{ "id": 9251345, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PHILLIP DAVID ALEXANDER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Alexander", "decision_date": "2002-09-03", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1249", "first_page": "701", "last_page": "706", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 N.C. App. 701" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "holding that, where the defendant fired his weapon while reaching inside the vehicle, the defendant could properly be charged with discharging a firearm \"into\" occupied property" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566745 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "holding that, where the defendant fired his weapon while reaching inside the vehicle, the defendant could properly be charged with discharging a firearm \"into\" occupied property" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2572739 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798899 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139575 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54010 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 110", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 867", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9538048, 9537729, 9537923, 9537860, 9537989, 9537638, 9537799, 9538117, 9538377, 9538435, 9538319, 9538197, 9537686, 9538264 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0867-08", "/us/531/0867-03", "/us/531/0867-06", "/us/531/0867-05", "/us/531/0867-07", "/us/531/0867-01", "/us/531/0867-04", "/us/531/0867-09", "/us/531/0867-13", "/us/531/0867-14", "/us/531/0867-12", "/us/531/0867-10", "/us/531/0867-02", "/us/531/0867-11" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "341", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]hile the earlier statements contained slight variations and some additional information, they contained nothing directly contradicting the witness' trial testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 658, "char_count": 13241, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.038467078000822e-08, "percentile": 0.4245674168648442 }, "sha256": "0898af8773655c4d599594f12bc0f82c5242aa010e921ef5567d8f70ee002c9a", "simhash": "1:a72bf44137806a1e", "word_count": 2094 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:40:03.287783+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PHILLIP DAVID ALEXANDER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nOn 27 February 2001, a jury found Phillip David Alexander (\u201cdefendant\u201d) guilty of first-degree murder for the death of Ernest Junior Bates (\u201cBates\u201d) under the felony murder rule. For the reasons hereafter stated, we find no error by the trial court.\nThe State presented evidence at trial tending to show the following: Defendant and the victim, Bates, had an antagonistic relationship. Defendant\u2019s wife was romantically involved with Bates prior to her marriage to defendant, and her occasional encounters with Bates after her marriage caused friction between the two men.\nOn 24 December 1999, defendant celebrated Christmas Eve at home with his wife and several family members and friends. Jason Lee Handy (\u201cHandy\u201d), a friend of the family, was present at the celebration and testified for the State. According to Handy, defendant received several telephone calls from Bates over the course of the evening and into the following morning, during which defendant and Bates threatened and cursed one another. Before leaving for work the following morning, defendant loaded his .357 Magnum revolver and expressed his intent on taking an alternate route to work in the hopes of encountering Bates. Referring to Bates, defendant stated that, \u201cIf I see the son-of-a-bitch, I\u2019ll kill him.\u201d When defendant returned to the house approximately forty-five minutes later, he was bleeding profusely from a bullet wound in his right shoulder. Defendant explained that he had confronted Bates, and that the two men had exchanged gunfire.\nThe victim\u2019s nephew, Gary Medley (\u201cMedley\u201d), witnessed defendant\u2019s encounter with Bates and testified for the State. Medley testified that, early on the morning of 25 December 1999, he drove his uncle to a local store to purchase cigarettes. On returning from the store, they passed defendant\u2019s residence, and Bates instructed Medley to park his vehicle at a church directly across from defendant\u2019s home. Defendant emerged from his house with a rifle in his hand, and the two men shouted obscenities at one another until Bates and Medley departed. According to Medley, he and Bates were on their way to pick up Bates\u2019 vehicle later that morning when they realized that the truck in front of them belonged to defendant. Bates instructed Medley to follow defendant. Defendant subsequently pulled his vehicle to the side of the road, and Medley stopped his car beside that of defendant\u2019s. Bates and defendant then exchanged further insults through the open windows, and defendant brandished his pistol. Bates attempted to exit the vehicle, but Medley dissuaded him from doing so, and began turning the car around. At that point, defendant \u201c[came] barreling up in his pickup, blocked [Medley\u2019s] car in . .. jumped out, and [ran] behind both vehicles.\u201d Medley testified that defendant then \u201cjerk[ed] [Bates\u2019] door open, and grabfbed] him, grab[bed] his coat, and he thr[ew] the gun there in his stomach . . . and fire[d] it.