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      "Judge MARTIN concurs.",
      "Judge THOMAS dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "BARRY E. ALFORD, et al., Plaintiffs v. CATALYTICA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. and EASTERN OMNI CONSTRUCTORS, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nI. Facts\nPlaintiffs were employees of Catalytica Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (\u201cdefendant\u201d). Defendant contracted with Eastern Omni Constructors (\u201cEastern Omni\u201d) to construct and install a new bulk bromine storage/handling system and components for bromine transfer.\nOn 15 August 1999, there was a rupture of a component part to the storage tank which caused the release of liquid bromine and bromine gas. Human exposure to bromine can cause death if ingested or inhaled and serious injury if it comes in contact with the skin. Plaintiffs were injured after coming into contact with the bromine liquid or bromine gas.\nPlaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant and Eastern Omni on 5 September 2000, alleging: (1) inherently dangerous activity, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3) assault, (4) battery, and (5) negligence. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Eastern Omni also moved to dismiss the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress only, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).\nOn 18 January 2001, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging three causes of action: (1) a Woodson claim, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (3) negligence. A hearing on all the parties\u2019 motions was held on 8 February 2001. The trial court: (1) granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion to amend their complaint, withdrawing the claims for assault, battery, and inherently dangerous activity; (2) granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 Woodson claim as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54; and (3) denied both defendant\u2019s and Eastern Omni\u2019s motions to dismiss as to plaintiffs\u2019 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court certified that portion of the order dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 Woodson claim for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.\nII. Issues\nThe sole issue presented is whether plaintiffs\u2019 claim pursuant to Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), is barred by the one-year statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54(3).\nThis appeal is interlocutory in nature. An order is interlocutory if entered during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but requires further action by the trial court to finally determine the rights of all the parties involved in the controversy. See Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). Generally, there is no right to appeal from an interlocutory order. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2001); Veazey, 231 N.C. at 362, 57 S.E.2d at 381. However, a party may appeal an interlocutory order when there has been a final determination as to one or more of the claims, and the trial court certifies that there is no just reason to delay the appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See Liggett Group v. Sunas, 113 N.C. App. 19, 23, 437 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1993).\nIn this case, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 Woodson claim, and denied defendant\u2019s motion and Eastern Omni\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court stated that \u201cthere is no just reason for delay with respect to the claim dismissed\u201d and certified the order \u201cas a final judgment.\u201d The trial court\u2019s order dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 Woodson claim is a final judgment as to that claim. We may review this issue on appeal, notwithstanding that further issues remain at the trial court for final determination.\nThe essential question on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) \u201cis whether the complaint, when liberally construed, states a claim upon which relief can be granted on any theory.\u201d Barnaby v. Boardman, 70 N.C. App. 299, 302, 318 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1984), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 313 N.C. 565, 330 S.E.2d 600 (1985) (emphasis in original). When the complaint fails to allege the substantive elements of some legally cognizable claim, or where it alleges facts which defeat any claim, the complaint must be dismissed. See Hudson-Cole Dev. Corp. v. Beemer, 132 N.C. App. 341, 345-46, 511 S.E.2d 309, 312 (1999). We decide whether plaintiffs\u2019 Woodson claim was properly dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.\nIf a Woodson claim is considered to be an intentional tort, it is governed by the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54(3) (1999) and dismissal was appropriate. On the other hand, if a Woodson claim is not an intentional tort, it is governed by the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-52(5) (1999) and dismissal was improperly granted. We hold that a claim pursuant to Woodson is governed by the one-year statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54(3).