{ "id": 9082571, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLAYTON BULLIN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bullin", "decision_date": "2002-06-18", "docket_number": "No. COA01-729", "first_page": "631", "last_page": "643", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 N.C. App. 631" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "294 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574694, 8574666, 8574606, 8574641, 8574623 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0738-05", "/nc/294/0738-04", "/nc/294/0738-01", "/nc/294/0738-03", "/nc/294/0738-02" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "upholding a seven-hour delay" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8546969 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6", "parenthetical": "upholding a seven-hour delay" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "finding no violation in a thirteen-hour delay" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790246 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758", "parenthetical": "finding no violation in a thirteen-hour delay" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5456 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "287" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798758 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231-32", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558310 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567490 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1089", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1330912, 1335109, 1330918, 1335077, 1335365, 1331497, 1331403, 1334705, 1330705, 1331381, 1330808, 1332409, 1331131, 1331288 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1089-08", "/us/513/1089-06", "/us/513/1089-12", "/us/513/1089-05", "/us/513/1089-04", "/us/513/1089-10", "/us/513/1089-11", "/us/513/1089-01", "/us/513/1089-02", "/us/513/1089-03", "/us/513/1089-13", "/us/513/1089-07", "/us/513/1089-14", "/us/513/1089-09" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503651 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132037, 131946, 132116, 132087, 132223 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0842-02", "/nc/350/0842-05", "/nc/350/0842-01", "/nc/350/0842-04", "/nc/350/0842-03" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11654669 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525588 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" }, { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573421 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" }, { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 700, 704, 187 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572694 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 700, 704, 187 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0235-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1057, "char_count": 29963, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.784437334661049e-07, "percentile": 0.8354931117605698 }, "sha256": "5d794a6fe32e875b3ef4f45eef257716e2e86138965617c6a254aa41d392948b", "simhash": "1:a769f068774425f4", "word_count": 4664 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:10.836930+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLAYTON BULLIN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nOn 9 June 1997, a grand jury for Iredell County indicted Clayton Doyle Bullin (\u201cdefendant\u201d) on charges of trafficking in drags, conspiracy to traffic in drugs, and possession of controlled substances with the intent to manufacture, sell or deliver. Defendant thereafter filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers at defendant\u2019s residence. On 2 August 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAt the hearing, the State presented evidence tending to show the following pertinent facts: In September 1996, law enforcement officers in Iredell County began investigating Ralph Jarvis (\u201cJarvis\u201d) for suspected drug trafficking. When the officers confronted Jarvis with evidence of his involvement in drug trafficking, Jarvis agreed to assist the officers in purchasing controlled substances. On 17 October 1996, Jarvis participated in a controlled purchase of cocaine from Jeff Feimster (\u201cFeimster\u201d). During the 17 October 1996 transaction, officers observed a black Chevy Blazer at Feimster\u2019s residence. Jarvis subsequently participated in two additional purchases from Feimster. During each transaction, Jarvis was unable to purchase cocaine until the black Chevy Blazer arrived, which Feimster identified as his source for cocaine. Through investigation, officers learned that the Chevy Blazer was registered to Jesse McNeil Hedrick (\u201cHedrick\u201d), whom they also observed driving the vehicle. Officers subsequently began surveillance of Hedrick\u2019s residence.\nOn 26 November 1996, Jarvis arranged to purchase cocaine from Feimster. When Jarvis arrived at Feimster\u2019s residence, he purchased Valium, but Feimster told him that he did not have any cocaine. Feimster informed Jarvis that he had \u201cjust called his man\u201d and instructed Jarvis to return in thirty minutes in order to purchase the cocaine. Jarvis left Feimster\u2019s residence. Approximately four minutes after Jarvis departed, officers observed Hedrick leave his residence in the Chevy Blazer. Hedrick drove directly to defendant\u2019s residence, entered the home, and re-emerged four minutes later. Hedrick then began driving \u201con the most direct route\u201d to Feimster\u2019s residence. When officers following Hedrick noticed him engaging in \u201cunusual\u201d and \u201cerratic driving maneuvers,\u201d they activated the vehicle\u2019s blue lights and indicated for Hedrick to stop his vehicle. After a brief chase, officers stopped Hedrick and discovered more than twenty-eight grams of cocaine concealed on his person.