{ "id": 9251686, "name": "CAROLYN CAMPBELL, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Campbell v. North Carolina Department of Transportation-Division of Motor Vehicles", "decision_date": "2003-01-21", "docket_number": "No. COA02-81", "first_page": "652", "last_page": "670", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "155 N.C. App. 652" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526760 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "quoting Bennett v. Bd. of Education., 69 N.C. App. 615, 618, 317 S.E.2d 912, 915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53839 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706-07", "parenthetical": "quoting Bennett v. Bd. of Education., 69 N.C. App. 615, 618, 317 S.E.2d 912, 915" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358977 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "quoting Watson v. N.C. Real Estate Comm., 87 N.C. App. 637, 639, 362 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521293 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "quoting Watson v. N.C. Real Estate Comm., 87 N.C. App. 637, 639, 362 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568091 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567415 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "quoting Comr. of Insurance v. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 231 S.E.2d 882 (1977)" }, { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524873 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "quoting Comr. of Insurance v. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 231 S.E.2d 882 (1977)" }, { "page": "157-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 12, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(1)" }, { "page": "(a)(1)" }, { "page": "(a)(11)" }, { "page": "(a)(11)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220106, 220010, 220045, 219924, 220085 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0493-04", "/nc/355/0493-01", "/nc/355/0493-05", "/nc/355/0493-02", "/nc/355/0493-03" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9367616 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527936 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 S.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916968 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138471 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439337 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "3-4" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "3-4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1238, "char_count": 45749, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.5372703885672516e-07, "percentile": 0.8846166320893611 }, "sha256": "800bf9c0e73db87a32060e12cb8cdcb3fed61ea8ef5c5d45aa2c63d268251e6f", "simhash": "1:badafec25c1376d0", "word_count": 7161 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:08:10.559314+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUDSON concur." ], "parties": [ "CAROLYN CAMPBELL, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\u2014DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nRespondent, the North Carolina Department of Transportation Division of Motor Vehicles, appeals from an order of the Superior Court reversing the decision of the State Personnel Commission and adopting the recommended decision of the Administrative Law Judge.\nPetitioner was employed by respondent from 5 October 1998 until 8 April 1999 as a Processing Assistant IV. Petitioner\u2019s job duties required her to work with stolen vehicle records kept in open files. The files were kept on shelves, not in filing cabinets, with some filed in boxes on the shelves. Petitioner has suffered from asthma since childhood and has severe allergies to dust and paint fumes. In late October 1998, petitioner noticed her conditions were aggravated, apparently by the dust in the open files. Petitioner sought medical care for asthma attacks in November and December 1998.\nIn early January 1999, while painters worked on her floor, petitioner was assigned to purge the open files. On 11 January 1999, petitioner suffered a severe asthma attack and was hospitalized for five days. Dr. Josephine Brown, M.D. (\u201cDr. Brown\u201d), petitioner\u2019s physician, testified that upon arrival \u201cthis woman was very close to death in the emergency room. She was close to being what we call intubated, having to put in a tube for artificial respiration.\u201d On 15 January 1999, Dr. Brown, wrote to Respondent explaining that petitioner is \u201cseverely allergic to dust and paint fumes.... She will not be able to return under her present working conditions, which exposed her to dust and also to paint fumes.\u201d On 25 January 1999, petitioner returned to work. Respondent offered petitioner a mask to protect her from the dust in the records and offered to remove her from the area when painting was scheduled. Petitioner left work since Dr. Brown had not approved of her working with only a mask to prevent another attack.\nOn 28 January 1999, petitioner met with Mr. Ronald Oates (\u201cMr. Oates\u201d), the State of North Carolina Department of Transportation\u2019s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) coordinator. Mr. Oates recommended that respondent, as a reasonable accommodation, search for another placement for petitioner where the environment is well ventilated, there are no open paper files or excessive dust, and no paint or other fumes. On 15 February 1999, Dr. Brown again wrote to respondent and recommended that petitioner \u201cnot be exposed to dust and fumes in the workplace, as this will exacerbate her asthma.\u201d\nIn relation to a workers\u2019 compensation claim petitioner filed in January, petitioner\u2019s work area was tested for respirable dust levels and petitioner was examined by another doctor for a second opinion. The dust level test revealed the respirable dust levels were very low. The report recommended that petitioner \u201cnot be allowed to open up old file boxes that appear to be dusty or have visible water damage or signs of dampness\u201d without a face mask. On 3 March 1999, petitioner met with Dr. Craig LaForce, M.D. (\u201cDr. LaForce\u201d) an allergy specialist. Dr. LaForce recommended petitioner increase use of her inhaler, monitor her peak flow meter measurements and utilize a HEPA filtration system. In response to this recommendation, Dr. Brown wrote to respondent opposing Dr. LaForce\u2019s solution, explaining that \u201c[t]he HEPA filtration system and mask may decrease the amount of dust, but judging from the severity of the last asthma attack, I recommend she be placed in another environment.