{ "id": 9249916, "name": "DAVID TEASLEY, Plaintiff v. THEODIS BECK, Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, in his official capacity, and JUANITA BAKER, Chairman of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in her official capacity; and ELBERT BUCK, and CHARLES L. MANN, SR., Members of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in their official capacities, Defendants; ODELL CLINTON BATES, Plaintiff v. THEODIS BECK, Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, in his official capacity, and JUANITA BAKER, Chairman of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in her official capacity; and ELBERT BUCK, and JEWYL DUNN, Members of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in their official capacities, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Teasley v. Beck", "decision_date": "2002-12-31", "docket_number": "No. COA02-212", "first_page": "282", "last_page": "294", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "155 N.C. App. 282" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" }, { "page": "773" }, { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11793232 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511232, 1511200, 1511145, 1511186, 1511547 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0615-03", "/nc/356/0615-05", "/nc/356/0615-01", "/nc/356/0615-02", "/nc/356/0615-04" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "250-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251617 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522738 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527496 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6209106 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" }, { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97", "parenthetical": "citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 507 S.E.2d 894 (1998)" }, { "page": "97", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081062 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345", "parenthetical": "citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 507 S.E.2d 894 (1998)" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11200315 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240022 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1- 258" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916760 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1- 258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527584 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0719-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 939, "char_count": 29722, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4237065898511734e-07, "percentile": 0.8012669850636079 }, "sha256": "e46d73f5190117b1bdbf7fa6b106ea20aeee365e62d0a683efe6479d5c8cec6d", "simhash": "1:e32bc5bf74bb7d64", "word_count": 4658 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:08:10.559314+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and MARTIN concur." ], "parties": [ "DAVID TEASLEY, Plaintiff v. THEODIS BECK, Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, in his official capacity, and JUANITA BAKER, Chairman of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in her official capacity; and ELBERT BUCK, and CHARLES L. MANN, SR., Members of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in their official capacities, Defendants ODELL CLINTON BATES, Plaintiff v. THEODIS BECK, Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, in his official capacity, and JUANITA BAKER, Chairman of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in her official capacity; and ELBERT BUCK, and JEWYL DUNN, Members of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in their official capacities, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nTheodis Beck, Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Corrections (the Department); Juanita Baker, Chairman of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission (Parole Commission or Commission); and other members of the Commission so designated (collectively defendants) appeal the trial court\u2019s order granting declaratory judgment in favor of David Teasley and Odell Clinton Bates (collectively plaintiffs).\nPlaintiff Teasley pled guilty to two Class H felonies. On 14 September 1992, Teasley was sentenced pursuant to the \u201cFair Sentencing Act (the FSA or the Act),\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1340.1 to -1340.7 (1988) (repealed effective 1 October 1994), as a habitual felon, and received a Class C felony life sentence.\nOn 16 October 1989, plaintiff Bates pled guilty to one count each of second-degree murder, a Class C felony, and first-degree burglary. Bates was sentenced, also under the FSA, to life imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction and a fifteen-year consecutive sentence for his first-degree burglary conviction.