{ "id": 9081805, "name": "WENDLE SHEEHAN, Employee, Plaintiff v. PERRY M. ALEXANDER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Employer, SELF-INSURED, PCA SOLUTIONS, Servicing Agent, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Sheehan v. Perry M. Alexander Construction Co.", "decision_date": "2002-06-04", "docket_number": "No. COA01-606", "first_page": "506", "last_page": "515", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 N.C. App. 506" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560289, 8560267, 8560333, 8560306, 8560243 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0196-03", "/nc/300/0196-02", "/nc/300/0196-05", "/nc/300/0196-04", "/nc/300/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548032 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825", "parenthetical": "\"If there is evidence of substance which directly or by reasonable inference tends to support the findings, the Court is bound by such evidence, even though there is evidence that would have supported a finding to the contrary.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 N.C. App. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524747 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "\"If there is evidence of substance which directly or by reasonable inference tends to support the findings, the Court is bound by such evidence, even though there is evidence that would have supported a finding to the contrary.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/63/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520298 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12", "parenthetical": "stating that the Commission is \"the sole judge of the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given its testimony\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" }, { "page": "12", "parenthetical": "\"The Industrial Commission may not discount or disregard any evidence, but may choose not to believe the evidence after considering it.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551082 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-86", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he Commission must find those facts which are necessary to support its conclusions of law.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080920 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116-17" }, { "page": "116-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 784, "char_count": 21343, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.403146011215567e-07, "percentile": 0.6451200436782222 }, "sha256": "06a0fc121aa73e6eee108ae3885099f4e2687a79034d788f19159e4895969c3a", "simhash": "1:b33117c036ebec44", "word_count": 3403 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:10.836930+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and CAMPBELL concur." ], "parties": [ "WENDLE SHEEHAN, Employee, Plaintiff v. PERRY M. ALEXANDER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Employer, SELF-INSURED, PCA SOLUTIONS, Servicing Agent, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nWendle Sheehan (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals from an opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the \u201cCommission\u201d) denying him workers\u2019 compensation benefits. We affirm.\nPlaintiff was bom on 19 June 1948. He has a ninth-grade education and served in the U.S. Army from 1966 until 1969. Since his discharge from the Army, plaintiff has worked primarily in heavy equipment and construction. Prior to his employment with Perry M. Alexander Construction Company (\u201cdefendant\u201d), plaintiff had a history of lower back problems and work-related injuries. He underwent three lumbar procedures in 1980, 1982, and 1990. Although plaintiff continued to experience pain and discomfort in his back following the 1990 surgery, he was able to work.\nPlaintiff began working as a bulldozer operator for defendant in November 1990. He alleges that on 13 April 1992, while he was working at a construction site in Marion, North Carolina, he hurt his back while operating the bulldozer. According to plaintiffs testimony before the Deputy Commissioner, he backed up his bulldozer over a large rock, and the bulldozer fell about three to four feet, jarring him and causing pain in his back and down his leg.\nOn 4 May 1992, plaintiff went to the emergency room at Transylvania Community Hospital, where he reported that he had hurt his back in a bulldozer accident. Plaintiff continued to work, although he experienced continual pain and discomfort. On 19 May 1992, plaintiff was terminated from his job with defendant.\nOn 27 July 1992, plaintiff began a course of treatment at the Veteran\u2019s Administration Medical Center (the \u201cVAMC\u201d). He reported to medical personnel at the VAMC that he had injured his back in a bulldozer accident. He was first seen in the orthopaedic clinic of the VAMC on 17 August 1992. On 8 November 1993, after his leg gave way causing him to fall at home, plaintiff was seen by Glyndon B. Shaver, Jr., M.D., Chief of Orthopaedic Surgery at the VAMC.