{ "id": 9251187, "name": "JAMES ANDREW HAWLEY, Plaintiff v. CHARLES SAMUEL CASH and ROSEWAY TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Hawley v. Cash", "decision_date": "2002-12-31", "docket_number": "No. COA02-93", "first_page": "580", "last_page": "586", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "155 N.C. App. 580" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135880 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12134800 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Von Viczay v. Thoms, 140 N.C. App. 737, 738, 538 S.E.2d 629, 630 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 445, 545 S.E.2d 210 (2001) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511589, 1511429, 1511366, 1511262, 1511167 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Von Viczay v. Thoms, 140 N.C. App. 737, 738, 538 S.E.2d 629, 630 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 445, 545 S.E.2d 210 (2001) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0159-05", "/nc/356/0159-03", "/nc/356/0159-01", "/nc/356/0159-02", "/nc/356/0159-04" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506-7", "parenthetical": "quoting Von Viczay v. Thoms, 140 N.C. App. 737, 738, 538 S.E.2d 629, 630 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 445, 545 S.E.2d 210 (2001) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9365903 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359", "parenthetical": "quoting Von Viczay v. Thoms, 140 N.C. App. 737, 738, 538 S.E.2d 629, 630 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 445, 545 S.E.2d 210 (2001) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138418, 138298, 138467, 138374 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0229-04", "/nc/354/0229-03", "/nc/354/0229-01", "/nc/354/0229-02" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11432915 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c) and (h)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082045 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567809 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "quoting Clark v. Bodycombe, 289 N.C. 246, 251, 221 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566231 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "quoting Clark v. Bodycombe, 289 N.C. 246, 251, 221 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198057 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080078 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252", "parenthetical": "quoting Fulk v. Piedmont Music Ctr., 138 N.C. App. 425, 429, 531 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079936 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "quoting Fulk v. Piedmont Music Ctr., 138 N.C. App. 425, 429, 531 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250149 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0413-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 728, "char_count": 16303, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2384224814723085e-07, "percentile": 0.6072939001463019 }, "sha256": "a890f25392d9c8050aad17861ad738b62fa07ab16581ec20c32303f4faca9492", "simhash": "1:8d80c5391c1c8d78", "word_count": 2677 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:08:10.559314+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUDSON concur." ], "parties": [ "JAMES ANDREW HAWLEY, Plaintiff v. CHARLES SAMUEL CASH and ROSEWAY TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nDefendants, Charles Cash (\u201cMr. Cash\u201d) and Roseway Transportation, Inc., appeal from a judgment granting plaintiff, James Hawley (\u201cMr. Hawley\u201d), $2.5 million for personal injury and $20,000 for property damages. Defendants appeal the denial of their motion for new trial. On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred in two ways: I. By granting plaintiffs motion for directed verdict as to defendants\u2019 claim that plaintiff was contrib-utorily negligent in causing the collision; and II. By denying defendants\u2019 motion for new trial because the damages awarded were excessive, the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, the jury manifestly disregarded the court\u2019s instructions, and the verdict was contrary to law. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court\u2019s judgment.\nOn 17 August 1999, at around six o\u2019clock in the morning, defendant, an employee of Roseway Transportation, Inc., was driving a tractor-trailer on Interstate 85 near Oxford. At approximately the same time, plaintiff was driving his 1969 pickup truck to work. Plaintiff entered Interstate 85 at exit 204. After plaintiff had traveled seven-tenths of a mile north of exit 204, defendant hit plaintiff\u2019s truck from behind, causing plaintiff\u2019s truck to cross the median and overturn. The one independent eyewitness to the accident, Julian Lowery (\u201cMr. Lowery\u201d), testified that he was driving north on Interstate 85 in the passing lane. Mr. Lowery estimated that Mr. Cash was traveling at about 65 miles per hour and that Mr. Hawley was driving at 45-50 miles per hour even though this was a 65 mile per hour zone. Mr. Lowery testified that he noticed Mr. Cash \u201chad his cab light on, and \u25a0 was leaning a little bit over to the inside, like he was getting something between the seats or something.