{ "id": 9249985, "name": "DIANA WELLS, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, a department of the State of North Carolina, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, THEODIS BECK, Secretary of the Department of Correction, DUNCAN DAUGHTRY, individually and as Superintendent of the Department of Correction, Newport Branch, and ANTHONY FLORENCE, individually and as supervisor of the Department of Correction, Newport Branch, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Wells v. North Carolina Department of Correction", "decision_date": "2002-08-20", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1199", "first_page": "307", "last_page": "323", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 N.C. App. 307" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "499 U.S. 959", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11377956, 11378022, 11378375, 11378253, 11377901, 11378319, 11378096, 11378450, 11378548, 11378133, 11378494 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0959-02", "/us/499/0959-03", "/us/499/0959-08", "/us/499/0959-06", "/us/499/0959-01", "/us/499/0959-07", "/us/499/0959-04", "/us/499/0959-09", "/us/499/0959-11", "/us/499/0959-05", "/us/499/0959-10" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551087, 551279, 551093, 551189, 551382 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0266-05", "/nc/347/0266-03", "/nc/347/0266-02", "/nc/347/0266-01", "/nc/347/0266-04" ] }, { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685026, 684898, 684899, 685087, 684959 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0676-03", "/nc/352/0676-05", "/nc/352/0676-04", "/nc/352/0676-02", "/nc/352/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11242134 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433910 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "iquoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, Comment d (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4780326, 4777709, 4778478, 4779983, 4776954 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "iquoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, Comment d (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0334-03", "/nc/317/0334-02", "/nc/317/0334-05", "/nc/317/0334-01", "/nc/317/0334-04" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "iquoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, Comment d (1965)" }, { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "\"It is a question of law for the court to determine, from the materials before it, whether the conduct complained of may reasonably be found to be sufficiently outrageous as to permit recovery\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521761 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493", "parenthetical": "iquoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, Comment d (1965)" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779", "parenthetical": "\"If the granting of summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal. If the correct result has been reached, the judgment will not be disturbed even though the trial court may not have assigned the correct reason for the judgment entered\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2482580 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132031 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795990 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526099 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" }, { "page": "887", "parenthetical": "quoting Anita R. Brown-Graham & Jeffrey S. Koeze, Immunity from Personal Liability under State Law for Public Officials and Employees: An Update, Loc. Gov't L. Bull. 67 (Inst. of Gov't, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill), Apr. 1995, at 7" }, { "page": "888" }, { "page": "889" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551301 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" }, { "page": "113-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "970 F.2d 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10513091 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43-44", "parenthetical": "holding that the passage of fourteen months between the plaintiff's initial EEOC charge and the defendant's alleged retaliatory conduct was not \"legally conclusive proof' against retaliation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/970/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 F.3d 759", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1615625 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/159/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132001, 132154, 131944, 132110, 132314 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0091-05", "/nc/350/0091-02", "/nc/350/0091-04", "/nc/350/0091-03", "/nc/350/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586-87", "parenthetical": "holding that the passage of fifteen months between the filing of an EEOC charge and the plaintiff's termination did not negate a causal connection between the two events" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 L. Ed. 2d 645", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "914 F.2d 525", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10535533 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/914/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 F.Supp. 1204", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7402425 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/679/1204-01" ] }, { "cite": "900 F.2d 27", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10526280 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "106-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/900/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "879 F.2d 100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10529105 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/879/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 893", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796069, 796136, 796141, 796046, 796059 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0893-04", "/nc/342/0893-01", "/nc/342/0893-05", "/nc/342/0893-03", "/nc/342/0893-02" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916106 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "925 F.2d 1100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1789046 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/925/1100-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 F.3d 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11659604 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/181/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11354393 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the Equal Employment Practices Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 F.3d 1137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7416163 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/67/1137-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 