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        "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nDefendant, Dwight Raymond Phelps, presents two issues on appeal arising from his conviction of felony possession of cocaine: (I) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress a statement made to the police because defendant\u2019s constitutional right against self-incrimination as protected by Miranda v. Arizona was violated; and (II) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress physical evidence obtained as a result of a coerced statement? We find no prejudicial error in defendant\u2019s trial.\nOn 5 February 2001, defendant was charged with one count of possession of a Schedule II Controlled Substance (cocaine) and being an habitual felon. Subsequently, defendant moved to suppress the cocaine seized from him as well as his statement to Officer Chad Mashni that he had crack cocaine in his coat pocket. Following the trial court\u2019s denial of that motion, a jury found defendant guilty of felony possession of cocaine. Thereafter, defendant pled guilty to the habitual felon charge, but reserved his right to appeal the order denying the motion to suppress and the conviction of felony possession of cocaine. Defendant was sentenced to seventy to ninety-three months imprisonment.\nThe evidence tended to show that on 23 December 2000 at approximately 1:00 p.m., Officer Mashni, from the Winston-Salem Police Department, was dispatched to investigate a larceny at an apartment, in which defendant and his girlfriend resided. Upon determining from his patrol car computer that defendant had two outstanding warrants for his arrest, Officer Mashni placed defendant under arrest and performed an exterior search on defendant\u2019s person for weapons and contraband items. None were discovered.\nFollowing the search, Officer Mashni placed defendant in his patrol car and drove him to the county jail. According to Officer Mashni, while in transit, he and defendant had a \u201cfriendly conversation\u201d because Officer Mashni knew defendant\u2019s brother, who was a police officer. Officer Mashni testified during the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress that defendant\u2019s emotional state was fairly stable during the course of the ride. When asked at the hearing what he said to defendant in the parking lot of the jail, Officer Mashni responded:\nI explained to him that he needed to let me know right now before we went past the jail doors if he had any kind of illegal substances or weapons on him, that it was an automatic felony no matter what it was, so he better let me know right now.\nOfficer Mashni had not read defendant his Miranda rights before making this statement to defendant. Defendant told Officer Mashni that he had some crack in his coat pocket and Officer Mashni then retrieved three rocks, which he believed were crack cocaine, from defendant\u2019s left front coat pocket. A chemist at the State Bureau of Investigation later confirmed that the rocks were crack cocaine. According to Officer Mashni, from the time that he arrested defendant up until he found the cocaine, he did not make any promises to defendant concerning the particular charges that would be brought against defendant.\nDefendant also testified at the hearing on his motion to suppress. He stated that while in the parking lot of the jail, Officer Mashni told him: \u201c[I]f you have any drugs or weapons on you, and you submit them at this time I won\u2019t charge you with them.\u201d According to defendant, after he told Officer Mashni that he had some crack in his pocket, Officer Mashni replied: \u201c [I] t\u2019s good that you told me that, because . . . if you would have took [sic] them on the other side of them doors in the jail, they would charge you with a felony.\u201d Defendant stated that he believed that he would not be charged with a felony if he told Officer Mashni about the crack in his pocket. Defendant also testified at the hearing that while riding to the jail in Officer Mashni\u2019s patrol car, he became upset and began crying.\nAt trial, the trial court admitted into evidence defendant\u2019s statement to Officer Mashni that he had some crack cocaine in his coat pocket, and the crack cocaine rocks. Defendant appeals from his conviction of felony possession of cocaine.\nI.\nDefendant first assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress his statement to Officer Mashni regarding the crack cocaine. In reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u201care conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u201d State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 745, 445 S.E.2d 917, 926 (1994). However, a trial court\u2019s legal conclusions are fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992). \u201c[T]he trial court\u2019s conclusions . . . must be legally correct, reflecting a correct application of applicable legal principles to the facts found.\u201d State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 11, 484 S.E.2d 350, 357 (1997).\nDefendant specifically argues that his statement regarding the location of the crack cocaine was inadmissible because he was not read his Miranda warnings prior to the statement being made and the statement was obtained during custodial interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 726 (1966) (holding a defendant\u2019s statements elicited during a custodial interrogation are not admissible unless the State demonstrates that Miranda warnings were given prior to the statement being made).\n\u201c \u2018[interrogation\u2019 under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.\u201d Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980) (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Washington, 102 N.C. App. 535, 539, 402 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1991) (Greene, J. dissenting), rev\u2019d per curiam, 330 N.C. 188, 189, 410 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1991) (reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals on the basis of the dissent filed in State v. Washington).\nIn the present case, there is no question that defendant was in custody at the time his statement was made. Therefore, the key inquiry becomes whether Officer Mashni\u2019s statement to which defendant responded that he had crack in his coat pocket was \u201cinterrogation\u201d within the meaning of Miranda. Officer Mashni testified at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress as follows:\nI explained to [defendant] that he needed to let me know right now before we went past the jail doors if he had any kind of illegal substances or weapons on him, that it was an automatic felony no matter what it was, so he better let me know right now.