{ "id": 9251233, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KAWAME LLOYD MAYS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Mays", "decision_date": "2002-12-17", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1388", "first_page": "572", "last_page": "580", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "154 N.C. App. 572" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522390 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521445 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416-17", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521141 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138326 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604316 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560781 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2570601 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "75" }, { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-34.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570230 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "620-1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-17", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138385 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135761, 135929, 135601, 135772 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0527-04", "/nc/353/0527-01", "/nc/353/0527-03", "/nc/353/0527-02" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441388 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139575 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4739096 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" }, { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2540746 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S. Ct. 178", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219986 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659896 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867652 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386-87" }, { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798972 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793102 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139375 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307-8", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L.Ed.2d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9679042, 9678662, 9678761, 9678795, 9678864, 9678962, 9678739, 9678834, 9678903, 9678645, 9678999, 9678940, 9678686, 9678719 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1018-14", "/us/531/1018-02", "/us/531/1018-06", "/us/531/1018-07", "/us/531/1018-09", "/us/531/1018-12", "/us/531/1018-05", "/us/531/1018-08", "/us/531/1018-10", "/us/531/1018-01", "/us/531/1018-13", "/us/531/1018-11", "/us/531/1018-03", "/us/531/1018-04" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155877 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0481-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 917, "char_count": 21140, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.67680748622093e-08, "percentile": 0.5291188791315633 }, "sha256": "e1f3c8611543ff63ea216a1b53530d09fb89f7cf420ae23358102ee158ce18dc", "simhash": "1:cf6af7021736a75c", "word_count": 3450 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:30:59.212861+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and HUDSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KAWAME LLOYD MAYS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nDefendant was indicted by the Wake County Grand Jury on 4 August 1997 and charged with one count of murder in the death of Michael Walker (\u201cWalker\u201d) and one count of murder in the death of Paul Hale. The cases were joined and tried before a jury at the 4 May 1998 session of the Wake County Superior Court, Judge Donald W. Stephens (\u201cJudge Stephens\u201d) presiding. The jury was unable to reach a verdict in the death of Paul Hale, and the court declared a mistrial as to that charge.\nThe evidence regarding the charge of murder of Walker tended to show that defendant met Linda Bass (\u201cBass\u201d), the only eyewitness to the murder, in early July 1997. After midnight on 11 July 1997, defendant arrived at Bass\u2019 house to spend the night on Bass\u2019 couch. While defendant slept, Walker arrived at Bass\u2019 home. He stayed for a short time and then left with an unidentified man. Approximately an hour later, a fight broke out in the street and the noise awakened defendant and Bass. When Bass saw Walker was being beaten by two men she yelled for them to stop. The men fled and Walker ran to Bass\u2019 porch for safety. Walker repeatedly stated he \u201cwasn\u2019t doing anything.\u201d He asked Bass to walk him to his truck which was parked straight across the street, but Bass told Walker that he would be safe walking to his truck on his own. No words were exchanged between Walker and defendant. As Walker walked to his truck, defendant asked Bass why Walker had asked her to walk him to his truck and Bass explained that he must have been afraid the men who had just beaten him up would return.\nAs Walker got in his truck, started it, and began to pull away defendant began to shoot his gun. Bass testified defendant was approximately \u201c50 feet\u201d away from the truck, which was \u201cstraight across in front of him\u201d when the defendant began shooting. The defendant \u201cshot straight at the truck. And then when the truck was going up the street he took a step up, couple of steps up, and shot at the back of the truck straight ahead.\u201d One of the bullets entered the left side window of the truck, fragmented, and struck Walker in the back of his head, killing him.\nWalker\u2019s truck then crashed into the back of James Hinton\u2019s (\u201cHinton\u201d) car which was parked on the side of the street in front of his home. When Bass asked defendant why he had shot his gun, defendant responded, \u201cI\u2019m sorry.\u201d\nDefendant testified that he shot from the same place and didn\u2019t move, he couldn\u2019t see the truck while he was shooting, he didn\u2019t mean to shoot Walker, but he was shooting \u201cin the direction of\u2019 the truck.\nIn the death of Michael Walker, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree based upon the felony murder rule. The court imposed a sentence of life without parole upon the defendant.