L. Ed. 2d 276", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 502", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355912 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6184064 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/450/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 792", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10002 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 228", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605428 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563912, 8563948, 8563931, 8563986, 8563963 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0467-01", "/nc/295/0467-03", "/nc/295/0467-02", "/nc/295/0467-05", "/nc/295/0467-04" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551364 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541066 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 F.Supp. 575", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3710031 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" }, { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/597/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11712046 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "714 F. Supp. 146", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7382035 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/714/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "282" }, { "page": "281" }, { "page": "284" }, { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "\"An articulated reason is not 'legitimate'. . . unless it has 'a rational connection with the business goal of securing a competent and trustworthy work force.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12136994 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-34.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(7)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-34.1(a)(7) and the Whistleblower Act provide \"two avenues to redress violations of the Whistleblower statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138401, 138313, 138378, 138487, 138394 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-34.1(a)(7) and the Whistleblower Act provide \"two avenues to redress violations of the Whistleblower statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0228-04", "/nc/354/0228-02", "/nc/354/0228-01", "/nc/354/0228-05", "/nc/354/0228-03" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "holding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-34.1(a)(7) and the Whistleblower Act provide \"two avenues to redress violations of the Whistleblower statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437867 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "holding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-34.1(a)(7) and the Whistleblower Act provide \"two avenues to redress violations of the Whistleblower statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"When multiple statutes address a single matter or subject, the statutes must be construed in para materia, 'as together constituting one law,' and harmonized to give effect to each statute whenever possible\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138470, 138323, 138489, 138494, 138495 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"When multiple statutes address a single matter or subject, the statutes must be construed in para materia, 'as together constituting one law,' and harmonized to give effect to each statute whenever possible\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0365-03", "/nc/354/0365-04", "/nc/354/0365-02", "/nc/354/0365-01", "/nc/354/0365-05" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539", "parenthetical": "\"When multiple statutes address a single matter or subject, the statutes must be construed in para materia, 'as together constituting one law,' and harmonized to give effect to each statute whenever possible\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11439225 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "\"When multiple statutes address a single matter or subject, the statutes must be construed in para materia, 'as together constituting one law,' and harmonized to give effect to each statute whenever possible\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1473, "char_count": 40881, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3042943848409035e-07, "percentile": 0.7877171603440973 }, "sha256": "72817dc08c70b94f52fd7149272b3f512020564e46f4c8d68d9a7233311f6ee1", "simhash": "1:0c713436c4bf861c", "word_count": 6206 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:40:03.287783+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "DIANA WELLS, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, a department of the State of North Carolina, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, THEODIS BECK, Secretary of the Department of Correction, DUNCAN DAUGHTRY, individually and as Superintendent of the Department of Correction, Newport Branch, and ANTHONY FLORENCE, individually and as supervisor of the Department of Correction, Newport Branch, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nOn 29 October 1999, plaintiff filed an amended complaint asserting a claim against defendants in their official capacities for wrongful workplace retaliation in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84, et seq. (the Whistleblower Act). Plaintiff also asserted claims against defendants Duncan Daughtry (Daughtry) and Anthony Florence (Florence) in their individual capacities for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On 9 July 2001, the trial court entered summary judgment for defendants on all claims.\nIn her complaint, plaintiff alleged that in 1998, while employed as an office assistant at the Carteret Correctional Center in Newport (Carteret), she reported that her supervisor, Florence, had made \u201cinappropriate, sexual comments, overtures, and gestures\u201d towards her. She further alleged that, although the Equal Employment Opportunities/Title VII (EEO) section of the Department of Corrections (DOC) determined her report was \u201cunfounded,\u201d defendants wrongfully retaliated against her by creating a \u201chostile\u201d work environment. Specifically, plaintiff asserted that, after she made her report, defendants: (1) forced her to return \u201cback to Florence\u2019s supervision,\u201d (2) required her to perform an \u201cexcessive amount of work equivalent for two people,\u201d and (3) gave her \u201cbelow average and unsatisfactory job evaluations.\u201d As a result, plaintiff developed \u201cheadaches, chest pain, depression, fatigue, decreased motivation, and decreased energy\u201d for which she needed medical treatment and was ultimately forced to resign her position.