{ "id": 9081725, "name": "SABRINA PITILLO, Employee/Plaintiff v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Employer/Self-Insured; KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Carrier/Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Pitillo v. N.C. Department of Environmental Health & Natural Resources", "decision_date": "2002-08-06", "docket_number": "No. COA01-999", "first_page": "641", "last_page": "650", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "151 N.C. App. 641" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497462 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571831 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11355398 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting dissent in 146 N.C. App. 187, 202, 552 S.E.2d 202, 211 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220142 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting dissent in 146 N.C. App. 187, 202, 552 S.E.2d 202, 211 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796139, 796140, 795983, 796016, 795895 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0651-01", "/nc/342/0651-04", "/nc/342/0651-03", "/nc/342/0651-02", "/nc/342/0651-05" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 783", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918192 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0783-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565283 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11434208 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4768845 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. App. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524843 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/62/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. Battleground Veterinary Hosp., 62 N.C. App. 720, 723, 303 S.E.2d 547, 549, disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 325, 307 S.E.2d 170 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237233 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. Battleground Veterinary Hosp., 62 N.C. App. 720, 723, 303 S.E.2d 547, 549, disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 325, 307 S.E.2d 170 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916804 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546", "parenthetical": "quoting Mills v. City of New Bern, 122 N.C. App. 283, 284, 468 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11438021 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404", "parenthetical": "quoting Mills v. City of New Bern, 122 N.C. App. 283, 284, 468 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626303 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "heart attack not compensable as injury by accident where the \"events comprising the 'situation'. . . were neither unexpected nor extraordinary,\" and heart attack was precipitated by claimant's emotional overreaction to ordinary situation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2543161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" }, { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding award of benefits to prison instructor who suffered post-traumatic stress disorder after inmate students engaged in violent fight while plaintiff was isolated from other prison employees or guards" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54120, 54158, 53875, 54037, 53942 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding award of benefits to prison instructor who suffered post-traumatic stress disorder after inmate students engaged in violent fight while plaintiff was isolated from other prison employees or guards" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0753-01", "/nc/345/0753-04", "/nc/345/0753-03", "/nc/345/0753-05", "/nc/345/0753-02" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11888632 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081701 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "accident occurred where plaintiff was injured when required to lift the legs of a 263 pound patient, a task she had never in her eleven years of work done before" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155760, 1155803, 1155704, 1155669 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "accident occurred where plaintiff was injured when required to lift the legs of a 263 pound patient, a task she had never in her eleven years of work done before" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0351-03", "/nc/351/0351-04", "/nc/351/0351-01", "/nc/351/0351-02" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520432 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams v. Burlington Industries, 61 N.C. App. 258, 260, 300 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239310 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams v. Burlington Industries, 61 N.C. App. 258, 260, 300 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514047 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684", "parenthetical": "citing Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 368 S.E.2d 582 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11356253 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280", "parenthetical": "citing Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 368 S.E.2d 582 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574321 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135777 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565243 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11203821 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572767 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11712737 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0678-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 932, "char_count": 21524, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.2032436701710605e-07, "percentile": 0.8660066667979485 }, "sha256": "7fcd9bb56d599a4a5315e56b360fb8500c9baa8b6186b8100b976cd978b61026", "simhash": "1:8333c686301f3256", "word_count": 3319 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:19.620477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "SABRINA PITILLO, Employee/Plaintiff v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Employer/Self-Insured; KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Carrier/Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BIGGS, Judge.