{ "id": 9249153, "name": "SYLVIA FRYE LONG, Administratrix of the ESTATE OF ESMAY FRYE STEVENSON, Deceased, Plaintiff v. C. WAYNE JOYNER and wife, CAROL JEAN JOYNER, Defendants v. CATAWBA VALLEY BANK and D. STEVE ROBBINS, Trustee, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Long v. Joyner", "decision_date": "2002-12-31", "docket_number": "No. COA02-433", "first_page": "129", "last_page": "138", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "155 N.C. App. 129" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220065, 220130, 219908, 219920, 220089 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0348-02", "/nc/355/0348-03", "/nc/355/0348-04", "/nc/355/0348-01", "/nc/355/0348-05" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11362776 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565860, 8565831, 8565883, 8565915, 8565951 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0589-02", "/nc/293/0589-01", "/nc/293/0589-03", "/nc/293/0589-04", "/nc/293/0589-05" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547502 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917814 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568284 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547194 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8686774 ], "year": 1879, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/81/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "denial of request to depose out of state witness" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558843 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "denial of request to depose out of state witness" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "order striking pleadings" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4766950, 4761735, 4765805, 4761782, 4762359 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "order striking pleadings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0319-05", "/nc/309/0319-03", "/nc/309/0319-04", "/nc/309/0319-02", "/nc/309/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 S.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192", "parenthetical": "order striking pleadings" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523375 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495", "parenthetical": "order striking pleadings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/62/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198", "parenthetical": "civil or criminal contempt" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557249 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30", "parenthetical": "civil or criminal contempt" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168946 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" }, { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528288 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737417, 4738602, 4733422, 4740368, 4733653 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0505-05", "/nc/318/0505-04", "/nc/318/0505-02", "/nc/318/0505-03", "/nc/318/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525073 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502", "parenthetical": "citing Dunlap v. Dunlap, 81 N.C. App. 675, 676, 344 S.E.2d 806, 807, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 505, 349 S.E.2d 859 (1986)" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522499 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "citing Dunlap v. Dunlap, 81 N.C. App. 675, 676, 344 S.E.2d 806, 807, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 505, 349 S.E.2d 859 (1986)" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0415-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 790, "char_count": 21106, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.440376707882796e-07, "percentile": 0.8796292756836402 }, "sha256": "2a39fc624f9b793992572305290cde34514b976103921ff6cacd12eb6cf644b7", "simhash": "1:8e2bc6a8370b8c62", "word_count": 3344 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:08:10.559314+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and HUDSON concur." ], "parties": [ "SYLVIA FRYE LONG, Administratrix of the ESTATE OF ESMAY FRYE STEVENSON, Deceased, Plaintiff v. C. WAYNE JOYNER and wife, CAROL JEAN JOYNER, Defendants v. CATAWBA VALLEY BANK and D. STEVE ROBBINS, Trustee, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Chief Judge.\nC. Wayne and Carol Joyner (\u201cdefendants\u201d) appeal from an order compelling them to answer interrogatories presented by Sylvia Frye Long (\u201cplaintiff\u2019). The order also required defendants to pay plaintiff\u2019s attorney fees in the amount of $1,980.00 as a sanction pursuant to Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.\nThe evidence tends to show the following. Plaintiff is serving as administratrix of the Estate of Sylvia Frye Long (\u201cdecedent\u201d). Decedent was plaintiff\u2019s aunt. Decedent was a widow who owned a parcel of land in Hickory, North Carolina. Defendant Wayne Joyner rented a portion of decedent\u2019s land and operated a used-car business on it. Defendants contend that decedent did not have a happy relationship with her family and did not want her family to inherit her land. Defendants state that decedent repeatedly contacted them about transferring her land to them.