{ "id": 9250832, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN BLAINE O'HANLAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. O'Hanlan", "decision_date": "2002-11-05", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1227", "first_page": "546", "last_page": "565", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "153 N.C. App. 546" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "515 U.S. 1169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1564225, 1564514, 1563810, 1564321, 1564429, 1563982, 1564143, 1563761, 1563860, 1564409, 1564054, 1564249, 1564283 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/1169-12", "/us/515/1169-06", "/us/515/1169-03", "/us/515/1169-13", "/us/515/1169-01", "/us/515/1169-02", "/us/515/1169-05", "/us/515/1169-08", "/us/515/1169-04", "/us/515/1169-09", "/us/515/1169-10", "/us/515/1169-07", "/us/515/1169-11" ] }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 853", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6398657, 6398434, 6397925, 6398022, 6398342, 6398215, 6398759, 6397447, 6398123, 6398544, 6397653, 6397790, 6397567 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/0853-12", "/us/498/0853-10", "/us/498/0853-05", "/us/498/0853-06", "/us/498/0853-09", "/us/498/0853-08", "/us/498/0853-13", "/us/498/0853-01", "/us/498/0853-07", "/us/498/0853-11", "/us/498/0853-03", "/us/498/0853-04", "/us/498/0853-02" ] }, { "cite": "510 U.S. 1028", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 230913, 231489, 231364, 234554, 234438, 234126, 232495, 232878, 230190, 230450, 231636, 235834, 230556 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/510/1028-11", "/us/510/1028-01", "/us/510/1028-08", "/us/510/1028-06", "/us/510/1028-02", "/us/510/1028-13", "/us/510/1028-04", "/us/510/1028-10", "/us/510/1028-12", "/us/510/1028-05", "/us/510/1028-07", "/us/510/1028-03", "/us/510/1028-09" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9679042, 9678662, 9678761, 9678795, 9678864, 9678962, 9678739, 9678834, 9678645, 9678903, 9678999, 9678940, 9678686, 9678719 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1018-14", "/us/531/1018-02", "/us/531/1018-06", "/us/531/1018-07", "/us/531/1018-09", "/us/531/1018-12", "/us/531/1018-05", "/us/531/1018-08", "/us/531/1018-01", "/us/531/1018-10", "/us/531/1018-13", "/us/531/1018-11", "/us/531/1018-03", "/us/531/1018-04" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 L. Ed. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135742 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11360317 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574188 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" }, { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2404419 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138439, 138410, 138317, 138387, 138292 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0221-01", "/nc/354/0221-03", "/nc/354/0221-04", "/nc/354/0221-02", "/nc/354/0221-05" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435124 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518633 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2400836 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 474", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541546 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571816 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508466 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "848" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513686 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413-14", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442290 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565-66", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 1232435 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/262/0003-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513076 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867700 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "\"Clearly, a medical expert may not testify that the defendant raped the prosecuting witness.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569232 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "\"Clearly, a medical expert may not testify that the defendant raped the prosecuting witness.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531110, 2526795, 2527021, 2530901, 2528511 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0563-01", "/nc/335/0563-05", "/nc/335/0563-04", "/nc/335/0563-03", "/nc/335/0563-02" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521295 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715465 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 L. Ed. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599, 617, 340 S.E.2d 309, 321 (1986); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 100, 337 S.E.2d 833, 849 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138504 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4681279 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132200 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571599, 571727 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0366-02", "/nc/349/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11197115 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4700970 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4739407, 4739670, 4745974, 4746910, 4740191 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0675-01", "/nc/319/0675-05", "/nc/319/0675-02", "/nc/319/0675-04", "/nc/319/0675-03" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8359118 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729914 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 L. Ed. 2d 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558011 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 L. Ed. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306762 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" }, { "page": "425-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240268 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545734 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567620 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139608 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 385, 488 S.E.2d 769, 779 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11147033 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 385, 488 S.E.2d 769, 779 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4684489 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" }, { "page": "849" }, { "page": "849", "parenthetical": "The medical witness could testify that injuries were caused by a male sex organ, an ultimate issue, noting that witness \"did not testify that [victim] had been raped, nor that the defendant raped her.