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    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge BRYANT concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "JEFFREY ALLEN BRAY, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL AND PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nJeffrey Allen Bray (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals from a decision and order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) denying his claim for damages. We affirm.\nThe facts, on the basis of stipulated evidence, are as follows. Plaintiff was injured on 23 February 1995 when the vehicle he was driving was hit by a patrol car driven by State Highway Patrolman Kevin Patrick Woods. Prior to the accident, Trooper Woods and Trooper H.L. Cox were parked on the shoulder of the road when they observed a black Camaro operating with no mufflers. They began to pursue the Camaro, which then turned and accelerated to a high rate of speed. The troopers activated their lights and sirens. The Camaro failed to stop. Trooper Cox had positioned himself as the primary chase vehicle, and Trooper Woods was positioned as the secondary chase vehicle. During the course of the chase, the vehicles entered a curve. As he entered the curve, Trooper Woods lost control of his vehicle. Plaintiffs vehicle was entering the curve from the opposite direction, and Trooper Woods\u2019 vehicle collided with plaintiffs.\nPlaintiff filed a claim for damages under the North Carolina Tort Claims Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-291 (2001). Deputy Commissioner W. Bain Jones, Jr., denied plaintiffs claim in a decision and order filed on 13 June 2000. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, which affirmed the decision and order of the deputy commissioner. Plaintiff now appeals the decision and order of the Full Commission.\nPlaintiff challenges the Commission\u2019s determination that Trooper Woods was not grossly negligent. \u201cUnder the Tort Claims Act, \u2018when considering an appeal from the Commission, our Court is limited to two questions: (1) whether competent evidence exists to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, and (2) whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact justify its conclusions of law and decision.\u2019 \u201d Fennel v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 145 N.C. App. 584, 589, 551 S.E.2d 486, 490 (2001) (quoting Simmons v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 128 N.C. App. 402, 405-06, 496 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1998)), cert. denied, 355 N.C. 285, 560 S.E.2d 800 (2002). \u201cNegligence and contributory negligence are mixed questions of law and fact and, upon appeal, the reviewing court must determine whether facts found by the Commission support its conclusion of . . . negligence.\u201d Barney v. Highway Comm., 282 N.C. 278, 284, 192 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1972).\nThe Commission\u2019s findings of fact are as follows:\n1. On February 23, 1995 at approximately 6:50 p.m., plaintiff was traveling in his 1980 Ford automobile north on Rural Paved Road 1131 in Wilson County, North Carolina near Sims, North Carolina.\n2. At the same time and place, State Highway Patrolman Kevin Patrick Woods was traveling south on Rural Paved Road 1131 pursuing another vehicle.\n3. As Trooper Woods approached a curve on Rural Paved Road 1131, Trooper Woods met Mr. Bray\u2019s vehicle traveling in the opposite direction.\n4. The speed limit on Rural Paved Road 1131 at the location of the accident was fifty-five (55) miles per hour. Trooper Woods\u2019 vehicle was traveling at approximately sixty-five (65) miles per hour when it collided with Mr. Bray\u2019s vehicle. Trooper Woods\u2019 vehicle had entered the curve at a higher speed. Trooper Woods\u2019 vehicle left tire impressions of 236 feet before striking Mr. Bray\u2019s vehicle and traveled an additional 254 feet after striking Mr. Bray\u2019s vehicle.\n5. Rural Paved Road 1131 is a two-lane road and there were no unusual circumstances related to the weather or otherwise on February 23, 1995.\n6. Trooper M.R. Johnson investigated the accident and indicated Trooper Woods was exceeding a safe speed and driving his vehicle left of the center lane.\n7. Trooper Woods was not grossly negligent in carrying out his duties as Highway Patrolman in pursuit of another vehicle. The evidence does not support that Trooper Woods recklessly disregarded the safety of others in carrying out responsibilities of his duties as a State Highway Patrolman. Trooper Woods had sounded his siren and turned on flashing lights as he was in pursuit of the other vehicle.\nThe Commission\u2019s relevant conclusion of law is that \u201cState Trooper Kevin Patrick Woods was not grossly negligent nor did he show reckless disregard for the safety of others while in pursuit of another vehicle on Rural Paved Road 1131 on February 23, 1995 when he struck the vehicle operated by Jeffrey A. Bray.\u201d\nIn Parish v. Hill, 350 N.C. 231, 238, 513 S.E.2d 547, 551 (1999), our Supreme Court held that \u201cin any civil action resulting from the vehicular pursuit of a law violator, the gross negligence standard applies in determining the officer\u2019s liability.\u201d Thus, the Commission properly determined that plaintiff\u2019s claim should be denied unless he established that Trooper Woods was grossly negligent.\nOur Supreme Court has defined \u201cgross negligence\u201d as \u201cwanton conduct done with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others.\u201d Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 583, 369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1988). An act \u201cis wanton when it is done of wicked purpose, or when done needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others.