\u201d\nAs a result of Dr. LaForce\u2019s recommendations, respondent wrote to petitioner on 19 March 1999 offering to purchase the HEPA filter and requiring that she return to work within seven days. Petitioner did not return to work on the advice of Dr. Brown, who explained \u201cthe [HEPA] machine is like a miniature air conditioner that is cold.... [it] could enhance the probability of another asthma attack.\u201d Therefore, petitioner wrote to respondent requesting again that Dr. Brown\u2019s recommendation be followed, that \u201cI be transferred into another position in a different building at the same grade level. I will also accept a position at a lower grade.\u201d\nRespondent and petitioner met on 5 April 1999 to discuss possible solutions. Respondent firmly maintained that its willingness to provide a HEPA filtration system and face mask constituted a reasonable accommodation. Petitioner firmly maintained that a reasonable accommodation would be assistance in seeking another placement. Lieutenant Colonel Brinson (\u201cLt. Col. Brinson\u201d) testified that he could not follow petitioner\u2019s request, as recommended by respondent\u2019s ADA coordinator, and assist in placing petitioner in a well-ventilated environment without excessive dust because' \u201cI did not have another position that does not work with files.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s testimony sheds light on this exchange:\nQ: . . . what, if any,- efforts did they make to secure you another position away from this work site in another part of the building or another building or wherever?\nA: Well, they didn\u2019t because on the 5th of April of \u201999 when I had the meeting with, you know, several people [from DOT], you know, I was told that there was dust everywhere and they didn\u2019t have anything \u2014 any position for me to go into because there was dust everywhere.\nQ: And to your knowledge, is that correct? I mean, is there dust everywhere throughout all the buildings that\u2014\nA: Well, there is dust all over the place, but it\u2019s not open files in every office that you work in. I have worked in several offices that, you know, I worked with files, but they was in a file cabinet and the dust was more contained than being open.\nThe meeting ended without compromise. Respondent explained to petitioner that if she did not return to work by 8 April 1999 she would be deemed to have voluntarily resigned her position. Following Dr. Brown\u2019s advice petitioner did not return to work.\nOn 9 June 1999, petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing alleging she was discriminated against due to her asthmatic condition and was unlawfully terminated. On 3 December 1999, Administrative Law Judge Robert Roosevelt Reilly, Jr. issued a recommended decision finding that petitioner was a handicapped person who had been unlawfully discriminated against, and respondent failed to make a reasonable accommodation. On 16 May 2000, the State Personnel Commission (\u201cCommission\u201d) issued a decision rejecting the recommended decision and finding that jurisdiction was lacking, but that even if it existed, respondent had made reasonable accommodations for petitioner. On 30 October 2001, Wake County Superior Court Judge Abraham Penn Jones reversed the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law were unsupported by substantial evidence and were arbitrary and capricious, and the conclusions of law were also affected by errors of law. The Superior Court adopted the recommended decision of the Administrative Law Judge.\nRespondent appeals to this Court asserting there is competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s decision, the decision was not arbitrary and capricious, and there was no error of law. Respondent asserts the decision of the superior court should be reversed and the Commission\u2019s decision should be reinstated.\nThis Court\u2019s review is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51 (2001). \u201cOur review of a superior court order regarding an agency decision consists of: \u2018(1) determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding whether the court did so properly.\u2019 \u201d Souther v. New River Area Mental Health, 142 N.C. App. 1, 3, 541 S.E.2d 750, 752, aff\u2019d, 354 N.C. 209, 552 S.E.2d 162 (2001) (citations omitted). \u201cThe proper standard of review depends upon the particular issues presented on appeal.\u201d Employment Security Comm. v. Peace, 122 N.C. App. 313, 317, 470 S.E.2d 63, 67 (1996).\nWhere the petitioner alleges that the agency decision was either unsupported by the evidence, or arbitrary and capricious, the [reviewing] court applies the \u2018whole record test\u2019 to determine whether the agency decision was supported by substantial evidence contained in the entire record. Where the petitioner alleges that the agency decision was based on error of law, the reviewing court must examine the record de novo, as though the issue had not yet been considered by the agency.\nSouther, 142 N.C. App. at 3-4, 541 S.E.2d at 752 (citation omitted). \u201c[I]t appears uncontroverted that the foregoing rule should not be interpreted to mean the manner of our review is governed merely by the label an appellant places upon an assignment of error; rather, we first determine the actual nature of the contended error, then proceed with an application of the proper scope of review.\u201d Amanini v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 675, 443 S.E.2d 114, 118 (1994). Therefore, we address each issue on appeal with the appropriate standard of review set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51.\nThe issues presented to the Court on appeal are whether or not the superior court was correct in determining that: (I) the Commission committed an error of law concluding that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction; and (II) the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law were affected by errors of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, and arbitrary and capricious; and (III) the Commission\u2019s findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious.\nI. Jurisdiction\nRespondent asserts the superior court erred in reversing the Commission\u2019s decision that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction. \u201cWhen the petitioner contends the agency decision was affected by an error of law, G.S. \u00a7 150B-51(b)(1)(2)(3) & (4), de novo review is the proper standard.\u201d R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t & Natural Res., 148 N.C. App. 610, 614, 560 S.E.2d 163, 166, disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 493, 564 S.E.2d 44 (2002). The Office of Administrative Hearings has limited jurisdiction to consider contested cases. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1 (2001). The Commission determined the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction because: (A) the petitioner was not a career State employee as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(1); (B) no jurisdiction exists for complaints regarding violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and; (c) petitioner does not have a handicapping condition, is not a qualified handicapped person, and was not terminated as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(2)b.\nA. Jurisdiction as a Career State Employee\nThe Commission determined the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner is not a career State employee. The Commission was correct. Jurisdiction exists for a career State employee to file a contested case in the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(1). A \u201c \u2018career State employee\u2019 means a State employee who:... (2) [h]as been continuously employed by the. State of North Carolina . . . for the immediate 24 preceding months.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-1.1 (2001). There is no evidence that petitioner is a career State employee, therefore the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(1).\nB. Jurisdiction under the Americans with Disabilities Act\nThe Commission determined the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction based upon an alleged violation of the ADA. The Commission was correct. Jurisdiction for the Office of Administrative Hearings is limited to those bases listed in the statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(11). The ADA was not added to the list until 1 October 2001. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(11). Therefore the Commission was correct in its determination that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction to consider this claim.\nC. Jurisdiction for discrimination against a \u201cqualified person with a disability\u201d\nThe Commission determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(2)b, which provides jurisdiction for: \u201c[a]n alleged unlawful State employment practice constituting discrimination, as proscribed by G.S. 126-36, including: . . . termination of an employee in retaliation for the employee\u2019s opposition to alleged discrimination on account of the employee\u2019s . .. handicapping condition as defined by Chapter 168A of the General Statutes.\u201d Here, the Commission was incorrect. Respondent asserted that jurisdiction was lacking because: the petitioner does not have a \u201chandicapping condition as defined by Chapter 168A of the General Statutes;\u201d the petitioner is not a \u201cqualified person with a disability;\u201d and the petitioner was not \u201cterminated.\u201d\nPetitioner properly alleged that Respondent terminated her employment. Though Respondent asserts it considers Petitioner to have voluntarily resigned her position and therefore she was not terminated within the meaning of the statute, Petitioner properly alleged she was unable to return to work without reasonable accommodations and therefore was terminated.\nPetitioner further alleged she is a \u201cperson with a disability\u201d within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3(7a) (2001). A \u201cperson with a disability\u201d is \u201cany person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3 (7a). A physical or mental impairment \u201cmeans (i) any physiological disorder or abnormal condition . . . caused by . . . illness, affecting one or more of the following body systems: . . . respiratory.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3(7a)a. A major life activity means \u201cfunctions such as . . . breathing . . . and working.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3 (7a)b. Petitioner alleged that she has asthma and severe allergies, physical impairments affecting her respiratory system. Petitioner further alleged her asthma and allergies substantially limit her major life activities of breathing and working.\nFinally, petitioner properly alleged that she was a \u201cqualified person with a disability\u201d within N.C. Gen. Stat. 168A-9a. (2001). A \u201cqualified person with a disability\u201d means \u201c[w]ith regard to employment, a person with a disability who can satisfactorily perform the duties of the job in question, with or without reasonable accommodation.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3(9)a. Petitioner alleged that she asked for reasonable accommodations to enable her to be able to perform her job duties. Respondent asserts jurisdiction is lacking because petitioner\u2019s requests for accommodations were unreasonable, and she rejected respondent\u2019s offers for reasonable accommodations. However, whether the accommodations offered to petitioner were \u201creasonable accommodations\u201d or whether petitioner\u2019s requests constituted \u201creasonable accommodations\u201d is not at issue in determining jurisdiction. Jurisdiction rests on the allegations of the petitioner. In this case, petitioner\u2019s allegations sufficiently establish jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(2)a. Therefore, the superior court was correct in finding the Commission erred by determining jurisdiction did not exist.\nIn addressing the remaining issues presented on appeal, we note that the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law and findings of fact are often mixed findings of fact and law or were mislabeled. Therefore, we address the pure conclusions of law in the \u201cconclusions of law\u201d section and then address the mixed findings and pure findings of fact in the \u201cfindings of fact\u201d section.