\nIn support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants provided affidavits from DOC Eastern Region Director Joseph Lofton (Lofton), former Programs Supervisor at Carteret Wallace Lunsford (Lunsford), Florence, and Daughtry. In Daughtry\u2019s affidavit, he stated that, as the Superintendent of Carteret, he became aware of \u201cdifficulties in communications\u201d between plaintiff and Florence concerning \u201cjob assignments\u201d in January of 1998. To alleviate the problem, Daughtry transferred plaintiff to the \u201cdirect supervision\u201d of Lunsford. Nonetheless, plaintiff \u201ccontinued to provide clerical support to . . . Florence and others in his department.\u201d According to Daughtry, he was not informed of plaintiff\u2019s allegations of sexual harassment until December of 1998. Following the EEO\u2019s determination that the allegations were unsubstantiated and after receiving instructions from Lofton, he returned plaintiff to Florence\u2019s direct supervision. At that time, another office assistant was on long-term sick leave and Lunsford was in the process of transferring to another correctional facility. Therefore, it became necessary to reassign the clerical duties normally handled by these two employees to \u201cother staffers,\u201d including plaintiff. Daughtry further averred that plaintiff received a \u201cBelow Good\u201d rating from Lunsford and Florence during her last year of employment. He attributed the rating to plaintiff\u2019s \u201cproblems with missing work, being tardy for work, . . . poor relations with coworkers,\u201d and an incident in which plaintiff failed to properly report that she had lost her set of security keys.\nIn his affidavit, Lofton averred that, in November of 1998, he received a request from Daughtry to investigate \u201cmorale problems\u201d at Carteret. At the time, he perceived the problems to be \u201ccentered around a complaint made by . . . plaintiff concerning her interim appraisal . . . .\u201d Consequently, Lofton sent two officials from the Eastern Region Office to Carteret to conduct an investigation, during which plaintiff alleged that Florence had sexually harassed her. In accordance with DOC policy, plaintiff\u2019s allegation was forwarded to the EEO. Lofton further stated that, after the investigation, he \u201cwas concerned of the finding . . . that the programs staff at Carteret were afraid to give directions to . . . plaintiff due to the perception of retaliation from her husband, Charles Wells, a correctional sergeant at Carteret.\u201d Following receipt of an EEO letter concluding that plaintiffs allegations of sexual harassment could not be substantiated, he ordered that plaintiff be moved back under Florence\u2019s direct supervision. His reasons for doing so were \u201cto put [plaintiff] back where she belonged in the organizational chart, to dispel the staff concerns that [plaintiff] could move around at will in the institution whenever she voiced dissatisfaction at her supervisor, and to also alleviate [plaintiff\u2019s] concerns that she had been \u2018demoted ....\u2019\u201d Finally, Lofton noted that, in May of 1999, he received a grievance from plaintiff regarding a \u201cBelow Good\u201d performance evaluation for the period of 1 April 1998 to 31 March 1999. After reviewing the evaluation, he declined to act on plaintiff\u2019s grievance; nevertheless, he informed plaintiff she could appeal his decision to the Secretary of Correction.\nIn his affidavit, Florence denied having sexually harassed plaintiff. He further averred that in December of 1997, he became concerned about plaintiff\u2019s \u201crepeated tardiness and her lack of attention to some specific job assignments . . . .\u201d Although he attempted to voice his concerns directly to plaintiff, Florence found her response \u201cmade it clear that she did not think that my concerns ... were something that I should have addressed with her.\u201d Soon thereafter, Daughtry transferred plaintiff to Lunsford\u2019s direct supervision. In the summer of 1998, Florence noted an improvement in plaintiff\u2019s job performance and, in an effort to \u201creenforce this behavior,\u201d he recommended that plaintiff be named \u201cEmployee of the Month\u201d for July of 1998. However, in the succeeding months, plaintiff became \u201cupset\u201d with Lunsford\u2019s supervision and received \u201cBelow Good\u201d ratings from Lunsford in her performance log for the months of August and September. When plaintiff was returned to his direct supervision, Florence issued a memorandum in which he re-distributed the clerical duties formerly performed by Lunsford and the office assistant who was on leave. In his opinion, plaintiff was \u201cnot assigned any duties outside of her job description.\u201d Once plaintiff expressed concern that she was \u201cdoing the workload of two people,\u201d he and Daughtry met with plaintiff and compared plaintiff\u2019s job description to that of the office assistant on leave. According to Florence, \u201c[o]ur review showed that [plaintiff] was not being given any assignments outside of her job description and that she did not do most of the job tasks on [the absent office assistant\u2019s] job description.\u201d\nFinally, in his affidavit, Lunsford corroborated the statements of Daughtry and Florence that plaintiff was transferred to his direct supervision in order to \u201cresolve communication problems\u201d between Florence and plaintiff. He further averred that, while under his supervision, plaintiff \u201cfrequently complained to me about her work, specifically about the tasks she was assigned to do.\u201d Lunsford noted that plaintiff had a history of \u201ceither being tardy or not showing up for work and she never built up a substantial balance of sick or vacation time.\u201d Although he encouraged plaintiff to improve on these points, plaintiff was \u201cresistant to constructive criticism on how to go about improving both her job performance and attendance problems.\u201d\nAmong the evidence plaintiff presented in response to defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion was her affidavit, in which she stated that, during an investigation in December of 1998, she \u201ctruthfully answered some questions regarding what [she] perceived to have been sexual harassment and a hostile work environment caused by . . . Florence.\u201d She further maintained that defendants\u2019 contention concerning the fact that she did not receive any additional job assignments following her report was \u201cuntrue.\u201d She then listed certain \u201cnew duties\u201d which she asserted were previously assigned to the other office assistant that she \u201cassume[d]\u201d after she returned to Florence\u2019s direct supervision. Plaintiff also presented various performance evaluations. In a 1996 evaluation, plaintiff received an overall \u201cGood\u201d rating from her previous supervisor, Jerry Moore, who specifically noted that plaintiff \u201ctakes on her duties in a professional manner,\u201d \u201cassists other staff very well,\u201d and \u201chas demonstrated good work habits.