{ "id": 9251898, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LANNIE BLANE SIMPSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Simpson", "decision_date": "2002-11-05", "docket_number": "No. COA02-85", "first_page": "807", "last_page": "810", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "153 N.C. App. 807" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220071 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8359179 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/82/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 824", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11488450, 11488515, 11488135, 11488328, 11488105, 11487882, 11488007, 11488174, 11487919, 11487957, 11488632, 11488057, 11488219, 11488575 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0824-11", "/us/522/0824-12", "/us/522/0824-07", "/us/522/0824-10", "/us/522/0824-06", "/us/522/0824-01", "/us/522/0824-04", "/us/522/0824-08", "/us/522/0824-02", "/us/522/0824-03", "/us/522/0824-14", "/us/522/0824-05", "/us/522/0824-09", "/us/522/0824-13" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867660 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0639-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 388, "char_count": 6344, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.851593942698113e-08, "percentile": 0.4985039668335876 }, "sha256": "c70519526581d26404b5eb1abcc849ec8d726e4f5cbe7dfcfd73cca3222ab6a5", "simhash": "1:962af262b60c4d57", "word_count": 1085 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:17:05.865609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LANNIE BLANE SIMPSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nLannie Blane Simpson (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from a judgment entered upon his conviction by a jury of robbery with a dangerous weapon and of being an habitual felon, arising out of defendant\u2019s alleged robbery, with the use of a handgun, of a CVS pharmacy on 6 January 2001. The sole assignment of error brought forward on appeal is to the trial court\u2019s order that defendant be restrained during his trial. During a recess in the presentation of the State\u2019s evidence, and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court stated as follows:\nI will first say with regard to the security issue that I have asked the bailiff to put restraints on [defendant]; and the reason that I did that and I indicated that was because looking through the habitual felon indictment I saw that he had been previously convicted of felony escape and in light of that, I did not feel comfortable security-wise with him not being restrained in the courtroom.\nThe trial court noted the objection of defendant\u2019s counsel and advised counsel that the jury would be brought in and out of the courtroom before anyone else moved; that defendant would not be walked in front of the jury in shackles; that if defendant were to testify, he would be brought to the witness stand out of the presence of the jury; and that the court would otherwise \u201cdo [its] best to keep the jury from seeing that he is under restraint.\u201d The court inquired as to whether defense counsel wished to be heard further regarding the matter and counsel responded that he did not. Defendant\u2019s habitual felon indictment contained in the record and referred to by the trial court revealed that in 1989, defendant was convicted of felony escape from a state prison in Cabarrus County.\nIn his sole argument on appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that he be restrained during trial, and that this error entitles him to a new trial. While we agree with defendant that the trial court did not fully comply with the requirements of G.S. \u00a7 15A-1031, he has not shown prejudice requiring a new trial.\nG.S. \u00a7 15A-1031 provides:\nA trial judge may order a defendant or witness subjected to physical restraint in the courtroom when the judge finds the restraint to be reasonably necessary to maintain order, prevent the defendant\u2019s escape, or provide for the safety of persons. If the judge orders a defendant or witness restrained, he must:\n(1) Enter in the record out of the presence of the jury and in the presence of the person to be restrained and his counsel, if any, the reasons for his action; and\n(2) Give the restrained person an opportunity to object; and\n(3) Unless the defendant or his attorney objects, instruct the jurors that the restraint is not to be considered in weighing evidence or determining the issue of guilt.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1031 (2001).\nIn the present case, there is no indication in the record that the trial court instructed the jury that it was not to consider defendant\u2019s restraint in weighing the evidence or determining his guilt. Nor does it appear defendant or his counsel objected to the trial court\u2019s failure to give such an instruction.\nWhile, as a general rule, a criminal defendant is entitled to be free from physical restraint at his trial, unless there are extraordinary circumstances which require otherwise, State v. Thomas, 344 N.C. 639, 477 S.E.2d 450 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 824, 139 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997), there is no per se prohibition against the use of restraint when it is necessary to maintain order or prevent escape. State v. Wright, 82 N.C. App. 450, 346 S.E.2d 510 (1986). \u201cWhat is forbidden\u2014by the due process and fair trial guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 19 of the North Carolina Constitution\u2014is physical restraint that improperly deprives a defendant of a fair trial.\u201d Wright at 451, 346 S.E.2d at 511. Such a decision must necessarily be vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.\nWe are unable to say that the trial court\u2019s decision to restrain defendant in the present case was an abuse of discretion. Though it is true that the escape upon which the trial court based its decision had occurred a number of years prior to the present trial, the trial court was in the better position to observe the defendant, to know th\u00e9 security available in the courtroom and at the courthouse, to be aware of other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make a reasoned decision, in the light of those factors, that restraint was necessary or unnecessary. Moreover, as in Wright, supra, there is no showing on this record that the jurors were affected by, or even aware of, defendant\u2019s restraint. The trial court pledged to ensure that the jury would not see defendant restrained; defendant has not argued that the court failed to do so, that the jury was able to view defendant\u2019s restraints, or that the jury was otherwise aware defendant was restrained during trial. As our Supreme Court recently noted, where the record fails to disclose that a defendant\u2019s shackles were visible to the jury, \u201cthe risk is negligible that the restraint undermined the dignity of the trial process or created prejudice in the minds of the jurors,\u201d and the defendant will not be entitled to a new trial on that basis. State v. Holmes, 355 N.C. 719, 729, 565 S.E.2d 154, 163 (2002). Accordingly, we find no prejudicial error.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error are deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(a); 28(b)(6).\nNo error.\nJudges GREENE and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Leonard G. Green, for the State.", "J. Clark Fischer for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LANNIE BLANE SIMPSON\nNo. COA02-85\n(Filed 5 November 2002)\nCriminal Law\u2014 defendant restrained \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that defendant be restrained during an armed robbery prosecution based on defendant\u2019s 1989 escape from a state prison where the court pledged to ensure that the jury would not see defendant restrained, and the record fails to show that the jury could see the restraints.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 22 August 2001 by Judge Kimberly S. Taylor in Cabarrus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 October 2002.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Leonard G. Green, for the State.\nJ. Clark Fischer for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0807-01", "first_page_order": 837, "last_page_order": 840 }