inc., 116 N.C. App. 703, 708, 449 S.E.2d 233, 237 (1994), cert. denied, 339 N.C. 737, 454 S.E.2d 650 (1995). However, the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are fully reviewable on appeal. Id. This Court \u201cdoes not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u201d Anderson v. Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965). See also Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116-17, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000) (holding that \u201c[requiring the Commission to explain its credibility determinations and allowing the Court of Appeals to review the Commission\u2019s explanation of those credibility determinations would be inconsistent with our legal system\u2019s tradition of not requiring the fact finder to explain why he or she believes one witness\u201d or one piece of evidence over another).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2001) defines a back injury as one arising \u201cout of and in the course of the employment, and is the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned.\u201d Prior to the amendment in 1983, \u201cthis statute required that there be some type of unusual circumstance\u201d for a compensable back injury. Fish, 116 N.C. App. at 707, 449 S.E.2d at 237. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) now provides two theories upon which a back injury can be compensated: \u201c(1) if the claimant was injured by accident; or (2) if the injury arose from a specific traumatic incident.\u201d Glynn v. Pepcom Industries, 122 N.C. App. 348, 354, 469 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1996). \u201cIf the injury arises out of and in the course of employment and is the result of a \u2018specific traumatic incident,\u2019 then the statute as amended mandates that the injury be construed to be \u2018injury by accident.\u2019 \u201d Caskie v. R.M. Butler & Co., 85 N.C. App. 266, 268, 354 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1987) (citation omitted). However, if there is no \u2018specific traumatic incident\u2019 the claimant may still be entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits if she meets the definition of \u2018injury by accident.\u2019 Id. (citation omitted).\nUnder our current case law, the specific traumatic incident provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) requires the plaintiff to prove an injury at a judicially cognizable point in time. See Fish, 116 N.C. App. at 708, 449 S.E.2d at 237. In determining whether an injury occurred at a cognizable time, it is not necessary to \u201callege the specific hour or day of the injury.\u201d Id. Moreover, \u201c[jJudicially cognizable does not mean \u2018ascertainable on an exact date.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 709, 449 S.E.2d at 238 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Instead,\nthe term should be read to describe a showing by plaintiff which enables the Industrial Commission to determine when, within a reasonable period, the specific injury occurred. The evidence must show that there was some event that caused the injury, not a gradual deterioration. If the window during which the injury occurred can be narrowed to a judicially cognizable period, then the statute is satisfied.\nId. Thus, \u201cevents which occur contemporaneously, during a cognizable time period, and which cause a back injury, do fit the definition intended by the legislature.\u201d Richards v. Town of Valdese, 92 N.C. App. 222, 225, 374 S.E.2d 116, 119 (1988), disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 337, 378 S.E.2d 799 (1989).\nIn the instant case, the evidence establishes that plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of a specific traumatic incident. The Commission found, and the evidence fully supports that plaintiff suffered a specific traumatic incident on 9 May 1998, when she lifted a forty-pound box of syrup out of her truck. This incident resulted in injury to her pre-existing back conditions including herniating discs and an unusual curvature of the spine. \u201cClearly, aggravation of a preexisting condition which results in loss of wage earning capacity is compensable under the workers\u2019 compensation laws in our state.\u201d Smith v. Champion, Int\u2019l., 134 N.C. App. 180, 182, 517 S.E.2d 164, 166 (2000). We therefore hold that the competent evidence clearly supports the finding and resulting conclusion that \u201cplaintiff suffered a compensable injury in the form of the aggravation of a pre-existing condition as a direct result of a specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of her employment].]\u201d\nDefendants argue that the evidence only establishes that plaintiff suffered a shoulder injury, not a back injury. However, contrary to defendants\u2019 assertion, there is competent evidence in the record to support the Full Commission\u2019s findings that plaintiff suffered a compensable injury in the form of an aggravated back injury. Plaintiff testified that on 9 May 1998, she sustained an injury while lifting a forty-pound box of syrup out of her truck. Plaintiff stated that she felt a \u201cpull or cramp\u201d in the area of her left shoulder blade, towards the center of her back. Subsequent tests revealed herniating discs to the left side of plaintiff\u2019s back. Medical evidence tended to show that plaintiff suffered from a \u201cdisk protrusion or a herniation at the C5 and C6 level\u201d and \u201ckyphosis which is an unusual curvature of the spine.