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715827 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" }, { "page": "100" }, { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 100, 337 S.E.2d 833, 849 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560540 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 100, 337 S.E.2d 833, 849 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2557180 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135586, 135716, 135621, 135595, 135666 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0271-03", "/nc/353/0271-02", "/nc/353/0271-04", "/nc/353/0271-01", "/nc/353/0271-05" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12124012 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155877 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0481-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1554, "char_count": 44202, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.69585960256113e-07, "percentile": 0.8926856353401299 }, "sha256": "b589fd1771a5ca4655a6d51b3e433231d5e224c6cd7684ecfbe1b51dc828f2db", "simhash": "1:962b508e647feddc", "word_count": 7267 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:17:05.865609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN BLAINE O\u2019HANLAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nThe Swain County Grand Jury indicted defendant John Blaine O\u2019Hanlan on 7 February 2000 for first-degree kidnapping, two counts of first-degree rape, three counts of first-degree sexual offense, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and felonious larceny. Defendant was tried on these charges at the 3 April 2000 Criminal Session of Swain County Superior Court before a jury and the Honorable Zoro J. Guice, Jr. The jury found defendant guilty of all charges. Defendant was sentenced to a minimum of 288 months and a maximum of 355 months for each first-degree sex offense charge, a minimum of 29 months and a maximum of 44 months for the consolidated assault and larceny charges, a minimum of 100 months and a maximum of 129 months for the first-degree kidnapping conviction, and a minimum of 288 months and a maximum of 355 months in prison for each of the first-degree rape convictions, all sentences to run consecutively. Defendant appeals.\nAt trial, the State presented evidence as follows: The victim lived and worked as a waitress at the Nantahala Outdoor Center in 1999, in the Mashburn\u2019s Housing Complex, which is comprised of five cabins in a wooded area near Wesser Creek. Each cabin is divided into three or four private rooms.\nDefendant, who went by the name of \u201cJack\u201d or \u201cJack O,\u201d worked as a cook at River\u2019s End Restaurant at the Nantahala Outdoor Center. He lived in the same cabin as the victim in an adjacent room.\nThe victim had planned to leave the Center on 5 November 1999 to return to Asheville and had told several people of her plans to do so. Around 11:00 a.m. on that day, the victim had her belongings on the cabin porch ready to be loaded into her Jeep. She asked defendant to watch her belongings while she was gone, and defendant agreed to do so. When she returned, defendant insisted on helping her load her belongings into her Jeep. After loading the Jeep, the victim returned to the cabin to do some final cleaning. As she carried out the trash and recycling, she felt a hard blow to the head from behind. She turned around and saw defendant holding a sock full of rocks. She asked defendant what he was doing, to which he responded by telling her to shut up and hitting her on the head with the sock again. Defendant pushed her to the ground, got on top of her, and began choking her. After struggling with the victim, defendant tied her hands and legs together with duct tape and shoved her into her Jeep. According to the victim, defendant informed her that he would kill her and anyone who came to her aid if she screamed.\nDefendant drove the victim\u2019s Jeep into the middle of the woods and stopped. Defendant untaped her, took off her jeans, and then kissed her face and rubbed her body. Defendant performed oral sex on her, becoming angry when she did not have an orgasm. Defendant then got on top of her and penetrated her vagina with his penis. He finally stopped and went to the Jeep, where he retrieved the victim\u2019s toothbrush and inserted it into her rectum.\nLater, defendant moved the Jeep into another location. Defendant penetrated her vagina again with his penis but had troubling maintaining an erection. He became more angry and brutal. At one point, defendant paused, retrieved some bath gel, and anally raped her. When defendant finished, he taped her arms and legs again, put a gag in her mouth, covered her eyes with duct tape, and put her in the backseat with her belongings. Defendant left her there and told her not to escape. However, the victim did manage to escape while defendant was gone and ran down a nearby trail through the woods. She eventually reached the home of the Evans family at about 8:45 a.m. on 6 November 1999.\nChief Deputy Jackie Fortner of the Swain County Sheriffs Department was summoned to the Evans\u2019 home. The victim told Fortner that \u201cJack 0\u201d had kidnapped and raped her. She was then transported by ambulance to the Swain County Emergency Room.\nDeputy Fortner arrested defendant at his place of work on the morning of 6 November 1999. At the time of his arrest, defendant had multiple cuts and scrapes on his arms and hands, his knuckles were red and dirty, his knees were skinned, and he had a scratch on his left shoulder. Deputy Fortner recovered the victim\u2019s watch which she had lost during the assault and a piece of duct tape from the person of defendant. Deputy Fortner also recovered various items of physical evidence, such as the Jeep and the items inside of it.\nDefendant assigns forty-six errors on appeal. He mentions only thirteen assignments of error in his brief. The assignments of error not mentioned in his brief are deemed abandoned according to N.C.R. App. R 28(b)(5) (2002). Defendant\u2019s remaining 13 assignments of error are grouped into four main arguments in his brief.\nDefendant argues on appeal that (I) the short form indictments for first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense failed to allege the elements of each offense sufficiently to charge defendant with these crimes and should be held unconstitutional; (II) the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted for substantive purposes the testimony of Dr. Patrick Hanaway, Dr. Lisa Lichtig and Detective Jack Fortner that the victim had been sexually assaulted, kidnapped, and raped; (III) the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury that the State need only establish \u201cpersonal injury\u201d for a first-degree rape conviction; and (IV) defendant\u2019s convictions should be vacated as a result of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons set forth we find no error.