{ "id": 9080591, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMASINA DENISE REID", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Reid", "decision_date": "2002-07-16", "docket_number": "No. COA01-985", "first_page": "420", "last_page": "429", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "151 N.C. App. 420" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486332 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525840 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774041 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523146 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639-40" }, { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192", "parenthetical": "no error in not charging jury on lesser included offense where defendant convicted for possession of fourteen to twenty-eight grams of heroin pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527786 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711", "parenthetical": "no error in not charging jury on lesser included offense where defendant convicted for possession of fourteen to twenty-eight grams of heroin pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526691 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "60-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155747, 1155782, 1155850, 1155723, 1155954 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0362-02", "/nc/351/0362-04", "/nc/351/0362-05", "/nc/351/0362-01", "/nc/351/0362-03" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "defendant properly convicted of trafficking by possession of 200-400 grams of cocaine in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3) based upon seized package of cocaine mixture weighing 273 grams and containing only 27 grams of pure cocaine" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238372 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85", "parenthetical": "defendant properly convicted of trafficking by possession of 200-400 grams of cocaine in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3) based upon seized package of cocaine mixture weighing 273 grams and containing only 27 grams of pure cocaine" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" }, { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519317 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" }, { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11652004 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-94" }, { "page": "622-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562781 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "officers feared that persons inside house might destroy contraband" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525827 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622-23", "parenthetical": "officers feared that persons inside house might destroy contraband" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "no substantial violation where officer announced his presence and purpose simultaneously with entering through an unlocked door and where entry was effected to prevent destruction of easily destructible contraband" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081545 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714596 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 S.E.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "no substantial violation where door was open, officers announced presence and purpose simultaneously with entry, and there was no objection to the entry" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547863 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Gaines, 33 N.C. App. 66, 234 S.E.2d 42 (1977)" }, { "page": "615", "parenthetical": "relying upon fact that object of search was quantity of powdery contraband \"peculiarly susceptible to being almost instantly disposed of\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521890 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Gaines, 33 N.C. App. 66, 234 S.E.2d 42 (1977)" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488-89" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790158 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-43" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he judicial official's decision pivots on whether the affidavits submitted to her supply probable cause that the illegal itemfs] or evidence sought will be at the premises described when the search warrant is executed\" (emphasis omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890161 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he judicial official's decision pivots on whether the affidavits submitted to her supply probable cause that the illegal itemfs] or evidence sought will be at the premises described when the search warrant is executed\" (emphasis omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343-44", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914262 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121-22", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)" }, { "page": "(h)(3)(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(h)(3)" }, { "page": "(h)(3)" }, { "page": "(h)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 890, "char_count": 22775, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.66700426289122e-07, "percentile": 0.8254643417434762 }, "sha256": "8605cfb9a233752c64a607d1d16c4d595c4221eab110adc2043837dfb66d250e", "simhash": "1:2b79a568e47bb756", "word_count": 3739 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:19.620477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and THOMAS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMASINA DENISE REID" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nThomasina Denise Reid (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from a judgment entered against her on the charge of trafficking by possession of cocaine. