{ "id": 9250779, "name": "RONALD H. SACK, Petitioner-Appellee v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY; MARYE ANNE FOX, CHANCELLOR; UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA; Respondents-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Sack v. North Carolina State University", "decision_date": "2002-12-31", "docket_number": "No. COA02-39", "first_page": "484", "last_page": "500", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "155 N.C. App. 484" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"superior court in its posture of an appellate court, . . . may not consider a matter not addressed by the [agency]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551395, 551302, 551321, 551388, 551102 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"superior court in its posture of an appellate court, . . . may not consider a matter not addressed by the [agency]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0409-03", "/nc/347/0409-04", "/nc/347/0409-05", "/nc/347/0409-01", "/nc/347/0409-02" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852", "parenthetical": "\"superior court in its posture of an appellate court, . . . may not consider a matter not addressed by the [agency]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11793979 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "\"superior court in its posture of an appellate court, . . . may not consider a matter not addressed by the [agency]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 F.3d 1040", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11646539 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/83/1040-01" ] }, { "cite": "911 F. Supp. 1228", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7827046 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/911/1228-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 F. Supp.2d 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 387555 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no property interest in raise absent evidence of entitlement, e.g., \"facts indicating that such raises were provided for by statute, regulation, rule, or contractual provision\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/30/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 F. 3d 64", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9497941 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/266/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54001, 53908, 53845, 53911, 53913 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0751-03", "/nc/345/0751-04", "/nc/345/0751-01", "/nc/345/0751-02", "/nc/345/0751-05" ] }, { "cite": "475 S.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11888358 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 564", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782964 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890", "parenthetical": "citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed.2d 548 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2520868 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed.2d 548 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527900 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Jarrett v. N.C. Dep't of Cultural Resources, 101 N.C. App. 475, 479, 400 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547848, 2548041, 2548241, 2548471 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Jarrett v. N.C. Dep't of Cultural Resources, 101 N.C. App. 475, 479, 400 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0466-02", "/nc/333/0466-01", "/nc/333/0466-04", "/nc/333/0466-03" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "citing Jarrett v. N.C. Dep't of Cultural Resources, 101 N.C. App. 475, 479, 400 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525390 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "citing Jarrett v. N.C. Dep't of Cultural Resources, 101 N.C. App. 475, 479, 400 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18", "parenthetical": "reviewing issue despite trial court's failure to properly delineate the standard of review it employed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511222 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "reviewing issue despite trial court's failure to properly delineate the standard of review it employed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220028 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11357914 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390, 392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Capital Outdoor, Inc. v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment (II), 146 N.C. App. 388, 390, 392, 552 S.E.2d 265, 267 (2001), (Greene, J., dissenting), rev'd per dissent, 355 N.C. 269, 559 S.E.2d 547 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9126704 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707236 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524580 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569880 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 S.E.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "quoting Thompson v. Wake County Board of Education, 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11242057 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "quoting Thompson v. Wake County Board of Education, 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568091 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796", "parenthetical": "quoting Lackey v. Dept. of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 238, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435274 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483", "parenthetical": "quoting Lackey v. Dept. of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 238, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53839 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435233 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527936 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802", "parenthetical": "granting immediate review where trial court \"exceeded its scope of review by [remanding for] further findings without first determining whether the [agency's] findings were sufficient to support [its] conclusion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527252 