\nI.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the short form indictments for first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense as they failed to allege the elements of each offense sufficiently to charge defendant with these crimes and contends the short form indictments should be held unconstitutional. Defendant recognizes that the North Carolina Supreme Court has upheld the short form as constitutional. See State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 528 S.E.2d 326, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000). Defendant urges this Court to reconsider such holdings. Our Court has previously addressed this matter as it pertained to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.1 (2001) for rape and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.2 (2001) for sexual offense and upheld the short form. See State v. Harris, 140 N.C. App. 208, 215-16, 535 S.E.2d 614, 619, appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 271, 546 S.E.2d 122 (2000). We find nothing in our previous cases or in defendant\u2019s argument that persuades us the short form indictments for rape or sexual offense are invalid or unconstitutional. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nII.\nIn his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted the testimony of Dr. Patrick Hanaway, Dr. Lisa Lichtig, and Detective Jack Fortner that the victim had been sexually assaulted, kidnapped, and raped. We disagree.\nThe rule governing testimony by experts is N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (2001). Rule 702 states that \u201c[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.\u201d Id. \u201cThe subject matter of the expert testimony must merely be such that it would be helpful to the fact finder.\u201d State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466, 477, 406 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1991). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 704, \u201c[testimony in the form of an opinion or inference is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 704 (2001). Expert testimony is not allowed, however, regarding a .legal conclusion ... at least where the standard is a legal term of art which carries a specific legal meaning not readily apparent to the witness.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Crawford, 329 N.C. at 477, 406 S.E.2d at 585 (quoting State v. Rose, 323 N.C. 455, 459, 373 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1988) (quoting State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 100, 337 S.E.2d 833, 849 (1985))).\nDr. Hanaway\nDr. Patrick Hanaway testified as an expert for the State. He is a board-certified family physician. He received his medical degree in 1987 and has worked in emergency rooms since 1988. He has been involved in 32 sexual assault examinations. Dr. Hanaway was qualified without objection as an expert in emergency medicine with a speciality dealing with rape victims.\nDr. Hanaway treated the victim in the emergency room and observed her physical condition. According to Dr. Hanaway, she described the assault in detail to him. Dr. Hanaway testified at trial that she seemed visibly shaken and scared. He also performed a rape kit examination. Dr. Hanaway found that she had multiple abrasions, bruises and scratches all over her body. Her back was bruised and scraped, her elbows rubbed raw, and her nipples bruised. Several of her front teeth were broken. Using a florescent light to examine the victim's genitals, Dr. Hanaway observed the lighting up of sperm across the victim\u2019s vaginal area.\nIn addition to her physical condition, Dr. Hanaway noted the victim\u2019s mental state. He described her demeanor as \u201cvisibly shaken,\u201d \u201cscared,\u201d \u201cstunned,\u201d \u201cclearly afraid\u201d and \u201cspontaneously breaking down in tears at times.\u201d\nAt trial, Dr. Hanaway testified as follows:\nQ. Tell the jury the things that you explained and the dialogue back and forth between you and [the victim]?\n. . . She didn\u2019t seem to be able to receive the information that I was giving her. It seemed that her emotional state was consistent with having been assaulted in some manner, and then it\u2019s my job to determine what the extent of that assault is.\n(Emphasis added.)\nFurther, the doctor stated:\n[Dr. Hanaway]: I\u2019ve indicated to you that I\u2019ve been involved in more than thirty of these cases. I\u2019ve definitely been involved in cases where it was my firm opinion at the end of the history and physical that there had not been a sexual assault that had occurred, because the pieces did not fit together.\nIn this case it seemed pretty clear that there had been some type of assault that had occurred from the history and from\u2014\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.\n[Court]: Overruled.\n[Prosecutor]: You may continue?\n[Dr. Hanaway]: . . .from the history and the physical observation that I had made to that point in time. So, I felt clear that there was some assault that had happened. I was not yet clear, based on the gathering of evidence, of whether any sexual assault had occurred, though her emotional state was consistent with a very severe and significant assault which happened.\n(Emphasis added.)\nLater, Dr. Hanaway testified that he had ordered an HIV test to be done \u201cso that it could be followed up in three to six months time to determine if [the victim] was exposed to HIV through that sexual encounter, sexual assault.\u201d Finally, Dr. Hanaway testified this case was the most \u201cintense and gruesome\u201d of the more than thirty alleged sexual assault cases he had seen.\nAs the transcript excerpt reveals, defendant only objected once to the testimony he now assigns as error. \u201c[W]hen . . . evidence is admitted over objection, and the same evidence has been previously admitted or is later admitted without objection, the benefit of the objection is lost.\u201d State v. Maccia, 311 N.C. 222, 229, 316 S.E.2d 241, 245 (1984). Thus, defendant\u2019s contentions are reviewable only for plain error. Under this standard, defendant is entitled to relief if he can show \u201c \u2018(i) that a different result probably would have been reached but for the error or (ii) that the error was so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice or denial of a fair trial.\u2019 \u201d State v. Stanfield, 134 N.C. App. 685, 689, 518 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1999) (quoting State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 385, 488 S.E.2d 769, 779 (1997)).