\nAccording to defendants, they hired an attorney at decedent\u2019s prompting to set up the land transfer. The final paperwork and closing documents were signed on 5 May 1997. The land was transferred to defendants in exchange for defendants\u2019 promise to pay an annuity of $550 per month to decedent for the rest of her life. Defendants also agreed to pay the gift taxes resulting from the transfer. A gift tax was paid because the value of the land was greater than the value of the annuity paid to decedent. Decedent\u2019s annuity was valued at $33,552. Defendants state that the land had a value of $220,000, while plaintiff contends that the land was worth at least $325,000. The attorney who prepared the deed and closing documents repeatedly asked decedent if she wanted another lawyer to represent her exclusively. She refused. He stated that decedent was fully competent despite being eighty-seven years old at the time of the transaction.\nAfter the land transfer, decedent would visit defendants once a month to pick up her annuity check. This process continued until decedent\u2019s hospitalization in June 2000. On 6 July 2000, decedent was declared incompetent. Plaintiff was appointed her guardian. Plaintiff filed this action seeking to set aside the deed of 5 May 1997 on the grounds of fraud, undue influence, and mental incapacity. On 16 March 2001, decedent died. Plaintiff became decedent\u2019s administratrix.\nOn 22 February 2001, plaintiff sent her first set of interrogatories to defendants. Interrogatory #4 requested a summary of any expert opinions, while interrogatory #5 asked defendants to identify any written opinions produced by experts. Defendants submitted answers to the interrogatories on 4 April 2001. Defendants responded to interrogatories #4 and 5 with the following sentence: \u201cNo decision has been made at this time by the Joyner Defendants as to any expert witnesses.\u201d\nAfter the defendants filed their answers to plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories, defendants\u2019 counsel hired Dr. Paul McGann and Dr. Todd Antin as consultants on the case. On 28 August 2001, defendants\u2019 counsel filed a supplemental answer to plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories that identified Dr. McGann and Dr. Antin as possible experts for trial. Defendants objected to interrogatory #5, stating that \u201cno such opinions [had] been provided to the Joyner Defendants, and any such opinions which may have been provided to counsel for said Defendants would constitute attorney work product and is otherwise beyond the scope of permitted discovery.\u201d\nOn 7 September 2001, plaintiff sent a second set of interrogatories to defendants, requesting more information about the two doctors\u2019 opinions. Interrogatory #8 asked for a listing of the records provided to Dr. McGann or Dr. Antin for review in formulating their expert opinions. Plaintiffs interrogatory #9 asked \u201cwhether their [sic] exists a written opinion by Dr. McGann and/or Dr. Antin as to their respective conclusion, whether or not the same was provided to the Joyner Defendants or their attorney.\u201d Interrogatory #10 requests the date, location and means of communication of the doctors\u2019 opinions, if no written form of the opinions exists. Interrogatory #11 asked defendants to identify journals, texts, studies, or other medical information defendants\u2019 experts used to formulate their opinions. Finally, interrogatory #12 asks whether a written opinion exists, regardless of whether it is in defendants\u2019 possession.\nDefendants again objected to giving the information about their expert witnesses that was requested in these interrogatories. Plaintiff moved to compel defendants to respond to the interrogatories. On 31 October 2001, the trial court ordered defendants to fully respond to plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories #9, 10 and 12 within 20 days. Defendants filed an objection and response to this order, stating that the only information defendants had regarding Dr. McGann and Dr. Antin\u2019s opinions was relayed to them by their attorney. Defendants contend that this information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Defendants did not contact Dr. McGann or Dr. Antin personally, instead relying on their attorney to communicate with the doctors. Defendants objected to answering plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories because they had no knowledge of the doctors\u2019 conversations with their attorney.\nPlaintiff filed a motion requesting sanctions against defendants for their refusal to answer the interrogatories. Defendants\u2019 attorney filed his answer to the interrogatories. Defendants reiterated that they could not answer the interrogatories personally because only their attorney had the requested information. The trial court imposed sanctions upon defendants for their failure to comply with the discovery order on 31 October 2001. The trial court ordered payment of the plaintiff\u2019s attorney fees in the amount of $1,980.00 as defendants\u2019 sanction. Subsequently, the parties settled the underlying claim regarding the deed transfer. Defendants appeal the order to pay attorney fees as a sanction.