{ "id": 9250489, "name": "ERIC DYLAN BYRD, Plaintiff v. JAMES MELVIN ADAMS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Byrd v. Adams", "decision_date": "2002-08-20", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1162", "first_page": "460", "last_page": "464", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 N.C. App. 460" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "37 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616840 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "855", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Carroll, 226 N.C. 237, 241, 37 S.E.2d 688, 691 (1946)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519454 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Carroll, 226 N.C. 237, 241, 37 S.E.2d 688, 691 (1946)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11794156 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500046 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62-63" }, { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138438 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53-54", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12131407 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0423-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 567, "char_count": 10262, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.674811488524084e-07, "percentile": 0.8261332996634166 }, "sha256": "d43cbb0c3d4a45aa921db3a186f915586a101354e46c787dcafa521bc1721daa", "simhash": "1:a1a3949a780dde66", "word_count": 1601 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:40:03.287783+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "ERIC DYLAN BYRD, Plaintiff v. JAMES MELVIN ADAMS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals an order dismissing his punitive damages claim against defendant that arose out of a vehicular accident between the parties. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.\nOn the evening of 19 April 1997, plaintiff was driving westbound on Interstate 40 in Durham County. Defendant, a medical student, was driving directly behind plaintiff. As both parties proceeded along Interstate 40 at a speed of sixty-five to seventy miles per hour, defendant collided with the rear of plaintiffs vehicle on two occasions. As a result of the second collision, plaintiff lost control of his vehicle and spun around in the median. Defendant\u2019s vehicle crossed over the median and the opposite lanes of travel, ultimately coming to a stop in a tree.\nImmediately after the accident, defendant became afraid and left the scene. He subsequently called the police from a nearby house. Officers from the Durham City Police Department picked up defendant from the house and returned him to the scene of the accident. Defendant was questioned by Trooper Edmund Watkins (\u201cTrooper Watkins\u201d) approximately twenty-five minutes after the accident had taken place. Defendant told Trooper Watkins that he was sleepy prior to colliding with plaintiffs vehicle, but he was uncertain as to whether he had fallen asleep at the wheel or blacked out. Defendant did not realize what had happened until after his vehicle had struck the tree.\nAs defendant spoke, Trooper Watkins smelled alcohol on his breath and subsequently gave defendant a roadside Aleo-Sensor test. Although defendant admitted to having drunk one or two beers prior to the accident, the test results established that his blood alcohol level was below the legal alcohol limit. No other sobriety tests were given because Trooper Watkins determined that his observations of defendant did not otherwise indicate that defendant was intoxicated or impaired. Thus, no charges were brought against defendant for intoxication or impairment, but he was charged with reckless driving and leaving the scene of an accident. Defendant ultimately pled guilty to careless and reckless driving as the result of a plea bargain.\nThereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint dated 4 February 2000 alleging that the accident was the result of defendant\u2019s negligence and seeking punitive damages. Plaintiff amended his complaint on 15 May 2001 to add allegations to both his claims, alleging that defendant had been driving while under the influence of an impairing substance at the time of the accident. On 25 April 2001, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s impairment allegations and plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages. On 11 July 2001, the Durham County Superior Court granted defendant\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff assigns error to the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment of plaintiff\u2019s. claim for punitive damages. For the following reasons, we reverse the court\u2019s decision.\n\u201cTo prevail on a claim for punitive damages, plaintiff must show that defendant\u2019s established negligence which proximately caused his injury reached a higher level than ordinary negligence; that it amounted to wantonness, willfulness, or evidenced a reckless indifference to the consequences of the act.\u201d Moose v. Nissan of Statesville, 115 N.C. App. 423, 428, 444 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1994) (citations omitted). In actions involving motor vehicle accidents, this \u201chigher level than ordinary negligence\u201d (hereinafter \u201cgross negligence\u201d) can be established \u201cwhere at least one of three rather dynamic factors is present: (1) defendant is intoxicated . . .; (2) defendant is driving at excessive speeds . . .; or (3) defendant is engaged in a racing competition[.]\u201d Yancey v. Lea, 354 N.C. 48, 53-54, 550 S.E.2d 155, 158 (2001) (citations omitted). Here, plaintiff\u2019s complaint included claims for negligence and punitive damages, both of which alleged that defendant was impaired and under the influence of an intoxicating substance when he collided with plaintiff\u2019s vehicle. Plaintiff included these allegations to establish the willful and wanton element needed to support his punitive damages claim arising out of the parties\u2019 vehicular accident. Based on our review of the record and trial transcript, we conclude the court erred in ultimately granting defendant\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment on this claim.