{ "id": 9248968, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY REVELS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Revels", "decision_date": "2002-09-17", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1233", "first_page": "163", "last_page": "169", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "153 N.C. App. 163" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549853 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696763 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2395265 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4764212 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 L. Ed. 2d 42", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "511 U.S. 1001", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1147827, 1146388, 1147449, 1146458, 1147836, 1146462 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/511/1001-02", "/us/511/1001-04", "/us/511/1001-01", "/us/511/1001-05", "/us/511/1001-03", "/us/511/1001-06" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532051 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551309 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4767283 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915198 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498848 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0210-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 698, "char_count": 13870, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.121491057675486e-08, "percentile": 0.42767474088257657 }, "sha256": "654d4dd562bff6ee71087604450a7e6a796b09717a8cd6d873796eba94e17f51", "simhash": "1:c67bf526c61edd74", "word_count": 2250 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:17:05.865609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY REVELS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nAnthony Revels (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgments sentencing him to life imprisonment without parole for his conviction of two counts of first degree murder. Defendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss the charges of first degree murder and his motion for mistrial. For reasons stated herein, we find no error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show that on the morning of 17 August 1998, law enforcement officers found a red Dodge Avenger with two dead individuals, identified as Patrick Sam Locklear (\u201cLocklear\u201d) and Billy Dean Wearnes (\u201cWearnes\u201d), seated inside the vehicle at the intersection of John French Road and Melinda Road in Robeson County. Officers found a nine millimeter handgun with its safety off and a bullet in its chamber, laying on the front passenger\u2019s side floorboard.\nA forensic pathologist, Dr. Robert L. Thompson (\u201cDr. Thompson\u201d), testified that Locklear\u2019s autopsy revealed five gunshot wounds and opined that Locklear\u2019s death was caused by gunshot wounds to the head and chest. Dr. Thompson further testified that Weames\u2019 autopsy revealed three gunshot wounds. According to Dr. Thompson, the cause of Weames\u2019 death was a bullet which entered his mouth and injured his right carotid artery.\nThe State\u2019s evidence also tended to show that defendant, Brian Chavis (\u201cChavis\u201d), and several others cruised Pembroke, North Carolina on the night of 16 August 1998. Later that evening, defendant\u2019s group as well as Locklear and Wearnes, who were driving a red Dodge Avenger, convened at Curley Jacobs\u2019 (\u201cJacobs\u201d) trailer to talk and drink beer. At one point while at Jacobs\u2019 home, Wearnes began showing off a small black nine millimeter gun. Defendant then removed a gun from Jacobs\u2019 waistband and told Weames that the gun was a real nine millimeter. Chavis never saw defendant return the gun to Jacobs.\nChavis testified that around 3:00 a.m. on 17 August 1998, defendant stated \u201che was thinking about robbing [Locklear and Weames], they wasn\u2019t nothing but a bunch of punks, and it wouldn\u2019t take nothing but two knocks on the side of the head.\u201d Jacobs testified that he lent his nine millimeter to defendant prior to defendant\u2019s statements about robbing Locklear and Weames.\nAt approximately 3:15 a.m., defendant, Chavis, Locklear, and Wearnes left Jacobs\u2019 trailer and drove to Bennie Locklear\u2019s (\u201cBennie\u201d) residence. Bennie was Weames\u2019 employer, who according to Weames, owed him money. Defendant and Chavis rode in defendant\u2019s track while Locklear and Weames rode in Locklear\u2019s Avenger; defendant and Locklear were the drivers. In transit, when defendant made a sharp left turn, Chavis saw Jacobs\u2019 nine millimeter gun slide across the seat of the truck. When he realized that Chavis saw the gun, defendant told Chavis that he was going to get Locklear and Weames.\nDefendant, Chavis, Locklear, and Weames arrived at Bennie\u2019s trailer between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m. on 17 August 1998. Defendant got out of his truck and walked to Locklear\u2019s car and started talking to Locklear while Wearnes walked up to the trailer. When Bennie asked Wearnes who was with him, Wearnes responded that defendant and the crowd were with him. Bennie then told Wearnes to stay right there and shut the door of the trailer. Weames quickly walked back to Locklear\u2019s car and said, \u201c \u2018[l]et\u2019s go.