{ "id": 9082316, "name": "PIEDMONT TRIAD REGIONAL WATER AUTHORITY, Plaintiff v. JOHN LEON LAMB, and wife, HAZEL RUTH LAMB, KRISTLE L. MARSH HYATT (formerly KRISTLE L. MARSH), JIMMY C. HYATT, JR. and NORTH CENTRAL FARM CREDIT, ACA, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Piedmont Triad Regional Water Authority v. Lamb", "decision_date": "2002-06-04", "docket_number": "No. COA01-970", "first_page": "594", "last_page": "598", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 N.C. App. 594" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11655510 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2646421 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 S.E.2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630303 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "citing Vandiford v. Vandiford, 215 N.C. 461, 2 S.E.2d 364 (1939)" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178-79", "parenthetical": "citing Vandiford v. Vandiford, 215 N.C. 461, 2 S.E.2d 364 (1939)" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659687, 1659928, 1659898, 1659836, 1659934 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0496-05", "/nc/348/0496-02", "/nc/348/0496-03", "/nc/348/0496-04", "/nc/348/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462-63" }, { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11648937 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155845, 1155765, 1155864, 1155930, 1155837 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0357-02", "/nc/351/0357-01", "/nc/351/0357-05", "/nc/351/0357-03", "/nc/351/0357-04" ] }, { "cite": "521 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241701 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 530, "char_count": 9958, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.125789038370556e-07, "percentile": 0.9106054059522389 }, "sha256": "2f7b47671d911d25d8e857978dc59cb2f5fbad277bc5bc6417db1a4eab88e1f1", "simhash": "1:d238746a75ae7bea", "word_count": 1627 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:10.836930+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and CAMPBELL concur." ], "parties": [ "PIEDMONT TRIAD REGIONAL WATER AUTHORITY, Plaintiff v. JOHN LEON LAMB, and wife, HAZEL RUTH LAMB, KRISTLE L. MARSH HYATT (formerly KRISTLE L. MARSH), JIMMY C. HYATT, JR. and NORTH CENTRAL FARM CREDIT, ACA, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nOn 25 May 1999, plaintiff, a public authority with the power of eminent domain, served official notice on defendants that it intended to institute condemnation proceedings to acquire a tract of land owned by defendants to construct the Randleman Lake Project. On 20 July 1999, plaintiff filed its complaint and declaration of taking which alleged the following in part:\n3. . . . [T]he Plaintiff, Piedmont Triad Regional Water Authority, has determined that it is necessary and in the public interest to acquire by condemnation the real property interest described in Exhibit A for the public use and purpose set forth in Exhibit B.\n11. The property and area described in Exhibit A, Paragraphs 2-3, are hereby DECLARED TO BE TAKEN and condemned, and title thereto, together with the right of possession, shall vest in the plaintiff according to the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-42. Right of entry shall vest with the Plaintiff with the placing of the deposit set forth herein in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-42.\n12. The owners will not be permitted to remove any timber, buildings, structures, permanent improvements or fixtures situated on or affixed to the property. \u25a0\nDefendants filed an answer asserting they lacked sufficient information regarding the accuracy of the descriptions of the property described in Exhibit A.\nLocated on defendants\u2019 property were two chicken houses which had not been used since 1995, along with various pieces of equipment situated in and around the chicken houses. This equipment included feed silos, mist cooling systems, egg conveyor systems, drinkers, automatic chicken feeders and egg laying nests.\nAfter a jury trial, the only issue for the jury to determine was just compensation for the taking. Defendants offered the testimonies of Edmund Lindsey Dean and Geoffrey Greg, two experts in the field of real estate appraisals. Both Mr. Dean and Mr. Greg considered the items of equipment as part of the improvements to the property in making their appraisals. Mr. Dean valued the property taken at $222,625, while Mr. Greg valued it at $252,900.\nPlaintiff offered the testimonies of Roy Neal Moore and Howard Williams, two experts in the field of real estate appraisals. Neither of plaintiffs experts included the equipment in the valuation of the property. Mr. Moore valued the property taken at $87,300, while Mr. Williams valued it at $75,500. The jury found just compensation for the taking of the property to be $158,500. Plaintiff moved for a new trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59(a)(5), (6) and (7) (2001) which was denied.\nPlaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the value of the equipment located on the property. Plaintiff claims that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-2(7) limits property which is subject to taking to real property. Thus, plaintiff claims that since the equipment is personal property, it is not subject to taking and evidence of its value is inadmissible.\nThe admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Lane v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 135 N.C. App. 494, 498, 521 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1999), disc. rev. denied, 351 N.C. 357, 542 S.E.2d 212 (2000).\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-2(7), property is defined as \u201cany right, title, or interest in land, including leases and options to buy or sell. \u2018Property\u2019 also includes rights of access, rights-of-way, easements, water rights, air rights, and any other privilege or appurtenance in or to the possession, use, and enjoyment of land.\u201d Plaintiff relies on the recent case from this Court, City of Durham v. Woo, 129 N.C. App. 183, 497 S.E.2d 457, cert. denied, 348 N.C. 496, 510 S.E.2d 380 (1998), for the proposition that equipment is not subject to taking. However, in Woo, this Court relied on the fact that the City gave notice to the owners that the equipment was not part of the taking and it specifically gave the owners an opportunity to remove the equipment. Woo, 129 N.C. App. at 191, 497 S.E.2d at 462-63. This Court reversed the award for the taking of \u201cfixtures and personal property.