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  "name": "THOMAS KROH, Plaintiff v. TERESA KROH, Defendant",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUNTER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "THOMAS KROH, Plaintiff v. TERESA KROH, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nThis case arises from Thomas Stewart Kroh\u2019s motion to collect a defamation judgment against his former wife, Teresa Ledford Kroh, by executing on Ms. Kroh\u2019s future interest in the couple\u2019s pending equitable distribution proceeding. The trial court granted Mr. Kroh\u2019s motion, and held under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-362, that he \u201cshould be deemed the holder of all right, title and interest in [Ms. Kroh\u2019s] equitable distribution claim... including but not limited to her claims to [his] 401(k) retirement accounts.\u201d\nOn appeal, Ms. Kroh raises one issue: Did the trial court\u2019s order, with respect to the 401(k) retirement account, violate North Carolina\u2019s \u201cIndividual Retirement Plan\u201d execution exemption codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 lC-1601(a)(9)? We answer, no, and therefore uphold the order of the trial court.\nThe underlying facts to this matter tend to show that on 28 December 2001, an $80,000 judgment was entered against Ms. Kroh, in favor of Mr. Kroh, for slander per se. Twice, on 15 February 2001 and 14 June 2001, Mr. Kroh attempted to execute this judgment. However, the executions were returned unsatisfied. Unable to satisfy his judgment, Mr. Kroh filed a Motion in Aid of Execution in Superior Court, Guilford County.\nIn his motion, Mr. Kroh noted Ms. Kroh\u2019s pending equitable distribution claim, filed 26 March 1999, in which Ms. Kroh requested equitable distribution of Mr. Kroh\u2019s 401(k) retirement account. Accordingly, Mr. Kroh requested the Superior Court to \u201cdeclare him the holder of all right, title, and interest\u201d in Ms. Kroh\u2019s future \u201cequitable distribution\u201d award \u201cto any portion of his retirement account\u201d not in excess of his unsatisfied judgment.\u201d\nOn 8 November 2001, the Superior Court granted Mr. Kroh\u2019s motion under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-362 which provides: \u201cThe court or judge may order any property, whether subject or not to be sold under execution (except the homestead and personal property exemptions of the judgment debtor)... due to the judgment debtor, to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment.\u201d Ms. Kroh argues, however, the trial court should have applied N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 lC-1601(a)(9), providing that: \u201cEach individual, resident of this State, who is a debtor is entitled to retain free of the enforcement of the claims of creditors .... Individual retirement plans.\u201d\nMs. Kroh contends that since the execution exemption for \u201cretirements accounts\u201d is neither restricted nor eliminated by Section 1-362, the trial court erroneously applied Section 1-362 frustrating the legislative purpose of Section 1C-1601. We disagree.\nOur Supreme Court has consistently held that we are required to \u201cgive effect to statutes covering the same subject matter where they are not absolutely irreconcilable and when no purpose of repeal is clearly indicated.\u201d Person v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 163, 165-66, 184 S.E.2d 873, 874 (1971). Here, Section 1-362 was enacted in 1870. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-362. In 1981, the legislature repealed sections 1-369 through 1-392, entitled \u201cProperty Exempt from Execution,\u201d and replaced that section with 1C-1601. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-369 through 1-392 (repealed by Session Laws 1981, Ch. 490, codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1C-1601 et seq). The legislature, however, did not repeal section 1-362. Chapter 1C contains no suggestion or evidence of a legislative intent to repeal section 1-362.\nMs. Kroh relies on Section 1C-1601 to support the proposition that the trial court erroneously used her exempt property to satisfy a judgment. Ms. Kroh\u2019s reliance on this section is misplaced. Her argument incorrectly equates a claim for equitable distribution with an ownership interest in property. Ms. Kroh does not own a retirement account, rather Ms. Kroh has an expectancy in an equitable distribution claim. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20, we have consistently held that an equitable distribution claim is not a property right in specific marital property.\nEquitable distribution is a statutory right granted to spouses under G.S. 50-20 which vests at the time of separation. This vested right does not create a property right in marital property. Perlow v. Perlow, 128 B.R. 412, 415 (E.D.N.C.1991). Nor does the separation create a lien on specific marital property in favor of the spouse. Id. It only creates \u201ca right to an equitable distribution of that property, whatever a court should determine that property is.