\u201d Parish, 350 N.C. at 239, 513 S.E.2d at 551-52 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nThe Court applied the gross negligence standard in Young v. Woodall, 343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996), upon which the Commission relied in its decision and order. In Young, a police officer for the City of Winston-Salem saw a Chevrolet Camaro with only one headlight on and began to follow the vehicle. The officer did not immediately activate his blue light or siren because he was concerned the driver would attempt to elude him. He intended to activate his light and siren once he was closer. The officer entered an intersection with a flashing light at a high rate of speed and collided with the plaintiff, who was making a left turn at the intersection. Id. at 460, 471 S.E.2d at 358. The Court held that the trial court should have granted summary judgment for the police officer, because the officer\u2019s \u201cfollowing the Camaro without activating the blue light or siren, his entering the intersection while the caution light was flashing, and his exceeding the speed limit were acts of discretion on his part which may have been negligent but were not grossly negligent.\u201d Id. at 463, 471 S.E.2d at 360.\nPlaintiff\u2019s attempt to distinguish Young is unavailing. Plaintiff argues that in this case, unlike Young, Trooper Woods crossed the center line in addition to exceeding a safe speed. Also, Trooper Woods was traveling at a speed of at least eighty miles per hour, at dusk, on a curving, rural road. Finally, Trooper Woods lost control of his car resulting in the collision with plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that the actions of Trooper Woods in this case were \u201cmore severe and serious\u201d than those of the officer in Young. None of these distinctions, however, would justify this Court in reversing the Commission\u2019s conclusion that Trooper Woods did not engage in \u201cwanton conduct done with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others.\u201d Bullins, 322 N.C. at 583, 369 S.E.2d at 603.\nPlaintiff argues that the public policy rationale articulated in Parish in support of the gross negligence standard does not apply here because Trooper Woods was not in pursuit. The Court observed in Parish that \u201c[political society must consider . . . the fact that if police are forbidden to pursue, then many more suspects will flee\u2014 and successful flights not only reduce the number of crimes solved but also create their own risks for passengers and bystanders.\u201d Parish, 350 N.C. at 245, 513 S.E.2d at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff contends that Trooper Woods, driving the secondary chase vehicle, was not pursuing or trying to overtake the Camaro.\nPlaintiff observes that Trooper Woods had been driving a vehicle with a strobe light instead of a blue system on top, and highway patrol regulations do not allow such a vehicle to be the lead chase vehicle. As the officer in the secondary vehicle, Trooper Woods\u2019 duties were to handle radio communications and provide back-up to Trooper Cox. We disagree with plaintiff\u2019s characterization that, in the secondary position, Trooper Woods was not pursuing the Camaro. To perform his duties, Trooper Woods needed to stay close to Trooper Cox, who was pursuing the Camaro. Moreover, Trooper Woods testified that should he be the only vehicle in pursuit of the violator, policy would allow him to be the primary chase vehicle. Therefore, we believe the evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings, which support its conclusion that Trooper Woods was also pursuing the Camaro.\nFinally, plaintiff asks this Court to reject the gross negligence standard in favor of an ordinary negligence standard. However, we are bound by Supreme Corut precedent stating unequivocally that the standard is gross negligence for an officer in pursuit. See Parish, 350 N.C. at 238, 513 S.E.2d at 551; Kinlaw v. Long Mfg., 40 N.C. App. 641, 643, 253 S.E.2d 629, 630 (\u201c[I]t is not our prerogative to overrule or ignore clearly written decisions of our Supreme Court.\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979).\nThe Commission\u2019s finding of fact and conclusion of law that Trooper Woods was not grossly negligent is supported by the evidence and consistent with the law. Therefore, the Commission did not err in denying plaintiff\u2019s claim. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission\u2019s decision and order.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge BRYANT concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HUDSON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Stanley G. Abrams, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Dahr Joseph Tanoury, for defendant-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JEFFREY ALLEN BRAY, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL AND PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant\nNo. COA01-660\n(Filed 2 July 2002)\nPolice Officers\u2014 negligence \u2014 collision during chase\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a Tort Claims action by determining that a Highway Patrol trooper was not grossly negligent and did not show reckless disregard for the safety of others while in pursuit of another vehicle. Plaintiffs distinctions from earlier cases did not justify reversal of the Commission\u2019s conclusion.\nAppeal by plaintiff from decision and order entered 30 January 2001 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 April 2002.\nStanley G. Abrams, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Dahr Joseph Tanoury, for defendant-appellee."
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  "file_name": "0281-01",
  "first_page_order": 311,
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