\u201d Dr. Miller opined that although plaintiff\u2019s herniating discs probably pre-existed the 9 May 1998 injury, the incident aggravated plaintiff\u2019s pre-existing condition and resulted in nerve impingement, causing neck and left shoulder pain. Even though the symptoms may have been manifest in the neck and shoulder area, the injury was to the spinal discs, which are indisputably, the \u201cback.\u201d Further, while there may have existed conflicting evidence as to the \u201cdegree of plaintiff\u2019s impairment, it was for the Commission to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and to decide the issues.\u201d Smith, 130 N.C. App. at 182, 517 S.E.2d at 166. We therefore overrule this assignment of error.\nIn their second assignment of error, defendants further contend that the Full Commission erred by finding a causal connection between plaintiff\u2019s injury and her disability. We disagree.\n\u201cIn order for there to be a compensable claim for workers\u2019 compensation, there must be proof of a causal relationship between the injury and the employment.\u201d Peagler v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 138 N.C. App. 593, 597, 532 S.E.2d 207, 210 (2000). \u201cIn evaluating the causation issue, \u2018this Court can do no more than examine the record to determine whether any competent evidence exists to support the Commission\u2019s findings as to causation[.]\u2019 \u201d Id. at 598, 532 S.E.2d at 210 (quoting Young v. Hickory Business Furniture, 137 N.C. App. 51, 55, 527 S.E.2d 344, 348 (2000)). An opinion by an expert to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that a particular cause could or might have produced the result is sufficient to support an award of workers\u2019 compensation benefits. See Buck v. Proctor & Gamble, Co., 52 N.C. App. 88, 96, 278 S.E.2d 268, 273 (1981) (holding that in \u201cviewing the totality of the expert testimony in the light most favorable to plaintiff,\u201d there was some evidence that the incident could have \u201cproduced the particular disability in question,\u201d and therefore, with respect to the sufficiency of the medical expert\u2019s opinion on causation, it is conclusive on appeal).\nIn the instant case, medical testimony was presented to establish causation. Dr. Miller opined that plaintiffs work-related accident aggravated pre-existing conditions existing prior to the date of the injury. Dr. Miller testified, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the lifting of the four-gallon box by plaintiff could have aggravated a pre-existing condition and that, \u201cin light of those underlying findings, it is possible or likely that [plaintiffs] lifting episode could have exacerbated those underlying, preexisting conditions, to give[] her the pain that she complained about.\u201d Dr. Miller further testified that the aggravation of plaintiff\u2019s herniated discs resulted in nerve impingement causing plaintiff\u2019s neck and left shoulder pain. In light of this testimony, we hold that the Full Commission did not err in determining that plaintiff\u2019s pre-existing condition contributed to some reasonable degree to her current disability.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was competent evidence to support the Full Commission\u2019s findings and we affirm the opinion and award of the Full Commission.\nAffirmed.\nJudge HUDSON concurs.\nJudge TYSON dissents.\n1. We note that under our existing case law, even without deciding the issue of specific traumatic incident, the Commission could have concluded that plaintiff\u2019s back injury was an \u201cinjury by accident\u201d arising out of and in the course of employment, therefore qualifying as a compensable injury under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6). Clearly, the evidence establishes that plaintiff\u2019s new job duties required more lifting and more physical work exertion. Even though the new requirements may have been part of plaintiff\u2019s normal job description, plaintiff was not merely carrying on her duties in the usual way. \u201cIt is well settled in this State that an extra or unusual degree of exertion by an employee while performing a job may constitute the unforeseen or unusual event or condition necessary to make any resulting injury an \u2018injury by accident.\u2019 \u201d Jackson v. Fayetteville Area Sys. of Transp., 88 N.C. App. 123, 126, 362 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1987); see also Caskie v. R.M. Butler & Co., 85 N.C. App. 266, 269, 354 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1987) (holding that without deciding the issue of specific traumatic incident, the Commission should have concluded that plaintiff suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, where the evidence showed that plaintiff \u201cwas not merely carrying on her usual and customary duties in the usual way\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." }, { "text": "TYSON, Judge,\ndissenting.