{ "id": 9250424, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HARRY REED, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Reed", "decision_date": "2002-10-15", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1371", "first_page": "462", "last_page": "468", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "153 N.C. App. 462" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "93 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219561 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "652", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524779 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4684489 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561370 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Tate, 307 N.C. 242, 245, 297 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4679881 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Tate, 307 N.C. 242, 245, 297 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 679, "char_count": 15390, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3198919466865322e-07, "percentile": 0.7898568603806632 }, "sha256": "1ebe30ba33350325fcc6f0fbda3399fa1d41583be37e3e8bfd2cd6bce6f8be08", "simhash": "1:076b2d723bbe98d1", "word_count": 2467 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:17:05.865609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HARRY REED, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nHarry Reed, Jr. (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals his conviction and sentencing for possession of alcoholic beverages for sale without a permit. We find no error requiring reversal of the trial court\u2019s decision.\nOn the night of 9 January 2000, a motor vehicle accident occurred in front of defendant\u2019s house that resulted in a stabbing and another assault between the vehicle occupants. When the police arrived, they noticed the stabbing victims and witnesses all had \u201cmini\u201d bottles of liquor in their possession. Detective A. E. Talley (\u201cDetective Talley\u201d), the primary officer in charge of the investigation, was told by several of the witnesses that they had been at \u201cHarry\u2019s place\u201d prior to the accident and assaults. One of these witnesses (an unidentified woman) further stated that she had been at \u201cHarry\u2019s liquor house\u201d and proceeded to point to defendant\u2019s house.\nDetective Talley subsequently instructed two detectives to interview defendant about the accident and related assaults. Defendant told the detectives that he was unaware of the events that had occurred outside his house and that no one had been at his residence prior to the accident. As the detectives questioned defendant from his doorway, they could see in plain view what appeared to be evidence of a liquor operation inside defendant\u2019s house.\nUpon receiving a report of the detectives\u2019 interview and observations, Detective Talley contacted the ABC Commission. The ABC Commission informed Detective Talley about three previously executed search warrants for defendant\u2019s house by ABC Agent Ricky D. Barbour (\u201cAgent Barbour\u201d) on 3 April 1998, 16 April 1998, and October of 1999. Those searches had resulted in the seizure of approximately fifty-two liters, twenty-eight liters, and at least eight liters of spirituous liquor respectively. During the 16 April 1998 search, Agent Barbour had specifically informed defendant that he would need an ABC permit and state and local revenue licenses to sell liquor. Detective Talley used the information from the report and the ABC Commission to obtain a search warrant for defendant\u2019s house.\nDefendant\u2019s house was searched on 10 January 2000. As a result of the search, the police seized approximately five liters of spirituous liquor (which included seventy-five \u201cmini\u201d bottles of liquor), seventy-eight, cans of beer, two bottles of champagne, and $946.00 in small bills (mostly one dollar bills). The police also found a box of \u201cbusiness cards\u201d containing defendant\u2019s address, telephone number, and the statement, \u201cHarry\u2019s open house for alcohol, food, and fun[.]\u201d Finally, a piece of paper labeled \u201cHarry\u2019s house rules\u201d was seized during the search that included the motto: \u201cYour money belong[s] in my pocket\u201d and a rule stating \u201c[n]o . . . begging. No . . . credit.... You don\u2019t get nothing here free.\u201d Thereafter, defendant was cited for possessing for sale \u201calcoholic beverages without first obtaining the applicable ABC permit and revenue licenses[,]\u201d a misdemeanor under Section 18B-304(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes. Defendant was convicted on 8 March 2000 in Wake County District Court and immediately appealed his conviction to the Wake County Superior Court.\nDefendant\u2019s appeal was heard in superior court on 21 September 2000. At trial, the court allowed the State to admit into evidence, over defendant\u2019s objection, the unidentified witness\u2019 statement regarding \u201cHarry\u2019s liquor house\u201d and a copy of the business card found during the search. Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied operating a liquor house. He further testified that the alcohol found in his home was left over from his New Year\u2019s Eve party and that he was intending to use the remaining alcohol for his birthday party on 16 January. Finally, when questioned about \u201cHarry\u2019s house rules,\u201d defendant testified that he does give away alcohol when he has a party.\nDefendant\u2019s trial concluded on 22 September 2000 when the jury returned a verdict of guilty of possession of alcoholic beverages for sale without a permit. As a result, defendant was sentenced to a term of forty-five days in the North Carolina Department of Correction, which was suspended for thirty-six months with supervised probation, a fine of $100.00, and $1,000.00 in attorney\u2019s fees to reimburse the state for court-appointed counsel. Defendant appeals.