\u2019 \u201d As they were leaving, Chavis heard about seven gunshots. Defendant and Chavis followed Locklear and Weames to an open area next to a tobacco field. The two vehicles were parked with the driver\u2019s side of defendant\u2019s truck beside the driver\u2019s side of Locklear\u2019s car.\nDefendant asked Wearnes why he had mentioned his name to Bennie. Weames replied that Bennie asked him who was with him so he told him. Locklear stated, \u201c \u2018[w]ell, where do we go from here?\u2019 \u201d and defendant responded, \u201c \u2018[y]ou don\u2019t go nowhere[.]\u2019 \u201d Defendant then began shooting toward Locklear and Weames. According to Chavis, defendant shot twelve or thirteen times. Defendant exited his truck, walked over to Locklear\u2019s car and reached into the car through the driver\u2019s side window. When defendant returned to his truck, he had a ring and a wallet that he did not have before the shooting.\nDefendant and Chavis then left the scene and traveled to Jacobs\u2019 trailer just before daylight. Defendant told Jacobs that he had to kill Locklear and Weames. Jacobs was in disbelief so defendant showed him the ring and wallet. Defendant, Chavis, and Jacobs then got into defendant\u2019s truck; defendant drove until reaching a dirt road where defendant stopped the truck. Defendant pulled out Locklear\u2019s food card and Blue Cross/Blue Shield card from the wallet which he showed Jacobs and Chavis. Defendant then stuck the cards back in the wallet and threw the wallet on the ditch bank. Defendant, Jacobs, and Chavis returned to Jacobs\u2019 trailer.\nOn 21 August 1998, Jacobs turned his handgun over to the sheriff\u2019s department. Eugene E. Bishop, a special agent with the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, testified that Jacobs\u2019 gun was compared with the bullet fragments recovered from the two victims\u2019 bodies and this comparison showed that Jacobs\u2019 gun had fired the bullets.\nDefendant testified at trial in his own defense and provided a different account indicating that he had acted in self-defense. Defendant testified that after parking by the tobacco barn on the morning of 17 August 1998, Wearnes told him that he wanted defendant to drive his truck by Bennie\u2019s trailer so that he and Locklear could do a drive-by shooting. According to defendant, after he refused, Wearnes began firing shots at him. Defendant then returned fire using Jacobs\u2019 nine millimeter pistol. After the shooting ceased, defendant drove back to Jacobs\u2019 residence where he picked up his girlfriend and went home.\nDefendant was charged with two counts of first degree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon. A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder and not guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant appeals.\nI.\nDefendant initially contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges of first degree murder at the close of all the evidence based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant asserts that his motion to dismiss should have been granted because of the evidence he presented showing that he acted in self-defense. We disagree.\nAt the outset, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine \u201cwhether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990). Substantial evidence is defined as \u201csuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). When considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Smith, 121 N.C. App. 41, 44, 464 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1995). \u201c[I]f the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the motion to dismiss should be allowed.\u201d State v. Bates, 309 N.C. 528, 533, 308 S.E.2d 258, 262 (1983).\nFirst degree murder is defined as \u201cthe intentional and unlawful killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 29, 489 S.E.2d 391, 407 (1997). \u201cA killing is \u2018premeditated\u2019 if the defendant contemplated killing for some period of time, however short, before he acted.\u201d State v. Williams, 334 N.C. 440, 447, 434 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1993), judgment vacated on other grounds, 511 U.S. 1001, 128 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1994). Deliberation means an intent to kill, carried out in a cool state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or to accomplish an unlawful purpose and not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by lawful or just cause or legal provocation. State v. Lowery, 309 N.C. 763, 768, 309 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1983).