\nII. Conclusions of Law \u2014 Errors of Law\nThe superior court determined that all the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law were affected by errors of law. Since errors of law are reviewed de novo by the reviewing court, we review each conclusion of law de novo. Souther, 142 N.C. App. at 4, 541 S.E.2d at 752.\nConclusion of law number one found that jurisdiction was lacking because petitioner did not prove she was a career State employee. For the reasons discussed in section (I) (A) of this opinion, we hold the superior court was incorrect in finding this portion of conclusion of law number one was affected by an error of law. A portion of conclusion of law number one and conclusion of law number seven also found that petitioner had voluntarily resigned her position and therefore had not been \u201cterminated,\u201d as required to establish jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(2)b. Regarding this contention, we hold that when an employee is \u201cdeemed to have voluntarily resigned\u201d by the State agency for being unable or unwilling to work in conditions that may constitute discrimination, such resignation can constitute a constructive discharge entitling the employee to file a contested case alleging termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1(a) (2)b. Petitioner was informed that she could either return to work in conditions she alleges were in violation of the law or be \u201cdeemed to have resigned.\u201d We hold a constructive discharge constitutes a termination for the purpose of interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34.1. Therefore, we hold the superior court correctly determined that this portion of conclusion of law number one, and conclusion of law number seven were affected by errors of law.\nIII. Findings of Fact\nThe superior court, in its order, determined that most of the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, and all the conclusions of law were \u201cunsupported by substantial, competent evidence, and are arbitrary and capricious considering the record as a whole.\u201d We address the determination that the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are unsupported by substantial, competent evidence.\n\u201cSubstantial evidence is \u2018such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Joyce v. Winston-Salem State University, 91 N.C. App. 153, 158, 370 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1988) (quoting Comr. of Insurance v. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 231 S.E.2d 882 (1977)). \u201c[Substantial evidence \u2018is more than a scintilla or a permissible inference.\u2019 \u201d Id., (quoting Lackey v. Dept. of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 293 S.E.2d 171 (1982)). To review whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, our standard of review is the whole record test. Souther, 142 N.C. App. at 3-4, 541 S.E.2d at 752.\nThe \u2018whole record\u2019 test does not permit the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for the agency\u2019s as between two reasonably conflicting views; however, it does require the court to take into account both the evidence justifying the agency\u2019s decision and the contradictory evidence from which a different result could be reached.\nFloyd v. N.C. Dept. of Commerce, 99 N.C. App. 125, 128, 392 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1990) (quoting Watson v. N.C. Real Estate Comm., 87 N.C. App. 637, 639, 362 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1987)). \u201c[T]he \u2018whole record\u2019 test \u2018gives a reviewing court the capability to determine whether an administrative decision has a rational basis in the evidence.\u2019 \u201d ACT-UP Triangle v. Commission for Health Services, 345 N.C. 699, 706-07, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1997) (quoting Bennett v. Bd. of Education., 69 N.C. App. 615, 618, 317 S.E.2d 912, 915). \u201cIf an agency decision is not supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted, it may be reversed.\u201d Joyce, 91 N.C. App. at 157-58, 370 S.E.2d at 869 (citation omitted).\nIn finding of fact number twenty, the Commission found that \u201c[a]s a Processing Assistant IV, Petitioner was required to maintain files pertaining to stolen vehicles. The files were centrally located within Respondent\u2019s offices on New Bern Avenue in Raleigh, N.C.\u201d Since this is a pure finding of fact, our review is the whole record test. We find there is ample evidence to support this undisputed finding of fact.\nFinding of fact number twenty-one states that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case that she is a person with a disability under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A because she failed to establish that her asthma substantially limits a major life activity. This is a mixed finding of fact and law. Conclusion of. law number two is also a mixed finding in which the Commission determined that jurisdiction was lacking because petitioner had not established that she is a \u201cperson with a disability.\u201d A \u201cperson with a disability\u201d includes any person who has any \u201cabnormal condition .. . caused by illness, affecting [the] . . . respiratory [system]\u201d that \u201csubstantially limits one or more\u201d \u201cfunctions such as . . . breathing . . . and working.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3(7a). Respondent, and the Commission, assert petitioner failed to establish her illness \u201csubstantially\u201d limits her breathing or working. The evidence petitioner offered was evidence of her five-day hospitalization in January 1999, and her inability to return to work thereafter without reasonable accommodations of her asthma and allergies. Reviewing the whole record, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that these limitations are not \u201csubstantial\u201d within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A. Moreover, Dr. Brown testified that on the night petitioner was admitted to the emergency room,\n[s]he had something called a peak flow which was less than 200, and that\u2019s where we can evaluate the severity of the asthma attack. And a peak flow under 200 is extremely severe. They [the hospital workers present at the time] informed me that they tried to break this lady\u2019s asthma attack for several hours in the emergency room with oxygen, Albuterol, treatments which are standard for asthma, and steroids and she just wasn\u2019t going to get any better.