{ "id": 9082328, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: PAUL JONAS ROBINSON", "name_abbreviation": "In re Robinson", "decision_date": "2002-08-06", "docket_number": "No. COA01-817", "first_page": "733", "last_page": "738", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "151 N.C. App. 733" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551143, 551390, 551342, 551375 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0670-01", "/nc/347/0670-02", "/nc/347/0670-03", "/nc/347/0670-04" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11652448 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521090 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569633, 8569497, 8569593, 8569562, 8569532 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0588-05", "/nc/296/0588-01", "/nc/296/0588-04", "/nc/296/0588-03", "/nc/296/0588-02" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554966 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0547-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 626, "char_count": 11463, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.022844622667751e-07, "percentile": 0.9659958939691079 }, "sha256": "1525b4aadd5ea5205ced60ac13d219bd799055534b512f2e6901a8512a1e87cb", "simhash": "1:8feb400e2f5f1d56", "word_count": 1839 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:19.620477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JUDGES MARTIN and TYSON concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: PAUL JONAS ROBINSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "THOMAS, Judge.\nJuvenile respondent, Paul Jonas Robinson, was adjudicated delinquent after admitting to the following offenses: (1) assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury; (2) robbery with a dangerous weapon; and (3) felonious larceny. He was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (the Department) for a period not to exceed his nineteenth birthday.\nThe juvenile appeals, contending the trial court erred: (1) in finding him capable of proceeding; and (2) by committing him to the Department. Based on the reasons herein, we affirm.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tends to show the following: On 7 February 2000, the fourteen-year-old juvenile shot his mother with a .12 gauge shotgun through the bathroom door at home. She was hit in the right arm and chest, resulting in serious injuries. The juvenile then took $20.00 from her and drove his father\u2019s car to South Carolina before finally wrecking.\nThe juvenile was taken into custody and returned to North Carolina. During questioning by Union County Sheriff\u2019s Department Detective Robert Rollins, the juvenile said \u201cthe devil\u201d made him shoot his mother. He further claimed the shotgun he used was similar to Detective Rollins\u2019s handgun, and that after the shooting he threw the weapon into the water behind his home.\nAt the juvenile\u2019s first appearance, his counsel moved to commit him to Dorothea Dix Hospital for an examination to determine capacity to proceed. Doctors Manuel Vers\u00f3la, M.D., and TriciaHahn, Ph.D., L.P., conducted exams and concluded that the juvenile suffered from no mental illness or retardation. They found him capable of proceeding. The juvenile then applied for and received an evaluation by a private psychologist, Dr. Frank Gaskill, Ph.D. Gaskill determined that the juvenile suffers from moderate mental retardation and schizophreniform disorder. As a result, Gaskill found him incapable of proceeding.\nAt a subsequent hearing, the trial court ruled that due to conflicting testimonies it could not make a determination as to capacity to proceed. The trial court then ordered an evaluation by Dr. Robert Rollins, M.D., Chief of Forensic Psychiatry at Dorothea Dix. Rollins found the juvenile capable of proceeding to trial. He based his evaluation on interviews with the juvenile and a review of the evaluations by Gaskill and Vers\u00f3la, a state employee at Dorothea Dix under Rollins\u2019s supervision.\nThe trial court concluded that the juvenile was competent to proceed in that the juvenile was able to understand the nature of the proceedings and to assist his attorney. There is no indication in the record of a probable cause hearing, a waiver of probable cause, or a transfer hearing in accordance with Article 22 of the Juvenile Code. There is a Transcript of Plea, however, with the juvenile entering admissions to the offenses and expressly reserving the right to appeal the issue of competency. The trial court then adjudicated the juvenile delinquent.\nAt the dispositional hearing, assessments by a juvenile court counselor indicated a medium risk of re-offending with the juvenile\u2019s needs level being high. The trial court found the juvenile to be at a Level 2 or Level 3 Disposition under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2508 (2001), and ordered a Level 3 Disposition. He was committed to the Department for a term not to exceed his nineteenth birthday.\nBy his first assignment of error, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in finding him capable of proceeding. We disagree.\nSection 7B-2401 of the North Carolina Juvenile Codes states that the provisions of sections 15A-1001 to 15A-1003 apply to all cases in which a juvenile is alleged to be delinquent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2401 (2001). Sections 15A-1001 to 15A-1003 of the North Carolina Criminal Procedure Act relate to a defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1001 to 15A-1003 (2001). Under section 15A-1001:\n(a) No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1001. Under section 15A-1002, the issue of capacity is within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and \u201c[the] determination thereof, if supported by the evidence, is conclusive on appeal.\u201d State v. Reid, 38 N.C. App. 547, 548-49, 248 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1978), disc. review denied, 296 N.C. 588, 254 S.E.2d 31 (1979).\nThe juvenile\u2019s primary contention is that the method used by the trial court in determining capacity constituted error. Rather than appoint Rollins to conduct a third evaluation, the juvenile argues, the trial court should have appointed an independent psychiatrist with no affiliation to either Vers\u00f3la or Gaskill. The juvenile maintains that Rollins\u2019s report was unreliable and biased because the conclusions in it were based in part on information previously gathered by Vers\u00f3la, one of his employees.\nIn his evaluation, Rollins sets forth the following bases for his opinions: (1) interviews with the patient; (2) observation of ward behavior; (3) routine laboratory and medical studies; (4) review of Versola\u2019s evaluation; (5) review of Gaskill\u2019s evaluation; (6) repeat psychological testing; and (7) contact with the juvenile\u2019s attorney and court counselor. We find no merit to the juvenile\u2019s contention that Rollins\u2019s evaluation was inherently unreliable or biased. The evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding. Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.\nBy his second assignment of error, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in committing him to the Department. We disagree.\nJuvenile dispositions in delinquency proceedings are controlled by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2500 el seq. For offenses occurring on or after 1 July 1999, courts are no longer bound by the language of former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-646 (1998). Under the new Code, the directives found in former section 7A-646 that the trial court \u201cselect the least restrictive disposition\u201d which is appropriate and that \u201c[a] juvenile should not be committed to training school or to any other institution if he can be helped through community-level resources\u201d have been deleted. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2501(c) (2001). The trial court is now required to \u201cselect the most appropriate disposition,\u201d one that is designed to \u201cprotect the public and to meet the needs and best interests of the juvenile,\u201d based on a list of enumerated factors. Id. A textual analysis shows a more balanced statutory design emphasizing appropriate dispositions, with some limitations, rather than what had been interpreted as a mandate for the least restrictive alternative under the circumstances. See In re Bullabough, 89 N.C. App. 171, 185-86, 365 S.E.2d 642, 650 (1988).\nUpon an adjudication of delinquency, a juvenile now is placed in a level of punishment, 1, 2, or 3, depending on the juvenile\u2019s delinquency history and the type of offense committed. Here, the juvenile was found delinquent for two offenses classified as violent, and one classified as serious. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2508(a) (2001). He has a \u201clow\u201d delinquency history level. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2507 (2001). Accordingly, under section 7B-2508(f), the disposition may be at either Level 2 or Level 3. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2508(f) (2001). Level 2 is an intermediate disposition, primarily community based, while Level 3 carries a commitment to the Department. Id.\nOnce a juvenile is placed in a dispositional level, the statutes provide dispositional alternatives which may be utilized by the trial court. However, in those instances where there is a choice of level, there are no specific guidelines solely directed at resolving that issue. Accordingly, choosing between two appropriate dispositional levels is within the trial court\u2019s discretion. Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court\u2019s choice. \u201cAn abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court\u2019s ruling \u2018is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d Chicora Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Erwin, 128 N.C. App. 101, 109, 493 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1997), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 670, 500 S.E.2d 84 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)).\nThere are overall guidelines for the trial court within the Juvenile Code, however, including but not limited to, section 7B-2501(c) as well as section 7B-2500, titled \u201cPurpose,\u201d which provides:\nThe purpose of dispositions in juvenile actions is to design an appropriate plan to meet the needs of the juvenile and to achieve the objectives of the State in exercising jurisdiction, including the protection of the public. The court should develop a disposition in each case that:\n(1) Promotes public safety;\n(2) Emphasizes accountability and responsibility of both the parent, guardian, or custodian and the juvenile for the juvenile\u2019s conduct; and\n(3) Provides the appropriate consequences, treatment, training, and rehabilitation to assist the juvenile toward becoming a nonof-fending, responsible, and productive member of the community.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2500 (2001).\nThe trial court here had before it both a risk of future offending assessment and a needs assessment. The record reveals the juvenile\u2019s risk level of future offending, 14, is at the top of the medium risk range. His total needs score was 23, the bottom of the high range. Further, the trial court found that: \u201cGiven the severity of the case, the lack of progress thus far, and the alternatives that appear to be available here in the community, [the] Court finds it is in the juvenile\u2019s best interest\u201d to be committed. The trial court\u2019s order for a Level 3 disposition is the result of a reasoned decision. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and we reject this assignment of error.\nAFFIRMED.\nJUDGES MARTIN and TYSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "THOMAS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Donna B. Stepp, attorney for respondent-appellant.", "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Lisa Granberry Corbett, Assistant Attorney General, for the State." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: PAUL JONAS ROBINSON\nNo. COA01-817\n(Filed 6 August 2002)\n1. Juveniles\u2014 capacity to proceed \u2014 evaluations\nThe trial court did not err by finding a juvenile capable of proceeding where 2 doctors from Dorothea Dix found the juvenile capable, a private psychologist found him incapable, and the trial court ordered an evaluation by the chief of forensic psychiatry at Dorothea Dix, who found the juvenile capable of proceeding. There was no merit to the juvenile\u2019s contention that the chief psychiatrist\u2019s evaluation was inherently unreliable or biased because it was based in part on information gathered by one of his employees.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 commitment \u2014 not an abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by committing a juvenile to the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention where the court had before it assessments of needs and risks and the court found that it was in the juvenile\u2019s best interest to be committed given the severity of the case, the lack of progress, and the alternatives available in the community.\nAppeal by respondent from judgment entered 11 December 2000 by Judge Lisa Thacker in Union County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 April 2002.\nDonna B. Stepp, attorney for respondent-appellant.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Lisa Granberry Corbett, Assistant Attorney General, for the State." }, "file_name": "0733-01", "first_page_order": 763, "last_page_order": 768 }