\nSabrina Pitillo (plaintiff) appeals from the Industrial Commission\u2019s denial of her workers\u2019 compensation claim. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Industrial Commission.\nPlaintiff began work for the North Carolina Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources (defendant; with Key Risk Management Services, Inc., collectively, defendants), in 1995, as a waste management specialist. She was responsible for inspection of commercial hazardous waste facilities, which required travel to industrial work sites in order to ascertain whether companies were in compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations. In June 1997, plaintiff received an annual performance review from her supervisor, Ms. Arms. She received ratings of \u201coutstanding\u201d or \u201cvery good\u201d in twelve areas, and a rating of \u201cgood\u201d in two areas, for an overall rating of \u201cvery good plus.\u201d Plaintiff was very upset that she was rated \u201cgood\u201d in two areas, and angry that the \u201cgood\u201d ratings were based in part upon input from unidentified co-workers. To \u201cappeal the inclusion of alleged comments\u201d in her review, plaintiff sought a meeting with Mike Kelly, the deputy director of the Division of Waste Management, and Brenda Rivers, personnel officer in the division\u2019s department. Plaintiff wrote Kelly that Arms\u2019 performance evaluation was \u201carbitrary and capricious\u201d; that she was \u201coutraged\u201d at her annual evaluation; and that she had decided to \u201cstand up to this injustice.\u201d\nThe meeting requested by plaintiff took place in Raleigh, on 24 July 1997. In attendance were plaintiff, Kelly, Rivers, Arms, and Ann Waddell, the manager of employee relations for the Department. Rivers later testified that she informed plaintiff in advance that Arms and Waddell would be included. The meeting focused on plaintiff\u2019s job performance, and on her concerns about the annual evaluation. There was also discussion of areas in which her supervisor saw some room for improvement.\nThe meeting ended after two hours of discussion, with no change in plaintiff\u2019s employment status or her overall performance rating of \u201cvery good plus.\u201d After the meeting, as plaintiff was driving home, she became very upset, stopped driving, and called her fianc\u00e9e for help. The following day, plaintiff met with Dr. Patel, her family doctor, who referred her to Dr. Patterson, a psychiatrist. Plaintiff received extensive psychiatric treatment during the following months, including medication, outpatient care for psychiatric illness, and psychiatric counseling from two psychiatrists.\nOn 21 August 1997, plaintiff filed an Industrial Commission Form 18 \u201cNotice of Accident to Employer,\u201d in which she alleged that the 24 July 1997 meeting in Raleigh either constituted a workplace accident, or had precipitated an occupational disease. She sought workers\u2019 compensation benefits for \u201cstress induced anxiety\u201d and a \u201cdiagnosed nervous breakdown.\u201d Defendants denied her claim on 24 September 1997, and the matter was subsequently heard by a deputy commissioner of the Industrial Commission. On 28 March 2000 the deputy commissioner issued an opinion denying plaintiffs claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission for a hearing, and filed a motion to compel a full accounting of bills submitted and fees received by Dr. Arnoff, a defense witness. The Commission issued an opinion on 2 May 2001, denying plaintiffs claim for benefits. They did not rule on plaintiffs motion to compel an accounting of Dr. Arnoffs fees. Plaintiff appealed from the Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award.\nStandard of Review\n\u201cThe standard of appellate review of an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission in a workers\u2019 compensation case is whether there is any competent evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether these findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Lineback v. Wake County Board of Commissioners, 126 N.C. App. 678, 680, 486 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1997). Moreover:\n[T]he Industrial Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. The Commission may accept or reject the testimony of a witness solely on the basis of whether it believes the witness or not.\nHilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1982) (citation omitted). \u201cThe Commission chooses what findings to make based on its consideration of the evidence [, and this] court is not at liberty to supplement the Commission\u2019s findings[.]\u201d Bailey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 131 N.C. App. 649, 653, 508 S.E.2d 831, 834 (1998). The Industrial Commission\u2019s findings of fact \u201care conclusive upon appeal if supported by competent evidence,\u201d even if there is evidence to support a contrary finding, Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1, 6, 282 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1981), and may be set aside on appeal only \u201cwhen there is a complete lack of competent evidence to support them[.]\u201d Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227, 230, 538 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2000).\nI.\nPlaintiff argues first that the Commission erred in its conclusion that plaintiff did not suffer an \u201cinjury by accident.