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564", "parenthetical": "granting immediate review where trial court \"exceeded its scope of review by [remanding for] further findings without first determining whether the [agency's] findings were sufficient to support [its] conclusion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915043 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where trial court \"vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for a rehearing, consistent with its order . . . the order requires further action to settle the controversy, [and] it is interlocutory\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796101, 796107, 796077, 796024, 796153 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where trial court \"vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for a rehearing, consistent with its order . . . the order requires further action to settle the controversy, [and] it is interlocutory\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0655-01", "/nc/342/0655-03", "/nc/342/0655-04", "/nc/342/0655-05", "/nc/342/0655-02" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916433 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0502-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1287, "char_count": 39587, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.777592465210664e-08, "percentile": 0.45647950903701334 }, "sha256": "e39d8aa57ebd457d61d7f80889ecb3f85b0ffee1e0a3b0476eb138330fcb7574", "simhash": "1:bfedc8d871ed3614", "word_count": 6005 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:08:10.559314+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WALKER and THOMAS concur." ], "parties": [ "RONALD H. SACK, Petitioner-Appellee v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY; MARYE ANNE FOX, CHANCELLOR; UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA; Respondents-Appellants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BIGGS, Judge.\nRespondents (N.C. State University; Marye Anne Fox, Chancellor of N.C. State University; University of North Carolina) appeal from an order vacating their dismissal of petitioner\u2019s grievance. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.\nThis appeal arises from a grievance filed by petitioner challenging a decision not to recommend him for a discretionary salary increase. The evidence in the record tended to show the following: Petitioner was employed by North Carolina State University (the university) as a history professor in 1971, and was tenured in 1974. In 1996, \u2018academic enhancement\u2019 funds were made available to the university for discretionary pay raises to 50% of the history faculty. \u201cThe purpose of the academic enhancement funds was to reward highly productive faculty who [were] likely to receive counter offers elsewhere, [and] who could not be easily replaced because of the talents they had.\u201d Dean Zahn, the Dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, asked Dr. Riddle, the chair of the history department, to identify the top 50% of the history faculty. Dr. Riddle was directed to consider several objective and subjective factors in making this determination, including: the number and quality of recent publications; service to the university and the community; special talents brought to the department; level of scholarship; likelihood of receiving an offer from another university; and the need to remedy existing salary inequities among history faculty. Dr. Riddle submitted his recommendations to Dean Zahn, who made the final decisions and awarded the discretionary salary enhancements. Petitioner was not among those recommended by Dr. Riddle.\nIn December, 1996, petitioner filed a grievance against Dr. Riddle, and requested a hearing before the university faculty grievance committee. He alleged that Dr. Riddle had (1) treated him unfairly \u201cfor personal reasons\u201d with regards to scheduling of classes and had (2) \u201cdeliberately overlooked\u201d him when making his recommendations regarding the discretionary salary enhancements, \u201cagain for purely personal reasons.\u201d Petitioner was granted a hearing, and on 29 December 1997, the committee submitted its report and recommendation to Chancellor Monteith, then Chancellor of the university. The committee \u201cwas unanimous in concluding that [petitioner] was treated fairly\u201d with regard to both the scheduling of classes and the determination of who Dr. Riddle would recommend for a salary enhancement. The committee acknowledged that it had spoken by telephone with Dean Zahn to clarify the time period during which faculty publications were evaluated. The committee also offered an opinion that \u201cperhaps if Dr. Riddle had been more forthright\u201d with petitioner, \u201cthe issue of salary enhancement would have been resolved and would have not resulted in a grievance.\u201d\nIn June, 1998, Chancellor Monteith \u201caccepted the committee\u2019s finding on [the] issue\u201d of class schedules. With regards to the issue of salary enhancement, Chancellor Monteith noted that the committee\u2019s ex parte phone conversation with Dean Zahn violated the university\u2019s grievance procedure, which requires that all decisions of the committee \u201cshall be based solely on material presented in the hearings.\u201d To correct this error, Chancellor Monteith remanded the grievance \u201cfor the limited purpose of receiving Dean Zahn\u2019s testimony on the record and providing each party the opportunity to cross-examine.\u201d Petitioner then wrote to university administrators asking whether he would be permitted to offer evidence to rebut Dean Zahn\u2019s testimony, and was informed that \u201cthe committee may entertain a request ... to present rebuttal to any relevant testimony that Dean Zahn may present regarding the issue of how enhancement monies were allocated.\u201d\nThe committee conducted its remand hearing in December, 1998, and submitted an addendum to its earlier report in May, 1999. The committee again concluded that petitioner \u201cwas treated fairly and properly with regard to the manner by which he was evaluated in 1996 for a salary enhancement.\u201d The committee also repeated its concerns about \u201cthe manner by which Dr. Riddle dealt with [petitioner] concerning this issue.