\nDefendant appeals his conviction and contends the trial court erred by: (I) denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it failed to set forth each and every element of first degree murder in violation of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions; (II) permitting the State to make racially discriminatory peremptory challenges; (III) submitting the offense of felony murder to the jury without substantial evidence to support the charge; (IV) failing to submit the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter to the jury.\nI. Constitutionality of the Indictment\nDefendant contends, for preservation of the issue, that the short-form indictment violates his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19, 22, and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. However, defendant acknowledges the North Carolina Supreme Court has considered the issue and held the short-form indictment constitutional. State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 528 S.E.2d 326, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018, 148 L.Ed.2d 498 (2000). Thus, we hold accordingly.\nII. Constitutionality of Peremptory Challenges\nDefendant contends the court erred by permitting the State to make racially based peremptory challenges in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19 and 26 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nThe constitutionality of the State\u2019s use of a peremptory challenge is determined by application of a three-step inquiry set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The North Carolina Supreme Court recently explained the three steps as follows:\nFirst, defendant must establish a prima facie case that the peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis of race. Second, if such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a racially neutral explanation to rebut defendant\u2019s prima facie case. Third, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.\nState v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 307-8, 488 S.E.2d 550, 560 (1997) (citations omitted). To properly establish a prima facie case, the \u201cdefendant need only show that the relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors solely because of their race.\u201d State v. Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 144, 462 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1995).\nWhen the trial court rules against the defendant, and holds the defendant did not establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, appellate review is generally limited to whether the trial court erred in that ruling. State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 359, 471 S.E.2d 379, 386-87 (1996). This limitation applies even when the prosecutor has furnished the record with his explanation for the challenge. Id., 343 N.C. at 359, 471 S.E.2d at 387. In such a case, the appellate court considers the prosecutor\u2019s reasons only if it determines the trial court erred. Id. When, however, the prosecutor volunteers his reasons to the trial court before the trial court rules, then, despite the trial court\u2019s ultimate ruling that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case, the appellate court proceeds as though the defendant had established a prima facie case and examines the prosecutor\u2019s explanations. State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 308, 488 S.E.2d 550, 560 (1997). In such a case, the appellate court considers the prosecutor\u2019s explanations pursuant to step two of Batson, and then proceeds to step three, inquiring whether the trial court was correct in its ultimate determination that the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges did not constitute intentional discrimination. Id.\nFor each Batson challenge in this case, Judge Stephens ruled defendant had not adequately set forth a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Judge Stephens then offered the prosecutor the opportunity to state his reasons \u201cfor the record.\u201d With regard to the first Batson challenge the prosecutor declined the opportunity, but for all of the following challenges the prosecutor stated his reasons for the record. Since the prosecutor\u2019s statements were made at the direction of Judge Stephens for the record and not to assist the trial court\u2019s ruling on the existence of a prima facie case, such statements are not considered by the appellate court unless the court determines that the trial court erred in its ruling that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case.\n\u201cSince the trial judge\u2019s findings . . . largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.\u201d Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 89 n.21. Our appellate courts accord great deference in reviewing the trial court\u2019s ruling on the establishment of a prima facie case. State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 527, 476 S.E.2d 349, 355 (1996). The trial court\u2019s ultimate Batson decision \u201cwill be upheld unless the appellate court is convinced that the trial court\u2019s determination is clearly erroneous.\u201d State v. Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 313, 500 S.E.2d 668, 680 (1998).\nTo review defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court erred in ruling that he had failed to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, we consider the following factors:\n[(1)] whether the \u2018prosecutor used a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges to strike African-American jurors in a single case;\u2019 [(2)] whether the defendant is a \u2018member of a cognizable racial minority;\u2019 . . . [(3)] whether the state\u2019s challenges appear to have been motivated by racial discrimination; . . . [(4)] \u2018the victim\u2019s race[;] [(5)] the race of the State\u2019s key witnesses!;]\u2019 and [(6)] \u2018whether the prosecutor made racially motivated statements or asked racially motivated questions of black prospective jurors . . . that raise [d] an inference of discrimination.\u2019\nState v. Nicholson, 355 N.C. 1, 22, 558 S.E.2d 109, 125, cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 178, - U.S. -, - L. Ed. 2d - (2002) (citations omitted).