\u201d After Mr. Lowery passed the tractor-trailer, he \u201cpassed this pickup truck that was running slower than the tractor and trailer.\u201d When Mr. Lowery looked in his rearview mirror after passing the pickup truck, he saw the tractor-trailer hit the pickup truck \u201cright dead center in the back end, and knocked it across the median, and flipped it upside down.\u201d The parties stipulated that defendant Cash was negligent. Thus, the only issue before the jury was what amount of compensatory damages plaintiff was entitled to recover for personal injury and for property damage. Mr. Cash died, of causes unrelated to the accident, before service of the complaint. Roseway Transportation was included as a defendant under the theory of respondeat superior.\nI. Contributory Negligence Issue\nDefendants first argue that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for directed verdict on defendants\u2019 affirmative defense of contributory negligence. In defendants\u2019 amended answer to plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint, defendants stated as an affirmative defense:\nPlaintiff was contributorily negligent in that he traveled on an interstate highway at an excessively slow speed, without activating his four-way flashers. Said low speed was in violation of G.S. \u00a7 20-141(c) and (h) or, in the alternative, was less speed than a reasonably prudent person would be using under the circumstances.\nIn his reply, plaintiff \u201cdenie[d] the allegations of negligence . . . and denie[d] that any negligence on [his] part . . . contributed to or was the cause of his injury.\u201d'\nIn ruling on a motion for directed verdict, we apply the same standard of review as on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Holcomb v. Colonial Associates, L.L.C., 153 N.C. App. 413, 416, 570 S.E.2d 248, 250 (2002). Appellate review requires this Court to examine \u201c \u2018all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,\u2019 \u201d give that party \u201c \u2018the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn therefrom\u2019 \u201d and determine if \u201c \u2018the evidence is sufficient to be submitted to the jury.\u2019 \u201d Branch v. High Rock Realty, Inc., 151 N.C. App. 244, 250, 565 S.E.2d 248, 252 (2002) (quoting Fulk v. Piedmont Music Ctr., 138 N.C. App. 425, 429, 531 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2000)). The trial court correctly denies a motion for directed verdict \u201c \u2018if there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of the non-movant\u2019s claim.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Norman Owen Trucking v. Morkoski, 131 N.C. App. 168, 172, 506 S.E.2d 267, 270 (1998)).\nFurthermore, \u201c[w]ith respect to contributory negligence as a matter of law, \u2018[t]he general rule is that a directed verdict for a defendant on the ground of contributory negligence may only be granted when the evidence taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff establishes [plaintiff\u2019s] negligence so clearly that no other reasonable inference or conclusion may be drawn therefrom. Contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence even when arising from plaintiff\u2019s evidence must be resolved by the jury rather than the trial judge.\u2019 \u201d Rappaport v. Days Inn, 296 N.C. 382, 384, 250 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1979) (quoting Clark v. Bodycombe, 289 N.C. 246, 251, 221 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1976)); see also Edwards v. Cerro, 150 N.C. App. 551, 564 S.E.2d 277 (2002).\nIn the subject case, the situation is unusual in that plaintiff made the motion for directed verdict on defendants\u2019 defense of contributory negligence at the close of all the evidence at trial. In most cases that set out the applicable standard of review, the defendant moves for a directed verdict on its affirmative defense that the plaintiff is barred from recovery as a result of plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence. Thus, the evidence viewed in the \u201clight most favorable to the non-moving party,\u201d is normally viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Here, however, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to defendants, since plaintiff was the moving party. Therefore, \u201cif there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of [defendants\u2019] claim\u201d that plaintiff was con-tributorily negligent, then the issue should have been submitted for the jury to decide. Here, the trial court did not find that sufficient evidence of plaintiff being contributorily negligent exists such that the jury should have been allowed to decide. In clarifying its granting of plaintiff\u2019s motion for directed verdict, the trial court stated:\n[T]he only evidence at all that could be showing any negligence would be that [Mr. Hawley] was operating [his truck] too slow [sic] to ... \u201cimpede the normal and reasonable movement\u201d of traffic .. . all the evidence tends to show that the defendant, Cash, was operating the tractor-trailer and struck Mr. Hawley square in the . . . back of the pickup truck. That there were no skid marks. There was no evidence of any movement of the tractor-trailer to avoid the [] striking of the pickup truck. There is evidence that tends to show that Mr. Cash didn\u2019t see the pickup truck before the impact. . . The Court finds that Mr. Hawley has testified . . . that he was proceeding fifty (50) to fifty-five (55) at the time of the collision. There is evidence that tends to show that the . . . State trooper, who is an experienced law enforcement officer involved in investigating accidents . . . estimated that Mr. Hawley was going about fifty (50) miles per hour . . . The Court does find as a fact that from all of the evidence that even if Mr. Hawley was going forty (40) to forty-five (45) miles per hour when it [sic] was not any minimum speed, that the Court finds that this would not have impeded the normal and reasonable movement of the traffic of someone keeping a proper lookout, and keeping their vehicle . . . under control, and not ramming someone in the back. And the Court does find as a fact that taking all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant in this case, that even if the vehicle was going . . . \u201capproximately forty (40) miles per hour,\u201d [as Mr. Cash testified before he died], that in considering all the evidence in this case that the Court should not submit [the] contributory issue to the jury. The Court finds and rules as a matter of law that there is insufficient evidence in this case for this Court to allow an issue of contributory negligence to go to the jury. That the only possible issue of negligence on behalf of the defendant would be driving ... at a slow speed to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, and the Court is going to allow the directed verdict on contrib[utory negligence].\nThe trial court found as a fact that Mr. Hawley was driving slower than the posted speed limit and that no minimum speed limit was posted. Driving slower than the speed limit is not unlawful unless it is so slow as to \u201cimpede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic\u201d in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141(c) and (h). The evidence produced at trial was not sufficient enough to show that Mr. Hawley was contributorily negligent even by \u201ca scintilla.\u201d We find no error in the trial court\u2019s ruling on this issue.\nII. Excessive Damages Issue\nDefendants\u2019 second argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because the damages were excessive and appeared to be the result of passion or prejudice, the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, the jury manifestly disregarded the court\u2019s instructions, and the verdict was contrary to law. It is has long been established that in reviewing the lower court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motion for new trial, this Court must decide whether the record \u201caffirmatively demonstrates an abuse of discretion.\u201d Whaley v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 144 N.C. App. 88, 92, 548 S.E.2d 177, 180, disc. rev. denied, 354 N.C. 229, 555 S.E.2d 277 (2001). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59 provides that new trial may be granted for:\nManifest disregard by the jury of the instructions of the court; . . . Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice; . . . Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or that the verdict is contrary to law[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(5)-(7) (2001). In the case at bar, in denying defendants\u2019 motion for new trial, the trial court noted in its findings that defendants \u201cargued for a new trial on the issue of personal injury damages only and abandoned [their] motion for a new trial on the issue of property damages.\u201d Thus, defendants\u2019 request is based solely on the $2.5 million verdict awarded to plaintiff for personal injury damages. The trial court made the following findings at the hearing on the motion for new trial:\n9. The Court... finds that there is evidence presented to the jury which tends to show . . . there was a permanent injury, a brain damage, as [a] result of this collision... [and] that Plaintiff could not continue to work, and even though he was 76 years old and had worked regularly and had a life expectancy of 9.5 years, that he had spent quite a deal of his time working in his yard and in his flower garden and he was unable to pursue those interests . . . that his normal relations and fellowship with his family and friends were diminished as a result of the injuries he received in this collision.\n10. The Court finds that the law is that a motion for new trial is in the sound discretion of the trial court.\n11. The Court finds that there was sufficient and admissible evidence for this jury to award the $2.5 million in damages for the personal injuries suffered by Plaintiff.\n12. The Court finds that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury disregarded the Court\u2019s instructions or that the award for personal injury damages was excessive. And the Court does find that there was sufficient evidence to justify the verdict and that the verdict was not contrary to law.