\u201d\nIn July, 1999, Chancellor Fox, who had succeeded Chancellor Monteith, wrote to the committee, petitioner, and Dr. Riddle, stating her intention to accept the committee\u2019s recommendation that \u201cno remedial action [was] required\u201d on either of petitioner\u2019s grievances. Before finalizing her decision, Chancellor Fox requested that the committee prepare a memo clarifying why it had neither permitted petitioner to present certain rebuttal testimony on the issue of faculty scheduling of classes, nor considered certain documents submitted by petitioner at the remand hearing. Petitioner had proffered documents to show that, although Dr. Riddle testified that he evaluated faculty publications for the previous 2 years, he had recommended certain faculty members for enhancement money whose publication records would not, standing alone, have qualified them unless Dr. Riddle had included their publications for the previous 3 years.\nThe committee responded that it excluded the testimony regarding rescheduling of classes, because the proposed witness \u201cwas not involved in the decision making process . . . [and] was not privy to [petitioner\u2019s] interactions with Dr. Riddle\u201d regarding scheduling issues. The committee further explained that it excluded petitioner\u2019s proffered documentation as \u201cirrelevant and immaterial\u201d to its resolution of either of the issues it considered dispositive: whether petitioner had shown by a preponderance of the evidence \u201cthat Dr. Riddle acted out of deliberate, personal malice,\u201d or whether Dr. Riddle\u2019s recommendations \u201cevidence[d] unfairness to [petitioner].\u201d The committee made findings of fact that Dr. Riddle was directed to \u201cgive very heavy weight\u201d to \u201cthe question of whether a given faculty member was both likely to be lured away by another university and was worth retaining.\u201d Therefore, the committee determined that Dr. Riddle\u2019s review of the number of publications of each faculty member, whether for two or three years, would not necessarily be \u201cthe final word on even his initial recommendation to the Dean.\u201d The committee also found that the Provost\u2019s guidelines \u201crequire [d] that Dr. Riddle exercise reasonable judgment\u201d and make a \u201cbroader assessment\u201d of an individual faculty members \u201coverall likelihood of being made an offer worth countering.\u201d Finally, the committee noted that it had evaluated whether Dr. Riddle\u2019s recommendations to Dean Zahn \u201creflected a reasonable determination of [petitioner\u2019s] relative value to his department],]\u201d and \u201cagreed unanimously and without reservation, that Dr. Riddle\u2019s recommendation was indeed reflective of a reasonable determination.\u201d On 17 December 1999, Chancellor Fox issued her final decision accepting the committee\u2019s conclusions.\nPetitioner then appealed to the President of the University of North Carolina. He reiterated his original complaints, and added new allegations of age discrimination, breach of contract, and violation of his due process rights. President Broad found no evidence that \u201cthe process or decisions reached in [petitioner\u2019s] appeal were wrongly made or otherwise in error\u201d and, accordingly, found \u201cno basis for reversing or otherwise modifying\u201d Chancellor Fox\u2019s decision. President Broad declined to address petitioner\u2019s age discrimination and breach of contract allegations, as these were not raised before the committee. Thereafter, petitioner appealed to the UNC Board of Governors, who referred the matter to their Committee on University Grievance. That committee found \u201cno compelling basis . . . for disturbing the president\u2019s decision\u201d and recommended that the board sustain the president\u2019s decision and dismiss petitioner\u2019s appeal. The Board of Governors approved the recommendation on 10 November 2000.\nFrom the decision of the Board of Governors, petitioner on 15 December 2000 appealed to the superior court for review. Petitioner\u2019s appeal was heard in superior court on 7 June 2001. On 1 October 2001, the trial court issued an order vacating the Board of Governors decision upholding Chancellor Fox\u2019s dismissal of petitioner\u2019s grievance. The court remanded petitioner\u2019s grievance \u201cto the Grievance Committee\u201d with instructions directing the committee to list all history faculty publications between specific starting and ending dates, and to assign \u201cpoints\u201d for publications of various types, according to the system that Dr. Riddle testified he used. The committee was ordered to prepare \u201ca master list of all the faculty members ... in rank order\u201d and \u201cdetermine the position occupied by the Petitioner\u201d according to the \u201cpoint\u201d system for the quantity of publications during the specified time period. If petitioner was in the top half of this list, the court ordered that \u201c[petitioner\u2019s] name and position in the ranking will be submitted to the Chancellor with a recommendation that he was not treated fairly.\u201d Conversely, if petitioner was not in the top 50%, the corut ordered that \u201c[petitioner\u2019s] grievance will be recommended for dismissal [.]\u201d The court also ordered that \u201cthe Grievance Committee shall not consider the age of any faculty member, or any other factor\u201d besides the publications each facility member had during the specified time period, and directed the committee to take testimony and rebuttal evidence on the issue of whether respondent had any \u201clegitimate business reason\u201d for considering the age of faculty members. Finally, the trial court ordered that \u201c[t]he Chancellor shall accept the recommendations of the Grievance Committee . . . and shall issue her determination of Petitioner\u2019s grievance.\u201d From this order, respondents appeal.