\nDefendant, however, testified at the hearing that Officer Mashni told him: \u201c[I]f you have any drugs or weapons on you, and you submit them at this time I won\u2019t charge you with them.\u201d\nThe trial court concluded in its order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress that Officer Mashni merely made a statement to defendant informing him of the law pertaining to possession of controlled substances in jail and that this statement did not constitute interrogation as defined by case law for the purposes of the Miranda decision. The trial court further concluded that the statements made by Officer Mashni were not designed to elicit an incriminating response. We disagree.\nIn this case, Officer Mashni knew or should have known that his statement was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. \u2022 Officer Mashni\u2019s objective purpose was to obtain defendant\u2019s admission or denial of the possession of contraband. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in admitting defendant\u2019s incriminating statement because the officer failed to advise defendant of his Miranda warnings prior to the custodial interrogation. See State v. Banks, 322 N.C. 753, 759, 370 S.E.2d 398, 402 (1988).\nNonetheless, the State asserts that even if this Court concludes that defendant\u2019s statement was improperly admitted, the trial court\u2019s error was harmless. We agree. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2001) provides:\nA violation of the defendant\u2019s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.\n\u201c \u2018Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt\u2019 has been interpreted to mean that \u2018there is no reasonable possibility\u2019 that the erroneous admission of evidence \u2018might have contributed to the conviction.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 682, 351 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1987) (quoting State v. Castor, 285 N.C. 286, 292, 204 S.E.2d 848, 853 (1974)).\nIn order to convict a defendant of felony possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant knowingly possessed the substance. State v. Givens, 95 N.C. App. 72, 76, 381 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1989). It is well established that \u201cknowledge is a mental state that may be proved by offering circumstantial evidence to prove a contemporaneous state of mind. Jurors may infer knowledge from all the circumstances presented by the evidence.\u201d State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 195, 376 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1989). Knowledge may be shown even where the defendant\u2019s possession of the illegal substance is merely constructive rather than actual. See, e.g., State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706 (1972).\nWhere, as in the instant case, the evidence before the jury tended to show that the illegal substance was found in the pocket of the coat worn by defendant, and there was no evidence to suggest that defendant did not own the coat, or that the coat had only recently come into his possession, there is no reasonable possibility that the exclusion of defendant\u2019s statement would have resulted in a different verdict. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nII.\nDefendant also contends the court erred in admitting the cocaine into evidence because the cocaine was found as a result of an interrogation that violated Miranda. We disagree.\nOur Supreme Court has previously stated that \u201c[i]f the record shows there was no actual coercion but only a violation of the Miranda warning requirement, it is not necessary to give too broad an application to the exclusionary rule.\u201d State v. May, 334 N.C. 609, 612, 434 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1198, 127 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1994). Under the exclusionary rule, \u201c[w]hen evidence is obtained as the result of illegal police conduct, not only should that evidence be suppressed, but all evidence that is the \u2018fruit\u2019 of that unlawful conduct should be suppressed.\u201d State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 113-14, 423 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1992). In May, the Court concluded that on the facts of that case, physical evidence which was found as a result of a Miranda violation, but not as the result of actual coercion which violated the rights of the defendant, was admissible. May, 334 N.C. at 613, 434 S.E.2d at 182. The May Court relied on the United States Supreme Court\u2019s recognition \u201cthat the failure to give Miranda warnings is not itself the violation of a person\u2019s right against self-incrimination.\u201d May, 334 N.C. at 612, 434 S.E.2d at 182 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1974) and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985)). \u201c[Determining whether evidence discovered as the result of a Miranda violation should be admitted depends on whether its exclusion would serve to deter improper police conduct or assure the trustworthiness of the evidence.\u201d May, 334 N.C. at 613, 434 S.E.2d at 182.\nIn determining whether defendant\u2019s statement in the instant case was voluntary, we must review the totality of the surrounding circumstances in which the statement was made. State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 499, 532 S.E.2d 496, 502 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001). A statement is involuntary or coerced if it is the result of government tactics so oppressive that the will of the interrogated party \u201chas been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired . . . Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973). Our Supreme Court has listed several factors that should be considered in determining the voluntariness of statements:\n[W]hether defendant was in custody, whether he was deceived, whether his Miranda rights were honored, whether he was held incommunicado, the length of the interrogation, whether there were physical threats or shows of violence, whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the familiarity of the declar-ant with the criminal justice system, and the mental condition of the declarant.\nState v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994).