\nFor the purpose of determining plaintiffs\u2019 parole eligibility dates, the minimum term of imprisonment for their life sentences was twenty years. Plaintiffs\u2019 life sentences were then reduced to ten years, based upon credits for good behavior at a rate of one credit per day of incarceration without a major infraction.\nThe Parole Commission further reduced Bates\u2019 parole eligibility date by only those gain and/or meritorious time credits earned during the pendency of his burglary term. In so doing, the Commission first reduced Bates\u2019 burglary sentence to seven and one-half years based upon accumulated good-time credits, then subtracted from the burglary sentence only those gain and/or meritorious time credits earned while serving the last seven and one-half years of his total sentence. In other words, to determine his parole eligibility date, Bates would serve the first ten years of his sentence and then the seven-and-one-half years, minus any gain and/or merit time earned during the burglary sentence. As to both Teasley and Bates, no gain and/or merit time was applied to reduce their life terms.\nTeasley and Bates filed separate actions for declaratory relief requesting that the court determine whether, based upon certain Department regulations, gain and/or meritorious time credits should apply to alter the parole eligibility date of their life sentence terms. In the alternative, Bates requested that the court declare him eligible for a reduction in his sentence for good time, gain time and meritorious time earned during his entire incarceration. Plaintiffs\u2019 actions were subsequently consolidated for a bench trial.\nOn 18 September 2001, the trial court concluded that pursuant to the Department\u2019s regulations governing \u201csentence reduction credits,\u201d inmates serving life sentences for Class C felonies were eligible to reduce their imprisonment terms by good, gain and meritorious time credits earned during their incarcerations. The trial court further concluded that for purposes of determining Bates\u2019 parole eligibility date, Bates was entitled to a reduction in his sentence by all gain and/or meritorious time credits earned during the pendency of his entire incarceration. Defendants now appeal.\nThe dispositive issues on appeal are: I) whether the Department\u2019s \u201csentence reduction credit\u201d regulations apply to inmates serving Class C life sentences for the purpose of determining their parole eligibility dates; and, if not, II) whether the Commission erred in its practice of applying gain and meritorious time credits to sentences running consecutively to a life term.\nPreliminarily we note that plaintiff Teasley obtained eligibility for parole on 26 August 2002, and therefore, any issues of parole eligibility with regard to Teasley are moot. Crumpler v. Thornburg, 92 N.C. App. 719, 723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1989). Nonetheless, we find the present action \u201c \u2018capable of repetition, yet evading review,\u2019 \u201d id. (citation omitted), and therefore, must review it even though the action is moot.\nBackground\nWe begin our discussion with an overview of the Department\u2019s structure and the statutes and rules giving rise to this appeal. As noted supra, plaintiffs were sentenced pursuant to the FSA, which has subsequently been superseded by the Structured Sentencing Act, effective on or after 1 October 1994. Accordingly, our discussion in the case sub judice is limited to those statutes and regulations that are part of and parcel to the FSA.\nThe Parole Commission, as its name indicates, is the independent agency within the Department that is responsible for releasing offenders eligible for parole. The Commission consists of one Chairman and two other members, all appointed by the Governor. The Secretary of the Department is also appointed by the Governor, but, unlike the Commission, has no authority over parole eligibility. Rather, the Secretary has the sole authority over the unconditional release of offenders.\nClass C felonies may be punishable by life imprisonment. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-1.1(a)(3). Prisoners sentenced under the FSA are \u201celigible for release on parole only upon completion of the service of th[e] minimum term or one fifth of the maximum penalty allowed by law . . . whichever is less, less any credit allowed under G.S. 15A-1355(c).\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1371(a) (2001) (emphasis added). One fifth of a life term is twenty years. Id.\nThe statutes at issue in the present appeal are provided below in relevant part. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1355(c), entitled \u201cCredit for Good Behavior,\u201d states:\nThe Department of Correction and jailers . . . must give credit for good behavior toward service of a prison or jail term imposed for a felony that occurred on or after the effective date of Article 81A, as required by G.S. 15A-1340.7. The provisions of this subsection do not apply to persons convicted of Class A or Class B felonies .... The Department of Correction and jailers may give time credit toward service of other prison or jail terms imposed for a felony or misdemeanor, according to regulations issued by the Secretary of Correction as provided by G.S. 148-13. The Department of Correction may give credit toward service of the maximum term and any minimum term of imprisonment and toward eligibility for parole for allowances of time as provided in rules and regulations made under G.S. 148-11 and 148-13.