\u201d Plaintiff contrasted this rating with a \u201cBelow Good\u201d rating she received on her 1999 evaluation based on \u201cBelow Good\u201d performances in \u201csupervision,\u201d \u201cplanning and organization,\u201d and \u201ccommunication\u201d and \u201cUnsatisfactory\u201d performances in \u201csafety and security\u201d and \u201cperformance stability.\u201d Notwithstanding the overall \u201cBelow Good\u201d rating, plaintiff averred that she \u201cworked hard\u201d and \u201cdid not have trouble with co-workers.\u201d Lastly, plaintiff provided an affidavit from a former co-worker, James Montanye, who stated that in 1999 Florence had complimented plaintiff\u2019s work in \u201ccomputing gain time.\u201d\nAfter reviewing the affidavits, pleadings and other materials submitted by the parties, the trial court determined that plaintiff\u2019s evidence \u201cestablished] a prima facie case of retaliation,\u201d but that defendants\u2019 evidence \u201crebutted the Plaintiff\u2019s prima facie showing\u201d by \u201cestablishing] that there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for all acts or omissions that the Plaintiff. . . alleged were retaliatory. . . .\u201d The trial court then concluded that plaintiff \u201cfail[ed] to establish any evidence of pretext on the part of the Defendants for their stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons . ...\u201d In addition, the trial court determined that \u201call alleged wrongful acts or omissions by Defendants Duncan Daughtry and Anthony Florence occurred within the scope of their employment\u201d and, as such, \u201cthe doctrine of sovereign immunity bars\u201d plaintiffs emotional distress actions.\nI.\nWe first address whether plaintiffs retaliation claim comes within the provisions of the Whistleblower Act. Defendants contend that retaliation claims such as the one made by plaintiff must come before the State Personnel Commission pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36(b). Therefore, defendants argue that summary judgment was appropriate as plaintiff had no remedy under the Whistleblower Act.\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36(b):\n[A]ny State employee or former State employee who has reason to believe that the employee has been subjected to any of the following shall have the right to appeal directly to the State Personnel Commission:\n(2) Retaliation for opposition to harassment in the workplace based upon age, sex, race, color, national origin, religion, creed, or handicapping condition, whether the harassment is based upon the creation of a hostile work environment or upon a quid pro quo.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36(b) (2001).\nOn the other hand, the Whistleblower Act states in pertinent part:\nIt is the policy of this State that State employees shall be encouraged to report verbally or in writing to their supervisor, department head, or other appropriate authority, evidence of activity by a State agency or State employee constituting:\n(1) A violation of State or federal law, rule or regulation;\nNo State employee shall retaliate against another State employee because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee reports ... [a violation of the Whistleblower Act].\nAny State employee injured by a violation of the [Whistleblower Act] may maintain an action in superior court for damages, an injunction, or other remedies provided ....\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84 et seq.\nDefendants maintain that because N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36(b) specifically addresses workplace harassment, the State Personnel Commission was the \u201cexclusive forum\u201d for plaintiffs action. In response, plaintiff contends that since harassment in the workplace is a violation of \u201cstate and federal law,\u201d her action under the Whistleblower Act is proper.\nBased on our analysis of these two statutes, we do not interpret N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36(b) as precluding plaintiffs Whistleblower action. Indeed, the statute merely provides plaintiff with \u201cthe right to appeal\u201d her wrongful retaliation claim directly to the State Personnel Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36(b) (emphasis added). Such \u201cright to appeal\u201d does not otherwise bar an action which meets the requirements of the Whistleblower Act. Furthermore, when N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36(b) is read in para materia with the Whistleblower Act, the two statutes are not irreconcilable. See Occaneechi Band of the Saponi Nation v. N.C. Comm\u2019n of Indian Affairs, 145 N.C. App. 649, 654, 551 S.E.2d 535, 539, disc. rev. denied, 354 N.C. 365, 556 S.E.2d 575 (2001) (\u201cWhen multiple statutes address a single matter or subject, the statutes must be construed in para materia, \u2018as together constituting one law,\u2019 and harmonized to give effect to each statute whenever possible\u201d). We conclude the two statutes create alternative means for an aggrieved party to seek relief. See generally Swain v. Elfland, 145 N.C. App. 383, 389, 550 S.E.2d 530, 535, cert. denied, 354 N.C. 228, 554 S.E.2d 832 (2001) (holding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-34.1(a)(7) and the Whistleblower Act provide \u201ctwo avenues to redress violations of the Whistleblower statute\u201d). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that plaintiffs Whistleblower action was properly before the court.\nII.\nWe next consider whether a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding plaintiffs Whistleblower action. The law, as it pertains to this area, was first addressed by this Court in Kennedy v. Guilford Tech. Community College, 115 N.C. App. 581, 448 S.E.2d 280 (1994). Initially, the plaintiff must establish aprima facie case of retaliation, the elements of which are: (1) the plaintiff\u2019s engagement in a \u201c \u2018protected activity,\u2019 \u201d (2) an \u201c \u2018adverse employment action\u2019 \u201d occurring subsequent to the \u201c \u2018protected activity,\u2019 \u201d and (3) the plaintiff\u2019s engagement in the \u201c \u2018protected activity\u2019 \u201d was a \u201c \u2018substantial or motivating factor\u2019 \u201d in the \u201c \u2018adverse employment action.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 584, 448 S.E.2d at 282 (quoting McCauley v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 714 F. Supp. 146, 151 (M.D.N.C. 1987)); see also Hanton v. Gilbert, 126 N.C. App. 561, 571, 486 S.E.2d 432, 439, disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 266, 493 S.E.2d 454 (1997). Once a prima facie case is made, the defendant must then \u201c \u2018articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse [employment] action.