\nHere, defendant is African-American, Walker was white, the State\u2019s witnesses were both white and African-American, and the State\u2019s key witness, the only eyewitness, is African-American. The record reveals no racially motivated statements made by the prosecutor. At the conclusion of jury selection, when addressing the final juror challenged under Batson, Judge Stephens explicitly stated, \u201clooking at the face of the entire record in these proceedings the Court cannot say that there has been a prima facie showing that race has been a motivating factor in the exclusion of jurors.\u201d\nThe prosecutor exercised nearly 70% (nine of thirteen) of his peremptory challenges against African-American jurors. In State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 123, 400 S.E.2d 712, 725 (1991), \u201cthe State exercised 80% of the peremptories used to remove black potential jurors.\u201d There, the Court held defendant had established a prima facie Batson case by proving an inference of racial discrimination. In Smith, however, there was also a statement by the prosecutor that \u201ctends to support ... an inference of discrimination.\u201d Id. Moreover, the case \u201cinvolved an interracial killing and attracted much attention,\u201d and the \u201cracial emotions and publicity surrounding the case were substantial enough for the defendant to successfully seek a change of venue.\u201d Smith, 328 N.C. at 122, 400 S.E.2d at 725. As in Smith, defendant here was a young, African-American man, and the victims were both white. Unlike Smith, however, defendant\u2019s motion to change venue was denied, and publicity was such that many jurors had never he\u00e1rd of the case. Therefore, while the percentages of peremptory challenges were high in both cases, other elements supporting an inference are not present in the case at bar.\nSince Judge Stephens was present to assess credibility, we will not overturn his judgment unless it was clearly erroneous. Considering all the factors, we cannot say the trial court erred in determining defendant failed to prove a prima facie Batson case.\nIII. Submission of Felony Murder Charge to the Jury\nDefendant contends the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to dismiss the charge of felony murder and instead submitting the charge to the jury because this charge was not supported by the evidence and therefore violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nAn appellate court reviewing such a motion to dismiss for lack of evidence must examine \u201cthe evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the State, in order to determine whether there is substantial evidence of every essential element of the crime.\u201d State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 571, 356 S.E.2d 319, 325 (1987). Substantial evidence is defined as \u201crelevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Allen, 346 N.C. 731, 739, 488 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1997). \u201c[T]he evidence need only give rise to a reasonable inference of guilt for the case to be properly submitted to the jury.\u201d State v. Barnett, 141 N.C. App. 378, 383, 540 S.E.2d 423, 427 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 527, 549 S.E.2d 552, aff\u2019d in part, 354 N.C. 350, 554 S.E.2d 644 (2001).\nThe felony murder rule applies to this case through the interaction of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-17 and 14-34.1. The law provides that \u201c[a]ny person who willfully or wantonly discharges or attempts to discharge ... [a] firearm... into any... vehicle ... while it is occupied is guilty of a.. . felony.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1 (2001). \u201cA murder . . . committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any . . . felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17 (2001).\nDefendant asserts the State failed to prove he intentionally shot into Walker\u2019s truck. The State presented the testimony of Bass, the only eyewitness, to prove that defendant shot \u201cstraight at the truck\u201d took a few steps and continued shooting at the truck. Defendant argues that this evidence is insufficient to prove defendant intended to shoot Walker in the truck, but rather \u201c[t]he only credible inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that defendant was attempting to scare Walker away or discourage him from returning to Bass\u2019 house.\u201d We disagree.\n\u201cA criminal defendant is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. It is an inherently incredible proposition that defendant could have intentionally fired a shot \u2018at\u2019 the fleeing [automobile] without intending that the bullet go \u2018into\u2019 the vehicle.\u201d State v. Wall, 304 N.C. 609, 617, 286 S.E.2d 68, 73 (1982). Moreover, \u201cany rational trier of fact could find the defendant intended to fire into the vehicle from the evidence that the defendant pointed the pistol toward the vehicle and fired the pistol so that a bullet went into the vehicle.\u201d State v. Wheeler, 321 N.C. 725, 727, 365 S.E.2d 609, 610 (1988). Therefore, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove defendant committed the felony of intentionally firing a gun into an occupied vehicle. Since the State presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that defendant intended to shoot at Walker\u2019s truck as Walker drove away, the crime of felony murder was properly submitted by the trial court to the jury.\nIV. Submission of Involuntary Manslaughter to the Jury\nDefendant contends the trial court erred by not submitting the charge of involuntary manslaughter to the jury.\n\u201cThe trial judge must charge on a lesser included offense if: (1) the evidence is equivocal on an element of the greater offense so that the jury could reasonably find either the existence or the nonexistence of this element; and (2) absent this element only a conviction of the lesser included offense would be justified.\u201d State v. Whitaker, 307 N.C. 115, 118, 296 S.E.2d 273, 274 (1982). There must be evidence to support a conviction of the lesser offense, \u201c[t]he presence of such evidence is the determinative factor.... Mere contention that the jury might accept the State\u2019s evidence in part and might reject it in part will not suffice.