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1355(c) (emphasis added).\nSection 15A-1340.7 provides:\n(a) ... Credit toward the service of the term shall be given for time already served .. ., and good behavior in prison or jail as provided by subsection (b) of this section, except that a life term imposed for a Class C felony shall not be subject to subsection (b) of this section but shall be subject to G.S. 148- 13(b) for the purposes of good time and gain time deductions. . . .\n(b) A prisoner committed to the Department of Correction or a jail to serve a sentence for a felony shall receive credit for good behavior at the rate of one day deducted from his prison or jail term for each day he spends in custody without a major infraction of prisoner conduct rules.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.7 (emphasis added).\nSection 148-13 states:\n(b) With respect to prisoners who are serving prison or jail terms for offenses not subject to Article 81A of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes and prisoners serving a life term for a Class C felony, the Secretary of Correction may, in his discretion, issue regulations regarding deductions of time from the terms of such prisoners for good behavior, meritorious conduct, work or study, participation in rehabilitation programs, and the like.\n(c) With respect to all prisoners serving prison or jail terms for felonies that occurred on or after the effective date of Article 81A of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes, the Secretary of Correction and local jail administrators must grant credit toward their terms for good behavior as required by G.S. 15A-1340.7. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to persons convicted of Class A or Class B felonies or persons sentenced to a life term for a Class C felony.\n(d) With respect to prisoners serving prison or jail terms for felonies that occurred on or after the effective date of Article 81A of Chapter 15A, the Secretary of Correction shall issue regulations authorizing gain time credit to be deducted from the terms of such prisoners, in addition to the good behavior credit authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.7. Gain time credit may be granted for meritorious conduct and shall be granted for performance of regular work and regular participation in study, training, work release, and other rehabilitative programs inside or outside the prison or jail. . . .\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 148-13(b)-(d).\nIn conjunction with the FSA, the Secretary promulgated regulations concerning the grant of \u201csentence reduction credits.\u201d 5 NCAC 2B .0110, et seq. (Supp. Jan. and Sept. 1995) (effective date 1 February 1995). According to these regulations, \u201csentence reduction credits\u201d are \u201c[t]ime credits applied to an inmate\u2019s sentence that reduce the amount of time to be served,\u201d including good, gain, and meritorious time. 5 NCAC 2B .0110(6). Good time is \u201ccredit for good behavior at the rate of one day deducted from an eligible inmate\u2019s sentence for each day he spends in custody without a major infraction of prisoner conduct rules.\u201d 5 NCAC 2B .0110(1). Gain time is \u201ccredit for participation in work and program activities,\u201d 5 NCAC 2B .0110(2), and meritorious time is credit awarded \u201cfor acts of exemplary conduct or work under extraordinary conditions,\u201d 5 NCAC 2B .0110(5).\nIn summary, the FSA provided that a prisoner sentenced to a life sentence for a Class C felony becomes parole eligible after a statutorily-mandated twenty-year period. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1371(a). The Department must give credit for good behavior pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1355(c) and as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.7. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1340.7, -1355(c). Section 15A-1340.7 directs that life terms for Class C felonies are subject to \u00a7 148-13(b), for purposes of determining whether, if at all, good and gain time credits may be applied such that the statutorily-mandated twenty-year period may be reduced.\nSection 148-13(b) provides that the Secretary may issue regulations governing deductions for good, gain or meritorious time for those convicted pursuant to the FSA but not to Class A and B life sentences. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 148-13(b). The paramount question remains: what, if any, is the effect of the \u201csentence reduction credit\u201d regulations on plaintiffs\u2019 parole eligibility dates.