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress, and that the trial court erred in its jury instructions. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and find no error at trial.\nThe evidence tended to show that on 20 March 2000, at approximately 9:00 or 9:30 p.m., approximately six to eight police officers executed a search warrant and forcibly entered an apartment leased by defendant at 4338 Grove Avenue, Apartment F, in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The police officers used a battering ram to break down the door. Approximately three or four individuals were found on the ground floor, and these individuals were detained. The officers also found a black male on the stairs coming down from the second floor. The officers also discovered defendant on the second floor leaving a bedroom with a wet sleeve. The officers subsequently discovered an unsealed plastic bag in a toilet on the second floor that was recycling after having been recently flushed, as well as drops of water from the bathroom to the bedroom from which defendant had exited. The bag contained a powder substance that had become wet, and which was later determined to be cocaine. The police officers also seized from the bedroom additional items such as digital scales, a pack of rolling paper, and additional plastic bags and a five dollar bill with cocaine residue.\nDefendant was charged pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95 (2001) with one count of trafficking by possession of cocaine, and one count of trafficking by transportation of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant, which motion was denied. At trial, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the trafficking by transportation charge at the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence. Upon a jury verdict of guilty for trafficking by possession of more than twenty-eight but less than 200 grams of cocaine, the trial court entered judgment and sentenced defendant to a prison term of thirty-five to forty-two months and fined defendant $50,000.00. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant; (2) the trial court erred in denying her request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of trafficking by possession of less than twenty-eight grams of cocaine; and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the theory of \u201c \u2018acting in concert.\u2019 \u201d\nI.\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence. Where a trial court conducts a hearing upon a motion to suppress made prior to trial, the trial court must make findings of fact. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(d) (2001). In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we are limited to determining whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the findings of fact in turn support legally correct conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982).\nHere, defendant presents two arguments in support of her contention that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. We address each in turn.\nA.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because there was insufficient evidence to constitute probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant. The search warrant for the apartment in question was issued upon an affidavit submitted by Officer Joe Adkins, Jr. of the Forsyth County Sheriffs Office, which affidavit stated, in pertinent part:\nMembers of the Forsyth County Sheriffs Narcotics Unit received information from a confidential reliable source (herein identified as Cl regardless of sex) who stated that a white female named \u201cThomasina\u201d and an Unknown Black Male are in the business of selling Cocaine from the residence located at 4338, apartment #F, Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The Cl stated that he/she has observed \u201cThomasina\u201d and the Unknown Black Male[] in possession of Cocaine within the past six (6) days.\n[The Cl made] a \u201ccontrolled buy\u201d . . . from the residence of 4338-F Grove Avenue, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; within the past six (6) days. . . . The Cl. . . went to the location given while under the direct supervision and surveillance of the member of the . . . Narcotics Unit, purchased the controlled substance and returned directly to the member with the controlled substances and/or money. . . .\nIn each \u201ccontrolled buy\u201d the controlled substance tested positive for . . . Cocaine.\nDefendant argues that the information provided by Officer Adkins was insufficient because it did not indicate the identity of the specific person from whom \u201cCl\u201d had purchased cocaine, or whether such individual was likely to be present in the premises six days after the purchase.\nThe standard for a court reviewing the issuance of a search warrant is \u201cwhether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate\u2019s decision to issue the warrant.\u201d\nWhether an applicant has submitted sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to issue a search warrant is a \u201cnontechnical, common-sense judgment[] of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings.\u201d \u201cThe affidavit [in support of an application for a search warrant] is sufficient if it supplies reasonable cause to believe that the proposed search for evidence probably will reveal the presence upon the described premises of the items sought and that those items will aid in the apprehension or conviction of the offender.\u201d\nMoreover, great deference is to be paid the magistrate\u2019s determination of probable cause, and reviewing courts \u201cshould not conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether probable cause existed at the time the warrant was issued.\u201d\nState v. Ledbetter, 120 N.C. App. 117, 121-22, 461 S.E.2d 341, 343-44 (1995) (citations omitted).