\u201d State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 159-60, 84 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1954). If the crime charged is felony murder, then the trial court need not instruct the jury on a lesser included offense unless the \u201cevidence also tended to show that the murder was not committed in the course of the commission of a felony.\u201d State v. Wilson, 354 N.C. 493, 506, 556 S.E.2d 272, 281 (2001).\nFelony murder requires (1) a felony and (2) a related killing. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17. The felony, here, was \u201c(1) the willful or wanton discharging (2) of a firearm (3) into any building [or vehicle] (4) while it is occupied.\u201d State v. Jones, 104 N.C. App. 251, 258, 409 S.E.2d 322, 326 (1991); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1. Defendant contends he did not commit a felony because he did not act willfully or wantonly in discharging his gun into Walker\u2019s truck while Walker drove away.\n[W]ilful as used in criminal statutes means the wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in violation of the law. Wantonness ... connotes intentional wrongdoing_Conduct is wanton when in conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others.\nState v. Casey, 60 N.C. App. 414, 416-17, 299 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1983) (citations omitted).\nDefendant\u2019s argument is similar to the argument asserted by the defendant in Wall. Wall, 304 N.C. at 620, 286 S.E.2d at 75. In Wall, the defendant was a convenience store clerk who shot into a car fleeing after one of the occupants stole beer from the store. Defendant appealed his conviction of first degree murder asserting manslaughter was the more appropriate charge. Defendant testified that he did not intend to shoot the victim, but rather fired his gun into the air intending to scare the thieves away. The Court held the trial court could have submitted only the charge of first degree felony murder to the jury, reasoning \u201call the evidence discloses that defendant killed the victim \u2018by discharging a firearm into occupied property.\u2019 \u201d Wall, 304 N.C. at 620-1, 286 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-34.1).\nIn Wall, the defendant asserted a more persuasive argument than in the case at bar. Defendant Wall offered the excuse that he shot over the car attempting to scare the thieves away. His excuse is more supportive of a finding that there was a justification or excuse and therefore lack of willfulness than this defendant\u2019s response that he does not know why he started shooting. Moreover, the fact that defendant Wall shot over the car would more strongly support a conclusion that he was not acting wantonly than the eyewitness\u2019 testimony in this case that defendant shot \u201cstraight at\u201d the truck. Despite these arguments the North Carolina Supreme Court in Wall held that all the evidence supported the charge of felony murder, and therefore the trial court could have submitted only the charge of felony murder.\nIn both Wall and this case, all the evidence supports the finding that defendant willfully and wantonly discharged a firearm into an occupied vehicle thereby causing a death. Since all the evidence supports the finding of felony murder, defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges WYNN and HUDSON concur.\n. \u201cAlthough we recognize that the State was not required in this case to come forward with neutral explanations for its challenges, we observe that it would often be of benefit to a reviewing court if those reasons were articulated in the record.\u201d State v. Robinson, 97 N.C. App. 597, 601, 389 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1990). Here, Judge Stephens encouraged the prosecutor to follow this advice by noting that while he may stand on his election not to speak, it would be \u201cprudent\u201d to provide, for the record, his reasons for peremptorily striking a juror.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorneys General John G. Barnwell and Robert G. Montgomery, for the State.", "Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Robert Manner Hurley, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KAWAME LLOYD MAYS\nNo. COA01-1388\n(Filed 17 December 2002)\n1. Homicide\u2014 short-form indictment \u2014 first-degree murder\u2014 constitutionality\nA short-form indictment for first-degree murder is constitutional.\n2. Jury\u2014 selection \u2014 peremptory challenges \u2014 Batson challenge\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by allegedly permitting the State to make racially-based peremptory challenges in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19 and 26 of the North Carolina Constitution, because: (1) the record revealed no racially motivated statements made by the prosecutor; and (2) although the prosecutor exercised nearly seventy percent of his peremptory challenges against African-American jurors, other factors supporting an inference of discrimination were not present.\n3. Homicide\u2014 felony murder \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by failing to grant defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of felony murder, because: (1) a criminal defendant is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that defendant intended to shoot at the victim\u2019s truck as the victim drove away.\n4. Homicide\u2014 felony murder \u2014 failure to submit lesser-included charge \u2014 involuntary manslaughter\nThe trial court did not err in a felony murder case by failing to submit the lesser-included charge of involuntary manslaughter, because: (1) the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense unless the evidence also tended to show that the murder was not committed in the course of the commission of a felony; and (2) all the evidence supported the finding that defendant willfully and wantonly discharged a firearm into an occupied vehicle thereby causing the victim\u2019s death.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 May 1998 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 August 2002.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorneys General John G. Barnwell and Robert G. Montgomery, for the State.\nCenter for Death Penalty Litigation, by Robert Manner Hurley, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0572-01", "first_page_order": 600, "last_page_order": 608 }