{ "id": 9080309, "name": "LINDA M. BAILEY, Employee-Plaintiff v. WESTERN STAFF SERVICES, Employer-Defendant, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier-Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Bailey v. Western Staff Services", "decision_date": "2002-07-16", "docket_number": "No. COA01-716", "first_page": "356", "last_page": "366", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "151 N.C. App. 356" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433042 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572767 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "citing Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11081184 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "citing Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659776, 1659845, 1659883, 1659694, 1659889 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0501-01", "/nc/348/0501-02", "/nc/348/0501-04", "/nc/348/0501-03", "/nc/348/0501-05" ] }, { "cite": "499 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11650004 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11867613 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "citing Harris v. North American Products, 125 N.C. App. 349, 354, 481 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9130510 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Harris v. North American Products, 125 N.C. App. 349, 354, 481 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "\"creation for injured employees of makeshift positions which do not exist in the ordinary marketplace will not meet an employer's responsibilities under the Workers' Compensation Act\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11795948 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "\"creation for injured employees of makeshift positions which do not exist in the ordinary marketplace will not meet an employer's responsibilities under the Workers' Compensation Act\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4704100 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "citing Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 342 S.E.2d 798 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9128207 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "citing Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 342 S.E.2d 798 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442486 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Form 63 appropriate where employer has \"reasonable grounds\" to question its liability for plaintiffs claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135848, 135570, 135571, 135636 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Form 63 appropriate where employer has \"reasonable grounds\" to question its liability for plaintiffs claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0381-03", "/nc/353/0381-02", "/nc/353/0381-04", "/nc/353/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12121612 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.C. App. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549735 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/19/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-18", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563", "parenthetical": "use of \"shall\" means \"the provisions of G.S. \u00a7 97-18(g) are mandatory\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435851 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110", "parenthetical": "use of \"shall\" means \"the provisions of G.S. \u00a7 97-18(g) are mandatory\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551329, 551235, 551326, 551111 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0671-03", "/nc/347/0671-04", "/nc/347/0671-02", "/nc/347/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798491 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9125602 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139458, 139363, 139469, 139548, 139613 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0546-05", "/nc/346/0546-03", "/nc/346/0546-04", "/nc/346/0546-02", "/nc/346/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11710610 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12122648 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132-33", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0130-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 896, "char_count": 24248, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.400451520469501e-07, "percentile": 0.7988664590097724 }, "sha256": "788a877f6c229034674ed364c0bf41bd7def22457bc03361c317e9c8fe5cab60", "simhash": "1:2c71c9aa91ab0a52", "word_count": 3658 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:19.620477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "LINDA M. BAILEY, Employee-Plaintiff v. WESTERN STAFF SERVICES, Employer-Defendant, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier-Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BIGGS, Judge.\nDefendants, Western Staff Services and Travelers Insurance Company, appeal from the Industrial Commission\u2019s award of workers\u2019 compensation benefits and attorney fees to plaintiff (Linda M. Bailey). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nIn 1998, plaintiff was employed by defendant Western Staff Services (Western), a temporary employment agency, and in March of that year Western placed her at \u2018Pharmagraphics\u2019 as a machine operator. On 28 April 1998, plaintiff struck her elbow on a machine while performing an assigned cleaning procedure for Pharmagraphics. Several days later, when plaintiff reported the incident to a supervisor at Pharmagraphics, she was directed to report it to Western, which she did on 5 May 1998. Plaintiff later testified that she did not seek medical care at that time because her Pharmagraphics supervisor had warned her that she would be fired if her injury caused her to miss any work. Following her injury, plaintiff continued to work for ten days, but her arm became swollen and tender, and her injury was increasingly painful. Plaintiff was unable to work an overtime shift on Saturday, 9 May 1998, and was thereafter terminated by Pharmagraphics. She did not work between that time and the time of the hearing. During the six months following her injury, plaintiff was treated by several physicians, including a neurologist and an orthopedist.\nOn 26 May 1998, Western filed an Industrial Commission Form 19, reporting plaintiff\u2019s injury to the Industrial Commission, and acknowledging that plaintiff was not working or receiving wages from them. On 1 June 1998, defendants wrote to plaintiff, denying her workers\u2019 compensation claim for \u201cnoncompliance\u201d with their investigation. However, because the letter was sent to the incorrect city, plaintiff did not receive it until 3 June 1998, at which time she participated in a tape-recorded telephone interview with defendants regarding her injury. The next day, 4 June 1998, defendants wrote to plaintiff offering her a \u201ctemporary position\u201d to begin 8 June 1998. However, on 5 June, three days before the job\u2019s starting date, defendants wrote plaintiff that she was terminated for failure to \u201cappear at the job site[.]\u201d On 18 June 1998, defendants wrote plaintiff, asserting the right to \u201cdirect your medical treatment once we accept compensability for your claim.\u201d The letter expressly denied liability for plaintiff\u2019s disability claim, based upon plaintiff\u2019s purported refusal of the \u201cmodified duty\u201d offered by Western. On 21 July 1998, defendants wrote to plaintiff\u2019s attorney regarding plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim; this letter was copied to the Industrial Commission.\nOn 30 July 1998, plaintiff filed a request for a hearing on her workers\u2019 compensation claim; the next day, defendants filed an Industrial Commission Form 61, \u201cDenial of Workers\u2019 Compensation Claim.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s case was heard before an Industrial Commission deputy commissioner on 11 February 1999. In its opinion filed 11 March 2000, the deputy commissioner concluded that (1) defendants had failed to admit liability for plaintiff\u2019s claim prior to the hearing, and thus had not obtained the right to direct plaintiff\u2019s medical treatment; and (2) plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability and to medical expenses. Defendants appealed to the Full Commission, which heard the matter on 25 October 2000. The Industrial Commission issued an opinion on 11 January 2001, affirming the deputy commissioner\u2019s ruling with minor modifications. Defendants appeal from the Industrial Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award.\nStandard of Review\nAppellate review of decisions of the Industrial Commission is \u201climited to a determination of (1) whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence in the record; and (2) whether the Commission\u2019s findings justify its conclusions of law.\u201d Goff v. Foster Forbes Glass Div., 140 N.C. App. 130, 132-33, 535 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2000) (citation omitted). The Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if there is evidence to support a contrary finding, Hedrick v. PPG Industries, 126 N.C. App. 354, 484 S.E.2d 853, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 546, 488 S.E.2d 801 (1997), and the Commission is the sole judge regarding the credibility of witnesses and the strength of evidence, Effingham v. Kroger Co., 149 N.C. App. 105, 561 S.E.2d 287 (2002). The Commission\u2019s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Grantham v. R.G. Barry Corp., 127 N.C. App. 529, 491 S.E.2d 678 (1997), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 671, 500 S.E.2d 86 (1998).\nI.\nDefendants argue first that the Industrial Commission erred in finding that they failed to properly admit liability for plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim, and thus were not entitled to direct plaintiff\u2019s medical treatment. We disagree.