\u201d We disagree.\nWorkers\u2019 compensation \u201cdoes not provide compensation for injury, but only for injury by accident.\u201d O\u2019Mary v. Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 510, 135 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1964). Thus, an injury is compensable under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act only if (1) it is caused by an \u201caccident,\u201d and (2) the accident arises out of and in the course of employment. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2001). \u201cThe claimant bears the burden of proving these elements!,]\u201d including the existence of an accident. Smith v. Pinkerton\u2019s Sec. and Investigations, 146 N.C. App. 278, 280, 552 S.E.2d 682, 684 (2001) (citing Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 368 S.E.2d 582 (1988)). In the present case, plaintiff contends that the psychological trauma of her performance review meeting on 24 July 1997, constituted a workplace \u201caccident,\u201d thus, meeting the first part of the statutory test for compensability.\nAn accident under the workers\u2019 compensation act has been defined as \u201c \u2018an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury,\u2019 \u201d and which involves \u201c \u2018the interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.\u2019 \u201d Calderwood v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 135 N.C. App. 112, 115, 519 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1999) (quoting Adams v. Burlington Industries, 61 N.C. App. 258, 260, 300 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1983)), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 351, 543 S.E.2d 124 (2000) (accident occurred where plaintiff was injured when required to lift the legs of a 263 pound patient, a task she had never in her eleven years of work done before). If an injury occurs under normal working conditions, no accident has occurred. Ruffin v. Compass Group, U.S.A., 150 N.C. App. 480, 563 S.E.2d 633 (2002).\nPlaintiff correctly states that a mental or psychological illness may be a compensable injury if it has occurred as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the claimant\u2019s employment. See Jordan v. Central Piedmont Community College, 124 N.C. App. 112, 476 S.E.2d 410 (1996), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 753, 485 S.E.2d 53 (1997) (upholding award of benefits to prison instructor who suffered post-traumatic stress disorder after inmate students engaged in violent fight while plaintiff was isolated from other prison employees or guards). However, an injury is not a compensable \u201cinjury by accident\u201d if the relevant events were \u201cneither unexpected nor extraordinary,\u201d and it was only the \u201c[claimants\u2019] emotional response to the [events that] was the precipitating factor.\u201d Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 328 N.C. 67, 71, 399 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1991).\nIn the case sub judice, plaintiff does not allege that the meeting\u2019s occurrence was unexpected, for it was called at her request. She contends, however, that the presence of Arms and Waddell, the subject matter discussed, and the participant\u2019s behavior towards her, all were unexpected and traumatic. Her testimony to this effect was contradicted by testimony from others who attended the meeting, presenting issues of credibility to be resolved by the Industrial Commission. In this regard, the Industrial Commission made the following pertinent findings of fact:\n9. . . . [T]he greater weight of the evidence presented . . . indicates that the discussion was a routine, problem-solving meeting in which everyone was treated courteously and with respect. Plaintiff was not verbally attacked, reprimanded or severely criticized. Nothing in this meeting was different from other meetings to discuss performance evaluations. . . .\n10. At the meeting plaintiff\u2019s supervisors encouraged plaintiff to be less adversarial.. . [and] to develop cooperative relationships and to establish rapport with the industry in order to facilitate compliance.. . .\n20. . . . [Plaintiff\u2019s account of the meeting on July 24, 1997 . . . was not an accurate representation of what actually occurred at the meeting. The Commission gives greater weight to the testimony of. . . the four [other] individuals present [at the meeting.]\n21. The Commission finds that the greater weight of the competent, credible evidence of record shows that the events of July 24, 1997 did not constitute an unexpected, unusual or untoward occurrence, nor did the meeting constitute an interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. The meeting to discuss plaintiff\u2019s job performance evaluation was requested by plaintiff and was an ordinary incident of employment. Prior to the meeting, plaintiff knew who would be present at the meeting.\nWe conclude that these findings are amply supported by competent evidence in the record, and further conclude that they support the Industrial Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff did not suffer an injury by accident. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nII.\nPlaintiff argues next that the meeting of 24 July 1997, which she has argued was an \u201caccident,\u201d also meets the second requirement for a compensable injury, in that it was an accident that \u201carises out of and in the course of employment.\u201d\nAn injury is said to \u2018arise out of the employment\u2019 \u201c[w]here any reasonable relationship to the employment exists, or employment is a contributory cause[.]\u201d Allred v. Allred-Gardner, Inc., 253 N.C. 554, 557, 117 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1960) (citations omitted). The determination of whether an injury \u201c \u2018arises out of employment\u2019 is a mixed question of law and fact[.]