\nDefendant first contends the trial court erred in admitting portions of Dr. Hanaway\u2019s testimony because he expressed his opinion that the victim\u2019s emotional state was consistent with sexual assault, and further that a sexual assault actually occurred.\nIn the present case, Dr. Hanaway was tendered and accepted as an expert in emergency medicine with a speciality dealing with rape victims. A qualified expert may testify, like any other witness, to his or her own observations. State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 462, 251 S.E.2d 407, 412 (1979). The challenged testimony summarized the pattern of injuries and constituted a medical conclusion which the witness was fully qualified to render. In a similar case the Supreme Court has held that:\n[The expert] used the term \u201csexual assault, attack\u201d merely to describe the pattern of injuries. Again, and to the extent that [the expert] stated a legal conclusion, \u201csexual assault or attack\u201d is not a legal term of art which carries a specific meaning not readily apparent to the witness. Like \u201ctorture,\u201d \u201csexual assault\u201d does not carry a precise legal definition involving elements of intent as well as acts, nor does it have a legal meaning that varies from the common understanding of the term.\nState v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 601, 430 S.E.2d 188, 198, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028, 126 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1993). It is clear from the record and transcript that there existed ample foundation for Dr. Hanaway\u2019s expertise and his characterization of what happened to the victim as a sexual assault. In the present case there was physical evidence to support a diagnosis that the victim had been sexually assaulted. Dr. Hanaway, who was qualified as an expert, examined her and noted substantial visible physical injuries consistent with assault. He testified to her injuries as listed above. Specifically as to sexual assault, Dr. Hanaway testified that when he used the florescent light there was \u201clighting up of presumably sperm across [the victim] \u2019s vaginal area.\u201d Dr. Hanaway\u2019s testimony concerning this issue was in accordance with N.C.R. Evid. 702 and does not constitute plain error.\nSecondly, defendant contends that Dr. Hanaway\u2019s testimony impermissibly bolstered the credibility of the victim.\nIn State v. Marine, 135 N.C. App. 279, 520 S.E.2d 65 (1999), this Court stated:\nRule 608(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence permits the use of reputation or opinion testimony in order to bolster another witness\u2019 credibility, so long as it is done in accordance with Rule 405(a). Rule 405(a) then explicitly prohibits expert testimony regarding a witness\u2019 character. When read together, the Rules of Evidence thus prohibit an expert witness from commenting on the credibility of another witness. State v. Wise, 326 N.C. 421, 426, 390 S.E.2d 142, 145, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 112 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1990).\nOn the other side of the coin, however, Rule 702 permits expert witnesses to explain the bases of their opinions. Thus, \u201ca witness who renders an expert opinion may also testify as to the reliability of the information upon which he based his opinion.\u201d State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 146, 451 S.E.2d 826, 842, (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1995). Furthermore, the mental and emotional state of the victim before, during, and after a rape or sexual assault is relevant testimony that can help assist the trier of fact in understanding the basis of that expert\u2019s opinion. State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 30-31, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366 (1987).\nId. at 281, 520 S.E.2d at 66-67.\nAs Marine noted, the cases dealing with the line between discussing one\u2019s expert opinion and improperly commenting on a witness\u2019 credibility have made it a thin one. See State v. Jenkins, 83 N.C. App. 616, 623-25, 351 S.E.2d 299, 303-04 (1986), cert. denied, 319 N.C. 675, 356 S.E.2d 791 (1987); State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 339-44, 341 S.E.2d 565, 567-69 (1986); State v. Wise, 326 N.C. at 425-28, 390 S.E.2d at 145-47 (1990); and State v. Bright, 131 N.C. App. 57, 60-61, 505 S.E.2d 317, 319-20, disc. review allowed, cert. allowed, 349 N.C. 366, 525 S.E.2d 179 (1998), disc. review dismissed as improvidently allowed, 350 N.C. 82, 511 S.E.2d 639 (1999). However, in the case sub judice, Dr. Hanaway\u2019s testimony did not improperly bolster the believability of the victim. His testimony, as set forth above, was that the victim\u2019s emotional state was consistent with someone who had been sexually assaulted; indeed, a severe sexual assault. We note that the doctor was never asked whether he believed the victim was sincere. Dr. Hanaway explained how he concluded that she had been sexually assaulted through the physical evidence, the victim\u2019s statements, and her emotional condition. While his testimony may in some way have bolstered the victim\u2019s claim that she had been sexually assaulted, this is incidental to the doctor\u2019s testimony. He was the treating physician when she came to the hospital and is permitted to give the background reasons and basis for his diagnosis. Thus, defendant\u2019s assignment of error, as it pertains to Dr. Hanaway, is overruled.\nDr. Lichtig\nDr. Lisa Lichtig also testified as an expert for the State. Dr. Lichtig has been a physician for ten years and is a board-certified family physician. She has extensive prior experience in treating sexual assault victims. Dr. Lichtig was tendered and admitted as an expert in the fields of family practice, emergency room practice, and the treatment of sexually abused patients.\nShe saw and treated the victim in this case in the emergency room, as she took over for Dr. Hanaway when his shift ended. In the emergency room, Dr. Lichtig observed the victim\u2019s emotional and physical state. She testified that the victim was \u201cquite frightened\u201d and \u201ccrying intermittently.\u201d Dr. Lichtig also noted that the victim had bruising and abrasions all over her body. The bruising was so severe according to the doctor, she ordered a CAT scan to rule out the possibility of a skull fracture.\nAt trial, Dr. Lichtig testified as follows:\nQ. . . . did you have an opportunity to form an opinion as to whether or not all of those findings, psychological, physical, medical, whether or not all of those findings were consistent with a woman who had been sexually assaulted, that is raped, based on your experience?