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18 (2001), which sets out an employer\u2019s duties when notified of an employee\u2019s injury or accident, generally requires an employer to make a determination regarding liability for compensation within 14 days of notice of an employee\u2019s injury, and to file the appropriate form with the Industrial Commission indicating the employer\u2019s position. The statute provides in pertinent part:\n(b) When the employer admits the employee\u2019s right to compensation, the first [payment]. . . . shall [be] due ... [14] day[s] after the employer has . . . notice of the injury[, and] . . . the insurer shall immediately notify the Commission, on a form prescribed bv the Commission, that compensation has begunf.] . . . The first notice of payment to the Commission shall contain the date and nature of the injury, . . . the [employee\u2019s wages], the weekly compensation rate, the date the disability... began, and the date compensation commenced.\n(c) If the employer denies the employee\u2019s right to compensation, the employer shall notify the Commission,... [by] the fourteenth day after . . . notice of the injury[,] on a form prescribed bv the Commission. . . .\n(d) [If] . . . the employer or insurer is uncertain on reasonable grounds whether ... it has liability for the claim . . . the employer or insurer may initiate compensation payments without prejudice and without admitting liability. The initial payment shall be accompanied by a form prescribed bv and filed with the Commission])]\nThe use of the word \u201cshall\u201d in the statute indicates that the use of an Industrial Commission form to admit liability is mandatory. Bostick v. Kinston-Neuse Gorp., 145 N.C. App. 102, 110, 549 S.E.2d 558, 563 (2001) (use of \u201cshall\u201d means \u201cthe provisions of G.S. \u00a7 97-18(g) are mandatory\u201d). Specifically, Industrial Commission Form 60, \u201cEmployer\u2019s Admission of Employee\u2019s Right to Compensation, [G.S. 97-18(b)],\u201d references N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18(b), and should be filed by an employer who wishes to admit liability. Similarly, Form 61, Denial of Workers\u2019 Compensation Claim, corresponds to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18(c); and Form 63, Notice to Employee of Payment of Compensation Without Prejudice, references N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18(d). The statutory requirements are further emphasized by Industrial Commission Rule 601, which provides in part:\nUpon notice of a claim, the employer must admit or deny com-pensability of the claim to the Commission within 14 davs after the employer has written or actual notice of the claim, or commence payment without prejudice pursuant, to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-18(d).\nThus, we conclude that defendants in the case sub judice were required under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18 and Industrial Commission Rule 601 to file an appropriate Industrial Commission form stating their position regarding liability within fourteen days of plaintiff\u2019s 5 May notification of her injury, or no later than 19 May 1998.\nAlthough defendants argue that there have been instances in which, under specific factual circumstances, a party\u2019s failure to employ an Industrial Commission form was excused by the Industrial Commission or by this Court, the sole case cited by defendants for this proposition is Cross v. Fieldcrest Mills, 19 N.C. App. 29, 198 S.E.2d 110 (1973). We find Cross inapplicable to the facts before us, in that it (1) involves the interpretation of a totally different statutory provision, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-24, which does not prescribe the use of an Industrial Commission form, and (2) was decided in 1973, many years before our present workers\u2019 compensation statute, which was amended in 1997.\nNotwithstanding their failure to adhere to the clear statutory mandate to file the appropriate Industrial Commission form within the prescribed time, defendants contend that they are nevertheless entitled to direct plaintiffs medical treatment. It is undisputed that the first Industrial Commission form that defendants filed regarding their liability for plaintiffs injury was the Form 61, denying plaintiffs workers compensation claim, which was filed 31 July 1998, several months after the deadline prescribed by the statute. Moreover, although defendants claim that they accepted liability and are entitled to direct plaintiffs medical care, they acknowledge that they did not rescind the Form 61 or file a Form 60. Rather, defendants argue that their letter of 21 July 1998, sent to plaintiffs counsel and copied to the Industrial Commission, \u201cwas sufficient to constitute the filing of a Form 60,\u201d and thus served to admit plaintiffs right to compensation. We do not agree.\nIn its order, the Industrial Commission made the following pertinent finding of fact regarding the letter of 21 July:\n15. On 21 July 1998, [defendants] wrote to plaintiffs counsel. . . that plaintiff \u201cdid have a compensable event.... However, further medical investigation needs to take place to determine if her current symptoms are indeed related to this contusion.