{ "id": 9251314, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES MANDEL WHITE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. White", "decision_date": "2002-12-17", "docket_number": "No. COA01-1495", "first_page": "598", "last_page": "607", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "154 N.C. App. 598" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2393544 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-87", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9128585 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442413 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867565 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9127969 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567356 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790203 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293-94", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696312 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "quoting Commentary to N.C. R. Evid. 403" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720164 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "quoting Commentary to N.C. R. Evid. 403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522544 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530965 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0729-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 914, "char_count": 21610, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0941452235591315e-07, "percentile": 0.7607740837400173 }, "sha256": "e81ed8a2b0dce8cd13e59f2605c9b7e8ac416b0853ce8d91b88c9ac3d7ccac5e", "simhash": "1:a32b0c35eeae4046", "word_count": 3541 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:30:59.212861+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUDSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES MANDEL WHITE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nDefendant was indicted on 26 June 2000 for first degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon of Ernest Odell Easom (\u201cEasom\u201d) and felonious burning of Easom\u2019s automobile. Defendant was tried before a jury on 16 April 2001, Judge Jack A. Thompson (\u201cJudge Thompson\u201d) presiding. On 2 May 2001, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of murder in the first degree under the felony murder rule, guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and not guilty of burning personal property. Judge Thompson arrested judgment on the conviction of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without parole.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that Easom was an elderly man who occasionally hired people to do his yard work. Easom paid for these services with a meal and cash. Defendant was hired by Easom in mid-November 1999 to trim tree limbs, and was paid in part with a meal. On 12 December 1999, defendant began staying approximately one quarter mile from Easom\u2019s home in the trailer of an acquaintance, Jeffrey Allen Gallier (\u201cGallier\u201d).\nIn the early evening hours of Monday, 13 December 1999, the defendant visited a friend, Andrea McKenzie (\u201cMcKenzie\u201d) and asked her for a knife sharpener, and explained he planned to \u201ctake care of\u2019 someone who owed him money. He obtained a long butcher knife with a brown handle. The knife appeared to be rusty. McKenzie testified the defendant said that if he wasn\u2019t paid he was going to kill the person who owed him money. At approximately 9 p.m. that evening, defendant returned to McKenzie\u2019s home driving a car. There was blood all over him and the knife. Defendant said, \u201cI told you I was going to get him.\u201d He took a shower and left his clothes to be washed. Defendant then went back outside, brought a television into the house, and asked McKenzie if she wanted to buy it for $165 or $175. McKenzie accepted the television and told the defendant she would pay him in a few days. Later that week McKenzie sold the television to her relative Jovan Carter (\u201cCarter\u201d) for $40.\nGallier, the man with whom defendant was staying, testified that on either Monday or Tuesday, 13 or 14 December, defendant came in around midnight with a black trash bag with groceries including Bob\u2019s Candy Canes, Ritz Crackers, Carefree Gum, coffee, canned goods, macaroni with beef, and eggs and other trash bags. Gallier found this strange since defendant had no source of income or money. Defendant explained that a lady friend had given him the groceries. Around this time Gallier noticed that his foot-long, wooden-handled kitchen knife was missing. The knife was not rusty, but did give that appearance.\nThe day following the murder and robbery the Cumberland County Sheriff\u2019s Office was called regarding a burning car. The license plate revealed the car belonged to Easom. On Friday, 17 December 1999, Detective Bobby Home (\u201cDetective Home\u201d) went to Easom\u2019s home to investigate the burning of the car. As he arrived, some of Easom\u2019s family also arrived and indicated they were worried because they hadn\u2019t seen Easom in a few days. Detective Horne approached the house, found it locked, but looked through a window and saw a body lying in the kitchen.\nDetective Horne called for assistance and an investigation began. There was no sign of forced entry. After prying the back door open with a crowbar, Officers entered and found Easom lying on his back with a pillow over his face. The pillow had a bloodstain from what appeared to be a long knife blade, as if the knife had been wiped off on the pillow. Coins were found on the floor around Easom\u2019s body, but no wallet or currency was found on his person. The kitchen cabinets were open and appeared to have been disturbed, and there were boxes of food on the floor. There were boxes of Bob\u2019s Candy Canes, Ritz Crackers, and Carefree Gum in the home. There was a box of white trash bags on the kitchen table and large black trash bags on the china cabinet. In the living room the entertainment center had a space where a television would normally go and a dust pattern consistent with there having been an item there. Instruction books for a Zenith Two Model television were found, but no such television was in the home.