\nA. Yes.\nQ. What was your opinion?\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.\n[Court]: Overruled.\nA. My opinion is that [the victim] was sexually assaulted, she was kidnapped, she was sexually raped and abused on multiple occasions in an eighteen hour period of time. . . . [I]t was the worst sexual assault case that I had ever been involved with in my career.\nQ. In your ten-year career?\nA. Yes, it was the worst one I had ever seen.\n(Emphasis added.)\nThe trial court then gave the jury the following limiting instruction:\n[Court]: Members of the jury, the Court has allowed this witness to express opinions in the field of family medicine, emergency room practice and the treatment of sexually abused patients. You ladies and gentlemen are the fact finders in this case. The credibility and the weight of this evidence is a matter for you the jury to determine and to decide.\nAs was the case with the testimony of Dr. Hanaway, defendant has lost the benefit of his objection by allowing the evidence to be introduced without objection. Therefore, we address his arguments here, as above, under the plain error standard. See State v. Whitley, 311 N.C. 656, 661, 319 S.E.2d 584, 588 (1984).\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Lichtig\u2019s expert opinion that the victim had been sexually assaulted, kidnapped, and raped as it impermissibly goes beyond the scope of expert opinion.\nWe have already held with the testimony of Dr. Hanaway that a conclusion of sexual abuse is permitted if concluded upon proper foundation. Likewise, Dr. Lichtig\u2019s opinion regarding sexual assault was based on her expertise in treating sexually abused patients, the victim\u2019s emotional state in the emergency room, her physical appearance and from what the victim had told her during the course of treatment. This is a proper foundation for her expert opinion that the victim was sexually assaulted in accordance with N.C.R. Evid. 702.\nHowever, Dr. Lichtig\u2019s opinion that the victim was kidnapped and raped was improper. \u201cAn expert may not testify regarding whether a legal standard or conclusion has been met \u2018at least where the standard is a legal term of art which carries a specific legal meaning not readily apparent to the witness.\u2019 \u201d State v. Parker, 354 N.C. 268, 289, 553 S.E.2d 885, 900 (2001), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002) (quoting State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599, 617, 340 S.E.2d 309, 321 (1986); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 100, 337 S.E.2d 833, 849 (1985)). \u201c \u2018Rape\u2019 is a legal term of art....\u201d State v. Najewicz, 112 N.C. App. 280, 293, 436 S.E.2d 132, 140 (1993), disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 563, 441 S.E.2d 130 (1994); see also State v. Galloway, 304 N.C. 485, 489, 284 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1981) (\u201cClearly, a medical expert may not testify that the defendant raped the prosecuting witness.\u201d); Smith, 315 N.C. at 100, 337 S.E.2d at 849 (The medical witness could testify that injuries were caused by a male sex organ, an ultimate issue, noting that witness \u201cdid not testify that [victim] had been raped, nor that the defendant raped her.\u201d).\nLike the term \u201crape,\u201d the term \u201ckidnap\u201d has its own meaning in the eyes of the law that is not readily apparent to the witness. Thus, it was also improper for Dr. Lichtig to render such an opinion, especially since it is clearly outside of her expertise.\nIt is clear that the jury is solely responsible for determining if one was kidnapped or raped. Dr. Lichtig\u2019s testimony goes beyond the scope of her permissible expert opinion as she was in no better position than the jury in concluding those facts.\nNevertheless, we do not believe that the error rises to the level of plain error. There was overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt; and following the testimony, the trial court gave a limiting instruction reminding the jurors that Dr. Lichtig\u2019s opinion is limited in certain areas and that they are the fact-finder. Any error in the admission of this testimony is harmless and does not rise to the level of plain error.\nBriefly, defendant also contends, as he did in reference to Dr. Hanaway\u2019s testimony, that Dr. Lichtig\u2019s testimony above improperly bolstered the victim\u2019s credibility. We find that this situation is indistinguishable from Dr. Hanaway\u2019s, and refer to the above discussion.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred when it admitted Dr. Lichtig\u2019s testimony that she told the victim at the hospital\nA. That she was safe, that this person was behind bars right now\u2014\n[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.\n[Court]: Overruled.\nA. That they had him in custody, and that she was going to get better from this.\nDefendant argues this implies not only that the victim had in fact been assaulted, but that defendant was guilty of the assault constituting prejudicial error. We disagree.\nThe State points out that Dr. Lichtig did not identify defendant as being the person who was in custody as she referred only to \u201cthis person\u201d and \u201chim.\u201d Dr. Lichtig was concerned about the victim\u2019s emotional well-being and was attempting to reassure her that she was safe. It was a generalized statement made as a part of the victim\u2019s treatment. The doctor had a very emotional patient she believed may have been suicidal. Dr. Lichtig said that she was trying to \u201cplant the seeds of hope\u201d in the victim that she could begin to recover. Furthermore, there was also other evidence of defendant being behind bars, as the jury heard without objection the testimony of Detective Fortner that he arrested defendant and told the victim that defendant was in jail. Thus, this evidence is cumulative, and its admission could not have prejudiced defendant. See State v. Taylor, 344 N.C. 31, 47, 473 S.E.2d 596, 605 (1996).\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erroneously admitted Dr. Lichtig\u2019s testimony that the victim\u2019s psychiatric history was relevant because \u201cwhen people recover from traumatic events in their life, it\u2019s important to know what other kinds of things they have been through.\u201d We disagree. The testimony complained of is as follows:\nQ. Any of this stuff the defense has brought up about the fact of anything about her past when she was a baby, does any of that have any impact whatsoever on the opinion that you gave this jury that this woman was raped?\nA. Absolutely not, it\u2019s totally irrelevant. The only relevance it has\u2014\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.\n[Court]: Overruled.