\u201d . . . [Defendants] provided a copy of this letter to the Industrial Commission. This letter did not constitute an admission of defendants\u2019 liability for plaintiff\u2019s continuing medical treatment^ and] . . . did not conform to the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-18(b). . . . [Defendants] did not . . . admit liability for plaintiff\u2019s 29 April 1998 injury until... 11 February 1999 [, when] . . . defendants through counsel admitted . . . [liability] for medical compensation for treatment of [plaintiffs\u2019] injury.\nBased upon this finding, the Industrial Commission concluded that defendants \u201chaving failed to admit liability for plaintiff\u2019s claim, did not obtain the right to direct plaintiff\u2019s medical treatment.\u201d\nThe 21 July letter fails in numerous respects to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18. The letter was not sent within fourteen days of notice of the injury, and was not \u201con a form prescribed by the Commission.\u201d Further, the letter omitted certain information required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18(b), in that it: (1) did not notify the Industrial Commission that compensation had begun; (2) did not state plaintiffs weekly wages or weekly compensation rate; (3) did not include the date that plaintiffs disability resulting from her injury began; and (4) did not state the date compensation was begun.\nMoreover, the 21 July letter failed to accept liability either for plaintiffs disability claim or for her medical expenses. Although defendants conceded in the letter that plaintiff had experienced \u201ca compensable event,\u201d the letter expressly declined to assume responsibility for plaintiff\u2019s ongoing medical treatment unless \u201cfurther medical investigation . . . [determines that] her current symptoms are indeed related to this contusion.\u201d Nor does the letter accept liability for plaintiffs disability claim; indeed defendants explicitly deny liability for plaintiffs wage claim. We conclude that the record clearly establishes that the 21 July letter did not meet the procedural or substantive requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18(b).\nDefendants argue that if the letter of 21 July is evaluated in conjunction with their \u201ccourse of conduct\" it establishes that \u201cPlaintiffs claim was accepted by Defendants.\u201d The \u201ccourse of conduct\u201d to which defendants refer consists of their letter sent on 18 June 1998, and of the Form 33R filed by defendants, which they contend establish their acceptance of liability for plaintiffs medical expenses. However, inasmuch as defendants\u2019 letter of 21 July 1998 explicitly declines to admit that plaintiff\u2019s \u201ccurrent symptoms are indeed related to this contusion,\u201d we conclude that the other documents to which defendants direct our attention fail to establish a \u201ccourse of conduct\u201d indicating acceptance of plaintiff\u2019s claim.\nDefendants also contend that they should be excused from using an Industrial Commission form to communicate their position, arguing that the Industrial Commission generally follows only \u201cinformal policies and practices.\u201d Defendants contentions in this regard are meritless, and are contradicted by the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18 and Industrial Commission Rule 601, discussed above. Defendants assert that, because they wished to accept liability only for plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses but not for her disability claim, the use of a Form 60 would have been inappropriate. We note that Form 63, Notice to Employee of Payment of Compensation Without Prejudice, was available to defendants if they wished to reserve the right to challenge liability. See Shah v. Howard Johnson, 140 N.C. App. 58, 535 S.E.2d 577 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 381, 547 S.E.2d 17 (2001) (Form 63 appropriate where employer has \u201creasonable grounds\u201d to question its liability for plaintiffs claim).\nWe conclude that there is factual support in the record for the Industrial Commission\u2019s finding that defendants\u2019 21 July letter \u201cdid not constitute an admission of defendants\u2019 liability for plaintiff\u2019s continuing medical treatment[,] . . . [and] did not conform to the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-18(b).\u201d Accordingly, this finding is binding on appeal.\nFurther, this finding by the Industrial Commission supports its conclusion that \u201c[defendants, having failed to admit liability for plaintiff\u2019s claim, did not obtain the right to direct plaintiff\u2019s medical treatment.\u201d \u201c[T]he right to direct medical treatment is triggered only when the employer has accepted the claim as compensable.\u201d Kanipe v. Lane Upholstery, 141 N.C. App. 620, 624, 540 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2000). Having upheld the Industrial Commission\u2019s finding that defendants failed to accept plaintiff\u2019s claim as compensable, we necessarily affirm its conclusion that defendants did not have the right to direct plaintiff\u2019s medical treatment.\nDefendants argue next that plaintiff is barred from receiving wage compensation because she refused their offer of suitable employment. We disagree.