\nPlaintiff filed a Form 18, Notice of Accident to Employer, on 18 September 1992, and defendant denied workers\u2019 compensation to plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s claim was heard by a Deputy Commissioner on 26 November 1996. The Deputy Commissioner awarded compensation, and defendant appealed. On 1 September 1999, the Full Commission reversed the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s opinion and award, and plaintiff appealed to this Court.\nIn an unpublished opinion, we vacated the opinion and award of the Full Commission. We overruled several assignments of error to certain of the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, but we found merit in plaintiff\u2019s assignment of error to the following findings:\n11. Plaintiffs claim that he injured his back while operating a bulldozer on 13 April 1992 is not credible.\n13. Given our finding that plaintiffs claim that he suffered an accidental, work-related injury is not credible, his current condition is due to non-compensable causes.\nWe held as follows:\nIn the case at bar, the Commission impermissibly disregarded the testimony of Dr. Shaver. The Commission made no reference to Dr. Shaver\u2019s testimony in its findings of fact or conclusion of law. This omission was error, particularly because Dr. Shaver\u2019s testimony corroborated plaintiff\u2019s testimony. Accordingly, we vacate the opinion and remand the case to the Commission for it to consider all of the evidence, make complete findings of fact and proper conclusions of law, and enter an appropriate award.\nOn remand, the Commission replaced the findings of fact quoted above with the following new findings:\n11. Plaintiff sought medical treatment for his back on 4 May 1992 at Transylvania Community Hospital and subsequently through the Veteran\u2019s Administration Medical Center where he was seen in the orthopaedic clinic on 17 August 1993. Thereafter, plaintiff fell at home when his leg gave way. Consequently, plaintiff was then seen on 8 November 1993 for the first time by Dr. Glyndon Shaver , who was Chief of Orthopaedic Surgery at the Veteran\u2019s Administration Medical Center. Plaintiff related the alleged injury of 13 April 1992 to Dr. Shaver as well as to several other physicians. Next, Dr. Shaver saw plaintiff on 19 November 1993 at which time plaintiff was rated with a 40-50% permanent partial impairment to the back under the AMA guidelines.\n12. Plaintiff\u2019s claim that he injured his back while operating a bulldozer on 13 April 1992 is not credible. Furthermore, any medical evidence of record that corroborates plaintiff\u2019s alleged injury including the records and testimony of Dr. Shaver is given little weight as it is based on an inaccurate history provided by plaintiff. Moreover, although Dr. Shaver based his opinion that plaintiff suffered an exacerbation of his back condition on 13 April 1993 on a thorough review of plaintiffs medical records, these records also contain inaccuracies and lack credibility.\n14. Given that plaintiff\u2019s claim that he suffered an accidental, work-related injury is not credible and any medical evidence supporting plaintiffs claim including that of Dr. Shaver has been tainted by an inaccurate history provided by plaintiff, plaintiffs current condition is due to non-compensable causes.\nPlaintiff now appeals, assigning error to these findings of fact.\nOn review of a decision of the Commission, we are \u201climited to reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). An appellate court \u201cdoes not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u201d Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nThe Full Commission is the \u201csole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.\u201d Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553. Furthermore,\nthe Commission does not have to explain its findings of fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or witnesses it finds credible. Requiring the Commission to explain its credibility determinations and allowing the Court of Appeals to review the Commission\u2019s explanation of those credibility determinations would be inconsistent with our legal system\u2019s tradition of not requiring the fact finder to explain why he or she believes one witness over another or believes one piece of evidence is more credible than another.\nId. at 116-17, 530 S.E.2d at 553. Additionally, in making its determinations, the Commission \u201cis not required ... to find facts as to all credible evidence. That requirement would place an unreasonable burden on the Commission. Instead the Commission must find those facts which are necessary to support its conclusions of law.\u201d Peagler v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 138 N.C. App. 593, 602, 532 S.E.2d 207, 213 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-86 (1999). Moreover, the Commission must \u201cmake specific findings with respect to crucial facts upon which the question of plaintiffs right to compensation depends.