\nIn the case sub judice, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that while at Jacobs\u2019 home on the night of 16 August 1998, defendant brandished to the crowd Jacobs\u2019 nine millimeter pistol. Additionally, Chavis testified that defendant stated that he was thinking of robbing the victims, Locklear and Wearnes. Defendant described the victims as \u201cnothing but a bunch of punks,\u201d and pointed out that \u201cit wouldn\u2019t take nothing but two knocks on the side of the head\u201d to rob them. While following Locklear and Wearnes to Bennie\u2019s residence, Chavis saw Jacobs\u2019 nine millimeter pistol slide across the seat at which point defendant informed Chavis that he was going to get Locklear and Wearnes. While parked beside a tobacco bam on the morning of 17 August 1998, when Locklear asked \u201c \u2018[w]ell, where do we go from here?\u2019 \u201d defendant responded \u201c \u2018[y]ou don\u2019t go nowhere,\u2019 \u201d and defendant began shooting toward Locklear and Wearnes in the car. Chavis recalled defendant shooting twelve or thirteen times. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant exited the track and reached into the victims\u2019 car. Defendant returned to the truck with a ring and a wallet, containing cards with Locklear\u2019s name on them, that he did not have before the shooting. Further, the State offered evidence showing that the bullets recovered from the victims\u2019 bodies had been fired by Jacobs\u2019 gun.\nWhen the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence supporting the necessary elements of first degree murder. Therefore, the trial court was proper in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the first degree murder charges. The evidence offered by defendant provided a conflicting account of what occurred and indicated that defendant acted in self-defense. However, contradictions in the evidence remain for the jurors to resolve. State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 313 S.E.2d 585 (1984). This assignment of error is overruled.\nII.\nDefendant next argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial following several incidents of emotional outbursts by members of Locklear\u2019s family. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1061 provides in pertinent part: \u201cThe judge must declare a mistrial upon the defendant\u2019s motion if there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant\u2019s case.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1061 (2001). The decision to grant or deny a defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 243, 333 S.E.2d 245, 252 (1985). Therefore, a trial court will not be reversed unless its \u201cruling is clearly erroneous so as to amount to a manifest abuse of discretion . . . .\u201d State v. Sorrells, 33 N.C. App. 374, 377, 235 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1977).\nThe record reveals that during trial, the trial judge had to caution the audience several times regarding audible emotions. At one point, a member of Locklear\u2019s family began sobbing and immediately rose and attempted to leave the courtroom. The court then sent the jury out of the courtroom. Defendant moved for a mistrial and a hearing was conducted. After denying defendant\u2019s motion, the trial judge called the jury back in and instructed the jurors that they were not to consider the emotional outburst in reaching a verdict. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial. The trial court excused the jurors when the emotional outburst occurred, cautioned the audience, and provided a curative instruction to the jury. Defendant has failed to establish that it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that the emotional outburst did not result in irreparable prejudice to defendant. Accordingly, this assignment of error has no merit.\nNo error.\nJudges GREENE and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General David Roy Blackwell, for the State.", "Carlton M. Mansfield for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY REVELS\nNo. COA01-1233\n(Filed 17 September 2002)\n1. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the two charges of first-degree murder even though defendant alleged self-defense, because: (1) there was substantial evidence supporting the necessary elements of first-degree murder; and (2) although the evidence offered by defendant provided a conflicting account of what occurred and indicated that defendant acted in self-defense, contradictions in the evidence remain for the jurors to resolve.\n2. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 motion for mistrial\u2014 emotional outbursts by victim\u2019s family\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a double first-degree murder case by denying defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial even though there were several incidents of emotional outbursts by members of one of the victim\u2019s families, because: (1) the trial court excused the jurors when the emotional outburst occurred, cautioned the audience, and provided a curative instruction to the jury; and (2) defendant has failed to establish that the emotional outbursts resulted in irreparable prejudice to defendant.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 15 March 2000 by Judge Gregory A. Weeks in Robeson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 August 2002.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General David Roy Blackwell, for the State.\nCarlton M. Mansfield for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0163-01", "first_page_order": 193, "last_page_order": 199 }