\nPreliminarily, we address petitioner\u2019s appellate motions to dismiss respondents\u2019 appeal, and to strike portions of respondents\u2019 reply brief. In his motion to dismiss, petitioner argues that, because the trial court remanded to the committee rather than reversing the Board of Governors, respondents\u2019 appeal should be dismissed as interlocutory. Petitioner correctly asserts that the trial court\u2019s order was interlocutory. See Heritage Pointe Bldrs. v. N. C. Licensing Bd. of General Contractors, 120 N.C. App. 502, 504, 462 S.E.2d 696, 697-98 (1995), disc. review denied , 342 N.C. 655, 467 S.E.2d 712 (1996) (where trial court \u201cvacated the Board\u2019s decision and remanded the case for a rehearing, consistent with its order . . . the order requires further action to settle the controversy, [and] it is interlocutory\u201d). This Court has generally held that an order \u201cremanding an action to an agency for hearing ... is not immediately appealable because avoidance of a hearing does not affect a substantial right.\u201d Byers v. N. C. Savings Institutions Division, 123 N.C. App. 689, 693, 474 S.E.2d 404, 407 (1996). However, in the case sub judice, we find merit in certain of respondents\u2019 substantive arguments. Therefore, in the interests of justice and pursuant to our authority under N.C.R. App. P. 21, we elect to treat respondents\u2019 appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. See N.C. R. App. P. 21 (2001)(a)(1) (\u201cThe writ of certio-rari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review . . . when no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists[.]\u201d). See also Tastee Freez Cafeteria v. Watson, 64 N.C. App. 562, 564, 307 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1983) (granting immediate review where trial court \u201cexceeded its scope of review by [remanding for] further findings without first determining whether the [agency\u2019s] findings were sufficient to support [its] conclusion\u201d).\nPetitioner also filed a motion to strike portions of respondents\u2019 reply brief. We conclude that respondents\u2019 reply brief comports with the requirements of N.C.R. App. P. 28(h), and, accordingly, deny petitioner\u2019s motion.\nStandard of Review\nThe trial court\u2019s order was entered pursuant to petitioner\u2019s appeal from a final agency decision, in this case the decision by the Board of Governors denying further review of his grievance against Dr. Riddle. Judicial review of a final agency decision is governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-51(b) (2001):\n[I]n reviewing a final decision, the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case . . . for further proceedings. It may also reverse or modify the agency\u2019s decision . . . [if] substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the agency\u2019s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:\n(1) In violation of constitutional provisions;\n(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;\n(3)Made upon unlawful procedure;\n(4) Affected by other error of law;\n(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence ... in view of the entire record as submitted; or\n(6) Arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion.\nThe standard of review applied by the superior court reviewing a final agency decision is determined by the type of error asserted; errors of law are reviewed de novo, while the whole record test is applied to allegations that the administrative agency decision was not supported by the evidence, or was arbitrary and capricious. Amanini v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 443 S.E.2d 114 (1994). \u201cDe novo review requires a court to consider the question anew, as if the agency has not addressed it.\u201d Blalock v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Servs., 143 N.C. App. 470, 475-76, 546 S.E.2d 177, 182 (2001).\nWhen it applies the whole record test, \u201cthe reviewing court [must] examine all competent evidence (the \u2018whole record\u2019) in order to determine whether the agency decision is supported by \u2018substantial evidence.\u2019 \u201d ACT-UP Triangle v. Commission for Health Services, 345 N.C. 699, 706, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1997) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is \u201c \u2018more than a scintilla\u2019 and is \u2018such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d Williams v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t & Natural Res., 144 N.C. App. 479, 483, 548 S.E.2d 793, 796 (2001) (quoting Lackey v. Dept. of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 238, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1982)). The whole record test \u201cdoes not permit the court \u2018to replace the [agency\u2019s] judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo,\u2019 \u201d N. C. Dept. of Correction v. McNeely, 135 N.C. App. 587, 592, 521 S.E.2d 730, 733 (1999) (quoting Thompson v. Wake County Board of Education, 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977)), but \u201cmerely gives a reviewing court the capability to determine whether an administrative decision has a rational basis in the evidence.\u201d Dept. of Correction v. Gibson, 58 N.C. App. 241, 257, 293 S.E.2d 664, 674 (1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983). Thus, if the agency\u2019s findings are supported by substantial evidence, they must be upheld. Id.\nOn appeal, this Court must determine whether the trial court committed any error of law, and our review of the trial court\u2019s order generally involves \u201c(1) determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding whether the court did so properly.\u201d Amanini, 114 N.C. App. at 675, 443 S.E.2d at 118-19. Thus, in its order regarding an agency decision, the trial court should state the standard of review it applied to resolve each issue. Deep River Citizens\u2019 Coalition v. North Carolina Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources, 149 N.C. App. 211, 215, 560 S.E.2d 814, 817 (2002) (citation omitted). However, if necessary, \u201cthis Court\u2019s duty to review a superior court order for errors of law can be accomplished by addressing the dispositive issue(s) before the [agency] and the superior court without (1) examining the scope of review utilized by the superior court [or] (2) remanding the case if the standard of review employed by the superior court cannot be ascertained,\u201d provided that this Court can \u201cdetermine whether: (1) the [b]oard committed any errors in law; (2) the [b]oard followed lawful procedure; (3) the petitioner was afforded appropriate due process; (4) the [b]oard\u2019s decision was supported by competent evidence in the whole record; and (5) . . . the [b]oard\u2019s decision was arbitrary and capricious.