\u201d Id. The Court noted that \u201cthe City specified that it was condemning defendants\u2019 real property, excluding the restaurant and kitchen equipment, and allowed defendants approximately four months to remove such equipment. Because defendants never removed those items despite the opportunity to do so, those items are deemed to have been abandoned.\u201d Id. at 191, 497 S.E.2d at 462. Thus, the value of the fixtures and personal property was not to be included in the value of the taking. Id.\nTo the contrary, in this case, the complaint and declaration of taking in paragraph twelve alleged that defendants \u201cwill not be permitted to remove any timber, buildings, structures, permanent improvements or fixtures situated on or affixed to the property.\u201d (Emphasis added). Defendants only answered that they lacked sufficient information regarding the accuracy of the description of the property taken. We find nothing in the complaint nor in the record which indicated what property defendants were entitled to remove. Defendants\u2019 witnesses testified that these items of equipment were part of and typically sold with the chicken houses, which plaintiff admitted were included in the taking.\nFurthermore, the trial court gave instructions on the amount of just compensation due defendants for the taking of \u201cproperty.\u201d There was no request for instructions regarding whether this equipment was included in the definition of \u201cproperty.\u201d There was no objection by plaintiff to the trial court\u2019s jury instructions. The jury was to determine whether the equipment was included within the definition of \u201cproperty.\u201d Since the record does not indicate that plaintiff ever excluded it from the taking, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendants\u2019 witnesses to include the equipment in their determination of the value of the property taken.\nPlaintiff further contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for a new trial because the jury reached an unlawful compromise or quotient verdict. \u201cA compromise verdict is one in which the jury answers the issues without regard to the pleadings, evidence, contentions of the parties or instructions of the court.\u201d City of Burlington v. Staley, 77 N.C. App. 175, 178-79, 334 S.E.2d 446, 450 (1985) (citing Vandiford v. Vandiford, 215 N.C. 461, 2 S.E.2d 364 (1939)). \u201cIt is the well-established law of North Carolina that no quotient verdict exists unless the jurors reach a prior agreement to be bound by the average of the amount each submits as damages.\u201d Seaman v. McQueen, 51 N.C. App. 500, 506, 277 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1981); see also Gram v. Davis, 128 N.C. App. 484, 490, 495 S.E.2d 384, 388 (1998). The dollar amount of the verdict alone is insufficient to set aside the verdict as being either an unlawful compromise or a quotient verdict. Staley, 77 N.C. App. at 179, 334 S.E.2d at 450; Gram, 128 N.C. App. at 490, 495 S.E.2d at 388.\nHere, the only indication of an unlawful compromise or a quotient verdict was that the jury\u2019s dollar amount for just compensation approximated the average of the valuations presented by the four experts. There is nothing else in the record to show that the jury had a \u201cprior agreement\u201d to be bound by any averages nor is there any showing that the jury acted without regard to the pleadings, evidence, contentions of the parties, or instructions of the trial court. As instructed, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of a witness\u2019s testimony as to the value of the taking. Because plaintiff has failed to establish that the jury\u2019s verdict was an unlawful compromise or quotient verdict, we find the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nIn conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendants\u2019 experts to testily regarding the value of the plaintiffs taking. The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and CAMPBELL concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roberson Haworth & Reese, PLLC, by Robert A. Brinson and Christopher C. Finan, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Wyatt Early Harris Wheeler, L.L.P., by Scott F. Wyatt, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PIEDMONT TRIAD REGIONAL WATER AUTHORITY, Plaintiff v. JOHN LEON LAMB, and wife, HAZEL RUTH LAMB, KRISTLE L. MARSH HYATT (formerly KRISTLE L. MARSH), JIMMY C. HYATT, JR. and NORTH CENTRAL FARM CREDIT, ACA, Defendants\nNo. COA01-970\n(Filed 4 June 2002)\n1. Eminent Domain\u2014 damages \u2014 equipment taken with property\nThe trial court did not err in a condemnation proceeding by allowing defendants\u2019 witnesses to include equipment in their determination of the value of the property taken where the complaint and declaration of taking stated that defendants would not be permitted to remove buildings or fixtures situated on the property; defendants\u2019 witnesses testified that the equipment in question was part of and typically sold with chicken houses which were included in the taking; there was no request for instructions regarding whether this equipment was included in the definition of property; and there was no objection to the trial court\u2019s instructions that the jury was to determine whether the equipment was included within the definition of property.\n2. Trials\u2014 verdict \u2014 average of four valuations \u2014 evidence of compromise insufficient\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial where plaintiff alleged that the jury reached a compromise or quotient verdict, but the only indication of an unlawful verdict was that the jury\u2019s dollar amount approximated the average of the valuations presented by the four experts.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 26 February 2001 and order entered 9 March 2001 by Judge Thomas W. Seay, Jr. in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 April 2002.\nRoberson Haworth & Reese, PLLC, by Robert A. Brinson and Christopher C. Finan, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWyatt Early Harris Wheeler, L.L.P., by Scott F. Wyatt, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0594-01", "first_page_order": 624, "last_page_order": 628 }