\nI do not find competent evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s finding and conclusion that plaintiff suffered a com-pensable back injury. I disagree with the majority\u2019s application of a \u201cspecific traumatic incident\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6) to the facts of this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.\nIn order to be compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (\u201cAct\u201d), an injury must result from an \u201caccident arising out of and in the course of the employment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2001). An accident is an \u201cunlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the injured employee.\u201d Edwards v. Piedmont Publ\u2019g Co., 227 N.C. 184, 186, 41 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1947) (citations omitted). In 1983, the General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6) to provide that the term \u201cinjury\u201d as applied to back injuries, means an injury resulting from a \u201cspecific traumatic incident of the work assigned.\u201d See Richards v. Town of Valdese, 92 N.C. App. 222, 224, 374 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1988) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6)). An employee may show a back injury by proving either (1) injury by accident or (2) injury arising from a specific traumatic incident. Id. This amendment eliminated the requirement that a back injury be the result of an \u201caccident.\u201d However, \u201cinjury by accident\u201d still applies to injuries to parts of the body other than the back. Id.\nHere, plaintiff repeatedly testified that she felt a \u201ccramp,\u201d \u201ccatch,\u201d or \u201cpull\u201d in her left \u201cshoulder\u201d or \u201cshoulder blade.\u201d Plaintiff never testified to an injury to her neck. The majority opinion relies on the testimony of Dr. Miller. Dr. Miller was asked:\nif [plaintiff] previously testified that while working on or about May 8^\\ [sic] 1998, she felt a catch in her neck while lifting a box which contained approximately four gallons of syrup, do you have an opinion satisfactory to yourself and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that this incident could or might have caused her injuries, which included disk [sic] herniations at the C4-5 \u2014 C4-C5, C5-C6, and C6-C7 levels?\n(Emphasis supplied.) Dr. Miller\u2019s testimony was based on facts not in evidence. His opinion was not competent testimony of a back injury. See Hubbard v. Quality Oil Co. of Statesville, Inc., 268 N.C. 489, 494, 151 S.E.2d 71, 76 (1966) (\u201cExpert testimony on a state of facts not supported by the evidence is inadmissible.\u201d).\n\u201c[T]here must be some unforeseen or unusual event other than the bodily injury itself\u2019 for an incident to constitute an accident within the meaning of the Act. Rhinehart v. Roberts Super Mkt., Inc., 271 N.C. 586, 588, 157 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1967). \u201cIf an employee is injured while carrying on his usual tasks in the usual way the injury does not arise by accident.\u201d Gunter v. Dayco Corp., 317 N.C. 670, 673, 346 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1986). If an interruption of the work routine occurs introducing unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences, an accidental cause will be inferred. Id. Here, plaintiff failed to show a compensable injury by accident.\nPlaintiff informed her treating chiropractor that she was injured from repetitive motion. Plaintiff testified on cross-examination that her injury occurred from \u201cconstantly dofing] a job every day, ten to twelve hours a day.\u201d Plaintiff further testified that on 9 May 1998, the date of the incident, she had only one vendor to service and that she lifted forty-pound boxes of syrup everyday as a part of her normal work routine.\nThe majority opinion, in a footnote, correctly cites that \u201can extra or unusual degree of exertion by an employee while performing a job may constitute the unforeseen or unusual event or condition necessary to make any resulting injury an injury \u2018by accident.\u2019 \u201d Jackson v. Fayetteville Area Sys. of Transp., 88 N.C. App. 123, 126, 362 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1987) (citing Jackson v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 272 N.C. 697, 158 S.E.2d 865 (1968); Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E.2d 96 (1947); Gladson v. Piedmont Stores, 57 N.C. App. 579, 292 S.E.2d 18, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 556, 294 S.E.2d 370 (1982); Bingham v. Smith\u2019s Transfer Corp., 55 N.C. App. 538, 286 S.E.2d 570 (1982); Porter v. Shelby Knit, Inc., 46 N.C. App. 22, 264 S.E.2d 360 (1980)). The facts of the present case are distinguishable.