\nA. ... in my opinion is in terms of her recovery. When people recover from traumatic events in their life it\u2019s important to know what other kinds of things they have been through so we can offer our compassion, we can offer medications when appropriate, we can offer them the kind of guidance they need in going on to live a normal healthy life ....\nDefendant has not shown this testimony, which was general in nature, to be prejudicial. This testimony was relevant in showing the type of information Dr. Lichtig relies upon in forming her opinions and was helpful to the jury in determining how much weight to give her testimony. This testimony was within the scope of permissible expert opinion under N.C.R. Evid. 702 and was not prejudicial in any way. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (2001).\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Lichtig\u2019s testimony concerning the contents of a psychiatric evaluation of the victim after the alleged rape, which included a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of severe trauma from kidnapping and rape by a co-worker at the Nantahala Outdoor Center. Defendant argues that no limiting instruction was given as required by State v. Hall, 330 N.C. 808, 412 S.E.2d 833 (1992), and the testimony was admitted for substantive purposes which was also error. We disagree.\nEvidence from an expert that a prosecuting witness is suffering from PTSD is admissible, for corroborative purposes to assist the jury in understanding the behavioral patterns of sexual assault victims. The expert witness may not, however, explicitly or implicitly indicate the PTSD was caused or contributed to by the actions of the defendant that are the subject of the trial. On this factual question, whether a defendant actually committed the act with which he is charged, the expert is \u201cin no better position to have an opinion than the jury.\u201d\nState v. Chavis, 141 N.C. App. 553, 565-66, 540 S.E.2d 404, 413-14 (2000) (citations omitted). \u201cIf admitted, the trial judge should take pains to explain to the jurors the limited uses for which the evidence is admitted. In no case may the evidence be admitted substantively for the sole purpose of proving that a rape or sexual abuse has in fact occurred.\u201d Hall, 330 N.C. at 822, 412 S.E.2d at 891.\nIn the present case, Dr. Lichtig testified that the victim suffered from PTSD as a result of the events that took place in November of 1999 while on redirect examination by the State. No limiting instruction followed. Thus, defendant contends that this was admitted for the sole purpose that the rape took place.\nThe State argues that defendant opened the door to the PTSD testimony. While cross-examining Dr. Lichtig, defendant asked questions pertaining to the victim\u2019s mental treatment, in particular, a psychiatric evaluation of the victim. This line of questioning elicited responses that could have given the jury the impression that the victim was mentally unstable prior to the time of the assault. On redirect examination, the State introduced the rest of the report to put the evidence introduced by defendant into context, namely that the victim only began suffering such mental problems after that attack. It was here that evidence of PTSD was admitted.\nPresumably, an instruction by the trial court in accordance with Hall and Chavis would have been required. However, this testimony is not violative of the Hall/Chavis principle. The reference to PTSD was being used to rebut the inference by defendant that the victim was mentally unstable prior to the assault and rape rather than to prove the assault and rape happened. Therefore, the evidence was admissible, but not as substantive evidence. Defendant would have been entitled to request the Hall/Chavis limiting instruction. However, since he did not, \u201c[t]he admission of evidence which is competent for a restricted purpose will not be held error in the absence of a request by the defendant for limiting instructions.\u201d State v. Jones, 322 N.C. 406, 414, 368 S.E.2d 844, 848 (1988).\nIn addition, evidence which is otherwise inadmissible is admissible to explain or rebut evidence introduced by defendant. State v. Garner, 330 N.C. 273, 290, 410 S.E.2d 861, 870 (1991); State v. Albert, 303 N.C. 173, 177, 277 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1981). This is true even if a defendant admits evidence during cross-examination of a State\u2019s witness, prompting the State to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence in rebuttal. State v. McKinnon, 328 N.C. 668, 673, 403 S.E.2d 474, 477 (1991). Therefore, where a defendant examines a witness so as to raise an inference favorable to defendant, which is contrary to the facts, defendant opens the door to the introduction of the State\u2019s rebuttal or explanatory evidence about the matter. State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 157-58, 322 S.E.2d 370, 386 (1984).\nAlthough it was error to admit evidence of PTSD substantively (or to not give the limiting instruction), defendant nonetheless opened the door to such evidence being admitted. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error as to Dr. Lichtig is overruled.\nDetective Fortner\nDefendant contends Chief Deputy Fortner gave improper opinion testimony which was tantamount to expert testimony. As with the previous two witnesses, defendant argues that the trial court erred in permitting him to bolster the credibility of the complaining witness, and to testify essentially that she had in fact been assaulted, raped, and kidnapped.\nDefendant heavily cross-examined Deputy Fortner as to his investigation and why certain procedures were done and not done. Specifically, defendant was asking the deputy why more items were not sent off for scientific testing. The challenged testimony at trial is as follows:\nQ. You know what evidence \u2014 what it means to have evidence that shows innocence of the accused, don\u2019t you?\nA. Yes sir.\nQ. Did you find any?\nA. Any evidence of\u2014\nQ. Or were you looking for any?\nA. I didn\u2019t need much evidence, sir, because I have a victim that had told me who her attacker was and from the look that her physical person was and the way she described the attack and her bruising and her scars, she told me who the attacker was and she gave me a name and a description. That\u2019s what I needed because I was fortunate I had an eye witness [sic] victim that survived.\nThe State, on redirect examination touched on the earlier testimony:\nQ. There was a lot of questions here from counsel for the defendant about the fact that you didn\u2019t send this off, you didn\u2019t send that off, you didn\u2019t do this or that check. What can you tell this jury about why you didn\u2019t have these things checked?