\n\u201c[T]his woman was very close to death in the emergency room.\u201d Moreover, following this attack, it is uncontested that petitioner was unable to return to work without reasonable accommodations. Therefore, we hold the superior court correctly reversed this mixed finding by the Commission as it was unsupported by substantial evidence. We find the evidence supports the conclusion that petitioner is a \u201cperson with a disability.\u201d\nFinding of fact number twenty one and conclusion of law number two further conclude that petitioner failed to establish that she is a \u201cqualified person with a disability.\u201d These are mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law. A \u201cqualified person with a disability\u201d means \u201c[w]ith regard to employment, a person with a disability who can satisfactorily perform the duties of the job in question, with or without reasonable accommodation.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3(9)a. First, Respondent asserts that the clause \u201cwith or without reasonable accommodation\u201d requires the person to be capable of performing the job, both with and without accommodations. Under this reading an employee would have to be capable of performing the job duties without reasonable accommodations. Once the employee had satisfactorily performed the job without accommodation, the employee would be a \u201cqualified person with a disability.\u201d We reject this interpretation. The plain language of the statute requires the disabled person be able to satisfactorily perform the job, either \u201cwith or without\u201d reasonable accommodation. Therefore to be classified as a \u201cqualified person with a disability\u201d the employee must be capable of performing the job duties with reasonable accommodations. The term reasonable accommodations, in the context of employment, is:\nmaking reasonable physical changes in the workplace, including, but not limited to, making facilities accessible, modifying equipment and providing mechanical aids to assist in operating equipment, or making reasonable changes in the duties of the job in question that would accommodate the known disabling conditions of the person with a disability seeking the job in question by enabling him or her to satisfactorily perform the duties of that job.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3(10)a. (2001).\nUnder whole record review of the facts, we do not find substantial evidence to support the finding that \u201c[petitioner\u2019s] evidence showed that she could riot perform the job duties under any circumstances.\u201d Presumably this conclusion stems from petitioner\u2019s repeated requests for assistance with a job transfer and her doctor\u2019s statements that she should not return to her previous work environment. However, petitioner was clear in her requests for reasonable accommodations that she needed a work environment that would not provoke an asthma attack. The fact that her solution for a clean work environment was a job transfer does not support a conclusion that petitioner did not properly prove that she could perform her job with reasonable accommodations. Petitioner requested a well-ventilated environment without paint fumes, open paper files or excessive dust. She asserted that with such accommodations she could return to work. Petitioner offered to accept, as likely the easiest solution to providing such an environment, a transfer to a job in a less dusty, better ventilated building using a closed filing system. Since the accommodations to her workplace would be classified as \u201creasonable physical changes in the workplace,\u201d petitioner\u2019s evidence established that she is a qualified person with a disability because she could perform the job with reasonable accommodations. Moreover, we note that reasonable accommodations include a change in job duties, therefore even if petitioner had testified that she could not perform some of her job duties, for example working with the old files in the open boxes, she still would be capable of performing her job with reasonable accommodations and therefore be considered a \u201cqualified person with a disability.\u201d\nIn finding of fact number 19, the Commission found that\n[petitioner at no time offered any possible or suggested accommodations for Respondent to make to her position as Processing Assistant IV. The only suggestions she made was for Respondent to find her another position. However, at no time did Petitioner provide any information concerning an available position which she would find acceptable.\nUpon considering the whole record, we find substantial evidence to support this finding of fact. Though petitioner presented evidence that she researched and applied for other jobs, there is substantial evidence that petitioner\u2019s repeated requests were for a transfer to a well-ventilated, low-dust environment without open files.\nRespondent asserts that since petitioner did not make additional suggestions for reasonable accommodations, petitioner breached her duty under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-4 and thereby lost her right to reasonable accommodations. The Commission agreed in conclusion of law number three:\n[petitioner here failed to provide Respondent with any \u2018suggestions for such possible accommodations\u2019 which would have allowed her to return to her position as Processing Assistant IV with Respondent. Instead, when Respondent proposed their reasonable accommodations, based on the suggestions of Dr. LaForce, Petitioner consistently rejected the proposed accommodations as insufficient, and made no additional proposed accommodations for Respondent to implement, other than finding her another position. Petitioner clearly failed to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the HPPA, and is not entitled to its protection.\nWe hold this conclusion of law is affected by an error of law. \u201cA qualified person with a disability requesting reasonable accommodation must:\u201d (1) apprise her employer of the condition; (2) \u201csubmit any necessary medical documentation;\u201d (3) \u201cmake suggestions for possible accommodations as axe known to such person with a disability;\u201d and (4) \u201ccooperate in any ensuing discussion and evaluation aimed at determining possible or feasible accommodations.