\u201d Gaines v. Swain & Son, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 575, 579, 235 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1977).\nIn his first assignment of error, plaintiff contends that Finding of Fact No. 11 is not supported by competent evidence. In particular, plaintiff assigns error to the finding that \u201cPlaintiff sought medical treatment for his back on 4 May 1992 at Transylvania Community Hospital and subsequently through the Veteran\u2019s Administration Medical Center where he was seen in the orthopaedic clinic on 17 August 1993.\u201d Plaintiff observes that, according to his medical records from the VAMC, he first sought treatment for his back there on 27 July 1992. Plaintiff argues that the date on which he first sought treatment is a crucial fact, and that the Commission\u2019s inaccurate finding of this fact demonstrates that the Commission disregarded competent evidence, namely all of plaintiff\u2019s visits to the VAMC occurring between July 1992 and August 1993.\nAlthough plaintiff first sought treatment at the VAMC on 27 July 1992, he was not seen in the orthopaedic clinic until 17 August 1992. We do not believe the Commission erred in focusing on the date that plaintiff was seen in the orthopaedic clinic rather than the date on which plaintiff was seen in the triage area of the hospital, especially since it accurately found that the first date he sought any treatment after the alleged accident was 4 May 1992. With respect to the year, our review of plaintiff\u2019s medical records reveals that he was not seen at the VAMC on 17 August 1993, but that he was seen there on 17 August 1992. We agree with defendant that the Commission\u2019s use of \u201c1993\u201d rather than \u201c1992\u201d is apparently a typographical error. In light of our disposition of the plaintiff\u2019s next contentions, we do not believe that the error is grounds for reversal. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nPlaintiff next assigns error to Findings of Fact No. 12 and No. 14, on the ground that these findings are \u201ctotally unsupported by competent evidence\u201d and are \u201cso arbitrary that they do not appear to be the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Hence, plaintiff argues, the Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s injury was not compensable, being based on unsupported findings, is also in error. We disagree.\nPlaintiff contends that there is no competent evidence supporting the Commission\u2019s finding that the medical evidence that tends to corroborate plaintiff\u2019s account is based on an inaccurate history provided by plaintiff. Plaintiff observes that \u201call of Plaintiffs statements given to medical personnel from his first visit to the emergency room on 4 May 1992 and continuing throughout the course of his treatment say the same thing \u2014 that he began experiencing pain in his lower back and right leg after being involved in a bulldozer accident on the job in April of 1992.\u201d Although this accurately characterizes the record evidence, it does not resolve the credibility of plaintiff\u2019s statements, which assessment is not within our province. See Deese, 352 N.C. at 116-17, 530 S.E.2d at 553; see also Weaver v. American National Can Corp., 123, N.C. App. 507, 510, 473 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1996) (stating that the Commission is \u201cthe sole judge of the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given its testimony\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)). The fact that plaintiff repeatedly gave the same account of his injury tends to lend credence to that account. Nevertheless, the Commission found that plaintiff\u2019s account of his bulldozer accident was not credible, and we cannot overturn the Commission\u2019s finding regarding plaintiff\u2019s credibility. Moreover, while the Commission is not required to explain its credibility determinations, and this Court does not review the Commission\u2019s explanation of its credibility determinations, see Deese, 352 N.C. at 116-17, 530 S.E.2d at 553, we note that the Commission found facts that tended to undermine plaintiff\u2019s allegation that he sustained an injury at work. For example, the Commission made the following findings of fact, which we affirmed as supported by the record when this case was previously before us:\n7. Randy Lee Keever, plaintiff\u2019s co-worker, testified that there were no large rocks on the Marion project site at the time plaintiff was operating his bulldozer. Plaintiff was scraping topsoil and spreading dirt, and no rocks were unearthed until later in the project when the digging was much deeper. Plaintiff\u2019s explanation of the cause of the alleged specific traumatic incident is deemed not credible.\n8. Plaintiff claimed to have told one of the pan operators, probably Randy Keever, to report to Jerry Cochran that plaintiff had hurt himself. Thereafter, plaintiff testified that he told Cochran himself of the injury. Plaintiff stated that Mr. Cochran was the grading foreman and in charge of the job. Plaintiff did not work the rest of the day, and Cochran finished the dozing. Plaintiff stated that he also told another co-worker, Tony Keever, of his injury.