\nAs a preliminary matter, we note that defendants are appealing an order compelling discovery and a sanction for failure to comply with that discovery order. \u201cAs a general rule, an order compelling discovery is not immediately appealable because it is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right which would be lost if the ruling is not reviewed before final judgment.\u201d Benfield v. Benfield, 89 N.C. App. 415, 418, 366 S.E.2d 500, 502 (1988) (citing Dunlap v. Dunlap, 81 N.C. App. 675, 676, 344 S.E.2d 806, 807, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 505, 349 S.E.2d 859 (1986)); see Cochran v. Cochran, 93 N.C. App. 574, 378 S.E.2d 580 (1989); Walker v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 84 N.C. App. 552, 353 S.E.2d 425 (1987).\nCertain sanctions have been deemed immediately appeal-able because they affect a substantial right under G.S. \u00a7 1-277 or \u00a7 7A-27(d)(1). See Willis v. Power Co., 291 N.C. 19, 30, 229 S.E.2d 191, 198 (1976) (civil or criminal contempt); Adair v. Adair, 62 N.C. App. 493, 495, 303 S.E.2d 190, 192, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 319, 307 S.E.2d 162 (1983) (order striking pleadings); Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp., 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977) (denial of request to depose out of state witness). However, an order to pay attorney\u2019s fees as a sanction does not affect a substantial right. See Benfield, 89 N.C. App. at 419, 366 S.E.2d at 503; Cochran, 93 N.C. App. at 577, 378 S.E.2d at 582. \u201cThe order granting attorney fees is interlocutory, as it does not finally determine the action nor affect a substantial right which might be lost, prejudiced, or be less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order.\u201d Cochran, 93 N.C. App. at 577, 378 S.E.2d at 582.\nOrdinarily, defendants\u2019 appeal from the sanction order would be dismissed as interlocutory. But here, the underlying legal issues in this case have been resolved by the parties in a settlement agreement. The trial court\u2019s order appealed in this case constitutes the only unresolved issue in the case and therefore is appealable. Accordingly, we choose to address the merits of defendants\u2019 appeal.\nDefendants argue that the trial court erred in finding that defendants\u2019 responses to interrogatories #9, 10, and 12 failed to comply with the court\u2019s discovery order. We disagree.\nDefendants contend that the information plaintiff requested regarding the expert witnesses was not known by defendants personally. Defendants argue that only defendants\u2019 counsel had the information required to answer plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories. This argument has no merit. The knowledge of an attorney hired by a client and doing work on behalf of that client is imputed to the client. Rogers v. McKenzie, 81 N.C. 164 (1879). Therefore the knowledge held by defendants\u2019 attorney was imputed to them. Although they did not hire the expert witnesses or interview the doctors, defendants were receiving the benefit of the doctors\u2019 consultation with their attorney. The attorney acts as an agent for the client. \u201cIn this jurisdiction there is a presumption in favor of an attorney\u2019s authority to act for the client he professes to represent.\u201d Greenhill v. Crabtree, 45 N.C. App. 49, 51, 262 S.E.2d 315, 316, aff\u2019d per curiam by an equally divided court, 301 N.C. 520, 271 S.E.2d 908 (1980). This presumption of attorney authority and knowledge by the client arises with regard to the procedural matters in a lawsuit. See id. Choosing expert witnesses and obtaining their testimony is a procedural pre-trial exercise typically left to the attorney. In this case, defendants\u2019 attorney was presumed to be working on the defendants\u2019 behalf when he hired expert witnesses and obtained their opinions for use at trial. Accordingly, the attorney\u2019s actions can be imputed to his clients in this instance. The sanction against defendants pursuant to Rule 37 could only be reversed upon a showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Graham v. Rogers, 121 N.C. App. 460, 466 S.E.2d 290 (1996). Defendants have failed to show an abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s order for them to answer interrogatories regarding their attorney\u2019s hiring of expert witnesses. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendants next contend that the trial court erred by requiring them to answer plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories because the interrogatories exceeded the scope of matter that is discoverable under the expert witness rule of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(4) (2001). We disagree.\n\u201cIt is a general rule that orders regarding matters of discovery are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be upset on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d Hudson v. Hudson, 34 N.C. App. 144, 145, 237 S.E.2d 479, 480, disc. rev. denied, 293 N.C. 589, 239 S.E.2d 264 (1977). Therefore, our review of the trial court\u2019s application of G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(4) is limited to determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred. Here, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.\nG.