\nMeanwhile, officers investigating defendant learned that he had been previously convicted for felony possession of marijuana and possession with intent to sell marijuana. Officers also learned that one of defendant\u2019s family members had contacted the Iredell County Sheriff\u2019s Department a few months earlier regarding defendant\u2019s involvement in selling controlled substances from his home. Acting on this information, as well as on the evidence obtained by their surveillance of defendant\u2019s residence and by Hedrick\u2019s arrest, the officers applied for and received a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest.\nDetective David Lynn Woodward (\u201cDetective Woodward\u201d) of the Statesville Police Department went to defendant\u2019s residence and spoke with defendant. When he informed defendant that he had a warrant for his arrest, defendant attempted to close the door, whereupon Detective Woodward and two other officers entered the home, arrested defendant, and made a brief search of the residence in order to ensure that no one else was in the home. During the search, Detective Woodward found a small scale, a knife, a spoon, a clear glass jar containing rice, and clear plastic bags containing cocaine, on the floor of a closet in the master bedroom. The officers made no further search of the residence, but waited for the issuance of a search warrant. After advising defendant of his Miranda rights, the officers waited with defendant at his residence until the search warrant was issued. Upon searching defendant\u2019s residence, officers found, among other items, \u201cover 50 grams of cocaine; pounds of marijuana; at least five or six different guns, some of them being assault rifles; and at least $22,000 in cash.\u201d\nBased on the above-stated evidence, the trial court concluded that there was probable cause for the magistrate to issue a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest and for a search of his residence. The trial court further concluded that the officers had the right to conduct a protective sweep of defendant\u2019s residence, and that the seizure of items located in the master bedroom closet was reasonable. Finally, the trial court concluded that defendant\u2019s detention was reasonable and did not violate his statutory rights. Finding no violation of defendant\u2019s constitutional or statutory rights, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence found at his residence.\nUpon the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress, defendant pled guilty to the charges against him and notified the court of his intention to appeal the denial of his motion. The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum term of thirty-five (35) months\u2019 and a maximum term of forty-two (42) months\u2019 imprisonment and fined him $50,000.00 on the charges of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. Defendant also received a suspended sentence of six to eight months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine of five hundred dollars for the possession of marijuana charge. On 27 February 2001, the trial court entered an order denying in part defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief, from which order, together with his convictions and resulting sentences, defendant now appeals.\nAlthough defendant designated eighteen assignments of error in the record on appeal, his brief to this Court contains arguments concerning only five assignments of error. Assignments of error in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited are deemed abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (2002). We therefore limit our review to those assignments of error addressed by defendant in his brief.\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in (I) joining the three charges against defendant for trial; (II) denying defendant\u2019s motion to sequester witnesses; (III) denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress; (IV) concluding that defendant\u2019s statutory rights had not been violated; and (V) denying defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief. We address these arguments in turn.\nI. Joinder of Charges\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in joining his charges for trial. Under section 15A-926(a) of our General Statutes, \u201c[t]wo or more offenses may be joined in one pleading or for trial when the offenses ... are based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-926(a) (2001). In determining whether joinder of offenses is appropriate\nthe trial court must determine whether the offenses are \u201cso separate in time and place and so distinct in circumstances as to render the consolidation unjust and prejudicial to defendant.\u201d Thus, there must be some type of \u201ctransactional connection\u201d between the offenses before they may be consolidated for trial. In addition, the trial judge\u2019s exercise of discretion in consolidating charges will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the defendant has been denied a fair trial by the order of consolidation.\nState v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235, 240, 278 S.E.2d 200, 203 (1981) (quoting State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 700, 704, 187 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1972)) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).\nDefendant argues that the connection between the trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine charges and the possession of marijuana charge was insufficient to support their consolidation. We disagree.