\n9. Randy Keever testified that plaintiff never told him of a back injury. Karen Smyly, personnel manager and bookkeeper for defendant, testified that she never received an injury report regarding plaintiffs alleged incident. Kevin Hensley, a field mechanic for defendant, was on the Marion job site checking the equipment at least once every day while plaintiff was there. He testified that plaintiff never told him he had injured his back while working there. Leroy Peek, superintendent of the job at which plaintiff claimed to have been injured, testified that plaintiff never reported to him that he had been injured. Further, Mr. Peek worked with plaintiff daily at the next job he worked on, and plaintiff never mentioned that he had incurred a back injury on the Marion job. Mr. Peek also testified that had plaintiff injured his back on the job, he knew the procedures for notifying the office of the injury and obtaining medical care.\nPlaintiff also asserts that the history of the injury he provided to medical personnel is \u201cunrefuted and without contradiction\u201d in his medical records. We first note that plaintiffs medical records and Dr. Shaver\u2019s testimony suggest that plaintiff did in fact re-injure his back, and the Commission did not make a contrary finding. However, the issue here is not whether plaintiff was injured, but whether his injury was work-related. Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that his injury was work-related. See Gibbs v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 112 N.C. App. 103, 107, 434 S.E.2d 653, 656 (1993).\nThe medical records reflect that plaintiff reported to medical personnel that he injured his, back in a bulldozer accident, and Dr. Shaver\u2019s opinion that plaintiff\u2019s back injury was exacerbated by a bulldozer accident was based on the history provided by plaintiff and recorded in his medical records. For example, Dr. Shaver testified that \u201c[t]he history that [plaintiff] gave from the record was that he had injured himself in a bulldozer accident.\u201d Dr. Shaver also testified that it was his \u201cconsidered opinion . . . that Mr. Sheehan, by history, had a definite exacerbation of a preexisting condition as the result of his bulldozer accident.\u201d (emphasis added). Similarly, Dr. Shaver testified that \u201cMr. Sheehan\u2019s exacerbations, according to the record, appear to be related to a bulldozer accident in April, 1992.\u201d (emphasis added). After a colloquy revealed that Dr. Shaver did not personally take plaintiff\u2019s history, Dr. Shaver testified as follows:\nQ. Basically, Dr. Shaver, you read the record . . ., didn\u2019t you?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And the record showed clearly that Mr. Sheehan reported that he had had a bulldozer accident?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. And not only on just one occasion, but that record indicates that he had made that report several times, does it not?\nA. That\u2019s true.\nQ. Now you may go ahead, if you have an opinion.\nA. Well, I have an opinion, and the opinion is that the accident certainly was of the degree that it could have caused a recurrent disk rupture at that level, even though he had been operated on three times previously.\nIn sum, while Dr. Shaver indicated that plaintiff\u2019s condition was consistent with injury in a bulldozer accident, as plaintiff described, Dr. Shaver had no independent knowledge that such an incident occurred.\nOnce the Commission determined that plaintiff\u2019s account of his injury was not credible, it acted within its authority in refusing to give much weight to Dr. Shaver\u2019s opinion based on the history supplied by plaintiff. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission\u2019s credibility determinations were within its discretion and its findings are supported by competent evidence. See Chapman v. Southern Import Co., 63 N.C. App. 194, 196, 303 S.E.2d 824, 825 (1983) (\u201cIf there is evidence of substance which directly or by reasonable inference tends to support the findings, the Court is bound by such evidence, even though there is evidence that would have supported a finding to the contrary.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)).\nThe only record evidence regarding how plaintiff injured his back consists of the account given by plaintiff and the statements of others that are based on plaintiff\u2019s account. Once the Commission rejected that account, no evidence remained indicating that plaintiff sustained his injury in a work-related accident. Accordingly the Commission did not act arbitrarily or contrary to reason in concluding that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proving that his injury is compensable. See Gibbs, 112 N.C. App. at 107, 434 S.E.2d at 656.