\u201d Capital Outdoor, Inc. v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment (I), - N.C. App. -, 567 S.E.2d 440 (2002) (quoting Capital Outdoor, Inc. v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment (II), 146 N.C. App. 388, 390, 392, 552 S.E.2d 265, 267 (2001), (Greene, J., dissenting), rev\u2019d per dissent, 355 N.C. 269, 559 S.E.2d 547 (2002)).\nIn the case sub judice, petitioner, in his appeal to superior court, argued that the committee erred by (1) excluding testimony by petitioner\u2019s rebuttal witness on the issue of Dr. Riddle\u2019s scheduling of classes; (2) excluding petitioner\u2019s proffered documentary rebuttal evidence on the issue of whether Dr. Riddle had recommended certain faculty members whose publications during the previous two years would not have been enough to place them in the top 50%; (3) requiring petitioner to show by the preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Riddle had acted out of personal malice; (4) failing to \u201cnote the use of an impermissible criterion that influenced Riddles\u2019s selection process; to wit, age bias\u201d; and, (5) finding that petitioner had been treated fairly by Dr. Riddle with regards to his recommendations to Dean Zahn regarding salary enhancement. Petitioner also added a generalized allegation that his \u201csubstantial rights\u201d were violated because respondent\u2019s actions were \u201cin violation of constitutional provisions, made upon unlawful procedure, affected by other error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence ... in view of the entire record as submitted, and arbitrary or capricious.\u201d However, petitioner did not associate this broad statement with any specific finding or decision by respondent.\nIn its order, the trial court concluded that \u201ca de novo review is appropriate for its consideration of each of Petitioner\u2019s assignments of error, because the [c]ourt views each of Petitioner\u2019s assignments of error as alleging errors of law.\u201d This conclusion was correct as regards the evidentiary issues, the proper burden of proof, and the committee\u2019s failure to reach the issue of age bias. However, petitioner\u2019s challenge to the committee\u2019s finding of fact, that Dr. Riddle had treated petitioner fairly in making his recommendations to Dean Zahn, requires application of the whole record standard.\nAlthough the trial court erred by failing to conduct whole record review of this issue, \u201c[w]e do not believe a remand is necessary, however, because the central issue presented ... is whether there was competent, material, and substantial evidence to support [the committee\u2019s] decision.. . . and the entire record of the hearing is before us.\u201d Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph County Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 15, 565 S.E.2d 9, 18 (2002) (reviewing issue despite trial court\u2019s failure to properly delineate the standard of review it employed).\nI.\nRespondents argue that the trial court erred by \u201cignoring and misinterpreting\u201d \u201cagency regulations bearing on the faculty grievance proceedings.\u201d We agree.\nWe first review the relevant agency regulations. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 116-11(2) (2001) the UNC Board of Governors is \u201cresponsible for the general . . . control, supervision, management and governance of . . . the constituent institutions^ and f]or this purpose . . . may adopt such policies and regulations as it may deem wise.\u201d Accordingly, the Board of Governors has directed that the Chancellor of each constituent institution \u201cshall provide for the establishment of a faculty grievance committee\u201d (Board of Governors Code \u00a7 607) and has authorized the various Boards of Trustees to \u201cadopt personnel policies not otherwise prescribed by state law[.]\u201d (Board of Governors Code, Appendix 1). NCSU regulations governing its grievance procedures are found in its Faculty Handbook, \u00a7 24.01, Grievance Procedure for Faculty, and in its NCSU Grievance Committee Manual. Under the university\u2019s grievance procedures, the trial court\u2019s review of the Board of Governors\u2019 decision not to hear petitioner\u2019s appeal was the fourth level of appeal by petitioner from Dr. Riddle\u2019s determination that petitioner should not be recommended for a discretionary pay raise. The earlier stages of the university\u2019s grievance process are summarized below:\n1. The grievance committee conducts a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that \u201ca decision which has adversely affected a [griev-ant\u2019s] professional or academic capacity, has been reached improperly or unfairly.\u201d The committee \u201chas no power to reverse an administrative decision but can only recommend a reassessment of that decision[.]\u201d\n2. Based upon a review of the complete record of the committee, the Chancellor makes the decision whether to accept the committee\u2019s recommendation.\n3. The President of UNC reviews the Chancellor\u2019s decision to determine whether \u201cthe process in reaching [the] decision^ was correctly followed and that the final conclusion reached had an evidentiary basis in the record.\u201d\n4. The Board of Governors examines the record to determine if significant procedural or substantive errors below require review.\nNCSU Grievance Manual, III.A.; NCSU Grievance Procedure, 24.01.10 and 13; Board of Governors, \u201cAppellate Review Policies and Procedures.\u201d Before conducting a hearing, the grievance committee must ascertain whether the alleged grievance meets its jurisdictional requirements. The committee may conduct a hearing only if the petitioner asserts that an administrative decision was reached improperly or unfairly, as those terms are defined by the university:\nImproperly means in violation of a specific university rule, regulation, policy, or practice pertaining to the employment relationship between the grievant and the university. Unfairly means in an arbitrary or capricious manner or in an unlawfully discriminatory manner.