\u201d After defendant fired his weapon a second time, Bates pulled out his own pistol and fired it at defendant, injuring defendant\u2019s right shoulder. Defendant stepped back from the vehicle and fired his weapon a third time. The three bullets fired by defendant struck Bates in the chest and upper right arm, killing him.\nDefendant testified in his own defense. According to defendant, Bates had threatened to \u201cbury him\u201d on several previous occasions. Defendant confirmed that he and Bates had spoken on the telephone the morning of 25 December 1999, and that the two men had exchanged harsh words and insults. Defendant testified that when Bates stopped at the church across from defendant\u2019s house early that morning, Bates brandished a pistol and threatened to kill defendant. Defendant explained that he took his .357 revolver with him to work because he was scared of Bates. Driving to work, defendant became more frightened when he realized that Bates was following him. Defendant testified that Medley\u2019s car then \u201cpulled over,\u201d and, although he was \u201cscared to death[,]\u201d defendant decided to \u201ctry to talk to the man to see if he would go on and leave me alone.\u201d Defendant exited his vehicle, pistol in hand. As he approached Medley\u2019s vehicle, Bates shot him in the shoulder. Defendant then \u201cjust started shooting. I stepped in, started shooting, because I was scared I was going to die.\u201d Defendant admitted that he shot Bates three times, killing him, but insisted that he had no other choice.\nAfter considering the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder under the felony murder rule. The jury further found defendant guilty of three counts of discharging a weapon into occupied property, and of possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole, from which sentence defendant appeals.\nDefendant presents two issues on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) admitting into evidence a statement given by a witness to law enforcement officers; and (2) denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the felony charges of discharging a firearm into occupied property. For reasons discussed herein, we conclude that defendant\u2019s assignments of error have no merit.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a statement given by Handy to law enforcement officers approximately two weeks before defendant\u2019s trial. Defendant contends that Handy\u2019s statement did not corroborate his testimony at trial and was therefore inadmissible as a prior consistent statement. Defendant further argues that, as the statement was made only two weeks before trial and more than a year after the events in question, the statement lacked credibility. Because Handy\u2019s statement contained prejudicial information and was inadmissible, defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial. We disagree.\nUnder Rule 613 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, prior consistent statements by a witness are admissible to corroborate sworn trial testimony. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 613 (2001); State v. Gell, 361 N.C. 192, 204, 524 S.E.2d 332, 340, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 867, 148 L. Ed. 2d 110 (2000). Where a witness\u2019s prior statement contains facts that manifestly contradict his trial testimony, however, such evidence may not be admitted \u201c \u2018under the guise of corroborating his testimony.\u2019 \u201d State v. Frogge, 345 N.C. 614, 618, 481 S.E.2d 278, 280 (1997) (quoting State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986)).\nDefendant points to four specific statements given by Handy to law enforcement officers that defendant contends do not corroborate Handy\u2019s testimony at trial. None of the four statements contains \u201cmanifestly contradictory\u201d information, however. For example, at trial, Handy testified that defendant stated, \u201cIf I see the son-of-a-bitch, I\u2019ll kill him.\u201d In his statement to police, Handy reported that defendant said, \u201cIf I see the son-of-a-bitch I\u2019m going, I\u2019m going to shoot him.\u201d We conclude that the slight variation between these two statements represents a minor inconsistency at most. Clearly, there is nothing particularly contradictory about defendant\u2019s avowal to \u201ckill\u201d the victim rather than to \u201cshoot\u201d him. Further examples proferred by defendant are equally baseless. For instance, according to Handy\u2019s testimony, defendant returned to the house with the bullet wound in his shoulder \u201capproximately thirty to forty-five minutes\u201d after leaving. In his statement, however, Handy indicated that the time period was approximately forty-five minutes. Again, the information given in these two statements does not reflect significant discrepancies such as to render the statements inconsistent with one another. See Gell, 351 N.C. at 204, 524 S.E.2d at 341 (stating that, \u201c[w]hile the earlier statements contained slight variations and some additional information, they contained nothing directly contradicting the witness\u2019 trial testimony\u201d).\nAs Handy\u2019s trial testimony was consistent with his prior statement, the statement was admissible as corroborative evidence. The fact that the prior statement was made two weeks before trial goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. See Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis and Broun on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 165 (5th ed. 1998) (noting that, \u201cthe more narrow the time gap between events in issue and the prior conduct or statement, the more persuasive it is\u201d). We therefore overrule defendant\u2019s first assignment of error.