\u2019 \u201d Kennedy, 115 N.C. App. at 585, 448 S.E.2d at 282 (quoting Melchi v. Burns Int\u2019l Sec. Servs. Inc., 597 F.Supp. 575, 582 (E.D. Mich. 1984)). \u201cFinally, if the defendant. . . meets its burden [of production], the plaintiff must then come forward with evidence to show \u2018that the legitimate reason was a mere pretext for the retaliatory action.\u2019 \u201d Id. \u201c[T]hus, \u2018a plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving that the [adverse employment action] would not have occurred had there been no protected activity\u2019 engaged in by the plaintiff.\u201d Id.\nAs with other summary judgment determinations, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id. at 583, 448 S.E.2d at 281. All reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-movant\u2019s favor. Id. While a trial court\u2019s findings and conclusions in support of a summary judgment may be helpful, \u201cthey are to be disregarded on appeal.\u201d See Sunamerica Financial Corp. v. Bonham, 328 N.C. 254, 261, 400 S.E.2d 435, 440 (1991); and Mosley v. National Finance Co., 36 N.C. App. 109, 111, 243 S.E.2d 145, 147, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 467, 246 S.E.2d 9 (1978).\nPlaintiff presents two alternative grounds as to why the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment on her Whistleblower action was improper: (1) the trial court failed to apply the appropriate analytical model to her action, and (2) even if the trial court applied the appropriate model, she presented sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment.\nA. Proper Analytical Model\nPlaintiff first argues that rather than utilizing the pretext model of analysis articulated in Kennedy, the trial court should have used a mixed-motive model resembling the one set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989). We disagree.\nIn Price Waterhouse, the Court recognized two distinct means for analyzing actions brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act \u2014 the pretext model and the mixed-motive model. The traditional pretext model follows the analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) and its progeny, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) and St. Mary\u2019s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993), and was applied to Whistleblower actions by this Court in Kennedy. However, in Price Waterhouse, the Court recognized the shortcomings of using the pretext model in cases where the evidence clearly shows that the adverse employment decision was the result of a \u201cmixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives.\u201d Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232, 104 L. Ed. 2d 276. Thus, in cases in which the plaintiff\u2019s prima facie case presents \u201cdirect evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion,\u201d the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant, who must then demonstrate that it would have made the same decision even absent the illegitimate criterion. Id. at 258, 277, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 293, 305 (emphasis added). The evidence required to trigger use of the mixed-motive model is \u201cevidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged [illegitimate criterion] and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.\u201d Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995).\nAs plaintiff points out, this Court recently applied the mixed-motive/pretext distinction to an action brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.1 (the Equal Employment Practices Act). See Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, 146 N.C. App. 82, 551 S.E.2d 902, appeal filed, (No. 560A01, 26 September 2001). In Brewer, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had discriminated against him on the basis of race and had wrongfully retaliated for filing a complaint of racial discrimination. Our Court determined that the mixed-motive/pretext distinction applied, but concluded that because the plaintiff had presented no direct evidence of discrimination, the case was properly categorized as a pretext model case. Id. at 86, 551 S.E.2d at 905.\nNonetheless, even if we were to assume the same distinction also applies to a Whistleblower action, plaintiff here has failed to proffer sufficient direct evidence of retaliation on the part of defendants to warrant analysis using the mixed-motive model. The substance of plaintiffs allegation is that defendants wrongfully responded to her report of sexual harassment by: (1) returning her to Florence\u2019s supervision, (2) requiring her to perform additional work assignments, and (3) giving her a negative performance rating. As \u201cdirect evidence\u201d in support of her allegation, plaintiff cites Lofton\u2019s affidavit in which he states that he returned plaintiff to Florence\u2019s supervision \u201cto dispel the staff concerns that [plaintiff] could move around at will in the institution whenever she voiced dissatisfaction at her supervisor.\u201d Plaintiff also cites a notation on her 1999 performance evaluation indicating that she \u201cdemonstrated difficulty in communicating with her supervisor\u201d and that she had \u201cpoor relations with co-workers.\u201d\nWe are not persuaded that plaintiff has presented the direct evidence required to treat her Whistleblower action as a mixed-motive case. By way of contrast, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse cited specific comments from the defendant\u2019s partners to support her allegation of gender discrimination. This evidence included a partner\u2019s suggestion that, in order to advance within the company, she should \u201c \u2018walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.\u2019 \u201d Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 278. Similarly, in Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Services, 181 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999), the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for opposing a supervisor\u2019s sexual harassment of a female co-worker. To substantiate his allegation, the plaintiff provided specific statements and actions of his supervisor which clearly reflected a retaliatory attitude. The evidence included the supervisor\u2019s statement that the reason for the plaintiff\u2019s termination was because the plaintiff had \u201cinitiated\u201d the co-worker\u2019s complaints of sexual harassment. Kubicko, 181 F.3d at 553.\nUnlike the evidence in Price Waterhouse and Kubicko, plaintiff\u2019s evidence here does not establish a clear connection between her sexual harassment complaint and the decision to return her to Florence\u2019s supervision or the \u201cBelow Good\u201d rating on her performance evaluation. Although plaintiff argues such a connection can be inferred, \u201c[s]imply because a . . . [wrongful] reason might be inferred from a prima facie case does not mean that a mixed motive case exists.