\nThe charges against defendant stemmed from a series of actions occurring over a short period of time that were part of one general transaction. The evidence showed that law enforcement officers arranged for Jarvis to purchase cocaine from Feimster on 26 November 1996. When Jarvis arrived at the Feimster residence at 2:00 p.m., Feimster informed him that \u201chis man\u201d would not arrive until 2:30 p.m., and Jarvis left approximately five minutes later. Meanwhile, officers watching Hedrick\u2019s residence observed him leave his home at 2:09 p.m. and drive directly to defendant\u2019s residence, where he remained for only four minutes. When officers subsequently stopped Hedrick\u2019s vehicle, they found cocaine hidden on Hedrick\u2019s person. The officers then obtained an arrest warrant for defendant, who by 3:30 p.m. was in custody. A search of defendant\u2019s residence produced more than fifty grams of cocaine, \u201cpounds\u201d of marijuana, numerous weapons, and $22,000.00 in cash.\nGiven this evidence, we conclude that the cocaine trafficking and conspiracy charges were not \u201cso separate in time and place and so distinct in circumstances\u201d from the marijuana possession charge \u201cas to render the consolidation unjust and prejudicial to defendant.\u201d Johnson, 280 N.C. at 704, 187 S.E.2d at 101. As there was a sufficient \u201ctransactional connection\u201d between the charged offenses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining the offenses for trial. We therefore overrule defendant\u2019s first assignment of error.\nII. Motion to Sequester\nBy his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to sequester the State\u2019s witnesses during the suppression hearing. We disagree.\nSequestration serves the dual purpose of acting \u201cas a restraint on witnesses tailoring their testimony to that of earlier witnesses\u201d as well as \u201cdetecting testimony that is less than candid.\u201d State v. Harrell, 67 N.C. App. 57, 64, 312 S.E.2d 230, 236 (1984). When a party moves to sequester witnesses in a criminal case, \u201cthe judge may order all or some of the witnesses other than the defendant to remain outside of the courtroom until called to testify[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1225 (2001). The decision to sequester witnesses rests within the full discretion of the trial court. See State v. Johnson, 128 N.C. App. 361, 370, 496 S.E.2d 805, 811 (1998), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 842, 538 S.E.2d 581 (1999).\nDefendant acknowledges that we may only review the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to sequester the witnesses for abuse of discretion, but he nevertheless asserts that \u201cthe trial court made a perfunctory ruling on the Defendant\u2019s Motion to Sequester, without carefully considering the basis for the motion, and denied the motion without weighing the concerns expressed by the Defendant.\u201d Defendant\u2019s argument is wholly without merit.\nThe record reveals that the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to sequester after hearing arguments and making appropriate inquiries of both sides. Further, the sole basis for the motion to sequester advanced by defendant before the trial court was his contention that \u201cthere\u2019s some conflicts between paperwork which was submitted in discovery between officers\u2019 statements, between paperwork that was filed with the [trial court], and that the officers\u2019 credibility as to the time in which events occurred in this case may be called into question[.]\u201d We agree with the State that if, in fact, any conflicts in paperwork existed, such discrepancies could be illustrated through the documents at issue. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to sequester the witnesses, and we therefore overrule defendant\u2019s second assignment of error.\nIII. Motion to Suppress\nDefendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the warrant for his arrest, and that the trial court therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized at defendant\u2019s residence pursuant to his arrest. Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress on the grounds that the initial search of his residence conducted by officers immediately pursuant to his arrest was unreasonable. Thus, argues defendant, any evidence seized as a result of the unreasonable and therefore illegal search should have been suppressed. We address defendant\u2019s arguments in turn.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact following a suppression hearing are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts when supported by competent evidence. See State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994). While the trial court\u2019s factual findings are binding if sustained by the evidence, the court\u2019s conclusions based thereon are reviewable de novo on appeal. See State v. Mahaley, 332 N.C. 583, 592-93, 423 S.E.2d 58, 64 (1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1995).\nIn the instant case, the trial court concluded that there was probable cause to support the issuance of the arrest warrant against defendant. Under section 15A-304 of our General Statutes,\n[a] judicial official may issue a warrant for arrest only when he is supplied with sufficient information, supported by oath or affirmation, to make an independent judgment that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. The information must be shown by one or more of the following:\n(1) Affidavit;\n(2) Oral testimony under oath or affirmation before the issuing official[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-304(d) (2001). \u201cProbable cause\u201d under this section \u201crefers to the existence of a reasonable suspicion in the mind of a prudent person, considering the facts and circumstances presently known.