\u201d Janney v. J.W. Jones Lumber Co., 145 N.C. App. 402, 404, 550 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2001) (quoting Mills v. City of New Bern, 122 N.C. App. 283, 284, 468 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1996)). \u201cThis Court has held that an injury is compensable under workers\u2019 compensation if it is ... \u2018fairly traceable to the employment\u2019... or if \u2018any reasonable relationship to employment exists.\u2019 \u201d Pittman v. International Paper Co., 132 N.C. App. 151, 154, 510 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1999) (quoting White v. Battleground Veterinary Hosp., 62 N.C. App. 720, 723, 303 S.E.2d 547, 549, disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 325, 307 S.E.2d 170 (1983)).\nIn the case sub judice, the Industrial Commission found in its finding of fact number 22, that although plaintiff\u2019s job duties generally were not \u201ca significant causal factor in the development of [her] psychological condition[,]\u201d that \u201cthe meeting of July 24, 1997 contributed to or was a significant causal factor in the development of plaintiff\u2019s psychological condition.\u201d We conclude that this finding of fact was supported by competent evidence, and thus must be upheld. However, this finding does not entitle plaintiff to workers\u2019 compensation unless the injury was caused by a workplace accident. Cody, 328 N.C. at 71, 399 S.E.2d at 106 (heart attack not compensable as injury by accident where the \u201cevents comprising the \u2018situation\u2019. . . were neither unexpected nor extraordinary,\u201d and heart attack was precipitated by claimant\u2019s emotional overreaction to ordinary situation). Having upheld the Industrial Commission\u2019s conclusion that the meeting of 24 July 1997 was not a workplace \u201caccident,\u201d we necessarily reject plaintiff\u2019s contention that she suffered a compensable injury as a result of the meeting. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIII.\nPlaintiff argues next that the Industrial Commission erred by concluding that she did not suffer from an occupational disease. We disagree.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53 (2001) lists twenty-seven specifically designated compensable occupational diseases. Although psychological illness is not listed among these, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) (2001) expands the definition of an occupational disease to include \u201c[a]ny disease, [caused by] . . . conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.\u201d \u201cThe burden is on the plaintiff to show that he suffered a compensable occupational disease[.]\u201d Pressley v. Southwestern Freight Lines, 144 N.C. App. 342, 346, 551 S.E.2d 118, 120 (2001). In Pressley, this Court stated that:\nthe plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the disease is characteristic of and peculiar to persons engaged in a particular trade or occupation in which the plaintiff is engaged; (2) \u201cthe disease is not an ordinary disease of life to which the public is equally exposed;\u2019\u2019and (3) there is a causal connection between the disease and the plaintiff\u2019s employment.\nPressley, 144 N.C. App. at 346, 551 S.E.2d at 120 (quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1981)).\nUnder appropriate circumstances, work-related depression or other mental illness may be a compensable occupational disease. Jordan v. Central Piedmont Community College, 124 N.C. App. 112, 476 S.E.2d 410 (1996); Baker v. City of Sanford, 120 N.C. App. 783, 463 S.E.2d 559 (1995), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 651, 467 S.E.2d 703 (1996). However, the claimant must prove that the mental illness or injury was due to stresses or conditions different from those borne by the general public. Woody v. Thomasville Upholstery Inc., 355 N.C. 483, 562 S.E.2d 422 (2002) (adopting dissent in 146 N.C. App. 187, 202, 552 S.E.2d 202, 211 (2001)). Thus, the claimant must establish both that her psychological illness is \u201c \u2018due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment\u2019 \u201d and that it is not \u201c \u2018an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is equally exposed.\u2019 \u201d Booker v. Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 468, 256 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1979) (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) (2001)); see also Norris v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, 139 N.C. App. 620, 534 S.E.2d 259 (2000) (upholding denial of claim based on occupational disease: although plaintiff\u2019s fibromyalgia was caused or aggravated by employment with defendant, there was no evidence that her employment with defendant placed plaintiff at an increased risk of contracting or developing fibromyalgia as compared to the general public not so employed).\nIn the case sub judice, the Commission made the following pertinent findings:\n22. The greater weight of the evidence of record fails to show that plaintiff\u2019s job duties significantly contributed to or were a significant causal factor in the development of plaintiff\u2019s psychological condition. ...\n23. The greater weight of the medical evidence fails to show that plaintiff\u2019s job as a waste management specialist exposed her to an increased risk of developing anxiety disorder and depression than members of the general public not so employed.\nThe Commission concluded that plaintiff \u201cfailed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that she sustained a compensable occupational disease. Plaintiff\u2019s employment with defendant-employer did not place plaintiff at an increased risk of developing anxiety disorder and depression than members of the general public not so employed.