\nHere, the affidavit states: (1) that \u201cCl\u201d purchased cocaine from someone at the specific apartment in question within the previous six days; (2) that, according to \u201cCl,\u201d a white female named \u201c \u2018Thomasina\u2019 \u201d and a black male were in the business of selling cocaine from the apartment in question; and (3) that \u201cCl\u201d had witnessed \u201c \u2018Thomasina\u2019 \u201d and the black male in possession of cocaine within the previous six days. Although defendant is correct that the affidavit does not specify the person from whom \u201cCl\u201d purchased the cocaine during the \u201c \u2018controlled buy,\u2019 \u201d defendant has failed to set forth any authority to support the proposition that such a deficiency is material under these circumstances. We hold that the information in the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause and to support the issuance of the search warrant for the apartment in question. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-244(2) (2001) (the substantive core of an application for a search warrant is \u201c[a] statement that there is probable cause to believe that items subject to seizure . . . may be found in or upon a designated or described place, vehicle, or person\u201d); State v. Smith, 124 N.C. App. 565, 570, 478 S.E.2d 237, 241 (1996) (\u201c[t]he judicial official\u2019s decision pivots on whether the affidavits submitted to her supply probable cause that the illegal itemfs] or evidence sought will be at the premises described when the search warrant is executed\u201d (emphasis omitted)). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress on this basis.\nB.\nDefendant also argues that the cocaine was obtained as the result of an illegal and unconstitutional forced entry, and that the trial court therefore should have suppressed the evidence pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-974 (2001). We disagree.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, Officer Adkins testified that at approximately 9:00 p.m. on 20 March 2000, after obtaining a search warrant for the apartment in question, police officers including Officer Adkins proceeded to the front door of the apartment, knocked three times and announced \u201c \u2018Sheriff\u2019s Office, search warrant,\u2019 \u201d then again knocked three times and made the same announcement. After waiting six to eight seconds, the police officers forcibly entered the apartment by breaking down the door with a battering ram. Based on Officer Adkins\u2019 testimony, the trial court found that \u201cthe officer had reason to believe that entry was being unreasonably denied or that no one was home or that evidence was being destroyed.\u201d The trial court did not make any findings as to the duration of time between the officers\u2019 announcement of their identity and purpose, and the forced entry into the apartment. The trial court concluded that the police officers had complied with the applicable statutes and that defendant\u2019s constitutional rights had not been violated, and, therefore, denied the motion to suppress.\nThe common law \u201c \u2018knock and announce\u2019 \u201d principle has been codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-251 and 15A-401(e)(1) and (2) (2001). State v. Knight, 340 N.C. 531, 542-43, 459 S.E.2d 481, 488-89 (1995). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-249 (2001) requires an officer executing a search warrant, before entering the premises, to \u201cgive appropriate notice of his identity and purpose,\u201d and \u201c[i]f it is unclear whether anyone is present at the premises to be searched, he must give the notice in a manner likely to be heard by anyone who is present.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-249. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-251 further authorizes an officer who has given the notice required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-249, and who \u201creasonably believes\u201d either (1) that \u201cadmittance is being denied or unreasonably delayed\u201d or (2) \u201cthat the premises ... is unoccupied,\u201d to break and enter the premises involved when necessary to execute the warrant. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-251(1).\nDefendant argues that the police officers failed to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-251(1), and violated her Fourth Amendment rights, because, after giving proper notice under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-249, the officers waited only six to eight seconds before beginning to break down the door with a battering ram. Defendant contends that six to eight seconds was insufficient to allow the officers to reasonably conclude either (1) that \u201cadmittance [was] being denied or unreasonably delayed\u201d or (2) \u201cthat the premises . . . [was] unoccupied.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-251(1).\nThis Court has repeatedly stated that \u201c[w]hat is a reasonable time between notice and entry depends on the particular circumstances in each case.\u201d State v. Edwards, 70 N.C. App. 317, 320, 319 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1984) (citing State v. Gaines, 33 N.C. App. 66, 234 S.E.2d 42 (1977)), reversed on other grounds, 315 N.C. 304, 337 S.E.2d 508 (1985). Specifically, where \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d exist at the time of the execution of a search warrant, a brief delay between notice and forced entry is more likely to be considered reasonable. See Knight, 340 N.C. at 543, 459 S.E.2d at 489.