\nA. I had a victim that survived her attack. She could positively identify her assailant, the person that kidnapped, raped, and brutally beat her. If she had died\u2014\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, speculative.\n[Court]: Overruled.\nQ. Go ahead?\nA. ... I would have done more fingerprinting, more checking under fingernails, more fiber transfer, because I wouldn\u2019t have known who done it. But she positively told me who done it and I arrested him.\nDefendant notes that Deputy Fortner was not tendered as an expert at trial. However, defendant contends that he is a professional law enforcement officer who had extensive experience investigating crimes over a lengthy career, and that his testimony was tantamount to expert testimony.\nThe context in which this testimony was given makes it clear Fortner was not offering his opinion that the victim had been assaulted, kidnapped, and raped by defendant, but was explaining why he did not pursue as much scientific testing of physical evidence in this case as he would a murder case because the victim in this case survived and was able to identify her assailant. His testimony was rationally based on his perception and experience as a detective investigating an assault, kidnapping, and rape. His testimony was helpful to the fact-finder in presenting a clear understanding of his investigative process. Further, defendant brought out this testimony by attacking the investigation on cross-examination. His testimony was in accordance with the rule for lay opinion testimony. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 (2001). Defendant\u2019s assignment of error as it pertains to Chief Deputy Fortner is overruled.\nAfter examining defendant\u2019s assignments of error as they pertain to the above witnesses\u2019 testimony, if there was any error, it does not rise to the level of plain error.\nIII.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury that the State need only establish \u201cpersonal injury\u201d for a first-degree rape conviction. Defendant admits the trial court initially instructed the jury that the State had to prove defendant inflicted serious personal injury upon the victim to prove first-degree rape; however, defendant contends the trial court erred when the instructions followed with a mandate that required the jury to convict defendant of first-degree rape upon a finding of \u201cpersonal injury,\u201d rather than \u201cserious personal injury\u201d as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2(a) (2001). We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(2)(b) provides that a person is guilty of first-degree rape if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person and inflicts \u201cserious personal injury upon the victim or another personf.]\u201d Id. Defendant did not object to this aspect of the jury instructions at trial. Accordingly, the challenged instruction is reviewable only for plain error. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(2); State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983). \u201cIn deciding whether a defect in the jury instruction constitutes \u2018plain error,\u2019 the appellate court must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding of guilt.\u201d Odom, 307 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79. In the present case, a review of the whole record reveals no plain error as the instructional error had no probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding of guilt.\nThe State presented the victim who testified that defendant raped, kidnapped, and assaulted her. This testimony was corroborated by witnesses who treated the victim\u2019s injuries. The victim\u2019s injuries included extensive bruises, abrasions all over her body, broken teeth, burst blood vessels in her eye, a shoulder injury, and psychological effects. These injuries satisfy the definition of serious personal injury. See, e.g., State v. Jean, 310 N.C. 157, 170, 311 S.E.2d 266, 273 (1984); State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 738-39, 370 S.E.2d 363, 367-68 (1988); State v. Ackerman, 144 N.C. App. 452, 459-61, 551 S.E.2d 139, 144-45, cert. denied, 354 N.C. 221, 554 S.E.2d 344 (2001).\nIn addition, the trial court correctly listed for the jury all of the elements of first-degree rape in accordance with the language in the Pattern Jury Instructions. N.C.P.I. Crim. 207.10 (2002). This included telling the jury that they must find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that \u201cthe defendant inflicted serious personal injury upon the victim.\u201d After listing the elements in detail, the trial court summarized what the State must prove and the trial court used the phrase \u201cpersonal injury\u201d instead of \u201cserious personal injury.\u201d The trial court\u2019s charge to the jury must be construed contextually and isolated portions of it will not be held prejudicial error when the charge as a whole is correct. State v. Boykin, 310 N.C. 118, 124, 310 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1984). \u201c \u2018Where the charge as a whole presents the law fairly and clearly to the jury, the fact that isolated expressions, standing alone, might be considered erroneous affords no grounds for reversal.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 125, 310 S.E.2d at 319 (quoting State v. Jones, 294 N.C. 642, 653, 243 S.E.2d 118, 125 (1978)).\nApplying the foregoing principles to the instant case, we hold that, although \u201cserious personal injury\u201d was omitted once, when the \u00e9ntire jury charge is viewed contextually, it reveals no plain error as the instructional error had no impact on the jury\u2019s finding of guilt. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nIV.\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant contends that his convictions should be vacated as a result of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant argues that his trial counsel failed on numerous occasions to object to repeated opinion testimony from Dr. Hanaway, Dr. Lichtig, and Chief Detective Fortner. In addition, defendant asserts that his trial counsel performed unreasonably when he failed to object to the trial court\u2019s mandate to the jury that it find first-degree rape upon proof of \u201cpersonal injury,\u201d instead of \u201cserious personal injury.\u201d Defendant argues that but for these errors, defendant would have obtained a different result at trial.\nIn order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish (1) that his attorney\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced by his attorney s performance to the extent there exists a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different absent the error.