\nNCSU Grievance Procedure, 24.01.2.1. Moreover, the grievance procedure \u201ccannot be used for . . . discretionary actions, such as salary adjustments . . . except to determine (1) whether the discretionary action was made in accordance with relevant university rules, regulations, policies, practices, procedures, or criteria; and (2) whether the action constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.\u201d NCSU Grievance Procedure, 2401.2.2.b. Thus, \u201cif the grievance contains allegations that are not grievable, those allegations must be dismissed.\u201d NCSU Grievance Manual, IV.A.2.a. Further, the \u201cgrievant bears the burden of establishing the jurisdictional grounds . . . and the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence [the] grounds for the grievance.\u201d NCSU Grievance Manual, III.A; IV.I.2.\nIn the case sub judice, petitioner alleges neither a violation of \u201ca specific university rule, regulation, policy, or practice,\u201d nor that he was the victim of discrimination. Rather, his grievance alleged that Dr. Riddle\u2019s decisions regarding scheduling of petitioner\u2019s classes for Spring, 1996, and his recommendations to Dean Zahn for salary enhancement both were unfairly based on \u201cpurely personal reasons.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s allegations, if proven, could constitute \u201ca clear abuse of discretion\u201d and, thus, the committee properly granted petitioner a hearing.\nIn its order the trial court concluded that the committee \u201cdid not properly perform its official duties.\u201d The court did not specify which \u201cofficial duty\u201d the committee had neglected. We have, therefore, reviewed each of the issues raised by petitioner in his appeal to superior court, to determine whether the resolution of these issues provides support for the trial court\u2019s conclusion.\nIn his appeal to superior court, petitioner excepted to the committee\u2019s findings that he was \u201ctreated fairly with regard to the salary enhancement issue.\u201d We disagree with petitioner.\nThe committee is the only fact-finding body in the grievance procedure; it is charged with \u201cresolving conflicting testimony,\u201d and must \u201cevaluate the evidence and determine the truth of material evidence.\u201d NCSU Grievance Manual, IV.D.2. In the case before us, the committee\u2019s report to the Chancellor stated that the committee \u201cwas unanimous in concluding that [petitioner] was treated fairly.\u201d After remanding to take Dean Zahn\u2019s testimony on the record, the committee prepared an addendum to their report, stating that \u201c[o]nce again, the [c]ommittee concludes that [petitioner] was treated fairly and properly with regard to the manner by which he was evaluated in 1996 for a salary enhancement.\u201d Finally, in its memorandum to Chancellor Fox clarifying certain evidentiary rulings, the committee \u201cagreed unanimously and without reservation, that Dr. Riddle\u2019s recommendation was indeed reflective of a reasonable determination.\u201d We conclude that the committee\u2019s findings of fact in this regard were supported by substantial evidence in view of the whole record.\nAt the hearing, Dr. Riddle testified that he had not based his recommendations to Dean Zahn on personal animus, and had weighed many factors. The testimony of other university professors and administrators tended to show that Dr. Riddle was directed to employ multiple criteria in his determinations, and that he was generally fair in making administrative decisions. Petitioner\u2019s testimony indicated that Dr. Riddle\u2019s recommendations were to be based on the number of publications for the previous three years, and that if factors other than the number of publications were excluded, he might have been in the top 50%. The committee was thus required to resolve conflicting testimony. \u201cAn appellate court may not . . . disturb an agency\u2019s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and sufficiency to be given to the testimony, . . . and may not override decisions within the agency\u2019s discretion if made in good faith and in accordance with the law.\u201d Teague v. Western Carolina University, 108 N.C. App. 689, 692, 424 S.E.2d 684, 686, disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 466, 427 S.E.2d 627 (1993) (citing Jarrett v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Cultural Resources, 101 N.C. App. 475, 479, 400 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1991)). Further, the university has expressly admonished the committee to \u201cunderstand the limits of their role. A Committee does not replace management^] . . . [and] may not support a grievance where reasonable persons could have differed and improper factors and improper procedures were not involved.\u201d We conclude that the committee\u2019s finding that petitioner had been treated fairly was supported by substantial competent evidence, and must be upheld.\nPetitioner also argued on appeal to superior court that the committee erred by requiring him to prove deliberate personal malice. Two issues are presented: the appropriate burden of proof, and the committee\u2019s use of the term \u201cdeliberate personal malice.\u201d Regarding the burden of proof, university regulations are clear that petitioner had the burden, of proving his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. NCSU Grievance Manual, III.A; IV.I.2. In the instant case, therefore, petitioner had the burden to prove his allegations that Dr. Riddle had \u201cunfairly treated\u201d him with regards to scheduling; that \u201cthis unfair treatment was deliberate\u201d; and that Dr. Riddle \u201cdeliberately overlooked [him] when recommending faculty for [salary] increases, again for purely personal reasons.\u201d Regarding the committee\u2019s use of the term \u201cpersonal malice,\u201d we note that the Code of the Board of Governors, applicable to its constituent institutions, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 116-11(2) and (14), and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 116-34, defines \u201cpersonal malice\u201d as \u201cdislike, animosity, [or] ill-will. . . based on personal characteristics, [or] traits ... of an individual that are not relevant to valid University decision-making.