\nIn Jackson, the plaintiff had unusual difficulty in opening a money collection box. Jackson, 88 N.C. App. at 124, 362 S.E.2d at 570. Jackson testified that she had no problem with any box until this particular one, that she could not recall ever having a money box that tough to open or that heavy, and that she had not previously had to exert as much pressure to get one to open. Id. at 125, 362 S.E.2d at 570. Similarly in Porter, the plaintiff suffered an injury by accident when he experienced pain while straining to withdraw a rod from a roll of cloth which was \u201cextra tight\u201d and \u201cunusually hard\u201d to pull out. Porter, 46 N.C. App. at 25, 264 S.E.2d at 362. There was no evidence of such unusual exertion here.\nPlaintiff did not testify to any unusual exertion in sliding and lifting the syrup box onto the handcart. The majority opines that the addition of stops on plaintiffs vendor route amounted to \u201can extra or unusual degree of exertion.\u201d The evidence does not support this conclusion. Plaintiff testified that she had been servicing the additional stops for three weeks prior to the day of the incident and that she was servicing only one vendor on that day. See Bowles v. CTS of Asheville, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 547, 550, 335 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1985) (\u201conce an activity, even a strenuous or otherwise unusual activity, becomes a part of the employee\u2019s normal work routine, an injury caused by such activity is not the result of an interruption of the work routine or otherwise an \u2018injury by accident\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted).\nThe evidence fails to establish that there was an interruption of plaintiffs regular work routine nor an unusual degree of exertion to qualify the incident as an injury by accident. See Swindell v. Davis Boat Works, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 393, 397, 337 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1985) (no matter how great the injury, if it occurred under normal working conditions and the employee was injured while performing his regular duties in the usual and customary manner, no accident has occurred). The Commission\u2019s findings and conclusions are not supported by the evidence. I would reverse the Opinion and Award of the Commission. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "TYSON, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Roberta L. Edwards, P.A., by Kenneth R. Massey, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Dayle A. Flammia and Tara L. Davidson, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BEVERLY A. RUFFIN, Employee-Plaintiff v. COMPASS GROUP USA, Employer, CNA INSURANCE CO., Insurer, Defendants\nNo. COA01-18\n(Filed 4 June 2002)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 specific traumatic incident\u2014 vending machine route \u2014 back injury\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation action by concluding that plaintiff had suffered a com-pensable back injury resulting from a specific traumatic incident when she aggravated a pre-existing condition by lifting a forty-pound box of syrup while servicing a vending machine.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 back injury \u2014 new vending machine route \u2014 same duties, greater work load\nIt was noted that the Industrial Commission in a workers\u2019 compensation action could have concluded that plaintiff suffered an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of employment where she injured her back on a new vending machine route that did not alter her duties but included longer hours and increased lifting and straining. Even though the new requirements may have been part of plaintiff\u2019s normal job description, plaintiff was not merely carrying out her duties in the usual way.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 back injury \u2014 symptoms in neck and shoulder\nThere was competent evidence in a workers\u2019 compensation action to support the Industrial Commission\u2019s findings that plaintiff suffered a compensable back injury where the symptoms . were apparent in the neck and shoulder but the injury was to spinal discs, which are indisputably the \u201cback.\u201d\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 disability \u2014 causal connection with injury\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by finding a causal connection between plaintiff\u2019s back injury and her disability where medical testimony was presented to establish causation.\nJudge Tyson dissenting.\nAppeal by defendants from an opinion and award entered 10 October 2000 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 November 2001.\nLaw Offices of Roberta L. Edwards, P.A., by Kenneth R. Massey, for plaintiff-appellee.\nTeague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Dayle A. Flammia and Tara L. Davidson, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0480-01", "first_page_order": 510, "last_page_order": 519 }