{ "id": 9249306, "name": "FREDDIE L. EMORY, Plaintiff v. JAMES \"JIM\" PENDERGRAPH, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the OFFICE OF SHERIFF OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY, PEERLESS INSURANCE COMPANY, as Surety of the Sheriff's Bond, SUSAN RAUL, WALTER SIZEMORE, MECKLENBURG COUNTY, and THEODIS BECK, in his official capacity as Secretary of North Carolina Department of Correction, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Emory v. Pendergraph", "decision_date": "2002-11-19", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1591", "first_page": "181", "last_page": "186", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "154 N.C. App. 181" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" }, { "page": "445", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306084 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440838 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11913803 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "Trial court's determination of whether the language in a consent judgment was ambiguous is a question of law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081015 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "Trial court's determination of whether the language in a consent judgment was ambiguous is a question of law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890143 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.W.2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 2784018, 2781191 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470-71", "parenthetical": "stating that a trial judge's interpretation is irrelevant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/236/0026-01", "/neb/236/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.W.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11918656 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "stating that some deference is given to the trial court's interpretation" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/194/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.W.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11772287 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/588/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.W.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11846087 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825", "parenthetical": "stating the trial judge's interpretation is given \"great weight\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/578/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 F.3d 1112", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7653094 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1117", "parenthetical": "stating a trial court's interpretation is subject to an abuse of discretion standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/106/1112-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" }, { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092024 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470258 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519292 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 595, "char_count": 11053, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.461747694611195e-08, "percentile": 0.5174950354248452 }, "sha256": "ee77105d69cebed9d308b243c54f594f5aaefd0769a474acd3a58e61424f218f", "simhash": "1:cf60543694142654", "word_count": 1740 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:30:59.212861+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge THOMAS concur." ], "parties": [ "FREDDIE L. EMORY, Plaintiff v. JAMES \u201cJIM\u201d PENDERGRAPH, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the OFFICE OF SHERIFF OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY, PEERLESS INSURANCE COMPANY, as Surety of the Sheriff\u2019s Bond, SUSAN RAUL, WALTER SIZEMORE, MECKLENBURG COUNTY, and THEODIS BECK, in his official capacity as Secretary of North Carolina Department of Correction, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge\nI. Facts\nOn 24 June 1999, Freddie L. Emory, (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) failed to appear at his equitable distribution proceeding. Judge Jane Harper held plaintiff in civil contempt for failure to appear and ordered him \u201ccommitted to the jail of Mecklenburg County for a period of (30) days. ...\u201d\nOn 11 July 1999, plaintiff was arrested by Union County deputies and appeared before a magistrate who issued a Release Order, commonly called a \u201cblue sheet.\u201d The blue sheet directed plaintiff be released from custody if he made a \u201cpayment in cash in the amount shown above [$16,313] for judgements [sic] as decreed in Civil Contempt Order (see order for dispersement [sic] of funds).\u201d\nOn 13 July 1999, plaintiff appeared before Judge Harper, and was sentenced to, \u201c30 days work release [for] contempt.\u201d No new written order was filed by Judge Harper. Plaintiff informed defendants that his sentence was for a maximum term of thirty days. He presented portions of Judge Harper\u2019s original sentencing order to his work-release counselor, Monica Lindsey, to show the length of his sentence. Lindsey gave the papers to her supervisor, Defendant Susan Rail.