\nOur Supreme Court in Woodson held that \u201cwhen an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct, that employee, or the personal representative of the estate in case of death, may pursue a civil action against the employer. Such misconduct is tantamount to an intentional tort, and civil actions based thereon are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the [Workers\u2019 Compensation] Act.\u201d Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228. The Court acknowledged that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (\u201cAct\u201d) seeks to balance the competing interests between employers and their employees and implements trade-offs by: (1) providing an injured employee certain and sure recovery without having to prove negligence or face affirmative defenses, and also (2) limiting the recovery available for compensable injuries and removing the employee\u2019s right to pursue potentially larger damages awards in civil actions against the employer. Id. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227 (citing Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 712, 325 S.E.2d 244, 246-47 (1985)).\nOur Supreme Court distinctly noted that in Pleasant the doctrine of \u201cconstructive intent\u201d has been applied to willful and wanton conduct. Id. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229. \u201cConstructive intent to injure may provide the mental state necessary for an intentional tort.\u201d Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 715, 325 S.E.2d at 248. While willful and wanton misconduct is sufficient for holding a co-employee civilly liable, civil actions against employers require more aggravated conduct than willful and wanton in \u201ckeeping with the statutory workers\u2019 compensation trade-offs.\u201d Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229. Substantial certainty is a higher threshold which \u201cserv[es] as a deterrent to intentional wrongdoing and promoting safety in the workplace.\u201d Id.\nIn adopting the substantial certainty standard, our Supreme Court cited cases from Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, and South Dakota. Id. at 342-43, 407 S.E.2d at 229-30. We turn to these jurisdictions for their treatment of such claims.\nThe workers\u2019 compensation statutes in Ohio provides that an action for an employment intentional tort shall be brought within one year of the date on which the employee knew or through exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the injury, condition or disease. See Christian v. The Scotts Co., 710 N.E.2d 1182, 1184 (Ohio App. 1998) (citing R.C. 2305.112(A)). South Dakota has held that \u201c[wjorker\u2019s [sic] compensation is the exclusive remedy for all on-the-job injuries to workers except those injuries intentionally inflicted by the employer. Under the intentional tort exception, workers may bring suit against their employers at common law only \u2018when an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would believe an injury was substantially certain to result from [the employer\u2019s] conduct.\u2019 \u201d Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 370, 371 (S.D. 1991) (citing VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Products, 334 N.W.2d 874, 876 (S.D. 1983) (emphasis in original)).\nThe legislature in Michigan has by statute rejected the \u201csubstantially certain\u201d test announced in Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986), and adopted a more rigorous \u201ctrue intentional tort\u201d standard as the proper test for determining the presence of an intentional tort to overcome the exclusivity of their workers\u2019 compensation provisions. See Gray v. Morley, 596 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Mich. 1999). The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that \u201cintentional act\u201d as used in their statute means the same as intentional tort, stating that \u201cintent\u201d means that the person either: \u201c \u2018(1) consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or (2) knows that that result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.\u2019 \u201d McCool v. Beauregard Memorial Hosp., \u2014 So.2d-, -(La. App. Apr. 3, 2002) (No. 01-1679) (quoting Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 481 (La. 1981)).\nThe courts and legislatures of those jurisdictions followed by our Supreme Court in Woodson, consider such claims to be equivalent to an intentional tort and within the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nPlaintiffs argue that our Supreme Court \u201cclarified that a claim under Woodson was not an intentional tort\u201d in Owens v. W.K. Deal Printing, Inc., 339 N.C. 603, 453 S.E.2d 160 (1995). In Owens, our Supreme Court reversed per curiam the decision of this Court for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion. The Court added that \u201c[t]o the extent that it may be read as implying that actions authorized under [Woodson], seek recovery for \u2018intentional torts\u2019 in the true sense of that term, we do not accept the reasoning of [the] dissent. We reemphasize that plaintiffs in Woodson actions need only establish that the employer intentionally engaged in misconduct and that the employer knew that such misconduct was \u2018substantially certain\u2019 to cause serious injury or death, and thus, the conduct was \u2018so egregious as to be tantamount to an intentional tort.