\nStandard of Review\n\u201cThe standard of review of a judgment rendered under the declaratory judgment act is the same as in other cases.\u201d Miesch v. Ocean Dunes Homeowners Assn., 120 N.C. App. 559, 562, 464 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1995) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1- 258). Thus, in a bench trial, the court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive, while its conclusions of law are reviewable de novo. Browning v. Helff, 136 N.C. App. 420, 423, 524 S.E.2d 95, 98 (2000).\nI.\nWe must first determine whether defendants erred in calculating the parole eligibility date on plaintiffs\u2019 life sentences. Resolution of this issue depends upon the accuracy with which defendants interpreted the relevant statutory scheme and related regulations. In examining whether ah agency erred in interpreting a statute it administers, \u201can appellate court employs a de novo review.\u201d County of Durham v. North Carolina Dep\u2019t of Env. & Natural Resources, 131 N.C. App. 395, 396, 507 S.E.2d 310, 311 (1998) (citation omitted). Legislative intent controls the meaning of statutes. Francine Delany New School for Children, Inc., v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 150 N.C. App. 338, 345, 563 S.E.2d 92, 97 (2002) (citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 507 S.E.2d 894 (1998)). \u201cTo determine legislative intent, a court must analyze the statute as a whole, considering the chosen words themselves, the spirit of the act, and the objectives the statute seeks to accomplish.\u201d Brown, 349 N.C. at 522, 507 S.E.2d at 895 (citation omitted). \u201cStatutes on the same subject matter must be construed together and harmonized to give effect to each.\u201d Delany, 150 N.C. App. at 345, 563 S.E.2d at 97 (citation omitted). Where statutes are \u201csilent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency\u2019s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.\u201d Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 703 (1984).\nAccordingly, while the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law do not bind us here, where a statute at issue is silent or ambiguous, we must give deference to the agency \u201c \u2018so [ ] long as the agency\u2019s interpretation is reasonable and based on a permissible construction of the statute.\u2019 \u201d Durham, 131 N.C. App. at 397, 507 S.E.2d at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Carpenter v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 107 N.C. App. 278, 279, 419 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1992)).\nIn reviewing the relevant statutes, we first find certain aspects of the statutory scheme unclear or ambiguous. Section 1533(c) states that those inmates serving Class C life sentences must receive credit for \u201cgood behavior\u201d toward their parole eligibility date as required by section 1340.7. However, section 1340.7(a) states that section 1340.7(b), the subsection citing the method for calculating credits for \u201cgood behavior,\u201d does not apply to those inmates serving Class C life sentences for the purpose of \u201cgood time and gain time\u201d deductions. Rather, section 1340.7(a) directs that credits for \u201cgood time\u201d are to be granted to inmates based upon section 148-13(b). Section 148-13(b), however, does not mandate that the Secretary pass regulations for deducting time for \u201cgood behavior . . . and the like.\u201d\nIn resolving this ambiguity, Parole Commission Chairperson, Juanita Baker, stated in an affidavit that the Commission believed section 15A-1355(c) allowed the twenty-year service requirement for those inmates serving Class C life sentences \u201cto be reduced by day-for-day good time to ten years.\u201d According to Baker, at the time of her affidavit, the Commission had reduced the sentences of approximately 963 inmates based upon credits for good behavior.\nWe conclude that the Commission\u2019s own interpretation of the relevant yet ambiguous statutes is reasonable. Under section 1355(c), granting deductions in Class C life sentences for good behavior was mandatory, and it was within the Commission\u2019s authority to carry out this statutory mandate. This is true, whether or not the Secretary had in his (or her) discretion granted by section 148-13(b) promulgated rules dictating the method by which the Commission was to apply those credits. As such, both Teasley and Bates were granted good-time credits to reduce parole eligibility on their Class C life sentences by day-for-day credits to within ten years of their conviction dates.\nNext, we examine what appears to be unambiguous .within the relevant statutory scheme. Unlike good time credits, the application of gain and meritorious time credits (time for \u201cmeritorious conduct, work or study, participation in rehabilitation programs, and the like\u201d) in determining the parole eligibility date of those serving Class C life terms was not statutorily mandated by section 1355(c) or, for that matter, any other statute. The Commission could not apply gain and meritorious time credits unless the Secretary issued regulations dictating such action pursuant to his or her discretionary authority per subsection 148-13(b).