\nRail made an inquiry to the Records and Classifications Department about plaintiff\u2019s sentence and was informed that it was indefinite. Rail also discussed plaintiffs protests with her superior, Defendant Walter Sizemore. Rail told plaintiff that he should retain an attorney if he wanted to be released because neither she nor her department could do anything about his incarceration.\nIn December 1999, Defendant Sizemore directed an employee to obtain plaintiffs district court file. Sizemore perceived that plaintiffs sentence to be thirty days. On 17 December 1999, Judge Harper ordered plaintiffs release.\nOn 27 September 2000, plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging false imprisonment, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and violations of the North Carolina State Constitution against defendants.\nOn 8 November 2000, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim for abuse of process. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Mecklenburg County as a defendant and to the dismissal of the claim of the violation of the state constitution. On 17 September 2001, Judge Forrest Bridges granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims. The trial court ruled that the wording of Judge Harper\u2019s order and the circumstances of incarceration evidenced no clear mandate, and held that plaintiff could not show defendants\u2019 \u201cdeliberate disregard\u201d in the absence of a clear mandate for plaintiff\u2019s release. Plaintiff appeals.\nII. Issues\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant and argues (1) the sentencing order was unclear as to the length of plaintiff\u2019s sentence and (2) defendants\u2019 conduct constituted deliberate disregard of the order, both issues of material fact for a jury.\nIII. Standard of Review\nOur standard of review is well-settled. \u201cWhere a motion for summary judgment is granted, the critical questions for determination on appeal are whether, on the basis of materials presented to the trial court, there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d You v. Roe, 97 N.C. App. 1, 7, 387 S.E.2d 188, 190 (1990) (citation omitted). \u201c[T]he evidence presented by the parties must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.\u201d Bruce-Terminix Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 130 N.C. App. 729, 733, 504 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1998) (citation omitted).\nIV. Clarity of Sentencing Order\nPlaintiff contends that summary judgment was improper because interpretation of the sentencing order presented issues of material fact. Defendants claim the interpretation of two orders, the blue sheet and Judge Harper\u2019s sentencing order, raised questions of law and not of fact.\nThe trial court determined that Judge Harper\u2019s order did not present a clear mandate to defendants concerning plaintiff\u2019s confinement period.\nThis Court further concludes that, even had Defendants obtained and reviewed the entirety of Judge Harper\u2019s June 24 Order, the wording of the Order and the circumstances of the Plaintiff\u2019s incarceration are such there was no clear mandate as to the date on which Plaintiff was entitled to be released.\n(Emphasis supplied).\nDefendants rely upon Blevins v. Welch, 137 N.C. App. 98, 527 S.E.2d 667 (2000) for the premise that an interpretation of a prior court order presents a question of law and should be given deference by a reviewing court.\nAlthough no unanimity seems to exist, several courts, in the context of ambiguous judgments, have given deference to the trial court\u2019s interpretation of the prior judgment. Exactly how much deference varies. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Stone & Webster Eng\u2019g Corp., 106 F.3d 1112, 1117 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating a trial court\u2019s interpretation is subject to an abuse of discretion standard); Holmberg v. Holmberg, 578 N.W.2d 817, 825 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (stating the trial judge\u2019s interpretation is given \u201cgreat weight\u201d), aff\u2019d, 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999); Schultz v. Schultz, 535 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that some deference is given to the trial court\u2019s interpretation). But see Kerndt v. Ronan, 458 N.W.2d 466, 470-71 (Neb. 1990) (stating that a trial judge\u2019s interpretation is irrelevant). Deference to a trial judge\u2019s interpretation is even more appropriate where, as here, that trial judge is the same one who presided over the original judgment now being interpreted. This is so because \u201cthe [trial judge\u2019s] resolution of the ambiguity is made based upon the judge\u2019s experience of trial or prior experience with the record.\u201d Schultz, 535 N. W.2d at 120. Here, the trial judge interpreted the 1983 judgment to include both roads. We will defer to his experience with this case and the parties and therefore affirm his interpretation.\nId. at 102, 527 S.E.2d at 671.\nBlevins is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. The judge interpreting the prior order in Blevins was the same judge who issued it. Id. at 102, 527 S.E.2d at 671. Judge Harper did not grant summary judgment on a complaint that questioned an order she had previously entered. That factual distinction between the cases is irrelevant because a superior court judge interpreted Judge Harper\u2019s order and found an ambiguity.