\nAn autopsy revealed Easom died from three stab wounds. One wound was to the left side of his abdomen. Another was to his upper right chest, penetrating his lung. The incision from the third indicated that it took at least three strokes to lacerate his right carotid artery. He had not been suffocated with the pillow.\nFurther evidence was developed during the investigation. An expert, who studied the trash bags\u2019 extrusion lines and the melt pattern that is part of the manufacturing process, testified that, in his opinion, based on markings from the manufacturing process, the trash bag defendant brought to Gallier\u2019s trailer was from the roll found in Easom\u2019s home. Defendant\u2019s fingerprints were on some of the groceries he brought into Gallier\u2019s trailer. The television recovered from Carter\u2019s home was a Zenith Two Model, the same brand and model as the instruction book found in Easom\u2019s home.\nEasom\u2019s sister-in-law, who lived behind him, recalled the last time she saw Easom alive was the afternoon of 13 December 1999. That evening at approximately 8 p.m. she noticed the brake lights of Easom\u2019s car repeatedly going on and off. The car was then driven away. She noted this was unusual because Easom never left home so late at night.\nDemarco Murphy (\u201cMurphy\u201d), a friend of defendant, testified he was with defendant a few days before the incident and defendant had threatened he was going to kill a man who owed him money. Jerome Banks (\u201cBanks\u201d), a cellmate of defendant, testified defendant admitted he had started robbing a man he knew and when the man resisted he stabbed the man and cut his throat because the man knew him. Banks testified defendant told him defendant had taken the man\u2019s television and left.\nDefendant declined to submit evidence.\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by: (I) admitting the fingerprint evidence; (II) allowing a police investigator to testify that the pillowcase placed over Easom\u2019s face indicated that Easom knew his attacker; (III) allowing the same investigator to testify the television recovered from Carter\u2019s residence was \u201cmore than probably\u201d Easom\u2019s; (IV) failing to dismiss for insufficient evidence the charge of robbery and felony murder.\nI. Fingerprint Evidence\nDefendant asserts the trial court erred by admitting evidence of defendant\u2019s fingerprints on a box of Ritz Crackers and Bob\u2019s Candy Canes found inside Gallier\u2019s trailer. Defendant asserts that the evidence is not relevant, and alternatively, if it is relevant that its probative value was substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice.\nRelevant evidence is \u201cevidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2001). \u201c[I]n a criminal case every circumstance calculated to throw any light upon the supposed crime is admissible.\u201d State v. Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 735, 440 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1994). \u201c[E]ven though a trial court\u2019s rulings on relevancy technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403, such rulings are given great deference on appeal.\u201d State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991). Here, the fingerprint evidence tends to show defendant touched the food items. The evidence thereby tends to corroborate Gallier\u2019s testimony concerning these food items. When considered with Gallier\u2019s testimony that defendant brought the food home around the time of the murder, that the brands of food were the same as the disturbed items in Easom\u2019s house, and the expert\u2019s testimony that the trash bag used to transport the food came from Easom\u2019s home, the fingerprint evidence tends to \u201cshed light\u201d on the robbery. Therefore, the fingerprint evidence was relevant.\n\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2001). \u201cUnfair prejudice has been defined as \u2018an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.\u2019 \u201d State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 731, 340 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1986) (quoting Commentary to N.C. R. Evid. 403). Whether or not to exclude evidence as being unfairly prejudicial is a matter \u201cwithin the sound discretion of the trial judge.\u201d Id. \u201c[H]is ruling may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that it \u2018was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d Id., (quoting State v. Thompson, 314 N.C. 618, 626, 336 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1985)). While this evidence tends to support the finding that a robbery occurred,, it does not provoke an emotional response or another improper basis influencing the jury in its consideration of the evidence. This evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, and therefore was properly admitted. Accordingly, we hold admission of this evidence was not error.\nII. Pillowcase Testimony\nDefendant argues the trial court erred in permitting Lieutenant Ray Wood (\u201cLieutenant Wood\u201d) to testify that the pillow placed across Easom\u2019s face was significant because it suggested he knew his attacker. Defendant argues that Lieutenant Wood was testifying as a lay witness, and as such could only testify to his personal observations. Since Lieutenant Wood did not personally observe the pillow over Easom\u2019s face, he could not testify to the conclusions he drew from this fact. The State asserts Lieutenant Wood was testifying as an expert witness, and as such could testify that the pillow over Easom\u2019s face indicated to him that Easom knew his attacker.\nGenerally an expert witness is tendered to the court for a ruling that the witness possesses the requisite skill.