\nI.\nBy defendant\u2019s first two assignments of error he argues the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce (A) the hearsay statement of an unidentified witness, and (B) the hearsay statement contained on a business card found in defendant\u2019s house during the police search.\nOur statutes define hearsay as \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (2001). The general rule is that hearsay statements are inadmissible as evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 802 (2001). However, our statutes do allow for the admissibility of some hearsay statements if they fall within certain recognized exceptions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 803 and 804 (2001).\nA.\nBy his first assignment of error, defendant argues the unidentified witness\u2019 statement to Detective Talley regarding \u201cHarry\u2019s liquor house\u201d was inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.\nOur Supreme Court \u201chas held that the statements of one person to another are admissible [as non-hearsay] to explain the subsequent conduct of the person to whom the statement was made.\u201d State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 16, 316 S.E.2d 197, 205 (1984) (citing State v. Tate, 307 N.C. 242, 245, 297 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1982)). In the case sub judice, upon hearing the witness\u2019 statement and learning the location of defendant\u2019s house, Detective Talley instructed two detectives to interview defendant about the accident and assaults that occurred in front of his home. It was the results of their interview and the information provided by the ABC Commission that led to defendant\u2019s house being searched. Thus, the witness\u2019 statement was offered only to explain Detective Talley\u2019s conduct subsequent to hearing the statement and not to show that defendant\u2019s home was actually a \u201cliquor house.\u201d\nFurthermore, assuming arguendo that the witness\u2019 statement was inadmissible, our Supreme Court has long held that when \u201cevidence is admitted over objection, and the same evidence has been previously admitted or is later admitted without objection, the benefit of the objection is lost.\u201d State v. Maccia, 311 N.C. 222, 229, 316 S.E.2d 241, 245 (1984) (citations omitted). Here, after the trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objection to Detective Talley\u2019s testimony regarding the witness\u2019 reference to \u201cHarry\u2019s liquor house,\u201d the detective testified: \u201cI had that witness follow myself in a police car . . . and had her actually identify by pointing out which house she was stating was Harry\u2019s liquor house.\u201d Defendant did not object. Defendant\u2019s failure to renew his objection when additional testimony about the witness\u2019 statement was offered resulted in his waiving this issue on appeal.\nAccordingly, we overrule defendant\u2019s first assignment of error.\nB.\nBy his second assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court\u2019s admission of a copy of the business card found during the search of his house contained an inadmissible hearsay statement. In ruling that the card was admissible, the trial judge stated:\nI\u2019m going to overrule [defendant\u2019s] objection for the reason that the matter is offered not for what\u2019s asserted but for the fact that this item was found at the scene and has been testified to that it was found in the residence of the defendant on the occasion of the search on January the 10th and for that reason it\u2019s part of the evidentiary package and ergo are liable under 804, 803.24 what I call a catch all because it\u2019s a reliable item found on the scene of the defendant offered to show that it was in there found not for what\u2019s said on there. And so it is hearsay ....\nAt the outset, we note that this ruling does not clearly provide whether the court admitted the statement on the card because it was (1) non-hearsay or (2) hearsay pursuant to Rule 803(24) of our statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(24). Nevertheless, we conclude the card was actually admissible as evidence under Rule 801(d) as an exception to the hearsay rule.\nRule 801(d) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for admissions by a party-opponent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(d) (2001). In pertinent part, Rule 801(d) states that \u201c[a] statement is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is offered against a party and it is [] his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity[.]\u201d Id.\nIn the present case, the business card represented that defendant\u2019s house was open for alcohol, food, and fun. Although the statement on the card was not in defendant\u2019s handwriting and defendant did not testify to the card\u2019s authenticity, the card was properly authenticated by the State based on its \u201cdistinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(4) (2001). Those characteristics and circumstances included: (1) the card being one of many identical business cards found in a box in defendant\u2019s bedroom during the search; (2) the card containing defendant\u2019s name, address, and telephone number; and (3) defendant being the sole occupant of the house in which the card was found. With respect to (3), this Court has previously held that a showing that defendant was the sole occupant of the residence where documents were found \u201cis sufficient for [those documents] to be admitted into evidence, and the weight given the evidence is for the jury to decide.\u201d State v. Mercer, 89 N.C. App. 714, 716, 367 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1988). Therefore, the card was properly authenticated as an admission by defendant. The court did not err in offering the card into evidence for the jury to decide what weight, if any, should have been given to it.