{ "id": 9249504, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: MEB", "name_abbreviation": "In re Meb", "decision_date": "2002-10-01", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1323", "first_page": "278", "last_page": "283", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "153 N.C. App. 278" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "169 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559163 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607", "parenthetical": "holding that \"a delinquent child is not a 'criminal.' The inference is that a juvenile's disposition is not intended to be a punishment but rather an attempt\" at rehabilitation." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573829 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "holding that \"a delinquent child is not a 'criminal.' The inference is that a juvenile's disposition is not intended to be a punishment but rather an attempt\" at rehabilitation." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482-83", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527781 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.29", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "providing that: \"Under no circumstances shall the registration of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent be included in the county or statewide registries, or be made available to the public via internet\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "upholding a special condition of probation restricting a juvenile's access to television for a one year period" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11220066 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "upholding a special condition of probation restricting a juvenile's access to television for a one year period" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0433-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 11772, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.3944407569707732 }, "sha256": "41dc9f52ca786ae271905da639033cc4e6ea4886d6252022255b1537caf4d6ed", "simhash": "1:a2fb04375e5f5fe3", "word_count": 1868 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:17:05.865609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUDSON and CAMPBELL concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: MEB" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nThis appeal presents an issue of first impression: Did the trial court err by requiring as a special condition of probation that a juvenile offender publicly wear a 12\" x 12\" sign with the words \u201cI AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL\u201d? We answer, yes, and therefore, reverse the order of the district court.\nOn 1 October 2000, Appellant, a 14-year old female juvenile, and three other juveniles broke into a middle school and caused approximately $60,000 of damage to school property. As a result of the offense, Appellant was expelled from the ninth grade for the remainder of the school year.\nOn 18 January 2001, Appellant, who had no prior history of delinquency, admitted allegations supporting the offenses of Felony Breaking and Entering and Felony Possession of Burglary Tools. On 19 February 2001, the district court entered its Disposition Order, Supplemental Order, and Conditions of Probation. As conditions of Appellant\u2019s twelve-month probation, the court ordered her (1) to pay $250 in restitution; (2) to complete 50 hours of community service; (3) to follow the curfew established by the Court Counselor; (4) not to associate with codefendants; (5) not to go on the property of the damaged school; (6) not to use firearms, controlled substances, or alcohol; and (7) to submit to random drug testing.\nAs a special condition of probation, the court ordered Appellant \u201cto wear a sign around her neck, 12\" x 12\" with the words \u2014 I AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL \u2014 written in large letters.\u201d Moreover, the court provided that: \u201cThe Juvenile is to wear this sign whenever out in public, whenever she is away from her own residence.\u201d The court further ordered Appellant to wear the sign \u201cuntil the school year term would have ended if the juvenile would have been attending school.\u201d This condition of probation is the sole issue on appeal.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510 states the law governing the imposition and conditions of juvenile probation in North Carolina. The section provides that \u201c[t]he court may impose conditions of probation that are related to the needs of the juvenile and that are reasonably necessary to ensure that the juvenile will lead a law-abiding life-\u201d N. C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(a) (2001). Although the section lists thirteen specific conditions of probation that may be applied, the trial court can require \u201cthe juvenile [to] satisfy any other conditions determined appropriate by the court.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(a)(14). \u201cIn deciding the conditions of probation, the trial judge is free to fashion alternatives which are in harmony with the individual child\u2019s needs.\u201d In re McDonald, 133 N.C. App. 433, 434, 515 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1999) (upholding a special condition of probation restricting a juvenile\u2019s access to television for a one year period).\nAppellant contends the discretion of the trial court to fashion alternative conditions of probation is limited by specific statutory language protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offenders. To illustrate this first contention, Appellant points to two sections in the Juvenile Code. First, Appellant points to N.C. Gen. Stat \u00a7 7B-3100 which provides that: \u201cDisclosure of information concerning any juvenile under investigation or alleged to be within the jurisdiction of the court that would reveal the identity of that juvenile is prohibited . . . .\u201d Second, Appellant points to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2102(d) which provides that fingerprints and photographs taken pursuant to the Juvenile Code are not public records, and are not subject to public examination or inspection. Furthermore, Appellant notes that the Juvenile Code and the Criminal Law prohibit state agencies and law enforcement from releasing the names of juveniles who are registered sex offenders. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.29 (2001) (providing that: \u201cUnder no circumstances shall the registration of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent be included in the county or statewide registries, or be made available to the public via internet\u201d). Accordingly, Appellant argues that \u201cif it is unlawful to disseminate a photograph of a juvenile to the public, logically it is not proper to require a juvenile to conduct her public business in open while wearing a sign that brands her as a \u2018juvenile criminal.\u2019 \u201d\nAs a second contention, Appellant argues that the special condition of probation violates the \u201cfocus of the juvenile justice system\u201d which \u201cis not on punishing the juvenile offender but on achieving an individualized disposition that meets the juvenile\u2019s needs and promotes [her] best interests.\u201d In re Groves, 93 N.C. App. 34, 36, 376 S.E.2d 481, 482-83 (1989) (emphasis in original). In support of this contention, Appellant points to a North Carolina Supreme Court decision noting that the \u201c[disposition of a juvenile . . . involves a philosophy far different from adult sentencing.\u201d In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 666, 260 S.E.2d 591, 607 (1979) (holding that \u201ca delinquent child is not a \u2018criminal.