\nNorth Carolina case law appears to adhere to the general rule that exigent circumstances may be found to exist where police are executing a search warrant for narcotics which may be easily disposed of prior to being discovered. See State v. Sumpter, 150 N.C. App. 431, 434, 563 S.E.2d 60, 62 (2002); Edwards, 70 N.C. App. at 320, 319 S.E.2d at 615 (relying upon fact that object of search was quantity of powdery contraband \u201cpeculiarly susceptible to being almost instantly disposed of\u201d); State v. Willis, 58 N.C. App. 617, 622-23, 294 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1982) (officers feared that persons inside house might destroy contraband), per curiam affirmed, 307 N.C. 461, 298 S.E.2d 388 (1983); but see Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 391-94, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, 622-24 (1997). Here, Officer Adkins testified that it is always possible that persons inside the premises to be searched may attempt to dispose of the narcotics.\nBased upon the fact that the police officers were executing a warrant to search for narcotics which are easily disposed of, we hold that the delay of six to eight seconds did not violate defendant\u2019s statutory and constitutional rights. See Sumpter, 150 N.C. App. at 434, 563 S.E.2d at 62 (no substantial violation where officer announced his presence and purpose simultaneously with entering through an unlocked door and where entry was effected to prevent destruction of easily destructible contraband); Gaines, 33 N.C. App. at 68-69, 234 S.E.2d at 44 (no substantial violation where door was open, officers announced presence and purpose simultaneously with entry, and there was no objection to the entry). We therefore affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nII.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of trafficking by possession of less than twenty-eight grams of cocaine. Four items were seized from the apartment containing a total of thirty-three and a half grams of cocaine or cocaine residue, including Exhibit Four, a bag weighing thirty and one half grams. The evidence indicated that Exhibit Four was discovered submerged by water in a toilet, and that the bag and the cocaine therein were wet when seized. At trial, no evidence was presented as to whether the weight of Exhibit Four included water weight. Defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of trafficking by possession of less than twenty-eight grams of cocaine because the jury could have concluded that the cocaine in Exhibit Four was not fully dry when weighed and that, absent the water weight resulting from submersion in the toilet, it would have weighed less than twenty-five grams (in which case the total weight of the cocaine seized would have been less than twenty-eight grams). We disagree.\nA judge is required to charge the jury on a lesser included offense \u201c[o]nly when there is evidence of a lesser-included offense.\u201d State v. Willis, 61 N.C. App. 23, 38, 300 S.E.2d 420, 429 (1983). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h) (2001):\n(3) Any person who . . . possesses 28 grams or more of cocaine and any salt, isomer, salts of isomers, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof, ... or any mixture containing such substances, shall be guilty of a felony, which felony shall be known as \u201ctrafficking in cocaine\u201d and if the quantity of such substance or mixture involved:\na. Is 28 grams or more, but less than 200 grams, such person shall be punished as a Class G felon and shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 35 months and a maximum term of 42 months in the State\u2019s prison and shall be fined not less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3)(a) (emphasis added). It is well established that the total quantity of the mixture containing cocaine is the relevant weight to be used in determining a violation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3). See, e.g., State v. Broome, 136 N.C. App. 82, 85, 523 S.E.2d 448, 451 (1999) (defendant properly convicted of trafficking by possession of 200-400 grams of cocaine in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3) based upon seized package of cocaine mixture weighing 273 grams and containing only 27 grams of pure cocaine), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 362, 543 S.E.2d 136 (2000); State v. Tyndall, 55 N.C. App. 57, 61, 284 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1981). The reason that the total weight of the mixture, rather than only the actual weight of the cocaine portion of the mixture, is used in determining a violation is because\n[o]ur legislature has determined that certain amounts of controlled substances and certain amounts of mixtures containing controlled substances indicate an intent to distribute on a large scale. Large scale distribution increases the number of people potentially harmed by use of drugs.\nTyndall, 55 N.C. App. at 60-61, 284 S.E.2d at 577.\nHere, the undisputed evidence indicated that the total weight of the mixture contained in Exhibit Four was thirty and one half grams. Thus, there was no evidence of the lesser included offense of trafficking by possession of less than twenty-eight grams of cocaine, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s request for an instruction on this lesser included offense. See State v. Agubata, 94 N.C. App. 710, 711, 381 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1989) (no error in not charging jury on lesser included offense where defendant convicted for possession of fourteen to twenty-eight grams of heroin pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(4) and only evidence showed defendant possessed several \u201cmixtures\u201d containing heroin and other substances weighing more than twenty-two grams altogether); Willis, 61 N.C. App. at 38, 300 S.E.2d at 429.\nm.\nLastly, defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the doctrine of \u201c \u2018acting in concert\u2019 \u201d because such a theory is generally improper where the charge involves possession of narcotics. We disagree.