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 604, 453 S.E.2d at 161 (emphasis supplied). We find this statement to be qual- \u2022 ified by the language \u201cin the true sense of that term.\u201d\nPlaintiffs argue, and the dissent asserts, that \u201csubstantial certainty\u201d originates in negligence. Our courts have acknowledged that certain behavior grounded in negligence is tantamount to an intentional tort, and have implicitly treated such conduct as intentional torts. E.g., Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956) (malicious conduct, wanton conduct, or a degree of negligence which indicates a reckless indifference to consequences will support punitive damages); see also State v. Snyder, 311 N.C. 391, 317 S.E.2d 394 (1984) (wanton and reckless conduct will supply malice for second-degree murder).\nAn intentional tort requires an actual or constructive intent to harm. Lynn v. Burnette, 138 N.C. App. 435, 440, 531 S.E.2d 275, 279 (2000) (citing 65 C.J.S. Negligence \u00a7 3 (1966)). The intentional tort of battery occurs \u201cwhen the plaintiff is offensively touched against the plaintiff\u2019s will.\u201d Id. at 439, 531 S.E.2d at 279 (citing Ormond v. Crampton, 16 N.C. App. 88, 94, 191 S.E.2d 405, 410, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 304, 192 S.E.2d 194 (1972)). Battery does not require malice, willfulness or wantonness. Id. at 439-40, 531 S.E.2d at 279 (citing Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 215, 371 S.E.2d 492, 496, disc. review denied, 323 N.C. 477, 373 S.E.2d 865 (1988)). The intent required for battery may be established by grossly or culpably negligent conduct, see Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1231 (1970), wanton and reckless negligence, see Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 715, 325 S.E.2d at 248, as well as one\u2019s belief that certain consequences are substantially certain to follow from an action, see Jones v. Willamette Industries, 120 N.C. App. 591, 594, 463 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1995) (emphasis supplied).\nOur Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a successful Woodson claim does not require actual certainty but substantial certainty. See Rose v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., Inc., 344 N.C. 153, 159, 472 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1996); Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 110, 463 S.E.2d 206, 211 (1995); see also Regan v. Amerimark Bldg. Products, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 225, 227, 489 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1997). We conclude that the additional language in Owens was to qualify the dissent\u2019s use of \u201cintentional tort\u201d and does not classify a Woodson claim as an additional cause of action separate and apart from an intentional tort.\nBoth parties point out that the North Carolina General Assembly has extended the statute of limitations for intentional torts. See N.C. Session Laws 2001-175. However, the statute in effect at the time plaintiffs\u2019 alleged Woodson claim arose subjects the claim to the one-year statute of limitations.\nWe reject plaintiffs\u2019 argument that \u201cthe expression of one thing is the exclusion of another,\u201d and conclude that section 1-54(3) applies to all actions substantially similar to those enumerated constituting intentional torts. We hold that plaintiffs\u2019 Woodson claim is equivalent to an intentional tort and we affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal of this claim as time-barred by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54(3).\nAffirmed.\nJudge MARTIN concurs.\nJudge THOMAS dissents.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "TYSON, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "THOMAS, Judge,\ndissenting.\nBecause our courts have not consistently held that an action forming the basis of a Woodson claim is an intentional tort \u201cin the true sense of that term,\u201d I respectfully dissent.\nThe one-year statute of limitations as prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-54(3) (1999) is inapplicable even if a Woodson claim is 99.9% an intentional tort. The standard is not flexible under any circumstances \u2014 it must be an intentional tort in every sense of the word, absolutely, or there is no room in that section for Woodson.\nStatutes of limitation are inflexible and unyielding and the trial court has no discretion when considering whether a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Congleton v. City of Asheboro, 8 N.C. App. 571, 174 S.E.2d 870 (1970).\nIn Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), our Supreme Court held there is an exception to the exclusivity clause of the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act where an employer had knowledge that an injury was substantially certain to occur under the circumstances. The Woodson court allowed a separate civil action, stating:\nthe legislature did not intend to relieve employers of civil liability for intentional torts which result in injury or death to employees. In such cases the injury or death is considered to be both by accident, for which the employee or personal representative may pursue a compensation claim under the Act, and the result of an intentional tort, for which a civil action against the employer may be maintained.