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(4) states, in pertinent part:\nA party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.\nG.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(4) (2001). Plaintiff requested in her first set of interrogatories the identity of defendants\u2019 expert witnesses, the subject matter of their testimony, the substance of facts and opinions of the expert, and a summary of the basis for those facts and opinions. Defendants provided this information in a supplemental answer on 27 August 2001. However, defendants did not answer plaintiff\u2019s interrogatory #5, which questioned the existence of any written opinions produced by defendants\u2019 experts. In plaintiff\u2019s second set of interrogatories, interrogatories #9, 10 and 12 similarly asked defendants whether a written opinion by either of their experts existed. Plaintiff inquired, if no written opinion existed, how defendants learned of the opinions of their expert witnesses. Upon defendants\u2019 failure and refusal to answer questions about the existence of expert opinions, defendants were sanctioned by the trial court.\nThe sanctions against defendants for failure to answer interrogatories #9, 10 and 12 were not assigned in violation of Rule 26(b)(4). Rule 26(b)(4) limits the amount of information a litigant can obtain through interrogatories concerning the substance of an expert opinion, but does not limit the request for information regarding the opinion\u2019s existence. When the trial court ordered defendants to answer the interrogatories in question, it did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendants argue that the trial court\u2019s order to compel them to answer interrogatories violated the attorney work product exception to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(3) (2001). We disagree.\nRule 26(b)(3), also called the \u201cwork-product rule,\u201d forbids the discovery of documents and other tangible things that are \u201cprepared in anticipation of litigation\u201d unless the party has a substantial need for those materials and cannot \u201cwithout undue hardship . . . obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(3) (2001). Defendants contend that plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories #9, 10 and 12 violate this rule. However, plaintiff did not ask defendants for documents or tangible things. Instead, plaintiff inquired whether the experts hired by defendants had produced an opinion in written form. Plaintiff did not ask for the work product of defendants\u2019 attorneys, nor for the work product of defendants\u2019 expert witnesses. Accordingly, plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories did not violate Rule 26(b)(3). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning defendants for their failure to answer these interrogatories. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering defendants to pay plaintiff\u2019s counsel the sum of $1,980.00 as a sanction. Defendants argue that plaintiffs counsel did not submit the proper paperwork to the court to support his charged fee. Also defendants argue that the trial court did not make the necessary findings of fact to support its award of fees. We disagree.\nThe assignment of a sanction by the trial court for a litigant\u2019s failure to follow a discovery order can be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. See Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 146 N.C. App. 658, 667, 554 S.E.2d 356, 363 (2001), appeal dismissed, disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 348, 563 S.E.2d 562 (2002). \u201cAn abuse of discretion results where the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d Id. Rule 37(a)(4) requires that upon a successful motion for an order to compel discovery, the moving party should be paid \u201creasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37(a)(4) (2001). In addition, \u201cto be reasonable, the record must contain findings of fact to support the award of any expenses.\u201d Benfield, 89 N.C. App. at 422, 366 S.E.2d at 504.\nHere, the trial court specifically found that:\n11. The Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees in the prosecution of her Motion for Sanctions and is entitled to attorney fees. The Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has filed an Affidavit as to attorney fees.\nThe trial court concluded that plaintiff was \u201centitled to attorney fees ... in the sum of $1,980.00, which\" said sums are reasonable and which such fees were caused by the failure of the Joyner Defendants to fully respond [to plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories].\u201d The total amount of attorney\u2019s fees awarded by the trial court corresponded with the charges incurred by plaintiff for one attorney\u2019s work in preparing and presenting the motion for sanctions, according to plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s affidavit. Therefore, the trial court found the award of attorney\u2019s fees to be reasonable and facts exist within the record that reasonably support that award. This assignment of error is overruled. Since the trial court did not commit reversible error in awarding plaintiff attorney\u2019s fees, we affirm.\nAffirmed.