\nIn his final assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the Commission failed to consider all of the evidence and make complete findings of fact, as mandated by this Court on remand. As a result, plaintiff maintains, the Commission failed to make proper conclusions of law and failed to enter an appropriate award. We disagree.\nIn its first opinion and award, the Commission made no mention whatsoever of Dr. Shaver\u2019s testimony. We were thus forced to conclude that the Commission had \u201cimpermissibly disregarded the testimony of Dr. Shaver,\u201d which it may not do. See Harrell v. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835, disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980). Therefore, we remanded for the Commission \u201cto consider all of the evidence, make complete findings of fact and proper conclusions of law, and enter an appropriate award.\u201d\nOur directive did not require the Commission to comment at length on all of the evidence it reviews. Rather, the Commission is required to make \u201cdefinitive\u201d factual findings, which are findings sufficient to \u201cdetermine the critical issues raised by the evidence in [the] case.\u201d Id. \\ see Peagler, 138 N.C. App. at 602, 532 S.E.2d at 213 (\u201c[T]he Commission must find those facts which are necessary to support its conclusions of law.\u201d). In the opinion and award currently before us, the Commission determined that plaintiffs account of the injury was not credible and, as it indicated in Finding of Fact No. 12, decided not to rely on the portion of the medical evidence based on plaintiffs account. See Weaver, 123 N.C. App. at 510, 473 S.E.2d at 12 (\u201cThe Industrial Commission may not discount or disregard any evidence, but may choose not to believe the evidence after considering it.\u201d). Therefore, the Commission gave \u201clittle weight\u201d to Dr. Shaver\u2019s testimony. Finding that plaintiff was not injured in a bulldozer accident as he described, the Commission concluded that \u201cplaintiff\u2019s current condition is due to non-compensable causes.\u201d\nWe hold that the Commission considered the evidence appropriately, made sufficient findings of fact, drew proper conclusions of law based thereon, and entered an appropriate award. Accordingly, we affirm the opinion and award.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN and CAMPBELL concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "H. Paul Averette, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Teague, Rotenstreich & Stanaland, L.L.P., by Elizabeth M. Stanaland and Paul A. Daniels, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WENDLE SHEEHAN, Employee, Plaintiff v. PERRY M. ALEXANDER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Employer, SELF-INSURED, PCA SOLUTIONS, Servicing Agent, Defendant\nNo. COA01-606\n(Filed 4 June 2002)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 back injury \u2014 date treatment sought \u2014 orthopaedic clinic rather than triage area \u2014 typographical error\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in focusing on the date that plaintiff was seen in the orthopaedic clinic of a hospital for a back injury rather than the date on which plaintiff was seen in the triage area of the hospital, and the Commission\u2019s use of the incorrect year was a typographical error which was not a ground for reversal.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 credibility \u2014 doctor\u2019s testimony \u2014 history given by plaintiff\nThe Industrial Commission did not act arbitrarily or contrary to reason in concluding that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proving that his back injury is compensable where the only record evidence of how plaintiff injured his back consists of the account given by plaintiff and the statements of others, including doctors, that are based on plaintiffs account. Once the Commission determined that plaintiff\u2019s account of his injury was not credible, it acted within its authority in refusing to give much weight to a doctor\u2019s history which was based upon the history supplied by plaintiff. The Commission\u2019s credibility determinations were within its discretion and its findings are supported by competent evidence.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 consideration of evidence \u2014 determination of credibility\nThe Industrial Commission in a workers\u2019 compensation action on remand from the Court of Appeals considered the evidence appropriately where the Commission determined that plaintiff\u2019s account of his injury was not credible and decided not to rely on the portion of the medical evidence based on plaintiff\u2019s account. The Commission may not discount or disregard evidence, but may choose not to believe evidence after considering it.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from opinion and award entered 14 February 2001 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 February 2002.\nH. Paul Averette, for plaintiff-appellant.\nTeague, Rotenstreich & Stanaland, L.L.P., by Elizabeth M. Stanaland and Paul A. Daniels, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0506-01", "first_page_order": 536, "last_page_order": 545 }