\nId. at 338-39, 407 S.E.2d at 227. The Woodson court held that\nwhen an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is seriously injured or killed by that misconduct, . . . [s]uch misconduct is tantamount to an intentional tort, and civil actions based thereon are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act.\nId. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228. (Emphasis added). See also Daye & Morris, North Carolina Law of Torts \u00a7 2.31, at 6 & n.10 (2d ed. 1999).\nHowever, in Owens v. W.K. Deal Printing, Inc., 339 N.C. 603, 453 S.E.2d 160 (1995), our Supreme Court explained that a Woodson claim is not an intentional tort \u201cin the true sense of that term.\u201d Id. at 604, 453 S.E.2d at 161. In Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 424 S.E.2d 391 (1993), our Supreme Court stated that a Woodson claim involved a \u201chigher degree of reckless negligence than willful, wanton and reckless negligence[,]\u201d but did not say the claim involved an intentional tort. Id. at 240, 424 S.E.2d at 395. (Emphasis added).\nThis evolving characterization ranging from an \u201cintentional tort,\u201d to \u201ctantamount to an intentional tort,\u201d to an extremely high level of \u201cnegligence,\u201d to not an intentional tort \u201cin the true sense of that term,\u201d clearly removes Woodson from the necessarily seamless definition needed for inclusion in section 1-54(3). The \u201csubstantial certainty\u201d test set forth in Woodson is one of the tests utilized in establishing intent for an intentional tort, yet its description appears to originate in negligence theory.\nThere is in fact a continuum of tortious conduct, with actual intent on one end and mere recklessness and negligence on the other. See Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228-29; Logan & Logan, North Carolina Torts \u00a7 17.20 (1996). It is generally clear where substantial certainty is on that continuum. However, it is unclear precisely where a Woodson claim is on the continuum and how it should be procedurally treated.\nIn Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981), our Supreme Court held that because no statute of limitations addressed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the general three-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 1-52(5) must govern. There is no specific limitation set forth in our General Statutes for a Woodson claim. Unlike Michigan, as cited in the majority opinion, our General Assembly has not acted to establish the statute of limitations at one year and has not adopted what the majority refers to as a \u201cmore rigorous true intentional tort test.\u201d If that \u201ctrue intentional tort test\u201d is indeed \u201cmore rigorous,\u201d then by the majority\u2019s own description section 1-54(3) is not applicable. Therefore, this claim, as with intentional infliction of emotional distress, must be controlled by the catch-all three-year statute of limitations in section 1-52(5). See also Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Inc., 571 F.Supp. 433 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (holding that absent other specific limitation, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-52(5) is applicable).\nFor these reasons, I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "THOMAS, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Resnick & Abraham, LLC, by Perry J. Pelaez, and Laura S. Jenkins, P.C., by Laura S. Jenkins, for plaintiffs-appellants.",
      "Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jemigan, L.L.P., by Mark A. Ash and J. Mitchell Armbruster, for defendants-appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BARRY E. ALFORD, et al., Plaintiffs v. CATALYTICA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. and EASTERN OMNI CONSTRUCTORS, Defendants\nNo. COA01-959\n(Filed 4 June 2002)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 certification for immediate appeal\nAlthough plaintiffs\u2019 appeal from the trial court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 Woodson claim is an appeal from an interlocutory order since there were further issues remaining for final determination, the appeal will be heard because the trial court certified the order as a final judgment and stated there was no just reason for delay with respect to the claim dismissed.\n2. Employer and Employee\u2014 Woodson claim \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 one-year statute of limitations\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendant employer\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff employees\u2019 Woodson claim based on the trial court\u2019s conclusion that plaintiffs\u2019 claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54(3), because plaintiffs\u2019 Woodson claim is equivalent to an intentional tort.\nJudge Thomas dissenting.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order entered 22 February 2001 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 April 2002.\nResnick & Abraham, LLC, by Perry J. Pelaez, and Laura S. Jenkins, P.C., by Laura S. Jenkins, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nSmith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jemigan, L.L.P., by Mark A. Ash and J. Mitchell Armbruster, for defendants-appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0489-01",
  "first_page_order": 519,
  "last_page_order": 527
}