\u201d State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 298, 283 S.E.2d 719, 724 (1981). Thus, to establish probable cause, \u201cthe evidence need not amount to proof of guilt, or even to prima facie evidence of guilt, but it must be such as would actuate a reasonable man acting in good faith.\u201d State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 207, 195 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1973).\nIn dealing with probable cause, ... we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.... Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same \u2014 and so are law enforcement officers.\nIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983) (citations omitted). The standard to be met when considering whether probable cause exists is the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 233, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 545.\nExamining the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, we conclude that there was probable cause to issue the arrest warrant against defendant. The evidence before the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant supported the reasonable probability that defendant was involved in drug trafficking. The facts showed that officers had observed Hedrick\u2019s vehicle, which Feimster identified as his drug source, on \u201cnumerous occasions\u201d at Feimster\u2019s residence during drug transactions. On 26 November 1996, immediately prior to a planned drug sale, officers followed Hedrick to defendant\u2019s house, whereupon Hedrick entered defendant\u2019s residence and remained for only four minutes before proceeding on a route towards Feimster\u2019s residence, where Feimster was expecting \u201chis man.\u201d When officers stopped Hedrick\u2019s vehicle shortly afterwards, they discovered more than twenty-eight grams of cocaine on his person. Further, although Detective Woodward could not specifically recall whether or not he informed the magistrate of defendant\u2019s reputation and previous involvement with drugs, he testified that it was his normal practice to do so. The trial court therefore found \u201cthat Det. Woodward did inform the magistrate of the Defendant\u2019s drug record and reputation in the community as a drug dealer when he applied for the arrest warrant.\u201d\nWe conclude that the above-stated chain of events, as found by the trial court, along with the information regarding defendant\u2019s reputation and previous involvement with drugs, supported the reasonable and \u201ccommon-sense conclusion\u201d that defendant had supplied the drugs that officers found on Hedrick\u2019s person. See Illinois, 462 U.S. at 231, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 544. The trial court therefore did not err in concluding that there was probable cause to issue the arrest warrant.\nDefendant further asserts that the initial search of his residence pursuant to his arrest was unreasonable and therefore unlawful. He contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the arresting officers had the right to conduct a protective sweep of defendant\u2019s premises to ensure their safety. Defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nThe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the \u201cright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV. \u201c[A] governmental search and seizure of private property unaccompanied by prior judicial approval in the form of a warrant is per se unreasonable unless the search falls within a well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement involving exigent circumstances.\u201d State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 135, 291 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1982). Evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure must be excluded. See State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313, 327, 471 S.E.2d 605, 613 (1996).\nProtective sweeps of a residence performed by law enforcement officers in conjunction with an in-home arrest are reasonable if there are \u201carticulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.\u201d Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 286 (1990). The purpose of a protective sweep is to ensure the security of law enforcement officers. See id. To that end, the protective sweep must be limited to a cursory inspection of places where a person may hide and last no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger. See id. at 335-36, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 287.\nIn the instant case, officers legally entered defendant\u2019s residence pursuant to a valid arrest warrant and performed a protective sweep of the home. The facts known to the officers at the time of defendant\u2019s arrest included the following information: (1) defendant had a history of drug dealing; (2) officers had received information that defendant was currently involved in drug trafficking; (3) defendant was a current suspect in a drug trafficking investigation involving numerous individuals; and (4) defendant resisted arrest when informed of the warrant. Given defendant\u2019s actions and his previous involvement with drugs, as well as the dangerous and unpredictable nature of drug trafficking, a prudent officer could reasonably believe that under these facts, a protective sweep of defendant\u2019s home was necessary to make certain that no one else was hiding in the residence. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the search was limited in scope and duration and aimed at ensuring the officers\u2019 safety. The officers involved in the protective sweep testified repeatedly that they searched the premises because they wanted to \u201cmake sure no one was there that could hurt. . . [the] officers] in that residence.\u201d Detective Woodward confirmed that, \u201c[o]nce we were satisfied no one else was in the residence, we went back . . . and waited for the search warrant.\u201d Moreover, the officers limited their search to obvious hiding places. Detective Woodward discovered the cocaine and drug paraphernalia seized during the initial search in a walk-in closet, an area where a reasonable officer could expect someone to conceal themselves. See Maryland, 494 U.S. at 334, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 286.\nUnder the facts of the present case, the initial search of defendant\u2019s residence was reasonable, and the trial court did not err in so concluding. As probable cause existed to support the issuance of the warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest, and because the protective sweep conducted by officers pursuant to defendant\u2019s arrest was lawful, the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized at his residence. We therefore overrule defendant\u2019s third assignment of error.\nIV. Delay Following Arrest\nBy his fourth assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in concluding that his statutory rights were not violated. Specifically, defendant argues that his detention by the arresting officers for almost two hours at his residence pending execution of the search warrant represented a violation of his rights under section 15A-501 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Section 15A-501 states, in pertinent part, that\nUpon the arrest of a person, with or without a warrant, but not necessarily in the order hereinafter listed, a law-enforcement officer:\n(2) Must, with respect to any person arrested without a warrant and, for purpose of setting bail, with respect to any person arrested upon a warrant or order for arrest, take the person arrested before a judicial official without unnecessary delay.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-501 (2001). In the case at bar, defendant was taken to a magistrate approximately two hours after he was arrested and advised of his rights. Detective Woodward explained that he did not take defendant to the magistrate immediately after arrest because\n[i]t is my experience from being a narcotics officer, when you serve a search warrant with no one home, generally it becomes an issue that officers planted evidence. Allegations of that type were being made. I wanted to not have any problem with that. So we allowed [defendant] to stay with us while we executed a search warrant.\nWe conclude that a two-hour delay at defendant\u2019s residence, during which officers asked defendant no questions, was not an \u201cunnecessary delay\u201d in violation of section 15A-501. See State v. Littlejohn, 340 N.C. 750, 758, 459 S.E.2d 629, 634 (1995) (finding no violation in a thirteen-hour delay); State v. Sings, 35 N.C. App. 1, 6, 240 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1978) (upholding a seven-hour delay), disc. review denied, 294 N.C. 738 (1978).\nDefendant additionally contends that the officers violated section 15A-257, which requires an officer \u201cwithout unnecessary delay\u201d to return to the clerk of the issuing court the search warrant, along with a written inventory of items seized. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-257 (2001). Defendant never raised this issue before the trial court, however, nor did he designate the alleged violation in his assignments of error in the record on appeal. Having failed to preserve this alleged error, defendant has waived his right to argue its merits on appeal. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (2002). Accordingly, we do not address this argument and overrule defendant\u2019s fourth assignment of error.\nV. Motion For Appropriate Relief\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for appropriate relief. In his motion for appropriate relief, defendant alleged that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel, in that his defense counsel had failed to perfect his appeal. Defendant therefore requested that the trial court vacate defendant\u2019s guilty plea and grant him a new trial. Alternatively, defendant asked the court to enter an order allowing new counsel to perfect his appeal. Defendant also requested sanctions against his former counsel for her failure to perfect defendant\u2019s appeal.\nThe trial court heard the matter on 26 February 2001 and found that defendant\u2019s former attorney \u201cfailed to take any steps to perfect the Defendant\u2019s appeal, despite receipts showing that she had been paid to represent the Defendant in his appeal.\u201d The trial court therefore granted defendant\u2019s motion in part, ordering the return of defendant\u2019s files and allowing defendant\u2019s new counsel to perfect his appeal to this Court. Defendant now argues that the trial court erred in \u201cdenying defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel without conducting an evidentiary hearing.\u201d We disagree.