\nSummary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2001). The burden of establishing the lack of a triable issue of fact resides with the movant. Roumillat v. Simplistic Enterprises, Inc., 331 N.C. 57, 62-63, 414 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1992). A movant-defendant may meet this burden by proving \u201ceither the non-existence of an essential element of the plaintiff\u2019s claim or that the plaintiff has no evidence of an essential element of her claim.\u201d Nourse v. Food Lion, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 235, 239, 488 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1997). Once the movant-defendant meets this burden, then the plaintiff must \u201cproduce a forecast of evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial.\u201d Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989). In order to meet his burden, the plaintiff \u201cmay not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.\u201d \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, \u201c[a]ll inferences of fact must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the nonmovant.\u201d Roumillat, 331 N.C. at 63, 414 S.E.2d at 342.\nIn the case sub judice, when all inferences of fact are drawn in favor of plaintiff, defendant is unable to meet his burden of proving that plaintiff had no evidence establishing impairment to support the willful and wanton element of his punitive damages claim. Evidence was offered that defendant \u201cfell asleep\u201d while driving his vehicle, but did not wake up until after (1) having collided with the rear of plaintiffs vehicle, (2) having then crossed over the interstate median and the opposite lanes of travel, and (3) eventually having come to a stop in a tree. Also, defendant conceded that he had consumed two beers and taken three prescription drugs prior to the accident. Our statutes define an impairing substance as alcohol or \u201cany other drug or psychoactive substance capable of impairing a person\u2019s physical or mental faculties ....\u201d\u00a7 20-4.01 (14a). Defendant offered no evidence that these prescription drugs (1) were not impairing substances and (2) to refute the implication that mixing alcohol and these drugs would not have impaired his ability to drive.\nFinally, evidence was offered regarding the Aleo-Sensor test defendant was given by Trooper Watkins, which indicated defendant\u2019s blood-alcohol level was not above the legal limit. In his deposition, Trooper Watkins testified that this test is not a legal screening device; it is used only \u201cto detect if there\u2019s any alcohol concentration on a person\u2019s breath.\u201d Furthermore, the results of Aleo-Sensor test, as well as Trooper Watkins\u2019 contemporaneous observations of defendant, took place approximately twenty-five minutes after the accident. Therefore, this test and Trooper Watkins\u2019 observations are not completely determinative as to whether defendant was impaired, especially in light of defendant not having undergone an actual legal test to determine his blood-alcohol level (such as an Intoxilyzer test) nor any other field sobriety tests. In the absence of such evidence, the remaining evidence presented to the court could have allowed a jury to possibly recognize and estimate defendant\u2019s alleged impairment because he had consumed alcohol and prescription drugs that may have caused him to \u201c \u2018lose the normal control of his bodily or mental facilities to such an extent that there is an appreciable impairment of either or both of these faculties.\u2019 \u201d State v. Harrington, 78 N.C. App. 39, 45, 336 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1985) (quoting State v. Carroll, 226 N.C. 237, 241, 37 S.E.2d 688, 691 (1946)). Taking this evidence with all inferences of fact drawn in plaintiff\u2019s favor, there is a genuine issue regarding plaintiff\u2019s punitive damages claim which must be resolved by a jury along with the issue of defendant\u2019s alleged impairment.\nAccordingly, the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages.\nReversed.\nJudges MARTIN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.\n. Even though the order only mentions plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages, we presume that the trial court also granted partial summary judgment on plaintiffs impairment allegations based on the case law provided in this opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Pulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., by Guy W. Crabtree, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Haywood, Denny, & Miller, L.L.P., by Robert E. Levin, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ERIC DYLAN BYRD, Plaintiff v. JAMES MELVIN ADAMS, Defendant\nNo. COA01-1162\n(Filed 20 August 2002)\nDamages and Remedies\u2014 punitive damages \u2014 impaired driving \u2014 issue of fact\nThe trial court erred by granting defendant\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages arising from an automobile accident where plaintiff based his punitive damages claim on allegations of impaired driving and there was evidence that defendant fell asleep after consuming two beers and 3 prescription drugs, but an Aleo-Sensor test indicated that defendant\u2019s blood-alcohol level was not above the legal limit. Neither the Aleo-Sensor test nor the trooper\u2019s observations of defendant are determinative as to whether defendant was impaired in this case.\nAppeal by plaintiff from an order entered 11 July 2001 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson, Jr. in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 May 2002.\nPulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., by Guy W. Crabtree, for plaintiff-appellant.\nHaywood, Denny, & Miller, L.L.P., by Robert E. Levin, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0460-01", "first_page_order": 488, "last_page_order": 492 }