\u2019 The inference is that a juvenile\u2019s disposition is not intended to be a punishment but rather an attempt\u201d at rehabilitation.); see also, In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 529-30, 169 S.E.2d 879, 886-87 (1969). Thus, Appellant contends that requiring a juvenile to wear a sign stating \u201cI AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL\u201d undermines the policy that a juvenile is not a criminal and unnecessarily subjects the juvenile to pubic humiliation and embarrassment.\nIn response to Appellant\u2019s first argument, the State concedes that many statutes restrict the dissemination of information about juvenile cases. The State contends, however, that various statutes permit disclosure of juvenile records \u201cby order of the court.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3001(b). The State argues that this statutory power, in conjunction with the court\u2019s authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2506(16) to \u201crequire the juvenile to comply with any other reasonable conditions . . . that are designed to facilitate supervision,\u201d provides a legal basis for the trial court\u2019s special condition of probation. Specifically, the State argues that because the juvenile was expelled from school, and because the juvenile\u2019s family dynamics did not ensure sufficient supervision, the trial court\u2019s order was reasonable in order to facilitate community supervision over the juvenile by alerting community members that the juvenile was in need of supervision.\nIn response to Appellant\u2019s second argument, the State contends that the sign does not undermine the policy of treating juveniles as delinquent because the sign is not a criminal punishment. Although the sign identifies the juvenile as a \u201ccriminal,\u201d the State contends that the sign is intended to emphasize the accountability'and responsibility of the juvenile, and not the juvenile\u2019s criminal acts. Furthermore, the State argues that the sign does not cause unnecessary embarrassment, because the juvenile is not required to wear the sign: The juvenile is free to remain at home at all times.\nWe find the State\u2019s arguments unpersuasive. The State\u2019s first contention, that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3001(b) gives the trial court the discretion to open juvenile records to public display, is based on a misinterpretation of the relevant statute. Section 7B-3001(b) provides that \u201call law enforcement records and files concerning a juvenile . . . shall be withheld from public inspection.\u201d (emphasis added). Section 7B-3001(b) provides five exceptions to this general principle; namely, the juvenile, the juvenile\u2019s parents, the prosecutor, the juvenile court counselor, and law enforcement officers may examine juvenile records without a court order. \u201cOtherwise, the records and files may be examined or copied only by order of the court.\u201d Id.\nIndeed, the State\u2019s reliance on this section to support the proposition that a court can order a juvenile to publicly disclose her status as a juvenile delinquent is misplaced. At most, this section provides a mechanism for individuals to obtain juvenile records upon a showing of need. This section does not grant the court authority to place juvenile records in a public display case on the courthouse steps. This is precisely the situation we face today. The court\u2019s order, requiring the juvenile to wear a sign stating \u201cI AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL,\u201d opens the juvenile\u2019s records to public display rather than permitting individual inspection of juvenile records authorized \u201cby order of the court\u201d under Section 7B-3001(b). The special condition of probation in the present case, transforms the privilege of an individual to obtain access to juvenile records, upon a showing of need, into a punishment against the juvenile. This is impermissible.\nThe State\u2019s second contention, that the sign is a reasonable means of facilitating community supervision, violates the Juvenile Code. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(b)(5), the court may authorize the court counselor to order the juvenile to comply with conditions of \u201cintense supervision.\u201d The court, however, \u201cshall not\u201d give the chief counselor the authority to order \u201cintense supervision\u201d unless the juvenile is subject to a class 2 disposition. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(b)(5). Here, the Appellant has no prior record and, therefore, the Appellant is a class 1 disposition under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-2507, 2508. Accordingly, Appellant is not subject to the condition of \u201cintensive supervision,\u201d and the State\u2019s justification for the sign is without merit.\nFinally, the State argues that Appellant is not required to wear the sign, because Appellant can choose to stay home. While this argument would solve the State\u2019s problems associated with \u201cintensive supervision\u201d and confidentiality in the State\u2019s first two arguments, it too is unpersuasive. Essentially, the State is arguing that Appellant has a choice between public ridicule and de facto house arrest. As noted previously, the first choice violates the Juvenile Code and public policy. The alternative choice, house arrest, is a remedy only available against class 2 juvenile dispositions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-2506(I8), 2508(d). Here, Appellant is a class 1 disposition. Accordingly, the State\u2019s attempt to place the juvenile under a defacto house arrest is without statutory authority.\nIn sum, we reverse the trial court\u2019s special condition of probation requiring the Appellant to wear a sign reading \u201cI AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL.\u201d We, therefore, remand this matter to the district court for modification of the Conditions of Probation.\nReversed and Remanded.\nJudges HUDSON and CAMPBELL concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "William M. Willis, IV, for respondent-appellant.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Diane Martin Pomper, for the State." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: MEB\nNo. COA01-1323\n(Filed 1 October 2002)\nJuveniles\u2014 special condition of probation \u2014 wear juvenile criminal sign in public\nThe trial court erred in a felony breaking and entering and felony possession of burglary tools case by requiring as a special condition of probation that a juvenile offender publicly wear a 12\" x 12\" sign with the words \u201cI am a juvenile criminal,\u201d because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-3001(b) merely provides a mechanism for individuals to obtain juvenile records upon a showing of need, and this special condition of probation transforms the privilege into a punishment against the juvenile; (2) the juvenile is not subject to the condition of intensive supervision under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2510(b)(5) since she has no prior record; and (3) the State\u2019s attempt to place the juvenile under a de facto house arrest by stating she can choose to stay home, rather than be required to wear the sign, is without statutory authority.\nAppeal by juvenile from orders entered 19 February 2001 by Judge James M. Honeycutt in District Court, Iredell County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 August 2002.\nWilliam M. Willis, IV, for respondent-appellant.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Diane Martin Pomper, for the State." }, "file_name": "0278-01", "first_page_order": 308, "last_page_order": 313 }