\nWhether or not an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law, and our review of that determination is de novo. Bicket v. McLean Securities, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 548, 553, 478 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1996) (citations omitted). Similarly, the existence of an ambiguity in a court order is also a question of law, but resolution of the ambiguity is a question of fact. See Potter v. Hilemn Labs, Inc., 150 N.C. App. 326, 331, 564 S.E.2d 259, 263 (2002) (Trial court\u2019s determination of whether the language in a consent judgment was ambiguous is a question of law). The existence of an ambiguity in the orders is a question of law to be decided by the judge and is not a question of fact for the jury.\nA claim of false imprisonment requires a showing of \u201cthe illegal restraint of a person against his will.\u201d Marlowe v. Piner, 119 N.C. App. 125, 129, 458 S.E.2d 220, 223 (1995) (citation omitted). \u201cIllegal\u201d or \u201cunlawful\u201d necessarily implies deliberateness in defendants\u2019 actions. Defendants had no duty to go behind the face of either order. See Thomas v. Sellers, 142 N.C. App. 310, 313, 542 S.E.2d 283, 286 (2001) (citation omitted).\nIn Harwood v. Johnson, 326 N.C. 231, 388 S.E.2d 439 (1990), plaintiff filed a lawsuit for false imprisonment after plaintiff was granted a writ of habeas corpus. The court at the habeas corpus proceeding concluded that the parole commission did not follow mandatory provisions of a statute, which rendered the detention and imprisonment of the plaintiff \u201cunlawful.\u201d Id. at 236, 388 S.E.2d at 442. While the unlawful incarceration was undisputed, our Supreme Court found that plaintiff could only recover if he established on remand \u201cthat the members of the Parole Commission falsely imprisoned him by deliberately disregarding the mandate of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1371(f). . . .\u201d Id. at 242, 388 S.E.2d at 445 (emphasis supplied).\nThe trial court found no clear mandate for plaintiff\u2019s release because \u201cthe wording of [Judge Harper\u2019s] . . . order and the circumstances of the plaintiff\u2019s incarceration\u201d created an ambiguity. The trial court\u2019s determination of law is supported by existing law and substantial evidence. We find no basis to reverse this conclusion. Because plaintiff\u2019s release date was ambiguous, defendants did not deliberately disregard a clear mandate and did not intentionally restrain plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Deliberate Disregard\nPlaintiff\u2019s second assignment of error alleges that defendants\u2019 deliberate disregard of Judge Harper\u2019s original order presents a question of material fact. If the orders had provided a clear mandate to defendants, whether they deliberately disregarded the orders would be a question of fact. The orders did not provide a clear mandate to defendants for plaintiff\u2019s release. A claim for false imprisonment against defendants cannot be established without their knowledge of the wrongful restraint.\nVI. Conclusion\nWe affirm summary judgment for defendant on the basis that there is no claim for false imprisonment without a clear mandate for release in the orders to show unlawful confinement. As a result of this holding, we do not reach plaintiff\u2019s second issue. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge THOMAS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ferguson, Stein, Chambers, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, P.A., by Henderson Hill and Corie Pauling, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Scott D. MacLatchie, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FREDDIE L. EMORY, Plaintiff v. JAMES \u201cJIM\u201d PENDERGRAPH, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the OFFICE OF SHERIFF OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY, PEERLESS INSURANCE COMPANY, as Surety of the Sheriff\u2019s Bond, SUSAN RAUL, WALTER SIZEMORE, MECKLENBURG COUNTY, and THEODIS BECK, in his official capacity as Secretary of North Carolina Department of Correction, Defendants\nNo. COA01-1591\n(Filed 19 November 2002)\nFalse Imprisonment\u2014 civil contempt incarceration \u2014 ambiguous sentence\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants on a false imprisonment claim where plaintiff was arrested on 11 July and ordered released on 17 December on a 30 day civil contempt sentence. The sentencing court\u2019s order and the circumstances of plaintiffs incarceration did not provide a clear mandate to defendants for plaintiffs release date; a claim for false imprisonment cannot be established without defendants\u2019 knowledge of the wrongful restraint.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 17 September 2001 by Judge Forrest Donald Bridges in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 October 2002.\nFerguson, Stein, Chambers, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, P.A., by Henderson Hill and Corie Pauling, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Scott D. MacLatchie, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0181-01", "first_page_order": 209, "last_page_order": 214 }