\u201d Schleinger v. Des Moines Water Works, 925 F.2d 1100, 1101 (8th Cir. 1991). As is required in mixed-motive model cases, plaintiff did not present any \u201cclear signs\u201d that the \u201calleged adverse employment action\u201d was directly related to her sexual harassment complaint. Hence, we conclude the trial court properly addressed her action as a pretext case. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 278.\nB. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nPlaintiff also maintains that she provided sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact concerning whether defendants\u2019 stated reasons for the changes in her working conditions and her \u201cBelow Good\u201d performance evaluation were merely pretexts for their retaliatory motives. This Court has previously held that, in a Whistleblower action, \u201conce a defendant, moving for summary judgment, presents evidence that the adverse employment action is based on a legitimate non-retaliatory motive, the burden [of production] shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence, raising a genuine issue of fact, that his [engagement in a protected activity]... [was] a substantial causative factor in the adverse employment action, or provide an excuse for not doing so.\u201d Aune v. University of North Carolina, 120 N.C. App. 430, 434-35, 462 S.E.2d 678, 682 (1995), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 893, 467 S.E.2d 901 (1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). To raise a factual issue regarding pretext, the plaintiffs evidence must go beyond that which was necessary to make a prima facie showing by pointing to specific, non-speculative facts which discredit the defendant\u2019s non-retaliatory motive. See Kennedy, 115 N.C. App. at 589, 448 S.E.2d at 284.\nHere, assuming arguendo that plaintiff has established a prima facie case, defendants presented legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the changes in plaintiff\u2019s working conditions and her \u201cBelow Good\u201d performance evaluation. Defendants noted in general that plaintiff remained in the same job classification, earned the same salary, and accrued the same benefits. In response to her particular allegations, defendants asserted that the reasons for plaintiff\u2019s return to Florence\u2019s direct supervision were: (1) because Lunsford had left Carteret, (2) to place her \u201cwhere she belonged within the organizational chart,\u201d and (3) to address staff concerns that plaintiff could change supervisors whenever she voiced her \u201cdissatisfaction.\u201d With respect to any additional work duties assigned to plaintiff, defendants stated that such assignment was necessary to cover the clerical work previously performed by Lunsford and by an office assistant who was on leave. Defendants further responded that, in any event, plaintiff was not required to perform any duties \u201coutside of her job description\u201d and was never required to work overtime. Finally, according to defendants, plaintiff received an overall \u201cBelow Good\u201d rating on her performance evaluation due to her tardiness and absenteeism, poor relations with co-workers, and failure to properly report a lost set of security keys. Defendants also point out that plaintiff had received \u201cBelow Good\u201d ratings from Lunsford on interim evaluations prior to her sexual harassment complaint.\nAs a response to defendants\u2019 reasons for returning her to Florence\u2019s supervision, plaintiff asserts that \u201c[defendants have offered no serious explanation for insisting that [plaintiff] report to the person who harassed her,\u201d and, therefore, \u201ca jury could consider punitive a requirement that [plaintiff] again work with . . . Florence after [Daughtry] had previously decided separation was necessary.\u201d In support of this position, plaintiff cites Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). However, in Paroline, the Court was not faced with the issue of whether the plaintiff\u2019s evidence was sufficient to raise a factual question of pretext. Rather, the Court addressed whether an employee\u2019s established acts of sexual harassment could be imputed to an employer. Id. at 106-07. In any event, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence which would indicate that defendants\u2019 stated reasons for returning her to Florence\u2019s supervision were not in accordance with any DOC personnel policies or were not otherwise legitimate. She merely renews her allegation that defendants \u201chad no serious explanation.\u201d See Kennedy, 115 N.C. App. at 585, 448 S.E.2d at 282 (\u201cAn articulated reason is not \u2018legitimate\u2019. . . unless it has \u2018a rational connection with the business goal of securing a competent and trustworthy work force.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Harris v. Marsh, 679 F.Supp. 1204, 1285 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part on other grounds by Blue v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959, 113 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1991)).\nPlaintiff further contends that, with respect to the additional work duties, her evidence \u201cquantified that the additional duties required as much as an additional 33 hours per week,\u201d and that \u201cdefendants did not include the job descriptions in the record\u201d to support their reasons for demanding she \u201cassume the duties of two people.\u201d However, even if we accept plaintiff\u2019s calculations, such evidence does not discredit defendants assertion that the additional job assignments were necessary to cover the absence of other employees or that plaintiff was never required to perform work outside of her job description or work overtime.\nLastly, regarding her \u201cBelow Good\u201d performance evaluation, plaintiff maintains that the \u201c \u2018telling temporal sequence\u2019 \u201d between her sexual harassment complaint and her negative evaluation, by itself, is \u201csufficient [for] a jury to find pretext.\u201d As authority, plaintiff cites this Court\u2019s first holding in Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, 130 N.C. App. 681, 504 S.E.2d 580 (1998), disc. rev. denied, 350 N.C. 91, 527 S.E.2d 662 (1999) and the decisions in Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759 (2nd Cir. 1998) and Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1992). However, Brewer and Shirley concerned whether the passage of a certain amount of time precluded as a matter of law the plaintiff\u2019s establishment of a prima facie case and not whether the plaintiff had established pretext. Brewer, 130 N.C. App. at 691, 504 S.E.2d at 586-87 (holding that the passage of fifteen months between the filing of an EEOC charge and the plaintiff\u2019s termination did not negate a causal connection between the two events), and Shirley, 970 F.2d at 43-44 (holding that the passage of fourteen months between the plaintiff\u2019s initial EEOC charge and the defendant\u2019s alleged retaliatory conduct was not \u201clegally conclusive proof\u2019 against retaliation). Additionally, the holding in Quinn is distinguishable from this case in view of the fact that in Quinn \u201c[n] early all of the record evidence supporting the [defendant\u2019s] asserted non-retaliatory reason... was generated by two of [the plaintiff\u2019s] alleged harassers . . . and followed her initial [complaint] . . . .