{ "id": 9249369, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: BRANDON PINEAULT", "name_abbreviation": "In re Pineault", "decision_date": "2002-08-06", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1152", "first_page": "196", "last_page": "201", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 N.C. App. 196" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080140 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497700 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571698 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" }, { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12121471 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567727 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564130 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520702 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(6)" }, { "page": "(a)(6)" }, { "page": "(a)(6)" }, { "page": "(a)(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-127", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 568, "char_count": 11108, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.225778523899894e-07, "percentile": 0.8673963231060962 }, "sha256": "f1c405207b0565e550d23b12aa939cc92b65c7c8363ebd0f7d8d4bcff6f198a1", "simhash": "1:8de9e02efa6f2c34", "word_count": 1791 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:40:03.287783+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: BRANDON PINEAULT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nBrandon Pineault (\u201crespondent\u201d) was adjudicated delinquent in the district court of Stokes County based upon violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-127 (2001), prohibiting injury to real property, and two counts of disorderly conduct in school pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4(a)(6) (2001). We affirm.\nEvidence at trial tended to establish that on 6 February 2001, respondent was a student at Piney Grove Middle School. Christine Carlson was the teacher at the time. On this day, Ms. Carlson was teaching mapping skills when she heard respondent tell another student, \u201c \u2018[f] \u2014 k you.\u2019 \u201d Ms. Carlson escorted respondent to the principal\u2019s office. On the way to the office, respondent said, \u201c \u2018[f] \u2014 k you, b \u2014 h.\u2019 \u201d\nMs. Carlson testified that on the following day, 7 February 2001, while she was on the phone with a parent, respondent began arguing with another student. Ms. Carlson\u2019s teacher\u2019s assistant attempted to resolve the situation. At that time, Ms. Carlson heard respondent say \u201c \u2018[f] \u2014 k off, bastard\u2019 \u201d to the other student. Ms. Carlson escorted respondent to the principal\u2019s office. According to the testimony of Principal Roger Lee Tucker, respondent was detained in the first aid room because he was acting disorderly and the assistant principal and teachers were attempting to calm him down. Mr. Tucker instructed respondent to enter his office and respondent refused. Mr. Tucker then restrained respondent by holding him by his \u201ctrunk\u201d and pinning his arms down to carry him into his office. While restrained, respondent began kicking, and eventually kicked a door, pushing the doorstop through the wall.\nAt the time of the hearing, respondent was thirteen years old. At the close of the evidence, respondent moved to dismiss the charges, which motion was denied. Respondent was given a curfew, placed on probation for a period of twelve months, ordered to undergo testing for alcohol and controlled substances, cooperate with residential and non-residential treatment programs, perform up to twenty hours of community service, submit to substance abuse monitoring, and participate in a life and educational skills program.\nRespondent assigns four errors to the trial court\u2019s rulings: (1) the trial court erred in denying respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of injury to real property; (2) the charge of injury to real property was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the trial court erred in denying respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss the two charges of disorderly conduct; and (4) the trial court erred in finding that the charges of disorderly conduct were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\nI.\nRespondent argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of injury to real property for lack of sufficient evidence. Specifically, he asserts the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he willfully and wantonly damaged the property. We disagree.\nIt is well-settled that \u201cin order to withstand a motion to dismiss the charges contained in a juvenile petition, there must be substantial evidence of each of the material elements of the offense charged.\u201d In re Bass, 77 N.C. App. 110, 115, 334 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1985). The evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to receive every reasonable inference of fact that may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 604, 268 S.E.2d 800, 807 (1980).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-127 provides that \u201c[i]f any person shall willfully and wantonly damage, injure or destroy any real property whatsoever, either of a public or private nature, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.\u201d Id. Respondent, in his brief, argues that there was no direct evidence of his intention to purposely and deliberately kick the door. We find there was sufficient evidence.\nThe term \u201c \u2018 \u201cwillful\u201d as used in criminal statutes means the wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in violation of the law.\u2019 \u201d State v. Brackett, 306 N.C. 138, 142, 291 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1982) (citation omitted). \u201c 'Willfulness\u2019 is a state of mind which is seldom capable of direct proof, but which must be inferred from the circumstances of the particular case.\u201d State v. Davis, 86 N.C. App. 25, 30, 356 S.E.2d 607, 610 (1987). \u201cFurther, a person is presumed to intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of his unlawful acts.\u201d Id. at 30, 356 S.E.2d at 610.\nHere, the State presented evidence that respondent \u201cwas being very belligerent, uncooperative,\u201d and \u201cdisruptive.\u201d Respondent kicked \u201cindiscriminately\u201d down the hall while being restrained. He kicked the door with such force as to cause the doorstop to punch a hole in the wall. Damage to the wall was a natural and foreseeable consequence of respondent kicking wildly down the hall. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find there was sufficient evidence that respondent willfully and wantonly kicked the door which caused the damage. Therefore, we conclude respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss was properly denied.\nII.\nRespondent next argues the trial court erred in finding the offenses of disorderly conduct had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. Respondent was charged with two counts of disorderly conduct. The first count was based on his use of foul language in the classroom on 6 February 2001; the second count stems from his behavior in the classroom and first aid room on 7 February 2001.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4(a)(6) prohibits the following:\n(a) Disorderly conduct is a public disturbance intentionally caused by any person who:\n(6) Disrupts, disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students at any public or private educational institution or engages in conduct which disturbs the peace, order or discipline at any public or private educational institution or on the grounds adjacent thereto.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4(a)(6). Our Supreme Court has held that the conduct must cause \u201ca substantial interference with, disruption of and confusion of the operation of the school in its program of instruction and training of students there enrolled.\u201d State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 154, 158 S.E.2d 37, 42 (1967); see also, In re Eller, 331 N.C. 714, 417 S.E.2d 479 (1992).\nAs to the first count, Ms. Carlson testified that while teaching mapping skills to her class on 6 February 2001, she heard respondent state, in a loud, angry voice, \u201c \u2018[f] \u2014 k you.\u2019 \u201d Ms. Carlson was required to stop teaching the class and escort respondent to the principal\u2019s office. As Ms. Carlson escorted respondent out of her classroom, he twice said to her, \u201c \u2018[f] \u2014 k you, b \u2014 h,\u2019 \u201d evincing a clear disrespect for her authority. While the record does not indicate how long Ms. Carlson was away from the classroom, it does establish that she escorted respondent to the principal\u2019s office and explained to office staff what had happened, thereby indicating she was away from the classroom for more than several minutes. We hold, given the severity and nature of respondent\u2019s language, coupled with the fact that Ms. Carlson was required to stop teaching her class for at least several minutes, that respondent\u2019s actions substantially interfered with the operation of Ms. Carlson\u2019s classroom in the manner contemplated in Wiggins.\nAs to the second count of disorderly conduct, the State presented evidence that respondent began arguing with another student while Ms. Carlson was on the telephone talking to a parent. He used profanity towards another student and was taken to the principal\u2019s office. According to the testimony of the principal, respondent was detained in the first aid room \u201cbecause he was being disorderly and the assistant principal and the teachers w[ere] with him trying to calm him down.\u201d Further, he testified that respondent \u201cwas being very belligerent, uncooperative with my teachers, would not cooperate with me, would not come into my office calmly, jerked away from me, pulled away, [and] was being very disruptive.\u201d The extent of respondent\u2019s disruptive behavior is further evidenced by the fact that respondent\u2019s conduct required restraint by the principal. Moreover, his behavior required the attention of several school officials including the principal, teachers, and the assistant principal. As a consequence of respondent\u2019s behavior, these officials stopped teaching and performing various administrative duties to attend to him. Thus, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to establish that respondent\u2019s conduct substantially interfered with the operation of the school. The trial court did not err in determining that respondent\u2019s behavior on both occasions constituted a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4(a)(6).\nAffirmed.\nJudges GREENE and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.\n. While this Court recently held that \u201ca student who talked during a test, slammed a door, and begged a teacher in the hallway that he not be sent to the office,\u201d causing the teacher to be away from her classroom for \u201cseveral\u201d minutes did not amount to a \u201csubstantial interference with the operation of the school,\u201d In re Brown, 150 N.C. App. 127, 131, 562 S.E.2d 583, 586 (2002), this case is distinguishable. In Brown, the respondent\u2019s conduct occurred during an examination and at the end of the examination, not while the teacher was conducting class as in the case sub judice. See id. at 127-28, 562 S.E.2d at 584. Moreover, in Brown, neither the respondent\u2019s language nor his behavior was as egregious or severe as respondent\u2019s language in this case. Accordingly, Brown is not controlling here.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Susan K. Nichols, for petitioner-appellee.", "R. Michael Bruce for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: BRANDON PINEAULT\nNo. COA01-1152\n(Filed 6 August 2002)\n1. Juveniles\u2014 injury to real property \u2014 motion to dismiss\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying respondent juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of injury to real property based on his kicking a door at school that caused damage to a wall, because there was sufficient evidence that respondent willfully and wantonly kicked the door which caused the damage.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 disorderly conduct \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying respondent juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss two charges of disorderly conduct based on his use of foul language in the classroom on 6 February 2001 and his behavior in the classroom and first aid room on 7 February 2001, because there was sufficient evidence that respondent\u2019s behavior interfered with the operation of the school including the nature and severity of respondent\u2019s language coupled with the fact that several school officials stopped teaching and performing various administrative duties to attend to respondent.\nAppeal by juvenile from orders entered 23 March 2001 by Judge Spencer G. Key, Jr. in Stokes County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2002.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Susan K. Nichols, for petitioner-appellee.\nR. Michael Bruce for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0196-01", "first_page_order": 224, "last_page_order": 229 }