\nJudges GREENE and HUDSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sigmon, Clark, Mackie, Hutton, Hanvey & Ferrell, P.A., by E. Fielding Clark, II, and Forrest A. Ferrell, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Wyatt Early Harris Wheeler, L.L.P., by William E. Wheeler, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SYLVIA FRYE LONG, Administratrix of the ESTATE OF ESMAY FRYE STEVENSON, Deceased, Plaintiff v. C. WAYNE JOYNER and wife, CAROL JEAN JOYNER, Defendants v. CATAWBA VALLEY BANK and D. STEVE ROBBINS, Trustee, Defendants\nNo. COA02-433\n(Filed 31 December 2002)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 order to pay attorney fees as a sanction\nAlthough an order compelling discovery is generally not immediately appealable based on the fact that it is an appeal from an interlocutory order and an order to pay attorney fees as a sanction does not affect a substantial right, this order is appealable because the underlying legal issues in this case have been resolved by the parties in a settlement agreement and the trial court\u2019s order appealed in this case constitutes the only unresolved issue in the case.\n2. Discovery\u2014 sanction for failure to comply \u2014 knowledge of attorney imputed to client\nThe trial court did not err in an action seeking to set aside a deed of 5 May 1997 that transferred land owned by an eighty-seven-year-old decedent to defendants prior to her death on the grounds of fraud, undue influence, and mental incapacity by ordering payment of plaintiff\u2019s attorney fees in the amount of $1,980.00 as a sanction based on defendants\u2019 failure to answer interrogatories presented by plaintiff regarding defendants\u2019 expert witnesses even though defendants contend the information was not known by defendants personally and was only known by defendants\u2019 counsel, because: (1) knowledge of an attorney hired by a client and doing work on behalf of that client is imputed to the client; and (2) defendants have failed to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court.\n3. Discovery\u2014 interrogatories \u2014 existence of expert opinions\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in an action seeking to set aside a deed of 5 May 1997 that transferred land owned by an eighty-seven-year-old decedent to defendants prior to her death on the grounds of fraud, undue influence, and mental incapacity by sanctioning defendants for their failure to answer plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories regarding the existence of expert opinions even though defendants contend the interrogatories exceeded the scope of matter that is discoverable under the expert witness rule of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(4), because Rule 26(b)(4) limits the amount of information a litigant can obtain through interrogatories concerning the substance of an expert opinion, but does not limit the request for information regarding the opinion\u2019s existence.\n4. Discovery\u2014 interrogatories \u2014 expert witnesses \u2014 work product doctrine\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in an action seeking to set aside a deed of 5 May 1997 that transferred land owned by an eighty-seven-year-old decedent to defendants prior to her death on the grounds of fraud, undue influence, and mental incapacity by sanctioning defendants for their failure to answer interrogatories regarding their expert witnesses even though defendants contend compelling defendants to answer the interrogatories violated the attorney work product exception under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(3), because: (1) plaintiffs did not ask defendants for documents or tangible things, but instead inquired whether the experts hired by defendants had produced an opinion in written form; and (2) plaintiff did not ask for the work product of defendants\u2019 attorneys nor for the work product of defendants\u2019 expert witnesses.\n5. Discovery\u2014 sanction for failure to comply \u2014 reasonableness of attorney fees\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in an action seeking to set aside a deed of 5 May 1997 that transferred land owned by an eighty-seven-year-old decedent to defendants prior to her death on the grounds of fraud, undue influence, and mental incapacity by ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs counsel the sum of $1,980.00 as a sanction for failure to answer interrogatories regarding their expert witnesses, because: (1) the affidavit of plaintiffs attorney revealed that the total amount of attorney fees awarded by the trial court corresponded with the charges incurred by plaintiff for the attorney\u2019s work in preparing and presenting the motion for sanctions; and (2) the trial court found the award to be reasonable and facts exist within the record that reasonably support that award.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 7 December 2001 by Judge James W. Morgan in Catawba County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 November 2002.\nSigmon, Clark, Mackie, Hutton, Hanvey & Ferrell, P.A., by E. Fielding Clark, II, and Forrest A. Ferrell, for plaintiff-appellee.\nWyatt Early Harris Wheeler, L.L.P., by William E. Wheeler, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0129-01", "first_page_order": 159, "last_page_order": 168 }