\u201d Quinn, 159 F.3d at 770. In contrast, the record here shows that plaintiff received \u201cBelow Good\u201d ratings from Lunsford on her interim appraisals prior to her sexual harassment complaint. Plaintiff also has not presented any facts to discredit defendants\u2019 assertion that her overall \u201cBelow Good\u201d performance evaluation was due to her tardiness and absenteeism, poor relations with co-workers, and loss of a set of security keys. Therefore, we conclude plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to raise a factual question concerning whether defendants\u2019 legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the change in her work conditions and her \u201cBelow Good\u201d performance evaluation were merely pre-textual. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff\u2019s Whistleblower action.\nIII.\nLastly, we address whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Florence and Daughtry on plaintiff\u2019s emotional distress claims. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in determining that these claims were barred based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Florence and Daughtry maintain that, because they were sued only in their \u201cofficial capacities,\u201d summary judgment was proper.\nIn Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 489 S.E.2d 880 (1997), our Supreme Court outlined the guidelines for determining whether a claim for relief may be made against an individual who is employed by the State. The first determination to be made is whether the complaint seeks recovery from a named defendant in his official or individual capacity or both. If the court determines that the defendant is being sued in his individual capacity, it must next determine whether the individual is a public official or public employee. This determination is important for negligence claims because, \u201c[p]ublic officials cannot be held individually liable for damages caused by mere negligence in the performance of their governmental or discretionary duties; public employees can.\u201d Meyer, 347 N.C. at 112, 489 S.E.2d at 888. However, if the plaintiff alleges an intentional tort claim, a determination is unnecessary since, in such cases, neither a public official nor a public employee is immunized from suit in his individual capacity. See Hawkins v. State, 117 N.C. App. 615, 630, 453 S.E.2d 233, 242, disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 188, 463 S.E.2d 79 (1995).\n\u201cThe crucial question for determining whether a defendant is sued in an individual or official capacity is the nature of the relief sought, not the nature of the act or omission alleged. If the plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring the defendant to take an action involving the exercise of a governmental power, the defendant is named in an official capacity. If money damages are sought, the court must ascertain whether the complaint indicates that the damages are sought from the government or from the pocket of the individual defendant. If the former, its an official-capacity claim; if the latter, it is an individual-capacity claim; and if it is both, then the claims proceed in both capacities.\u201d\nMeyer, 347 N.C. at 110, 489 S.E.2d at 887 (quoting Anita R. Brown-Graham & Jeffrey S. Koeze, Immunity from Personal Liability under State Law for Public Officials and Employees: An Update, Loc. Gov\u2019t L. Bull. 67 (Inst. of Gov\u2019t, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill), Apr. 1995, at 7). \u201cWhether the allegations relate to actions outside the scope of [the] defendant\u2019s official duties is not relevant in determining whether the defendant is being sued in his or her official or individual capacity.\u201d Id. at 111, 489 S.E.2d at 888.\nHere, our review of the record reveals that, in the caption of her complaint, plaintiff designated that Florence and Daughtry were being sued in both their official and individual capacities. Additionally, in the prayer for relief for her emotional distress claims, plaintiff seeks monetary damages directly from Florence and Daughtry and not from the other named defendants. Thus, we conclude Florence and Daughtry were sued in their individual capacities with respect to these claims. Moreover, because intentional infliction of emotional distress is an intentional tort, Florence and Daughtry were not entitled to immunity as to this claim.\nIn accordance with the holding in Meyer, we next consider whether Florence and Daughtry are public officials and therefore are immune from plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. As our Supreme Court has noted:\nOur courts have recognized several basic distinctions between a public official and a public employee, including: (1) a public office is a position created by the constitution or statutes; (2) a public official exercises a portion of the sovereign power; and (3) a public official exercises discretion, while public employees perform ministerial duties.\nIsenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 610, 517 S.E.2d 121, 127 (1999) (citations omitted). \u201c \u2018Discretionary acts are those requiring personal deliberation, decision and judgment\u2019 \u201d while \u201c[m]inisterial duties . . . are absolute and involve \u2018merely [the] execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Meyer, 347 N.C. at 113-14, 489 S.E.2d at 889).\nAside from their respective job titles, the record does not detail the job responsibilities of Florence and Daughtry. Also, neither defendant has cited authority which specifically categorizes their position as a public official. Hence, we are unable to conclude that either Florence or Daughtry is a public official entitled to immunity on plaintiff\u2019s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Nevertheless, the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s emotional distress claims can be sustained on other grounds. See Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989) (\u201cIf the granting of summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal. If the correct result has been reached, the judgment will not be disturbed even though the trial court may not have assigned the correct reason for the judgment entered\u201d).\nRegarding plaintiff\u2019s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, plaintiff\u2019s evidence fails to demonstrate that Florence\u2019s and Daughtry\u2019s conduct was \u201c \u2018so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.