\u201d\nWe hold that the Commission\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence. Although plaintiff testified to several minor incidents at work in support of her contention that she suffered from an occupational disease, no evidence was presented that these incidents'contributed to her emotional illness, nor that the \u201cdiagnosed nervous breakdown\u201d or \u201cstress induced anxiety\u201d for which she sought compensation were (1) \u201ccharacteristic of and peculiar to [her] particular trade or occupation\u201d or employment; (2) \u201cnot an ordinary disease of life to which the public is equally exposed\u201d; or that (3) \u201cthere is a causal connection between the disease and the plaintiff\u2019s employment.\u201d Pressley, 144 N.C. App. at 346, 551 S.E.2d at 120.\nWe conclude that the Industrial Commission\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusion that plaintiff failed to establish that her psychological depression or anxiety disorder was a compen-sable occupational disease. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nIV.\nPlaintiffs final argument is that the Commission erred by failing to rule on her motion to compel an accounting of defendant\u2019s financial interactions with Dr. Amoff. Before the hearing, plaintiff moved to compel disclosure of all of defendants\u2019 financial dealings with Dr. Arnoff, their medical witness, in order to demonstrate bias connected to his financial relationship with defendants.\nPursuant to Rule 10(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, the complaining party must \u201cobtain a ruling upon the party\u2019s request, objection or motion\u201d in order to preserve a question for appellate review. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that she ever sought a ruling on her motion, and, therefore, she did not preserve the question for appellate review.\nMoreover, although the Commission did not rule on plaintiff\u2019s motion, plaintiff cross-examined Dr. Arnoff extensively during his deposition concerning the amount of his fee; the fact that the fee was paid directly to him, and not remitted to a hospital or other third party; and the fact that his independent examinations in workers\u2019 compensation cases generally were undertaken on behalf of the defendant, and not the plaintiff. We conclude that, even without a full accounting from Dr. Arnoff, plaintiff could have adequately presented to the Commission any issues associated with Dr. Arnoff\u2019s fees, and, thus, that the error, if any, in the Commission\u2019s failure to rule on plaintiff\u2019s motion was harmless. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nFor the reasons discussed above, the opinion of the Industrial Commission is\nAffirmed.\nJudges GREENE and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BIGGS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of George W. Lennon, by George W. Lennon and Michael W. Ballance, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Jonathan R Babb, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SABRINA PITILLO, Employee/Plaintiff v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Employer/Self-Insured; KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Carrier/Defendant\nNo. COA01-999\n(Filed 6 August 2002)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 stressful performance evaluation \u2014 not an injury by accident\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation proceeding by concluding that plaintiff did not suffer an injury by accident where plaintiff alleged that a meeting to discuss her performance evaluation led to her nervous breakdown, but the meeting was called at plaintiff\u2019s request. Her contention that the people present, the subject matter, and the participants\u2019 behavior were unexpected and traumatic was contradicted by others who attended the meeting.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 job stress \u2014 significant causal factor \u2014 not accidental\nA workers\u2019 compensation plaintiff did not suffer a compensable injury as a result of a meeting to discuss her performance evaluation where there was competent evidence to support a finding that the meeting was a significant causal factor in the development of plaintiffs psychological condition, but the meeting was not an accident.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 job stress \u2014 not an occupational disease\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation action by concluding that plaintiff did not suffer from an occupational disease where plaintiff sought compensation for stress induced anxiety after a meeting to discuss a performance evaluation, but no evidence was presented that plaintiffs condition was characteristic of and peculiar to her particular occupation; that it was not an ordinary disease of life to which the public is equally exposed; or that there was a causal connection between the disease and plaintiffs employment.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 doctor\u2019s relationship with defendant \u2014 motion to compel accounting\nAny error was harmless where a workers\u2019 compensation plaintiff contended that the Industrial Commission erred by failing to rule on her motion to compel an accounting of defendant\u2019s financial transactions with a doctor, but plaintiff did not seek a ruling on her motion and was allowed to throughly cross-examine the doctor. Plaintiff could have presented any issues concerning the doctor\u2019s fees even without the accounting.\nAppeal by plaintiff from an Opinion and Award entered 2 May 2001 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2002.\nLaw Offices of George W. Lennon, by George W. Lennon and Michael W. Ballance, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Jonathan R Babb, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0641-01", "first_page_order": 671, "last_page_order": 680 }