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-4(a) (2001). Once the person has requested accommodation, the employer \u201cshall investigate whether there are reasonable accommodations that can be made and make reasonable accommodations.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-4(b) (2001). In this case, Patricia Hawkins, (\u201cHawkins\u201d), the manager of employee relations for respondent, testified that upon rejecting respondent\u2019s offer of a filter and a mask that \u201cMs. Campbell should have come up with something else if there was anything else.\u201d Petitioner testified that she didn\u2019t make a counteroffer to respondent of other reasonable accommodations because \u201cI didn\u2019t know of anything else to do.\u201d While respondent may have preferred for petitioner to make \u201cadditional proposed accommodations for Respondent to implement, other than finding her another position,\u201d petitioner\u2019s duty was merely to \u201cmake suggestions for such possible accommodations as are known to such person with a disability\u201d and \u201ccooperate\u201d in the discussion aimed at determining reasonable accommodations. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-4(a). The duty of investigating reasonable accommodations falls squarely upon respondent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-4(b). Therefore, we hold that conclusion of law number three was affected by an error of law, and petitioner did not abdicate her right to reasonable accommodations either by refusing to accept respondent\u2019s offers or by failing to offer respondent additional suggestions for what she would consider a reasonable accommodation.\nFinding of fact number ten details the 25 January 1999 meeting between petitioner and respondent, noting a letter\ninformed [petitioner that Respondent was \u2018prepared to reasonably accommodate her medical needs in order to allow her to perform the duties of her job.\u2019 Specifically, Lt. Col. Brinson [petitioner\u2019s supervisor] indicated that Petitioner would be removed from the workplace if painting was to occur within the vicinity of her workplace. Petitioner would also be provided a facemask to wear to reduce exposure to dust.\nUpon whole record review, we find substantial evidence supports this finding of fact. However, since these accommodations were not the final accommodations offered by respondent, we next address those accommodations respondent contends constitute reasonable accommodation of petitioner\u2019s disability.\nFinding of fact number fourteen and conclusion of law number five both conclude that Dr. LaForce \u201cexamined\u201d petitioner and instructed that she increase her inhaler medication, monitor her peak flow measurements, use a HEPA filter, and wear a face mask. The supporting evidence is the report from Dr. LaForce. Conflicting evidence is the testimony of petitioner stating that Dr. LaForce did not examine her in any respect, but \u201cjust asked me questions\u201d for approximately thirty minutes. Since the evidence here supports two \u201creasonably conflicting views,\u201d we must conclude that the superior court erred in determining there was not substantial evidence to support this finding of fact and conclusion of law by the Commission.\nThe parties agree that the recommendations of Dr. LaForce, as delineated above, were the final accommodations offered to petitioner by respondent. The parties disagree as to whether these accommodations constitute reasonable accommodations, as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3 (10)a. Regarding this matter, the superior court concluded that the Commission\u2019s finding of fact number two, \u201c[Respondent responded with reasonable accommodations,\u201d and number twenty-two, \u201c[Respondent did make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner as required by law,\u201d were unsupported by substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious. The superior court also concluded that the Commission\u2019s conclusion of law number six, that \u201c[b]ased on the recommendations of Dr. LaForce, Respondent did make reasonable accommodations,\u201d was unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious and affected by an error of law. All of these statements are mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and as such are review, in respective parts, by whole record review and de novo.\nWe previously set forth the definition of reasonable accommodations provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3(10)a. Generally, the term means those physical and job duty modifications that would accommodate the disabling conditions to enable the qualified person with a disability to return to work. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3(10)a. Reasonable accommodations do not require an employer to: hire additional employees; reassign duties to other employees without assigning the disabled employee compensable duties; reassign duties away from the disabled employee that would increase \u201cthe skill, effort or responsibility\u201d of the other employees; alter seniority policies; provide personal accommodations (for example hearing aids or eyeglasses); make^ physical changes that would cost more than required by the statutory formula. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 168A-3(10)a. 1-7.\nHaving defined reasonable accommodations, we now consider whether the accommodations offered complied with the statutory obligation. The superior court found the Commission\u2019s conclusion that respondent had provided reasonable accommodations was unsupported by substantial evidence. The supporting evidence consists of a dust report and a report of Dr. LaForce\u2019s conclusions from Carolina Case Management.\nFirst, we address the dust report. The report concludes that the dust level in petitioner\u2019s former office space was \u201cvery low.\u201d However, the dust level testing was performed in the break room and another desk located near Petitioner\u2019s desk, but Petitioner\u2019s desk area was not tested. Despite the fact that the main cause for concern was excessive dust from the open files, \u201cat the time of sampling, boxes were not being opened to retrieve files.\u201d Therefore, this report does not provide adequate information regarding the dust level of petitioner\u2019s work environment.