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-32 provides that \u201c[i]f an injured employee refuses employment. . . suitable to his capacity he [is not] . . . entitled to any compensation ... unless in the opinion of the Industrial Commission such refusal was justified.\u201d However:\n[I]f the proffered employment is not suitable for the injured employee, the employee\u2019s refusal thereof cannot be used to bar compensation^] . . . Furthermore, an employer cannot avoid its duty to pay compensation by offering the employee a position that could not be found elsewhere under normally prevailing market conditions.\nMoore v. Concrete Supply Co., 149 N.C. App. 381, 389, 561 S.E.2d 315, 320 (2002) (citing Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 342 S.E.2d 798 (1986)) (compensation not barred where \u201cmaintenance worker\u201d position constituted \u201cmake work\u201d specially created for plaintiff). See also Smith v. Sealed Air Corp., 127 N.C. App. 359, 362, 489 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1997) (\u201ccreation for injured employees of makeshift positions which do not exist in the ordinary marketplace will not meet an employer\u2019s responsibilities under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act\u201d). In the instant case, the Industrial Commission made the following pertinent findings of fact:\n11. ... [0]n 4 June 1998 . . . [defendants] offered plaintiff ... a \u201ctemporary position[.]\u201d . . . [Defendants] stated that the physical requirements of the position have been approved by plaintiff\u2019s treating physician. However,. . . [no one] had provided any physician with a description of the . . . position[, and] . . . defendants [did not] offerQ plaintiff any description of the nature or actual duties of the temporary, modified position[, which] . . . was to begin on 8 June 1998.\n12. ... Dr. Crowell excused plaintiff from work from 3 June 1998 through 15 July 1998.\n16. Considering plaintiff\u2019s physical restrictions, her excuse from work by Dr. Crowell, and the vague description of the temporary, modified position . . . plaintiff\u2019s non-acceptance . . . was reasonable.\nThese findings are supported by competent evidence in the record. Although Western offered plaintiff a temporary office job, the record establishes that Western normally employed only one full time and one part time employee in its office, and that plaintiff was right handed, was restricted from using her right arm, and had no prior clerical experience. These facts suggest that the position was \u201cmake work.\u201d Moreover, several days before the job\u2019s starting date, defendants wrote to plaintiff terminating her employment for failure to appear at the \u201ctemporary job.\u201d We conclude that there is evidence in the record to support the Industrial Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff\u2019s refusal of this work was reasonable. Accordingly, plaintiff is not barred from receiving compensation on this ground.\nII.\nDefendants also argue that the Industrial Commission erred in its determination that plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability compensation, contending that plaintiff presented \u201cno competent evidence\u201d that she was disabled. We disagree.\n\u201cDisability\u201d is defined by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as the \u201cincapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(9) (2001). \u201cDisability is a legal conclusion and will be binding on the reviewing court if supported by proper findings.\u201d Derosier v. WNA, Inc., 149 N.C. App. 597, 601 562 S.E.2d 41, 44 (2002) (citing Harris v. North American Products, 125 N.C. App. 349, 354, 481 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1997)). An employee claiming disability benefits bears the initial burden of proof on the existence and degree of disability. Snead v. Carolina Pre-Cast Concrete, Inc., 129 N.C. App. 331, 499 S.E.2d 470, cert. denied, 348 N.C. 501, 510 S.E.2d 656 (1998). \u201cTo do so, he must demonstrate that he is unable to earn pre-injury wages in the same employment or in any other employment and that the inability to earn such wages is due to his work-related injury.\u201d Olivares-Juarez v. Showell Farms, 138 N.C. App. 663, 666, 532 S.E.2d 198, 201 (2000) (citing Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982)).\nIn its order, the Industrial Commission made the following pertinent findings of fact:\n1. . . . [P]laintiff [is] forty-seven years old[,] . . . graduated from high school[,]... [and has] work[ed] as a... nursing assistant and respiratory therapist. . . .\n4. Plaintiff is right hand dominant.. . .\n6. . . . [Fallowing the incident. . . her right elbow became progressively swollen, discolored and painful.. . .\n7. . . . Plaintiff did not work on [9 May 1998] due to right upper extremity pain. . . . Due to her absence from work on that date, Pharmagraphics terminated plaintiff[.] . . .\n8. On 10 May 1998, . . . the emergency department of Forsyth Memorial Hospital... restricted plaintiff from using her right arm for one week[.] . . .\n12. On 4 June 1998, ... Dr. Crowell excused plaintiff from work from 3 June 1998 through 15 July 1998.