\nII.\nBy defendant\u2019s third assignment of error he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge against him at the close of all the evidence. We disagree.\nWhen ruling on a motion to dismiss in a criminal action, the trial court is to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, which entitles the State \u201cto every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence[.]\u201d State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 67, 296 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1982). The evidence considered must be \u201csubstantial evidence (a) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (b) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d Id. at 65-66, 296 S.E.2d at 651. Whether the evidence presented is substantial is a question of law for the court. State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 384, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1956). Therefore, \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s function is to determine whether the evidence allows a \u2018reasonable inference\u2019 to be drawn as to the defendant\u2019s guilt of the crimes charged.\u201d Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 67, 296 S.E.2d at 652 (citation omitted).\nHere, the State\u2019s evidence established that three prior searches of defendant\u2019s house were executed by the ABC Commission. Each of those searches resulted in the seizure of quantities of spiritous liquor that were substantial enough to establish a prima facie case for possessing for sale alcoholic beverages without first obtaining the applicable ABC permit and revenue licenses under Section 18B-304(b). See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 18B-304(b). Defendant contends that since the quantities of liquor seized during the search at issue were insufficient to establish such a prima facie case, the charge against him should have been dismissed. We disagree. It is not necessary, for a Section 18B-304(a) violation, that defendant have in his possession the quantities of alcoholic beverages listed in Section 18B-304(b). The ultimate question is whether there is substantial evidence defendant sold or possessed for sale \u201cany\u201d amount of alcoholic beverage without having an applicable ABC permit and revenue licenses. In this case, there is such substantial evidence. This evidence consisted of the police finding approximately five liters of spirituous liquor stored in various closets and refrigerators throughout defendant\u2019s house, approximately $946.00 in small bills, packaging items, and seventy-eight cans of beer. The police also found a box of business cards and a copy of \u201cHarry\u2019s house rules,\u201d which indicated that nothing was \u201cfree.\u201d Finally, there was evidence that defendant admitted telling the local newspaper that the state\u2019s monopoly on liquor sales is like a communist dictatorship. Therefore, when considering all the substantial evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of the evidence.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that defendant\u2019s conviction and sentencing should be upheld.\nNo error.\nJudges GREENE and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.\n. Section 18B-304(b) provides that:\nPossession of the following amounts of alcoholic beverages, without a permit authorizing that possession, shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor is possessing those alcoholic beverages for sale:\n(1) More that 80 liters of malt beverages, other that draft malt beverages in kegs;\n(2) More that eight liters of spirituous liquor; or\n(3) Any amount of nontaxpaid alcoholic beverages.\nN..C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 18B-304(b) (2001).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General R Ely Hall, for the State.", "John T. Hall for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HARRY REED, JR.\nNo. COA01-1371\n(Filed 15 October 2002)\n1. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 statement to detective \u2014 explanation of subsequent conduct\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for possessing alcoholic beverages for sale without a permit by admitting an unidentified witness\u2019s statement to a detective where the statement was offered only to explain the detective\u2019s subsequent conduct. Furthermore, defendant did not renew his objection when additional testimony about the witness\u2019 statement was offered.\n2. Evidence\u2014 admissions \u2014 business card\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for possessing alcoholic beverages for sale without a permit by admitting a copy of a business card found during a search of defendant\u2019s house where the card represented that defendant\u2019s house was open for alcohol, food, and fun. The card was properly authenticated as an admission by defendant, based on its distinctive characteristics taken in conjunction with circumstances.\n3. Alcoholic Beverages\u2014 possession for sale without permit \u2014 quantities\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of possessing alcoholic beverages for sale without a permit where the defendant contended that the quantities of liquor found in his house were insufficient to establish a prima facie case under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-304(b), but the minimum quantities listed in subsection (b) are not necessary for an N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-304(a) violation.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 22 September 2000 by Judge Abraham P. Jones in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 August 2002.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General R Ely Hall, for the State.\nJohn T. Hall for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0462-01", "first_page_order": 492, "last_page_order": 498 }