\u201d Id. (quoting Wilson v. Wilson, 73 N.C. App. 96, 99, 325 S.E.2d 668, 670, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 121, 332 S.E.2d 490 (1985)).\nHearndon v. Hearndon, 132 N.C. App. 98, 101, 510 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1999).\nUnder section 1C-1601, a debtor may use the retirement account exemption to shield her own retirement account, but not to shield her claim to someone else\u2019s account. Here, Ms. Kroh does not even have a legal claim to the retirement account. Rather, Ms. Kroh has an equitable distribution claim to a marital estate that might include the retirement account. Accordingly, Ms. Kroh\u2019s assignment of error is without merit.\nIn sum, because Ms. Kroh does not have a property interest in the 401(k), Ms. Kroh is precluded from arguing, under section 1C-1601, that the trial court erred by using her exempt property to satisfy a claim.\nAffirmed.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUNTER concur.\n. Ms. Kroh also argues in her brief the trial court\u2019s order violated North Carolina\u2019s \u201c$1,500 motor vehicle\u201d and \u201c$3,500 personal property\u201d execution exemption. However, she failed to raise these assignments of error in the record on appeal; accordingly, these arguments are not before us. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a) (2002).\n. In an earlier appeal from the defamation judgment, this Court affirmed the $80,000 award of compensatory and punitive damages, but reversed the award of $5000 based upon a violation of the Electronic Surveillance Act. Kroh v. Kroh, 152 N.C. App. 347, 567 S.E.2d 760 (2002).\n. It is implausible to believe section 1-362 incorporates the exemptions of chapter 1C-1601 by reference. Chapter 1C-1601 was not enacted until 1981, a century after section 1-362 was first enacted. Although section 1-362 contains a clause appearing to be a \u201ccatch-all exemption\u201d for personal property, this clause actually has a clear and narrow meaning. The homestead and personal property exemptions noted in section 1-362 arise directly from Article X of the North Carolina Constitution. See N.C. Const. Art. X, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WYNN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Moss, Mason, & Hill, by Matthew L. Mason and William L. Hill for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Smith, James, Rowlett, & Cohen, L.L.P., by Seth R. Cohen for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THOMAS KROH, Plaintiff v. TERESA KROH, Defendant\nNo. COA02-151\n(Filed 19 November 2002)\nEnforcement of Judgment\u2014 defamation judgment \u2014 execution \u2014 future interest on pending equitable distribution proceeding \u2014 401(k) retirement account\nThe trial court did not err by granting plaintiff former husband\u2019s motion under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-362 to collect a defamation judgment against defendant former wife by executing on defendant\u2019s future interest in the couple\u2019s pending equitable distribution proceeding including but not limited to defendant\u2019s claims to plaintiff\u2019s 401(k) retirement accounts even though defendant contends that the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 lC-1601(a)(9) retirement exemption applies, because: (1) defendant\u2019s reliance on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 lC-1601(a)(9) is misplaced when defendant equates a claim for equitable distribution with an ownership interest in property; (2) defendant does not own a retirement account but has an expectancy in an equitable distribution claim; (3) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20 provides that an equitable distribution claim is not a property right in specific marital property; (4) under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 lC-1601(a)(9), a debtor may use the retirement account exemption to shield her own retirement account but not to shield her claim to someone else\u2019s account; and (5) defendant does not even have a legal claim to the retirement account, but instead has an equitable distribution claim to a marital estate that might include the retirement account.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 8 November 2001 by Judge Melzer A. Morgan, Jr. in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 October 2002.\nMoss, Mason, & Hill, by Matthew L. Mason and William L. Hill for plaintiff-appellee.\nSmith, James, Rowlett, & Cohen, L.L.P., by Seth R. Cohen for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0198-01",
  "first_page_order": 226,
  "last_page_order": 230
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