\nBy his second assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges of discharging a firearm into occupied property, the felony upon which defendant\u2019s felony murder conviction was based. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was outside of the vehicle when he fired the weapon and thus cannot properly be charged with discharging a firearm \u201cinto\u201d occupied property. Defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nUpon a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the court must consider whether the State has presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime charged. See State v. Allen, 346 N.C. 731, 739, 488 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1997). Substantial evidence is such \u201crelevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.\u201d Id. In examining the evidence, the court must view any contradictions or discrepancies in the light most favorable to the State, allowing all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. See State v. Gainey, 343 N.C. 79, 85, 468 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1996). A motion to dismiss is properly denied where there is substantial evidence supporting a finding that the offense charged was committed. See State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988).\nUnder section 14-34.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, \u201c[a]ny person who willfully or wantonly discharges or attempts to discharge ... [a] firearm . . . into any . . . vehicle . . . while it is occupied is guilty of a Class E felony.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1 (2001). In the instant case, it is undisputed that defendant intentionally fired his pistol at the victim, who was sitting in an occupied vehicle at the time. Defendant\u2019s only argument is that he did not fire his weapon \u201cinto\u201d the vehicle, because there was some evidence at trial tending to show that defendant was inside the vehicle when he shot the victim. We disagree.\n\u201c[A] firearm can be discharged \u2018into\u2019 occupied property even if the firearm itself is inside the property, so long as the person discharging it is not inside the property.\u201d State v. Mancuso, 321 N.C. 464, 468, 364 S.E.2d 359, 362 (1988); see also State v. Bray, 321 N.C. 663, 670, 365 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1988) (holding that, where the defendant fired his weapon while reaching inside the vehicle, the defendant could properly be charged with discharging a firearm \u201cinto\u201d occupied property). In the case at bar, there was substantial evidence from which a jury could find that defendant fired \u201cinto\u201d occupied property. Medley indicated that although defendant was \u201calmost leaning inside the car,\u201d he was definitely \u201cstanding outside\u201d and \u201cin the crease of the door\u201d when he shot the victim. Moreover, when Bates fired his weapon at defendant, defendant moved \u201ca step back\u201d before discharging his weapon a third time. Defendant testified that he was several feet from the car when he \u201cjust started shooting.\u201d Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that there was substantial evidence that defendant was standing outside the automobile when he shot the victim, thereby discharging his weapon \u201cinto\u201d an occupied vehicle. The trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, and we therefore overrule defendant\u2019s second assignment of error.\nIn conclusion, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting a prior consistent statement by a witness; nor did it err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charges of discharging a firearm into occupied property.\nNo error.\nJudges GREENE and HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Bur\u00e9n R. Shields, III, for the State.", "White and Grumpier, by Dudley A. Witt, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PHILLIP DAVID ALEXANDER\nNo. COA01-1249\n(Filed 3 September 2002)\n1. Evidence\u2014 pretrial statement \u2014 slight variations \u2014 admissible as corroboration\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by admitting a statement given by a State\u2019s witness which defendant contended did not corroborate the witness\u2019s testimony. Slight variations represented minor inconsistencies at most and the statement was admissible as corroborative evidence.\n2. Firearms and Other Weapons\u2014 discharging firearm into occupied property \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution for discharging a firearm into occupied property, there was sufficient evidence that defendant shot the victim while standing outside the car in which the victim was sitting and the court did not err by denying a motion to dismiss.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 27 February 2001 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr., in Wilkes County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 August 2002.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Bur\u00e9n R. Shields, III, for the State.\nWhite and Grumpier, by Dudley A. Witt, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0701-01", "first_page_order": 729, "last_page_order": 734 }