\n18. Plaintiff first [saw] Dr. O\u2019Keefe on 30 September 1998. . . . [Her] symptoms, which she had experienced since 29 April 1998, were caused by lateral epicondylitis . . . [which] was caused by the incident on 29 April 1998.\n19. Dr. O\u2019Keefe . . . restricted plaintiff from any use of her right arm pending a follow-up evaluation in two months.. . .\n20. At defendant-insurer\u2019s direction, plaintiff presented to Dr. Meyerdierks for evaluation on 28 July 1998. . . . Plaintiff did not exhibit signs of symptom magnification. . . .\n22. When the conservative treatment provided by Dr. O\u2019Keefe failed to provide relief, he recommended that plaintiff undergo epicondylar release surgery. . . .\n26. . . . [P]laintiff [did not seek] employment after 8 May 1998. However, from 10 May 1998 through the date of the hearing, plaintiff\u2019s physicians excused her from work or imposed restrictions that severely limited the duties she was capable of performing. Considering plaintiffs age, education, work experience, work restrictions, and work excuses, any effort to obtain employment after 8 May 1998 would have been futile. 27. From 9 May 1998 through the date of the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner plaintiff was incapable of earning wages from defendant-employer or any other employer as a result of her right lateral epicondylitis.\nWe conclude that there is competent evidence in the record to support each of these findings of fact. Thus, they are conclusively established, notwithstanding any evidence tending to contradict the findings. Allen v. Roberts Elec. Contr\u2019rs., 143 N.C. App. 55, 546 S.E.2d 133 (2001). We further conclude that these findings support the Industrial Commission\u2019s determination that plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability benefits. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFor the reasons discussed above, the order of the Industrial Commission is\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and McCULLOUGH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BIGGS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert A. Lauver for plaintiff-appellee.", "Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.R, by Neil P. Andrews for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LINDA M. BAILEY, Employee-Plaintiff v. WESTERN STAFF SERVICES, Employer-Defendant, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier-Defendant\nNo. COA01-716\n(Filed 16 July 2002)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 employer\u2019s failure to admit liability for claim-entitlement to direct medical treatment\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by concluding that defendant employer failed to properly admit liability for plaintiff employee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim and thus was not entitled to direct plaintiff\u2019s medical treatment, because: (1) defendant failed to file an appropriate Industrial Commission Form stating its position regarding liability within fourteen days of notice of the claim as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18 and Industrial Commission Rule 601; and (2) defendant\u2019s 21 July letter to plaintiff\u2019s attorney failed to admit liability for plaintiff\u2019s disability claim or medical expenses, and the other documents provided by defendant do not establish a course of conduct indicating acceptance of plaintiff\u2019s claim.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 suitable employment \u2014 makeshift positions\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff employee was not barred by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-32 from receiving wage compensation even though she refused defendant employer\u2019s alleged offer of suitable employment, because: (1) creation for injured employees of makeshift positions which do not exist in the ordinary marketplace will not meet an employer\u2019s responsibilities under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and the facts of this case suggest the position was \u201cmake work;\u201d (2) several days before the job\u2019s starting date, defendants wrote to plaintiff to terminate her employment for failure to appear at the \u201ctemporary job;\u201d and (3) there is evidence to support the finding that plaintiff\u2019s refusal of the work was reasonable.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 temporary total disability \u2014 competent evidence\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by determining that plaintiff employee was entitled to temporary total disability compensation because there is competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, and thus, they are conclusively established notwithstanding any evidence tending to contradict the findings.\nAppeal by defendant-appellants from an Opinion and Award entered 11 January 2001 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 April 2002.\nRobert A. Lauver for plaintiff-appellee.\nHedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.R, by Neil P. Andrews for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0356-01", "first_page_order": 386, "last_page_order": 396 }