\u201d Board of Governors, \u201cAppellate Review\u201d III-I-15. Petitioner\u2019s assertions that Dr. Riddle, e.g., \u201cdeliberately overlooked [him] when recommending faculty for increases, again for purely personal reasons\u201d would appear to fall within the Board of Governors definition of \u201cpersonal malice,\u201d as the term is used in university proceedings. Moreover, although the committee used the term \u201cpersonal malice\u201d in a memorandum clarifying one of its evi-dentiary rulings, the committee\u2019s written submissions to university administrators all stated affirmatively that Dr. Riddle\u2019s recommendation was reflective of a reasonable determination, and that petitioner was treated fairly. We hold that the committee did not err by requiring petitioner to prove his allegations by the preponderance of the evidence, and that petitioner was not subjected to a heightened standard by the committee\u2019s reference to petitioner\u2019s specific allegations, that Dr. Riddle\u2019s scheduling and salary enhancement decisions were based on \u201cpurely personal reasons,\u201d by the more general term \u201cpersonal malice.\u201d\nPetitioner\u2019s appeal to superior court also challenged two of the committee\u2019s evidentiary rulings. We first note that the committee is authorized to \u201cexercise complete control\u201d over the hearing, including the determination of \u201cwhether information or testimony is material and relevant to the issues involved in the grievance.\u201d It \u201cmay rule that certain presentations not be considered],]\u201d and in so doing, the committee is \u201cnot bound by strict rules of legal evidence\u201d although its rulings must be \u201c[consistent with the principles of impartiality and equity].]\u201d NCSU Grievance Procedures, \u00a7 24.01.8.\nIn the present case, the committee excluded certain testimony regarding scheduling of classes, on the basis that the witness \u201cwas not involved in the decision making process . . . [and] was not privy to [petitioner\u2019s] interactions with Dr. Riddle\u201d regarding scheduling issues. We conclude that this determination was within the scope of the committee\u2019s authority, and was not error.\nThe committee also excluded documents offered by petitioner in rebuttal to Dean Zahn\u2019s testimony. These documents were intended to show that Dr. Riddle had recommended certain faculty to Dean Zahn despite the fact that the number of publications by these faculty in the past two years would not, standing alone, have placed them in the top 50%. In excluding this evidence, the committee rejected petitioner\u2019s basic premise \u2014 that Dr. Riddle\u2019s recommendations for salary increases were supposed to be based primarily upon how many publications each faculty member had within a certain time period, so that evidence that in several cases Dr. Riddle\u2019s recommendations did not correspond to the faculty member\u2019s rank according to number of publications would tend to show unfairness on Dr. Riddle\u2019s part. Instead, the committee, as fact-finder, determined that Dr. Riddle was directed to base his recommendations largely on a subjective assessment of many factors, in order to determine whether a faculty member was likely to receive an competitive offer from another institution, and on Dr. Riddle\u2019s evaluation of the faculty member\u2019s \u201crelative value to his department.\u201d The committee concluded that, even assuming Dr. Riddle made an \u201cinadvertent error\u201d in his tabulation of the number of publications for the two or three previous years, this \u201cwould not, without more evidence, have established deliberate personal malice.\u201d The committee found that there was no other evidence that Dr. Riddle acted for personal reasons, and that \u201cDr. Riddle\u2019s recommendation reflected a reasonable determination of [petitioner\u2019s] relative value to his department.\u201d The committee therefore excluded petitioner\u2019s proffered \u201crebuttal evidence\u201d on the basis that it was \u201cirrelevant and unnecessary\u201d to their determination of whether Dr. Riddle\u2019s failure to recommend petitioner for a raise was \u201cdeliberately\u201d based upon \u201cpurely personal reasons\u201d as alleged by petitioner. We hold that the committee\u2019s decision not to consider petitioner\u2019s rebuttal evidence was within its authority, and was not inconsistent with the \u201cprinciples of impartiality and equity\u201d that the university requires the committee to apply.\nFor the reasons discussed above, we are unable to discern any basis in the issues presented by petitioner to the trial court, for the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the committee \u201cdid not properly perform its official duties.\u201d Accordingly, respondents\u2019 assignment of error that the trial court erred in interpreting relevant agency regulations is upheld.\nII.\nRespondents also argue that the trial court erred by concluding that petitioner was denied due process because petitioner\u2019s grievance \u201cimplicates no interest protected by due process rights.\u201d Specifically, respondents contend that the discretionary salary enhancement did not give rise to any property right of petitioner\u2019s invoking his right to due process. We agree.\n\u201cIn analyzing a due process claim, we [must] first. . . determine whether a constitutionally protected property interest exists. To demonstrate a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, a party must show more than a mere expectation; he must have a legitimate claim of entitlement.\u201d McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 447, 450 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1994) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed.2d 548 (1972)). A \u2018legitimate claim of entitlement\u2019 requires \u201cmore than a \u2018unilateral expectation\u2019 of a property interest[.]\u201d Chapman v. Byrd, 124 N.C. App. 13, 18, 475 S.E.2d 734, 738 (1996), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 751, 485 S.E.2d 50 (1997) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972)).\nAlthough North Carolina appellate courts have not addressed this issue in the context of a discretionary salary increase, appellate cases from other jurisdictions have held there is no property interest in discretionary decisions about employment. See, e.g., Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F. 3d 64, 67 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.) 