\nState v. Skipper, 146 N.C. App. 532, 537-38, 553 S.E.2d 690, 694 (2001); State v. Jaynes, 353 N.C. 534, 547-48, 549 S.E.2d 179, 191 (2001), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 152 L. Ed. 2d 220 (2002); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Defendant has not satisfied either prong of this test.\nIn the present case, defendant has failed to prove the attorney\u2019s performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness or to show that his error was such that the result of defendant\u2019s trial would have been different. In light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, the failure to object in certain instances would not make it more probable that the outcome of trial would have been different as the testimony complained of was at most harmless error and the jury instructions as a whole were correct. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nBecause we find that defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error, we find\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Amy C. Kunstling, for the State.", "David G. Belser for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN BLAINE O\u2019HANLAN\nNo. COA01-1227\n(Filed 5 November 2002)\n1. Indictment and Information\u2014 short-form indictment\u2014 rape, sexual offense\nShort form indictments for first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense, and first-degree kidnapping are constitutional.\n2. Evidence\u2014 sexual assault \u2014 emergency room physician\u2019s testimony \u2014 victim\u2019s emotional state\nThere was no plain error in a prosecution for first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and first-degree kidnapping in the admission of an emergency room physician\u2019s opinion testimony that the victim\u2019s emotional state was consistent with sexual assault and that a sexual assault had actually occurred because the challenged testimony summarized the pattern of injuries and constituted a medical conclusion which the witness was qualified to render.\n3. Evidence\u2014 sexual assault \u2014 emergency room physician\u2019s testimony \u2014 credibility of victim\nAn emergency room physician\u2019s opinion testimony that the victim\u2019s emotional state was consistent with someone who had been sexually assaulted and that a sexual assault had occurred did not improperly bolster the credibility of the victim so as to constitute plain error in a rape and sexual offense prosecution. The treating physician is permitted to give the background reasons for his diagnosis and he was never asked whether he believed the victim was sincere.\n4. Evidence\u2014 sexual assault \u2014 emergency room physician\u2019s opinion\nThere was no plain error in a prosecution for first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and first-degree kidnapping where an emergency room physician who had assumed care after a shift change testified that the victim had been sexually assaulted where the doctor\u2019s opinion was based on her expertise in treating sexually abused patients, the victim\u2019s emotional state in the emergency room, the victim\u2019s physical appearance, and what the victim had said during the course of treatment.\n5. Evidence\u2014 kidnapping and rape \u2014 emergency room doctor\u2019s characterization\nThere was no plain error where an emergency room doctor testified that a patient was kidnapped and raped. Even though the testimony was improper because the legal meanings of \u201crape\u201d and \u201ckidnapping\u201d are outside the doctor\u2019s area of expertise, the trial court gave a limiting instruction and there was overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\n6. Evidence\u2014 rape victim \u2014 defendant\u2019s arrest \u2014 emergency room reassurances of safety\nThere was no prejudicial error in a prosecution for first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and first-degree kidnapping in the admission of testimony that an emergency room doctor had told the victim that she was safe, and that \u201cthis person\u201d was behind bars. The doctor did not identify defendant as being in custody, made a generalized statement to reassure the victim as a part of her treatment, and there was other testimony, admitted without objection, that a detective told the victim that defendant was in jail.\n7. Evidence\u2014 sexual assault \u2014 importance of psychiatric history\nThere was no error in a prosecution for first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and first-degree kidnapping in the admission of an emergency room doctor\u2019s testimony that a victim\u2019s psychiatric history is important to her recovery. The testimony was general and helpful to the jury in that it showed the type of information upon which the doctor relied in forming her opinions.\n8. Evidence\u2014 sexual assault and kidnapping \u2014 victim\u2019s PTSD diagnosis \u2014 opening door\nAlthough it was error to admit a sexual assault and kidnapping victim\u2019s Post Traumatic Stress Disorder diagnosis substantively without a limiting instruction, defendant opened the door by raising the inference that the victim was unstable prior to the assault.\n9. Evidence\u2014 extent of investigation \u2014 cross-examination\u2014 identification of defendant by victim\nThere was no error in a prosecution for first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and first-degree kidnapping in the admission of cross-examination testimony from a detec-tiv\u00e9 that he had not done more scientific testing of evidence because the victim had survived the attack and identified her attacker.\n10. Rape\u2014 first-degree \u2014 instructions\u2014serious injury\nThere was no plain error in a first-degree rape prosecution where the judge instructed the jury that a conviction required a finding of \u201cpersonal injury\u201d rather than \u201cserious personal injury.\u201d In context, the error had no probable impact because there was specific testimony about the victim\u2019s injuries and the court included serious injury in its instructions on the elements of first-degree rape.\n11. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 failure to object\nA sexual assault and kidnapping defendant did not suffer ineffective assistance of counsel from his counsel\u2019s failure to object at certain points during the trial, given the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 11 April 2000 by Judge Zoro J. Guice, Jr., in Swain County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 June 2002.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Amy C. Kunstling, for the State.\nDavid G. Belser for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0546-01", "first_page_order": 576, "last_page_order": 595 }