\nWhile the better practice may be to make a formal tender of a witness as an expert, such a tender is not required. Further, absent a request by a party, the trial court is not required to make a formal finding as to a witness\u2019 qualification to testify as an expert witness. Such a finding has been held to be implicit in the court\u2019s admission of the testimony in question. Defendant must specifically object to the qualifications of an expert witness in order to preserve the objection.\nState v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 293-94, 457 S.E.2d 841, 858 (1995) (citations omitted). Therefore, \u201ca mere general objection to the content of the witness\u2019s testimony will not ordinarily suffice to preserve the matter for subsequent review.\u201d State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 243, 287 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1982).\nThe prosecutor was implicitly eliciting expert testimony by inquiring, \u201c[W]hat was the significance of that [the pillow over Easom\u2019s face] to you based on your training and experience?\u201d Defendant made a general objection. The court overruled defendant\u2019s objection thereby implicitly accepting the witness as an expert. Since defendant made a general objection to the Lieutenant\u2019s testimony, and did not specifically object to the qualification of the Lieutenant as an expert, the issue of whether Lieutenant Wood was properly qualified as an expert was not preserved for appellate review.\nThe issue remains whether Lieutenant Wood\u2019s expert testimony was \u201cpatently inadmissible and prejudicial\u201d as asserted by defendant. Expert witnesses may testify regarding a fact in issue in the form of an opinion. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (2001). \u201cThe facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be of those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 703 (2001). Moreover, \u201cexpert testimony is properly admissible when such testimony can assist the jury to draw certain inferences from facts because the expert is better qualified.\u201d State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 139, 322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1984). \u201c[T]he trial judge is afforded wide latitude of discretion when making a determination about the admissibility of expert testimony.\u201d Id., 312 N.C. at 140, 322 S.E.2d at 376. Here, Lieutenant Wood had \u201ctraining, and various courses and experience in working certain cases\u201d which led him to conclude that \u201cthere are times that the significance of an object such as a pillow or a cloth being placed over somebody\u2019s face can mean in a case that the perpetrator knew the victim and did not want to see their face or have their face appear either before, during, or after the crime.\u201d Since Lieutenant Wood testified in the form of an opinion based on his expertise, and the testimony was likely to assist the jury making an inference from the circumstances of the crime, the trial court properly admitted the testimony.\nIII. Television Testimony\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by permitting Lieutenant Wood to testify that in his opinion the Zenith Two Model television found in Carter\u2019s possession was \u201cmore than probably the television from Easom\u2019s residence.\u201d\nSince the qualification of a witness as an expert depends upon their \u201cknowledge, skill, experience, training of education,\u201d a witness may be an expert on some issues and classified as a layman on other issues. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702. There is no indication here of special training or other qualifications which would elevate Lieutenant Wood\u2019s conclusion regarding the original ownership of the television to that of an expert\u2019s opinion. There is also no indication of the court\u2019s acceptance of Lieutenant Wood as an expert on this matter.\nAs a layman, Lieutenant Wood\u2019s testimony must have been rationally based on his perception and helpful to the jury. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 (2001). Here, Lieutenant Wood\u2019s testimony that the recovered television was \u201cmore than probably\u201d Easom\u2019s television was not based upon his perception. Moreover, Lieutenant Wood was in no better position than the jury to deduce whether the television found with Carter was Easom\u2019s television. The jury is charged with drawing its own conclusions from the evidence, and without being influenced by the conclusion of Lieutenant Wood. Therefore, we find the trial court erred in permitting this testimony.\nThe next issue, is whether or not this error was prejudicial. \u201cIn order to show prejudicial error, defendant must show that a different result would have been reached at trial if the evidence had not been admitted.\u201d State v. Patterson, 149 N.C. App. 354, 364, 561 S.E.2d 321, 327 (2002) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1999)). Since there is substantial circumstantial evidence which links defendant to this crime, and the jury could have drawn the conclusion that defendant committed the crime without input from Lieutenant Wood, we hold defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that he would not have been found guilty if Lieutenant Wood\u2019s testimony had not been permitted. Therefore, though the testimony was error, we hold it was not prejudicial error.\nIV. Insufficient Evidence of Robbery\nDefendant asserts there was insufficient evidence to prove he robbed Easom of Easom\u2019s car, television, or groceries because the only evidence submitted is circumstantial. Without sufficient evidence to prove the items were taken by defendant, defendant asserts the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nIn reviewing a motion to dismiss this Court asks \u201cwhether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996). \u201cSubstantial evidence is that which a reasonable juror would consider sufficient to support a conclusion that each essential element of the crime exists.