\u2019 \u201d Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 493, 340 S.E.2d 116, 123, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986) (iquoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, Comment d (1965)). Indeed, Lofton ordered that plaintiff be returned to Florence\u2019s supervision and the \u201cBelow Good\u201d evaluation was based in part on observations made by Lunsford. Even assuming Florence and Daughtry did not always agree with plaintiff, their decisions concerning plaintiff\u2019s working conditions did not go \u201cbeyond all possible bounds of decency.\u201d See e.g. Stamper v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 143 N.C. App. 172, 174-75, 544 S.E.2d 818, 820 (2001) (holding that conduct of a principal and other officials in subjecting teacher to more than 15 classroom observations and conference meetings, videotaping her while she was teaching a lesson, and transferring her to a school which was a long distance away from her children\u2019s school was not sufficiently \u201cextreme and outrageous\u201d conduct to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Therefore, we conclude, as a matter of law, that their alleged actions do not rise to a level of \u201cextreme and outrageous\u201d conduct necessary to support an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 490, 340 S.E.2d at 121 (\u201cIt is a question of law for the court to determine, from the materials before it, whether the conduct complained of may reasonably be found to be sufficiently outrageous as to permit recovery\u201d).\nWith respect to plaintiff\u2019s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, such an action has three elements: \u201c(1) defendant engaged in negligent conduct; (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress and (3) defendant\u2019s conduct, in fact, caused severe emotional distress.\u201d Robblee v. Budd Services, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 793, 795, 525 S.E.2d 847, 849, disc. rev. denied, 352 N.C. 676, 545 S.E.2d 228 (2000). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that plaintiff failed to forecast sufficient evidence that it was reasonably foreseeable that Florence\u2019s and Daughtry\u2019s decision to change her working conditions would cause her severe emotional distress. Therefore, summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was also appropriate.\nIn sum, we hold the trial court properly entered summary judgment for all defendants on plaintiff\u2019s Whistleblower claim and we further conclude that Florence and Daughtry were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs emotional distress claims. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and BRYANT concur.\n. The record does not indicate plaintiff filed a wrongful retaliation claim with the State Personnel Commission. Thus, unlike Swain, this case does not present an issue of claim preclusion.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patterson, Harkavy & Lawrence, L.L.P., by Martha A. Geer; and Davis, Murrelle & Lyles, P.A., by Edward L. Murrelle, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Moore, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DIANA WELLS, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, a department of the State of North Carolina, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, THEODIS BECK, Secretary of the Department of Correction, DUNCAN DAUGHTRY, individually and as Superintendent of the Department of Correction, Newport Branch, and ANTHONY FLORENCE, individually and as supervisor of the Department of Correction, Newport Branch, Defendants\nNo. COA01-1199\n(Filed 20 August 2002)\n1. Public Officers and Employees\u2014 workplace harassment\u2014 Whistleblower action\nThe trial court did not err by determining that plaintiffs Whistleblower action was properly before the court rather than the State Personnel Commission where the action arose from workplace harassment. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-36(b) provides plaintiff with the right to appeal directly to the State Personnel Commission but does not bar a Whistleblower action. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-84 et seq.\n2. Employer and Employee\u2014 workplace harassment \u2014 analytic model \u2014 pretext rather than mixed-motive\nThe trial court properly addressed plaintiff\u2019s Whistleblower action under a pretext model rather than a mixed-motive model where plaintiff did not present any clear signs that the alleged adverse employment action was directly related to her sexual harassment complaint. The trigger for use of the mixed motive model is evidence of conduct or statements that reflect directly the alleged illegitimate criterion and that bear directly on the contested employment decision. A mixed motive does not exist simply because a wrongful motive might be inferred from a prima facie case.\n3. Employer and Employee\u2014 workplace harassment \u2014 pretext \u2014 insufficient evidence\nThe trial court correctly granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs Whistleblower action where plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence that a change in plaintiffs work conditions and a \u201cBelow Good\u201d performance evaluation were merely pretextual. Defendants presented legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the changes in plaintiffs working conditions and her performance evaluation; to raise a factual issue regarding pretext, plaintiffs evidence must go beyond a prima facie showing by pointing to specific, non-speculative facts which discredit defendant\u2019s non-retaliatory motive.\n4. Emotional Distress; Immunity\u2014 state employee \u2014 workplace harassment \u2014 sovereign immunity\nThe trial court correctly granted summary judgment for defendants Florence and Daughtry on plaintiffs emotional distress claims arising from her employment with the state Department of Correction where the trial court erroneously determined that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, but the evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct was insufficient for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the evidence of foreseeability was insufficient for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Summary judgment should be affirmed on appeal if it can be sustained on any grounds.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 9 July 2001 by Judge Jay D. Hockenbury in Carteret County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2002.\nPatterson, Harkavy & Lawrence, L.L.P., by Martha A. Geer; and Davis, Murrelle & Lyles, P.A., by Edward L. Murrelle, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Moore, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0307-01", "first_page_order": 335, "last_page_order": 351 }