\nFirst, as noted above, the trial court did not deny defendant\u2019s - motion for appropriate relief, but rather granted it in part. Further, the basis of defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his motion for appropriate relief focused exclusively on the failure of defendant\u2019s former counsel to perfect his appeal. Defendant made no allegations, however, concerning his counsel\u2019s performance at trial. The trial court therefore found that an evidentiary hearing on defense counsel\u2019s performance at trial was unnecessary in order to grant defendant relief. Because the allegations concerning defense counsel\u2019s ineffective assistance did not concern her performance at trial, but rather her performance on appeal, defendant\u2019s request for a new trial was properly denied by the trial court. The trial court supplied defendant with appropriate relief by allowing new counsel to perfect his present appeal. We therefore overrule defendant\u2019s final assignment of error.\nIn conclusion, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining the charged offenses against defendant, and properly denied defendant\u2019s motions to sequester witnesses and to suppress evidence. The trial court also properly denied in part and granted in part defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief. We therefore affirm the order and judgments of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges GREENE and HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Judith Tillman, for the State.", "Deborah R Brown for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLAYTON BULLIN\nNo. COA01-729\n(Filed 18 June 2002)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 joinder \u2014 trafficking in drugs \u2014 conspiracy to traffic in drugs \u2014 possession of controlled substances\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by joining for trial under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(a) the three charges against defendant of trafficking in drugs, conspiracy to traffic in drugs, and possession of controlled substances because the charges against defendant stemmed from a series of actions occurring over a short period of time that were part of one general transaction.\n2. Witnesses\u2014 motion to sequester \u2014 suppression hearing\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a trafficking in drugs, conspiracy to traffic in drugs, and possession of controlled substances case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to sequester the State\u2019s witnesses during the suppression hearing, because: (1) the trial court denied the motion after hearing arguments and making appropriate inquiries of both sides; and (2) any alleged conflicts in paperwork that were claimed by defendant could be illustrated through the documents at issue.\n3. Evidence\u2014 drugs \u2014 motion to suppress \u2014 probable cause for arrest warrant \u2014 protective sweep of residence\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in drugs, conspiracy to traffic in drugs, and possession of controlled substances case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized at defendant\u2019s residence pursuant to his arrest, because: (1) the totality of circumstances reveals that there was probable cause to issue the arrest warrant against defendant including the chain of events, along with the information regarding defendant\u2019s reputation and previous involvement with drugs; (2) the officers legally entered defendant\u2019s residence pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, and given defendant\u2019s actions and his previous involvement with drugs, as well as the dangerous and unpredictable nature of drug trafficking, a prudent officer could reasonably believe that a protective sweep of defendant\u2019s home was necessary to make certain that no one else was hiding in the residence; and (3) the search was limited in scope and duration and aimed at ensuring the officers\u2019 safety.\n4. Arrest\u2014 delay following arrest \u2014 detention pending execution of search warrant\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in drags, conspiracy to traffic in drags, and possession of controlled substances case by concluding that defendant\u2019s detention by the arresting officers for almost two hours at his residence pending execution of the search warrant did not violate his rights under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-501 and 15A-257, because: (1) a two-hour delay at defendant\u2019s residence, during which officers asked defendant no questions, was not an unnecessary delay in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-501; and (2) defendant failed to preserve the issue of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-257 by failing to raise this issue at the trial court and by failing to designate the alleged violation in his assignments of error.\n5. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel\u2014 motion for appropriate relief\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in drugs, conspiracy to traffic in drugs, and possession of controlled substances case by allegedly denying defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief regarding effective assistance of counsel for failure to perfect defendant\u2019s appeal, because: (1) the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief in part by ordering the return of defendant\u2019s files and allowing defendant\u2019s new counsel to perfect his appeal; and (2) defendant made no allegations concerning his counsel\u2019s performance at trial, and therefore an evi-dentiary hearing on defense counsel\u2019s performance at trial was unnecessary in order to grant defendant\u2019s relief.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 2 August 2000 by Judge Michael E. Beale in Iredell County Superior Court and from order entered 27 February 2001 by Judge C. Preston Cornelius in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 April 2002.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Judith Tillman, for the State.\nDeborah R Brown for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0631-01", "first_page_order": 661, "last_page_order": 673 }