\u201d State v. Baldwin, 141 N.C. App. 596, 604, 540 S.E.2d 815, 821 (2000). \u201cIn reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences.\u201d State v. Payne, 149 N.C. App. 421, 425, 561 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2002). Violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-87, robbery with firearms or other dangerous weapons, requires a person who \u201cwith use or threatened use of any . . . dangerous weapon . . ., whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal property from another . . . either day or night.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-87(a) (2001).\nDefendant asserts there was insufficient evidence of a taking because the only evidence of the taking was circumstantial. We disagree. \u201cUnquestionably circumstantial evidence is \u2018essential and, when properly understood and applied, highly satisfactory in matters of the gravest moment.\u2019 \u201d State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 28, 310 S.E.2d 587, 602 (1984) (citations omitted). For circumstantial evidence to support a conviction \u201cthe jurors must be convinced of the defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Id.\nDefendant left to kill a man who owed him money, and returned, covered in blood, and bragging he had killed the man. Defendant left without a car, television or groceries, and returned with those items. Easom\u2019s car was stolen and found burned. The space in Easom\u2019s entertainment center that would normally contain a television was empty. Easom had Zenith Model Two instruction books for a television not found in his house, but matching the television defendant sold to McKenzie. Easom\u2019s groceries had been disturbed, and the same brand item groceries were brought home by defendant. The trash bag defendant used to bring in the groceries came from a roll of bags in Easom\u2019s home. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the State a reasonable jury could have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a taking. Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence of the taking element of the crime of robbery with a dangerous weapon.\nNo prejudicial error.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUDSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel P O\u2019Brien, for the State.", "James R. Parish, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES MANDEL WHITE\nNo. COA01-1495\n(Filed 17 December 2002)\n1. Evidence\u2014 fingerprints on stolen items \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for first-degree murder and armed robbery by admitting evidence that defendant\u2019s fingerprints were on boxes of crackers and candy found in a trailer in which defendant was staying where there was testimony that defendant brought food home in a trash bag around the time of the murder, that the same brands were among the items disturbed in the victim\u2019s home, and that the trash bag used to carry the food came from the victim\u2019s home.\n2. Evidence\u2014 fingerprints on stolen items \u2014 not undnly prejudicial\nThe probative value of fingerprints on cracker and candy boxes linked to a murder and robbery was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because the evidence does not provoke an emotional response or otherwise improperly influence the jury in its consideration of the evidence.\n3. Evidence\u2014 expert \u2014 implicit request \u2014 specific objection required\nDefendant did not preserve for appellate review the issue of whether a police lieutenant was properly qualified to testify about the meaning of a pillow found on the victim\u2019s face after a robbery and murder where the prosecutor implicitly elicited, expert testimony by inquiring about the significance of the pillow \u201cbased on your training and experience\u201d and defendant did not specifically object to the qualification of the lieutenant as an expert.\n4. Evidence\u2014 expert \u2014 significance of pillow on victim\u2019s face\nTestimony from a police lieutenant about the significance of a pillow found on a murder and robbery victim\u2019s face was properly admitted where the officer testified in the form of an opinion based on his expertise and the testimony was likely to assist the jury in making an inference from the circumstances of the crime.\n5. Evidence\u2014 police officer\u2019s opinion \u2014 not an expert on this question \u2014 harmless error\nThere was no prejudicial error in a first-degree murder and armed robbery prosecution, even though the court improperly allowed a police lieutenant to testify that a certain television was \u201cmore than probably\u201d from the victim\u2019s residence, because substantial evidence linked defendant to the crime.\n6. Robbery\u2014 armed \u2014 evidence of taking\nThere was sufficient evidence of a taking to support an armed robbery conviction where defendant went to kill a man who owed him money and returned covered in blood and bragging that he had killed the man; defendant left without a car, television, or groceries, and returned with those things; the victim\u2019s car was stolen and burned; the space for the television in the victim\u2019s entertainment center was empty, with instruction books being found for a television model which was not found in his house but which defendant sold; the victim\u2019s groceries were disturbed, with the same brands being found in the victim\u2019s house and being brought home by defendant; and the trash bag which defendant used to bring in the groceries came from a roll of bags in the victim\u2019s home.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 May 2001 by Judge Jack A. Thompson in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 September 2002.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel P O\u2019Brien, for the State.\nJames R. Parish, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0598-01", "first_page_order": 626, "last_page_order": 635 }