\nFurthermore, subsection 148-13(b) stands in stark contrast to subsections 148-13(c), (d). Subsections (c) and (d) require the Secretary to issue regulations for the deduction of both good and gain time credits from the sentences of those prisoners serving \u201cterm of year\u201d sentences, while expressly excluding those serving life sentences. There is a clear disjunctive between subsections (b) and (c), (d) under section 148-13: section 148-13 binds the Secretary as to subsections (c), (d) but gives discretion as to subsection (b).\nThis leads us to the crucial question: under which of the above stated statutes were the Secretary\u2019s \u201csentence reduction credit\u201d regulations promulgated. If they were passed pursuant to \u00a7 148-13(c), (d), as defendants contend, then the regulations apply to the reduction of eligible inmates\u2019 sentences for the purpose of determining unconditional release dates. Thus, given the present situation, because those inmates serving life sentences are not entitled to unconditional release, plaintiffs\u2019 parole eligibility date could not be further reduced based upon gain or meritorious time earned while incarcerated. However, if the regulations were passed under \u00a7 148-13(b), as plaintiffs contend, then they apply to parole eligibility dates, such that plaintiffs\u2019 sentences would be further reduced by the gain and meritorious time earned while incarcerated.\nWe believe that this question is best answered by giving deference to the Department\u2019s interpretation of its own regulations. For it is well established that an agency\u2019s interpretation of its own regulations are to be afforded \u201cdue deference by the courts unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s].\u201d Pamlico Marine Co., Inc. v. N.C. Dept. of Natural Resources, 80 N.C. App. 201, 206, 341 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1986) (citation omitted).\nTheodis Beck, the Secretary at the time of this appeal, stated in an affidavit that he did not possess the authority to consider inmates for parole, and that 5 N.C. Admin. Code 2B .0112 [Policy and Procedures for computing gain time] governs only unconditional release from prison, something within his statutory authority. According to Beck, he never instructed the Commission to apply gain time to reduce the parole eligibility service requirements of inmates serving Class C life sentences. Chairperson Baker also noted that in her regular consultations with past and present Secretaries, they never informed her that the Commission erred in failing to apply gain or merit time to the sentences of those prisoners serving Class C life sentences.\nFurthermore, Andrew Terrell, a thirty-year Commission employee holding positions as the Commission\u2019s parole analyst, chief of staff, and statistician, testified in the action below that the Secretary had not issued any regulations directing the Commission to grant inmates serving Class C life sentences gain time credits. According to Terrell, the Commission had never followed Subchapter 2B in calculating parole eligibility, and did not have the authority to apply gain time credits.\nPlaintiffs argue that the \u201csentence reduction credit\u201d regulations apply to inmates serving Class C life sentences because while the regulations expressly exclude Class A and Class B felons, see 5 NCAC 2B .0111(4), .0112(4), they do not exclude those serving Class C life sentences. This is admittedly plaintiffs strongest argument. However, we find that the failure to exclude inmates serving Class C life sentences simply creates another ambiguity in the regulation for which we must defer to the agency. The Department insists that the regulations were promulgated under subsections 148-13(c), (d) and not (b). These subsections are clear: 148-13(c), (d) does not apply to any inmate serving a life sentence, whether it is Class A, B, or C life sentence. Furthermore, unlike all \u201cClass A and Class B felons,\u201d not all Class C felons are subject to life sentences. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-1.1(a)(3) (stating that sentences for Class C felonies may be punishable by life imprisonment, a term of up to fifty years, a fine, or both a term and a fine). If the regulation excluded Class A, B, and C felons, it would certainly contradict N.C.G.S. \u00a7 148-13(c), (d), by which inmates serving \u201cterm of years\u201d sentences must receive gain and/or meritorious time credits.\nPlaintiffs also argue that the regulations apply because Subchapter 2B defines the term \u201cparole eligibility date.\u201d See 5 NCAC 2B .0110(10). We disagree. The regulations define \u201cparole eligibility date\u201d as \u201c[t]he date, if any, provided to the Department of Correction by the Parole Commission as the date an inmate becomes eligible for parole.