{ "id": 9250876, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAURICE JOHNSTON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Johnston", "decision_date": "2002-12-03", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1379", "first_page": "500", "last_page": "504", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "154 N.C. App. 500" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573061 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916462 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168882 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549576 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338811 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 U.S. 318", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1147005 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/511/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11354849 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092188 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9783616, 9783489, 9784512, 9784931, 9785068, 9784364, 9784782, 9784238, 9785236, 9783863, 9783992, 9784122, 9784638 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1165-02", "/us/531/1165-01", "/us/531/1165-08", "/us/531/1165-11", "/us/531/1165-12", "/us/531/1165-07", "/us/531/1165-10", "/us/531/1165-06", "/us/531/1165-13", "/us/531/1165-03", "/us/531/1165-04", "/us/531/1165-05", "/us/531/1165-09" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685022 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "826" }, { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "339" }, { "page": "341-42" }, { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 501, "char_count": 9535, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.953369822139675e-07, "percentile": 0.8490284568714238 }, "sha256": "7067344a85919fac26d52f2d2898962ead3da5993fe85290e6d8e591f0a6b7dd", "simhash": "1:23885d2047660f52", "word_count": 1533 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:30:59.212861+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUDSON and CAMPBELL concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAURICE JOHNSTON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nThis case presents one fundamental issue: Does handcuffing a criminal suspect in the back of a police car constitute \u201ccustody\u201d and trigger the protections of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)? In State v. Buchanan, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that \u201cthe appropriate inquiry in determining whether a defendant is in \u2018custody\u2019 for purposes of Miranda is, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether there was a \u2018formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u2019 \u201d 353 N.C. 332, 339, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001) (citations omitted). Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that handcuffing defendant in the back of a police car did trigger Miranda protections, because it was a \u201crestraint on freedom of movement. . . associated with a formal arrest.\u201d Nonetheless, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt in this case, we hold this error to be harmless. Therefore, we uphold defendant\u2019s convictions of discharging a firearm into occupied property and assault with a deadly weapon.\nIn the early morning of 11 April 1998, the Pitt County Sheriff\u2019s Department responded to a complaint that a male, driving a gray car, fired shots into an occupied vehicle with a sawed-off shotgun. A few hours later, at the scene of the incident, police officers observed a gray Nissan Maxima driving along the side of the road. With their guns drawn, the officers stopped the vehicle, asked defendant to step out of the vehicle, handcuffed defendant, and placed defendant in the back of a patrol car. Although defendant was handcuffed, the police officers informed defendant that he was not under arrest, but only in \u201csecure custody\u201d for defendant\u2019s safety and the safety of the officers.\nWhen asked why he was at the scene, defendant told the officers that he was looking for a pocketbook. An officer advised defendant that he \u201cknew\u201d defendant \u201cwas actually looking for the shotgun.\u201d According to the officer, the defendant \u201cbecame verbal\u201d upon hearing this accusation and retorted: \u201cSo what if I threw the shotgun out.\u201d\nOver defendant\u2019s objection, and after the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, this statement was admitted into evidence. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the statement on the basis that defendant was not \u201cin custody\u201d when the statement was made, and on the basis that the statement was \u201cvoluntary\u201d rather than the product of interrogation. On 19 January 2001, defendant was convicted of discharging a firearm into occupied property and assault with a deadly weapon.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda; the statement was incurably prejudicial; and the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was an abuse of discretion demanding a new trial.\n\u201cIt is well established that the standard of review in evaluating a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u2018are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u2019 \u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1165 (2001)). \u201cThe determination of whether a defendant was in custody, based on those findings of fact, however, is a question of law and is fully reviewable by this Court.\u201d State v. Briggs, 137 N.C. App. 125, 128, 526 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2000) (citations omitted).\n\u201cMiranda warnings are required only when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation.\u201d State v. Patterson, 146 N.C. App. 113, 121, 552 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2001) (citations omitted). The Miranda Court defined \u201ccustodial interrogation\u201d as \u201cquestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.\u201d Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. \u201c[T]he appropriate inquiry in determining whether a defendant is in \u2018custody\u2019 for purposes of Miranda is, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether there was a \u2018formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u2019 \u201d Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828 (citations omitted).\nThe United States Supreme Court has consistently held that \u201cthe initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.\u201d Id. at 341, 543 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)). \u201cA policeman\u2019s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question of whether a suspect was \u2018in custody\u2019 at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation.\u201d Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 341-42, 543 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)).\nAfter a careful review of the record, we conclude, as a matter of law, that defendant was in \u201ccustody.\u201d The record reveals that defendant was ordered out of his vehicle at gun point, handcuffed, placed in the back of a patrol car, and questioned by detectives. Although the officers informed defendant that he was in \u201csecure custody\u201d rather than under arrest, we conclude that defendant\u2019s freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. A reasonable person under these circumstances would believe that he was under arrest.\nHowever, the record further shows that defendant\u2019s conviction was supported by overwhelming evidence, therefore the trial court\u2019s error was harmless. Evidence admitted in violation of Miranda is subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Hicks, 333 N.C. 467, 479, 428 S.E.2d 167, 174 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 340, 543 S.E.2d at 828. However, \u201cbefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must . . . declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443 (2001). The burden is on the State to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2001).\nIn this case, the State presented overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Defendant\u2019s car and a person matching defendant\u2019s description were described by the 911-caller; defendant and his car were found at the crime scene; and defendant and defendant\u2019s car were positively identified at trial by various witnesses. We conclude, therefore, that the erroneous admission of defendant\u2019s statement was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAs a second assignment of error, defendant contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defendant\u2019s motion to sequester the State\u2019s witnesses. \u201cA ruling on matters involving the sequestration of witnesses is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and is not reviewable absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Williamson, 122 N.C. App. 229, 233, 468 S.E.2d 840, 844 (1996) (citations omitted). \u201cA discretionary ruling is reversible only where it is shown that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Id. (citations omitted). Defendant argues that the trial court should have weighed evidence or heard oral arguments before ruling on the motion. Defendant did not object to the court\u2019s ruling or request to be heard. Instead, \u201c[defendant... stood silently by and did not object.... In these circumstances, defendant has waived whatever objection he may have had, and his belated complaint may not be \u2018heard\u2019 on appeal.\u201d State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 699, 292 S.E.2d 264, 270 (1982). Even assuming defendant has the right to be \u201cheard\u201d on appeal, we find no merit to defendant\u2019s argument and overrule the assignment of error.\nWe have examined defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error and find them to be without merit.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUDSON and CAMPBELL concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Mark J. Pletzke, for the State.", "Angela H. Brown, for the defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAURICE JOHNSTON, Defendant\nNo. COA01-1379\n(Filed 3 December 2002)\n1. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 \u201csecure custody\u201d \u2014 custodial interrogation \u2014 absence of Miranda warnings \u2014 harmless error\nA defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when he was ordered out of his vehicle at gunpoint, handcuffed, placed in the back of a patrol car, and questioned by detectives. Despite being told that he was in \u201csecure custody\u201d rather than under arrest, defendant\u2019s freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Therefore, the trial court erred by admitting a statement made by defendant in response to interrogation without Miranda warnings, \u201cSo what if I threw the shotgun out,\u201d but this error was harmless in light of the other overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to object at trial\nAn assault defendant\u2019s contention that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying his motion to sequester witnesses was not heard on appeal where defendant did not request to be heard or object to the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 January 2001 by Judge Clifton W. Everett, Jr., in Superior Court, Pitt County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 August 2002.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Mark J. Pletzke, for the State.\nAngela H. Brown, for the defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0500-01", "first_page_order": 528, "last_page_order": 532 }