\nSecond, we address Dr. LaForce\u2019s report. Respondent did not provide Dr. LaForce\u2019s testimony, nor other evidence regarding how Dr. LaForce came to the conclusion that a HEPA filter, face mask, increased asthma medication, and petitioner\u2019s monitoring of her peak flow measurements would be reasonable accommodations to enable petitioner to return to work. Petitioner testified:\nQ: Did he [Dr. LaForce] tell you on that occasion that he was going to recommend that you stay in the work site and you receive a mask and that a HEPA filtration system be installed? Did he [Dr. LaForce] tell you that?\nA: Yes, he \u2014 you know, he said he was basing it on what the \u2014 the dust report that was done through DOT and the recommendation that they had made, you know. And he also recommended for me to increase my medication, you know, to help me, you know, get back into the, you know, work environment and, you know, whatever the \u2014 you know, the people had said in the dust report, you know, to wear a mask and the HEPA filtration system.\nThis is the only evidence of why Dr. LaForce recommended these accommodations. Moreover, the report reads: \u201cDr. LaForce was cognizant of Ms. Campbell\u2019s fear of reoccurrence upon returning to this environment and stated he could give no guarantees that this would not happen again.\u201d Considering that the last asthma attack brought petitioner close to death and required a five-day hospitalization, this statement is less than reassuring of Dr. LaForce\u2019s position that his recommendations constitute reasonable accommodations to enable petitioner\u2019s return to work.\nIn addition to these concerns are the questions raised by Dr. Brown. Dr. Brown treated petitioner\u2019s January asthma attack and repeatedly recommended to respondent that petitioner \u201cnot be exposed to a work environment with paint fumes or excessive dust\u201d and \u201cnot return to work to her old environment under any circumstances.\u201d Dr. Brown explained that the dust and fumes would exacerbate petitioner\u2019s asthma. Moreover, Dr. Brown wrote to respondent stating \u201cI do not feel that the mask and the filtration system would help.\u201d Dr. Brown testified:\n[T]his statement wasn\u2019t taken lightly and this letter wasn\u2019t written lightly. This came after research of the literature. Based on people [with disabilities like those of petitioner], ... it basically states that these air filtration systems can decrease the amount of allergens in the air, but basically it\u2019s transient and the person can still have an aggravated asthma attack. It does not have to always be an allergen as to dust or dust mites per se, but the particulate matter coming from old records can be an irritant. . . . Based on the review of the literature, it basically could not tell me 100 percent that this would help this lady and she would not have a severe asthma attack. Based on that and based on the severity of her asthma attack when I saw her, based on my 12 years of seeing patients and seeing many, many, many asthmatics, this woman was very close to death in the emergency room. She was close to being what we call intubated, having to put in a tube for artificial respiration. So in my search of the literature, I did not find anything that would tell me 100 percent that a filtration system would prevent her from having an asthma attack. And, in my opinion, I didn\u2019t think it would be unreasonable to put her in another environment that did not have the particulate matter that would be coming from old records.\nMoreover, Dr. Brown explained to petitioner that the \u201cHEPA filtration system would not benefit me unless the whole area is filtered. . . . the machine is like a miniature air conditioner that is cold ... it could enhance the probability of another asthma attack.\u201d There is no response presented from Dr. LaForce to address the concerns of Dr. Brown. Moreover, petitioner expressed the following concerns to Dr. LaForce regarding his recommended treatment:\nThe Court: So, did the doctor ask you what medications you were taking?\nA: Yes, he asked me what medications I was taking. He asked me to, you know, increase it. And I let him know that asthma medicine, you know, causes you to be nervous. And, you know, kind of hinders you from even performing your job the way you need to whenever you\u2019re real nervous and tense.\nQ: Did you express to him [Dr. LaForce] reservations about the filtration system and the mask?\nA: Yes. For the mask, it\u2019s the problem like I said to, you know, breathe all day in the mask because they have \u2014 depending on what kind of mask it is, you can still smell stuff coming through the mask because I\u2019ve tried several, you know, kind of masks, and that would be hard to do all day. And the HEPA filter, it was just to be put at my desk, and that was confining me to one area. You know, it would just eliminate the dust in the area, not all over the building.\nAgain, there is no evidence that Dr. LaForce\u2019s recommendation addressed the concerns of petitioner. Without an explanation for why Dr. LaForce\u2019s treatment constitutes reasonable accommodations despite these concerns, we cannot find upon review of the whole record that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that his recommendations would have enabled petitioner to return to work. Therefore, we hold the superior court was correct in determining that these findings of fact and conclusions of law were not supported by substantial evidence.\nHaving found the Commission\u2019s decision was supported by substantial evidence in part, and unsupported by substantial evidence in part, we affirm in part and reverse in part the superior\u2019s court\u2019s order and remand to the superior court for subsequent remand to the Commission with direction to order the reinstatement of petitioner and such other relief to which petitioner may be entitled consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUDSON concur.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUDSON concurred in this opinion prior to 31 December 2002.\n. Petitioner testified on cross examination that she spoke to her case manager at Carolina Case Management regarding the option that respondent filter the entire building, but she said \u201cshe had already talked to people within DOT and they said that they was not going to get a filtration system for the whole building. It\u2019s not in writing, but that\u2019s what I was told on the phone, that they were only getting one for my desk because it cost too much.