\nThe \u201cknowing possession\u201d element of the offense of trafficking by possession may be established by a showing that (1) the defendant had actual possession, (2) the defendant had constructive possession, or (3) the defendant acted in concert with another to commit the crime. State v. Garcia, 111 N.C. App. 636, 639-40, 433 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1993). A person has actual possession of a substance if it is on his person, he is aware of its presence, and either by himself or together with others he has the power and intent to control its disposition or use. State v. Crawford, 104 N.C. App. 591, 600, 410 S.E.2d 499, 504 (1991). \u201c \u2018Under the theory of constructive possession, a person may be charged with possession of . . . narcotics when he has both the power and intent to control its disposition or use even though he does not have actual possession.\u2019 \u201d Garcia, 111 N.C. App. at 640, 433 S.E.2d at 189 (citation omitted).\nAs to the third theory, \u201c[a] defendant acts in concert with another to commit a crime when he acts \u2018in harmony or in conjunction . . . with another pursuant to a common criminal plan or purpose.\u2019 \u201d State v. Diaz, 317 N.C. 545, 547, 346 S.E.2d 488, 490 (1986) (citation omitted). Thus, a defendant acts in concert in committing the offense of trafficking where the evidence establishes that the defendant was present while a trafficking offense occurred and that the defendant acted in concert with others to commit the offense pursuant to a common plan or purpose. Id. at 552, 346 S.E.2d at 493 (clarifying that the reason the \u201cacting in concert\u201d doctrine was inapplicable in State v. Baize, 71 N.C. App. 521, 529, 323 S.E.2d 36, 41 (1984), is because, in Baize, \u201cthe drugs in question were in the possession and under the control of a person other than [the defendant], and [the defendant] was not present when the drugs were seized\u201d).\nWhere an instruction correctly states the law and is supported by the evidence, it is properly given. State v. Ball, 324 N.C. 233, 377 S.E.2d 70 (1989). Here, the evidence was sufficient to warrant an instruction on the doctrine of acting in concert, and the instruction itself correctly stated the law. Thus, we hold the trial court did not err in giving the instruction.\nNo error.\nJudges WYNN and THOMAS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph Ellis Herrin, for the State.", "White and Crumpler, by E Kevin Mauney, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMASINA DENISE REID\nNo. COA01-985\n(Filed 16 July 2002)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014 probable cause for warrant \u2014 controlled buy \u2014 sufficiency of affidavit\nAn officer\u2019s affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to search an apartment leased by defendant for narcotics based upon a controlled buy of cocaine at the apartment by a confidential informant, although the affidavit did not indicate the identity of the specific person from whom the informant had purchased cocaine, where the affidavit stated that (1) the informant purchased cocaine from someone at the apartment within the previous six days, (2) the informant had told officers that a white female with the same first name as defendant and a black male were in the business of selling cocaine from the apartment, and (3) the informant had witnessed the white female and the black male in possession of cocaine within the previous six days.\n2. Search and Seizure\u2014 search warrant \u2014 knock and announce \u2014 forcible entry \u2014 delay of six to eight seconds\nA delay of only six to eight seconds between the time officers knocked on the door of defendant\u2019s apartment and announced \u201cSheriff\u2019s Office, search warrant\u201d and their forcible entry into the apartment by breaking down the door with a battering ram did not violate defendant\u2019s statutory or constitutional rights so as to render inadmissible cocaine discovered in a search of the apartment where the officers were executing a warrant to search for narcotics which could have been easily disposed of by persons in the apartment.\n3. Drugs\u2014 trafficking by possession of cocaine \u2014 instruction on lesser included offense of trafficking by possession of less than twenty-eight grams of cocaine\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking by possession of cocaine case by denying defendant\u2019s request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of trafficking by possession of less than twenty-eight grams of cocaine even though defendant contends the cocaine was not fully dry when weighed after its submersion in the toilet, because it is well-established that the total quantity of the mixture containing cocaine is the relevant weight to be used in determining a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3)' rather than the actual weight of the cocaine portion of the mixture.\n4. Drugs\u2014 trafficking by possession of cocaine \u2014 jury instruction on acting in concert\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking by possession of cocaine case by instructing the jury on the theory of acting in concert, because: (1) a defendant acts in concert in committing the offense of trafficking where the evidence establishes that defendant was present while a trafficking offense occurred and that defendant acted in concert with others to commit the offense pursuant to a common plan or purpose; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to warrant an instruction on the doctrine of acting in concert, and the instruction itself correctly stated the law.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 January 2001 by Judge Michael E. Helms in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2002.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph Ellis Herrin, for the State.\nWhite and Crumpler, by E Kevin Mauney, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0420-01", "first_page_order": 450, "last_page_order": 459 }