\u201d Id. This is the only mention of parole eligibility in the regulations. The regulations specify that they are to be applied to the \u201cparole eligibility date.\u201d If anything, the above-noted definition affirms the distinction between \u201cparole eligibility dates,\u201d which is provided by the Commission, and \u201csentence reduction,\u201d which is regulated by the Secretary.\nFinally, plaintiffs contend that if gain and meritorious time do not apply to Class C life sentences, there would be no need for the Department to allow those prisoners serving such sentences to accumulate gain and merit time, or for the Department to keep records of that accumulation, as is its practice. However, Terrell explained that these records are kept because prisoners sentenced to life can have their sentences commuted to a term of years, at which point gain and meritorious time must be applied, per section 148-13(d). We are persuaded that Terrell\u2019s reasoning concerning the regulations, the other above-noted explanations, and defendants\u2019 interpretation of the regulations in their entirety are not erroneous or inconsistent with the letter of the regulations. In so finding, we conclude that the Secretary promulgated the \u201csentence reduction credit\u201d regulations under section 148-13(c), (d) to apply to the unconditional release date of those inmates serving \u201cterm of years\u201d sentences. The Secretary has not, however, exercised its authority under section 148-13(b) to pass regulations for the application of good, gain, and meritorious time credits for those serving life sentences. See Price v. Beck, 153 N.C. App. 763, 768, 571 S.E.2d 247, 250 (stating, in dicta, that \u201c[t]he Secretary has not issued regulations regarding deductions of time for Class A, B, and C felons\u201d), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 615, 575 S.E.2d 26 (2002). The trial court, therefore, erred in concluding otherwise.\nII.\nWe next address whether the Department\u2019s practice of applying gain and merit time to a sentence served consecutive to a life term is a permissible practice. Bates argued and the trial court concluded that this practice contravenes N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1354(b) (2001) and our holding in Robbins v. Freeman, 127 N.C. App. 162, 487 S.E.2d 771 (1997), prohibiting the practice of \u201cpaper parole.\u201d We disagree.\nIn Robbins, the plaintiff was incarcerated for, inter alia, three counts of robbery with a deadly weapon, in which one sentence ran consecutive to the other two. In calculating the plaintiffs parole eligibility date, the Department employed a practice known as \u201c \u2018paper parole,\u2019 whereby an inmate serving consecutive sentences for armed robbery is required to be paroled from the first sentence to a second consecutive sentence before being treated as having begun service of the second sentence for purposes of determining parole eligibility.\u201d Id. at 163, 487 S.E.2d at 772.\nOur Court held that the practice of \u201cpaper parole\u201d was impermissible because according to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1354(b) (1985) the Department must treat defendants as if they have been committed for single terms. Id. at 164-65, 487 S.E.2d at 773. Accordingly, the Robbins Court concluded that the plaintiffs sentences should be aggregated before determining his parole eligibility date. Id. at 165, 487 S.E.2d at 773.\nRobbins is distinguishable from the present action, in that Robbins concerned an inmate serving three sentencing terms, each for the same offense, and to each the same calculations of time credits applied. In contrast, Bates\u2019 consecutive term followed a life sentence, for which the accumulation of time credits differed dramatically. Also, in calculating Bates\u2019 parole eligibility date, defendants treated the accumulation of time for each sentence differently, but not the sentences themselves. Unlike the defendants in Robbins, here, defendants properly aggregated the sentencing terms after the proper amounts of accumulated time credits were applied to both. The practice employed in the case sub judice simply does not run afoul of the practice prohibited by Robbins.\nFurthermore, this Court recently affirmed the validity of this practice to a similar situation in Price v. Beck, 153 N.C. App. 763, 571 S.E.2d 247. In Price, the plaintiff was sentenced to life imprisonment for a Class B felony and to a consecutive term for second-degree kidnapping. Id. at 765, 571 S.E.2d at 249. The Price plaintiff brought suit to challenge the defendants\u2019 calculation of his parole eligibility, arguing, inter alia, that the Commission erred in failing to apply time credits to his life sentence and in retroactively applying Robbins to determine his parole eligibility.