\u201d Respondent clarified that she never spoke to anyone from DOT directly, and petitioner admitted that she only spoke to the case manager, who \u201cwas hired by DOT,\u201d but not a DOT employee.", "type": "majority", "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Edmisten & Webb, by William Woodward Webb, Sr., for petitioner-appellee.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Kimberly P. Hunt and Special Deputy Attorney General Hal F. Askins, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAROLYN CAMPBELL, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\u2014DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent\nNo. COA02-81\n(Filed 21 January 2003)\n1. Administrative Law \u2014 jurisdiction of Office of Administrative Hearings \u2014 termination of state employee \u2014 Americans with Disabilities Act\nA de novo review revealed that the trial court erred by concluding that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction to consider a contested case regarding the termination of petitioner state employee whose asthma and severe allergies were worsened by her work conditions even though petitioner was not a career state employee under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(l) and the American with Disabilities Act was not added as a basis for jurisdiction in the list provided under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(ll) until 1 October 2001, because: (1) petitioner properly alleged that respondent terminated her employment based on plaintiff being unable to return to work without reasonable accommodations; (2) petitioner properly alleged she is a person with a disability within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 168A-3(7a) based on her asthma, severe allergies, and physical impairments affecting her respiratory system and substantially limiting her major life activities of breathing and working; and (3) petitioner properly alleged that she was a qualified person with a disability within N.C.G.S. \u00a7 168A-9a.\n2. Public Officers and Employees\u2014 termination of state employee \u2014 constructive discharge \u2014 contested case\nThe State Personnel Commission erred in concluding that a state employee had voluntarily resigned her position and had not been terminated as required to establish jurisdiction in the Office of Administrative Hearings under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-34.1(a)(2)b where the employee sufficiently alleged a constructive discharge in that she was informed that she could either return to work in conditions that violated the law or be deemed to have voluntarily resigned. When an employee is deemed to have voluntarily resigned by a state agency for being unable or unwilling to work in conditions that may constitute discrimination, such resignation can constitute a constructive discharge entitling the employee to file a contested case alleging termination.\n3. Public Officers and Employees\u2014 termination of state employee \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 disability\nThe whole record test revealed that the trial court did not err in an action regarding the termination of a state employee whose asthma and severe allergies were worsened by her work conditions by concluding that most of the State Personnel Commission\u2019s findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious, because: (1) the evidence supports the conclusion that petitioner is a person with a disability under N.C.G.S. Ch. 168A; (2) petitioner established that she is a qualified person with a disability under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 168A-3(9)a since the fact that petitioner\u2019s solution for a clean work environment was a job transfer does not support a conclusion that petitioner did not properly prove that she could perform her job with reasonable accommodations; and (3) petitioner did not abdicate her right to reasonable accommodations either by refusing to accept respondent\u2019s offers or by failing to offer respondent additional suggestions for what she would consider a reasonable accommodation.\n4. Public Officers and Employees\u2014 termination of state employee \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 doctor examination\nThe trial court erred in an action regarding the termination of a state employee whose asthma and severe allergies were worsened by her work conditions by determining that there was no substantial evidence to support the State Personnel Commission\u2019s finding of fact and conclusion of law that a doctor examined petitioner and instructed that she increase her inhaler medication, monitor her peak flow measurements, use a HEPA filter, and wear a face mask, because the evidence supports two reasonably conflicting views.\n5. Public Officers and Employees\u2014 termination of state employee \u2014 reasonable accommodations\nThe trial court did not err in an action regarding the termination of a state employee whose asthma and severe allergies were worsened by her work conditions by determining that there was no substantial evidence to support the State Personnel Commission\u2019s finding of fact and conclusion of law that respondent made reasonable accommodations under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 168A-3(10)a to enable petitioner to return to work, because: (1) the pertinent dust report did not provide adequate information regarding the dust level of petitioner\u2019s work environment when the dust level testing was not performed in petitioner\u2019s desk area; and (2) respondent did not provide evidence regarding how a doctor came to the conclusion that a HEPA filter, face mask, increased asthma medication, and petitioner\u2019s monitoring of her peak flow measurements would be reasonable accommodations.\nAppeal by respondent from an order entered 30 October 2001 by Judge Abraham Penn Jones in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 September 2002.\nEdmisten & Webb, by William Woodward Webb, Sr., for petitioner-appellee.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Kimberly P. Hunt and Special Deputy Attorney General Hal F. Askins, for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0652-01", "first_page_order": 682, "last_page_order": 700 }