2001) (\u201cdiscretionary salary increase was not a form of property protected by the Constitution against deprivation without due process of law\u201d); Temple v. Inhabitants of City of Belfast, 30 F. Supp.2d 60, 67 FN5 (D. Me. 1998) (no property interest in raise absent evidence of entitlement, e.g., \u201cfacts indicating that such raises were provided for by statute, regulation, rule, or contractual provision\u201d); Day v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 911 F. Supp. 1228, 1241 (D. Neb. 1995), aff\u2019d, 83 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. (Neb.) 1996) (no property interest in salary raise where plaintiff \u201cclaims that he has not received salary increases which he believes his academic record merits, [but] he has offered no evidence of any statute, regulation, rule, or contractual provision [that] would entitle him to receive any raise, let alone one of a specific amount\u201d).\nIn the case sub judice, petitioner does not cite any statute or university regulation that would entitle him to be recommended for the salary enhancement. Moreover, as discussed above, the committee found that Dr. Riddle was directed to base his recommendations on an array of factors, both objective and subjective. These findings of fact establish that an individual faculty member could have no more than a unilateral expectation that he or she would be recommended by Dr. Riddle. We hold that petitioner\u2019s Due Process rights were not implicated in Dr. Riddle\u2019s recommendations to Dean Zahn, and that the trial court erred by concluding that petitioner had a contractual right to be recommended for a raise, or that his Due Process rights were violated.\nIII.\nFinally, respondents argue that the trial court erred in reaching the issue of age discrimination. Again, we agree.\nThe trial court concluded that \u201cthe Board of Trustees, the Dean, and Dr. Riddle were all influenced illegally by age bias[,]\u201d and that the committee \u201cignored substantial evidence of age discrimination.\u201d University regulations strictly limit a grievance committee to consideration of issues alleged in petitioner\u2019s grievance letter, or which the committee has unanimously consented to consider by later amendment of the grievance. NCSU Grievance Procedure, 3.1.1; 8.1.11.\nIn the instant case, it is undisputed that petitioner did not raise the issue of age discrimination in his request for a grievance hearing, did not request an amendment of his grievance, and did not even raise the issue at the hearing. Therefore, this issue was never presented at petitioner\u2019s grievance hearing, and thus was not properly before the trial court on appeal. See Tate Terrace Realty Investors, Inc. v. Currituck County, 127 N.C. App. 212, 224, 488 S.E.2d 845, 852, disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 409, 496 S.E.2d 394 (1997) (\u201csuperior court in its posture of an appellate court, . . . may not consider a matter not addressed by the [agency]\u201d) (citation omitted). Therefore, the trial court erred by addressing the issue on appeal.\nFor the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order, reversing respondents\u2019 decision dismissing petitioner\u2019s grievance, was erroneous and must be\nReversed.\nJudges WALKER and THOMAS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BIGGS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Capitol District Law Offices, by Reagan H. Weaver and Robert J. Harris, for petitioner-appellee.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joyce S. Rutledge, for respondents-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RONALD H. SACK, Petitioner-Appellee v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY; MARYE ANNE FOX, CHANCELLOR; UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA; Respondents-Appellants\nNo. COA02-39\n(Filed 31 December 2002)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 certiorari granted\nA superior court order remanding a university grievance to a university committee was interlocutory, but was treated as a petition for a writ of certiorari and heard in the interests of justice because there was merit in some of the substantive arguments.\n2. Administrative Law\u2014 judicial review \u2014 standard\nWhen reviewing a university grievance procedure, the superior court correctly chose to apply de novo review for the evi-dentiary issues, the proper burden of proof, and the failure to reach an issue, but a challenge to a finding of fact should have been reviewed by the whole record standard. Remand was not necessary, however, because the entire record was before the appellate court.\n3. Administrative Law\u2014 university grievance procedures\u2014 followed properly\nThe superior court erred in an action arising from a university grievance procedure by concluding that the university grievance committee did not perform its official duties properly where the court did not specify the official duties the committee had neglected and no basis for the court\u2019s conclusion could be discerned from the issues presented by the petitioner to the trial court.\n4. Constitutional Law\u2014 due process \u2014 discretionary salary increase \u2014 no property right\nA professor who did not receive a raise was not denied due process because he had no property right in the discretionary salary increase.\n5. Administrative Law\u2014 university grievance \u2014 issue not raised in grievance proceeding \u2014 not before superior court\nThe superior court erred by reaching the issue of age discrimination when reviewing a university grievance procedure where the issue was never presented at the grievance hearing and thus was not properly before the trial court on appeal.\nAppeal by respondents from order entered 1 October 2001 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr., in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2002.\nCapitol District Law Offices, by Reagan H. Weaver and Robert J. Harris, for petitioner-appellee.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joyce S. Rutledge, for respondents-appellants." }, "file_name": "0484-01", "first_page_order": 514, "last_page_order": 530 }