\nThe Price defendants applied Robbins to determine the plaintiff\u2019s parole eligibility by first determining the minimum time allowable on the plaintiff\u2019s life sentence, which was twenty years. The defendants took the good, gain, and meritorious time credits gained by plaintiff and applied those to the minimum time allowable on his consecutive sentence, but not the life sentence. The defendants then added the resulting two sentences together to determine the plaintiff\u2019s parole eligibility date. Id. In reviewing the above-noted practice, our Court concluded that because no time credits applied to the Price plaintiffs life sentence, the Commission did not err in applying time credits to the consecutive sentence but not the life sentence. Id. at 767-68, 571 S.E.2d at 250-51.\nAlthough neither the issues raised in, nor the facts presented by Price are completely analogous, Price indicates our Court\u2019s approval of the process employed by the Commission in the present case. Similar to its practice in Price, the Commission applied all time credits available to plaintiff Bates\u2019 life sentence and all time credits available to his burglary sentence and then aggregated those sentences to determine his parole eligibility date. Under Price, such practice does not run afoul of and is even in accordance with the Robbins holding that sentences must be treated in the aggregate. Thus, the trial court erroneously concluded that the practice employed by defendants sub judice was impermissible and erred in granting Bates\u2019 declaratory relief on that basis.\nConclusion\nFor the reasoning stated herein, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting declaratory judgment in plaintiffs\u2019 favor.\nReversed.\nJudges GREENE and MARTIN concur.\n. Incident to the passage of the Structured Sentencing Act, several of the North Carolina General Statutes at issue in the present action were repealed or amended. The following statutes applicable to plaintiffs were repealed, effective 1 January 1995: N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 14-1.1 (1986) (defining classes of felonies) and 148-13(c), (d) (1987) (governing gain time credits). The following relevant statutes have since been amended: N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 14-52 (1986) (defining punishment for burglary) and 15A-1355(c) (1988) (calculating terms of imprisonment). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.7(a) (1988) (governing credits for good behavior) was repealed effective 1 October 1994.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "George B. Currin, for plaintiffs-appellees.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth F. Parsons, for the State." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAVID TEASLEY, Plaintiff v. THEODIS BECK, Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, in his official capacity, and JUANITA BAKER, Chairman of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in her official capacity; and ELBERT BUCK, and CHARLES L. MANN, SR., Members of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in their official capacities, Defendants ODELL CLINTON BATES, Plaintiff v. THEODIS BECK, Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, in his official capacity, and JUANITA BAKER, Chairman of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in her official capacity; and ELBERT BUCK, and JEWYL DUNN, Members of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, in their official capacities, Defendants\nNo. COA02-212\n(Filed 31 December 2002)\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 mootmess-issue evading review and capable of repetition\nA case concerning the calculation of parole eligibility was reviewed even though a plaintiff had become eligible for parole because it was capable of repetition, yet evaded review.\n2. Probation and Parole \u2014 eligibility dates \u2014 life sentences\u2014 gain and merit time\nPlaintiffs\u2019 parole eligibility dates for life sentences under the Fair Sentencing Act were calculated correctly, and the trial court erred by concluding otherwise, where defendants applied good behavior time reductions (\u201cgood time\u201d) to plaintiffs life sentences but not gain and merit time (awarded for work and program participation). Some aspects of the statutory parole scheme are ambiguous and deference must be given to reasonable agency interpretation.\n3. Probation and Parole \u2014 eligibility date \u2014 time credits \u2014 consecutive sentences\nThe Department of Correction\u2019s application of time credits to a Fair Sentencing Act burglary sentence served consecutively with a life term did not violate statutory and case law prohibitions on \u201cpaper parole\u201d (whereby inmates serving consecutive sentences are required to be paroled from the first sentence before beginning the second for purposes of determining parole eligibility).\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 18 September 2001 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 October 2002.\nGeorge B. Currin, for plaintiffs-appellees.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth F. Parsons, for the State." }, "file_name": "0282-01", "first_page_order": 312, "last_page_order": 324 }