\n13. The Court finds that this trial court is not empowered to change a jury\u2019s verdict, however the Court has sound discretion to either order a new trial or deny a motion for new trial.\n14. The Court in recalling the actual trial of this matter and the evidence presented, finds as a fact that there is nothing to indicate that the jury disregarded the instructions of the Court. That this Court specifically told the jury they were not to award any damages based on pity or sympathy. The Court does find that there was evidence presented to this jury to justify the verdict that the jury gave, and there is nothing in the evidence, or the record of this trial, to show that the jury acted under passion or prejudice.\nAbsent an obvious \u201csubstantial miscarriage of justice,\u201d this Court cannot overturn a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion for new trial. Whaley at 92, 548 S.E.2d at 180 (citation omitted). From our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendants\u2019 motion for new trial. We affirm.\nFinally, plaintiff appealed the trial court\u2019s granting of defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s punitive damages claim. Plaintiff\u2019s appeal is based on defendants\u2019 alleged spoliation of documents that plaintiff could have utilized in establishing a claim for punitive damages.\nIn reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we must determine whether: \u201c(1) the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Adams v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 148 N.C. App. 356, 359, 558 S.E.2d 504, 506-7, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 159, 568 S.E.2d 186 (2002) (quoting Von Viczay v. Thoms, 140 N.C. App. 737, 738, 538 S.E.2d 629, 630 (2000), aff\u2019d, 353 N.C. 445, 545 S.E.2d 210 (2001) (citations omitted)). Based on a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its ruling to grant defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion. Plaintiff did not forecast any evidence that would have supported a punitive damages claim. Further, plaintiff points to nothing that might be contained in the discovery material he claims was inappropriately destroyed which would support such a claim. We conclude that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to this issue and the trial court correctly granted defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment.\nAffirmed.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUDSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jones, Martin, Parris & Tessener, P.L.L.G., by Hoyt G. Tessener and Elizabeth C. Todd, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Womble, Carlyle, Sandrige & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Clayton M. Custer and Bryan D. Graham, and Roberts & Stevens, by Frank P Graham, Kenneth R. Hunt and Wyatt S. Stevens, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES ANDREW HAWLEY, Plaintiff v. CHARLES SAMUEL CASH and ROSEWAY TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendants\nNo. COA02-93\n(Filed 31 December 2002)\n1. Motor Vehicles\u2014 contributory negligence \u2014 slow driving\nDriving slower than the posted speed limit was not sufficient to support contributory negligence by a driver rear-ended by a tractor-trailer on an interstate where there was no posted minimum and the court found that plaintiff\u2019s speed would not have impeded the normal and reasonable movement of traffic. The trial court did not err by granting plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict on the defense of contributory negligence.\n2. Damages and Remedies\u2014 motion for a new trial \u2014 denied\u2014 award not excessive\nThe trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion for a new trial for excessive damages for a $2.5 million personal injury verdict to a 76 year old plaintiff was not an abuse of discretion.\n3. Damages and Remedies\u2014 punitive \u2014 spoliation of documents \u2014 summary judgment\nThe trial court correctly granted defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment on punitive damages in an automobile collision case where plaintiff based its appeal on the alleged spoliation of documents by defendants. Plaintiff did not forecast any evidence that would have supported punitive damages and pointed to nothing supporting such a claim in the discovery material he claims was inappropriately destroyed.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 12 July 2001 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr. denying defendants\u2019 motion for a new trial. Appeal by plaintiff from order granting summary judgment entered 27 March 2001 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr. in Granville County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 2002.\nJones, Martin, Parris & Tessener, P.L.L.G., by Hoyt G. Tessener and Elizabeth C. Todd, for plaintiff-appellee.\nWomble, Carlyle, Sandrige & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Clayton M. Custer and Bryan D. Graham, and Roberts & Stevens, by Frank P Graham, Kenneth R. Hunt and Wyatt S. Stevens, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0580-01", "first_page_order": 610, "last_page_order": 616 }