\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court concluded there was not any evidence of coercion on the part of the officer and therefore, even if a Miranda violation had occurred, the crack cocaine was still admissible. The court made findings to support this conclusion of law and those findings are supported by competent evidence. The trial court found that during the ride to the jail and prior to searching defendant, the officer did not threaten or promise defendant anything. Additionally, the trial court found that defendant was calm during the ride to the jail and while admitting to the officer that he had cocaine in his pocket. We acknowledge that defendant\u2019s testimony conflicts with the trial court\u2019s findings as well as Officer Mashni\u2019s testimony. However, our review is restricted to determining whether the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence. We conclude the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence (Officer Mashni\u2019s testimony) and these findings, in turn, support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that there was not any evidence of coercion on the part of the officer. Therefore, in following May, we conclude that although Officer Mashni violated the prophylactic rule of Miranda, the evidence found as a result of this violation was properly admitted since defendant\u2019s statement was not the product of coercion.\nFurthermore, even assuming defendant\u2019s statement was coerced, the cocaine would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine, which allows the admission of evidence which was illegally obtained, when the evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. See State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 423 S.E.2d 740 (1992). In this case, defendant had been arrested pursuant to two outstanding warrants and was being transported to jail for processing when he made the statement regarding the cocaine and the officer retrieved the crack from defendant\u2019s coat. In accordance with police procedure, during processing, defendant\u2019s clothing would have been searched and the cocaine would have been found. See State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 241, 536 S.E.2d 1, 10-11 (2000) (stating \u201cIt is well settled in North Carolina that clothing worn by a person while in custody under a valid arrest may be taken from him for examination.\u201d) Accordingly, the cocaine was properly admitted.\nNo prejudicial error.\nJudge TIMMONS-GOODSON concurs.\nJudge HUNTER concurs in part and dissents in part.\n. We note that this rationale may be called into doubt by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000), in which our United States Supreme Court held that Miranda was a constitutional decision. However, any possible impact of Dickerson on May would have'to be addressed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina because we are bound by May until our State\u2019s highest Court holds otherwise.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WYNN, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "HUNTER, Judge,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting defendant\u2019s statement to Officer Mashni that he had some crack in his coat pocket because the officer failed to advise defendant of his Miranda warnings prior to the custodial interrogation. However, I disagree with the majority\u2019s holding that the trial court\u2019s erroneous admission of defendant\u2019s incriminating statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2001). In addition, I concur with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the cocaine, which was found as a result of the Miranda violation, was properly admitted since defendant\u2019s statement was not the product of coercion. However, I disagree with the majority\u2019s determination that \u201ceven assuming defendant\u2019s statement was coerced, the cocaine would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine . . . .\u201d Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would vacate defendant\u2019s conviction and remand for a new trial.\nA violation of a defendant\u2019s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the State demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b). In order for an Appellate Court to conclude that the State has met its burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court must be convinced \u201cthat \u2018there is no reasonable possibility\u2019 that the erroneous admission of evidence \u2018might have contributed to the conviction.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 682, 351 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1987) (quoting State v. Castor, 285 N.C. 286, 292, 204 S.E.2d 848, 853 (1974)). The presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt may render a constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 400, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988).\nIn the instant case, the admission of defendant\u2019s statement to Officer Mashni that he had some crack in his coat pocket was highly inflammatory on the issue of whether defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine. The State\u2019s evidence as to whether defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine, excluding defendant\u2019s statement, is hardly overwhelming. In fact, the only evidence against defendant is that cocaine, discovered as a result of a Miranda violation, was found inside the coat defendant was wearing. Thus, without the admission of defendant\u2019s incriminating statement, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have had reasonable doubt as to whether defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine and returned a different verdict. Therefore, I conclude the State has not met its burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, by showing that there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneous admission of the statement might have contributed to the conviction. Accordingly, I would vacate defendant\u2019s conviction and remand for a new trial.\nI concur with the majority\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s statement was not the product of coercion and therefore, the cocaine found as a result of the Miranda violation was properly admitted. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s determination that \u201ceven assuming defendant\u2019s statement was coerced, the cocaine would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine .. . .\u201d Pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine,\nevidence which would otherwise be excluded because it was illegally seized may be admitted into evidence if the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered by the law enforcement officers if it had not been found as a result of the illegal action.\nState v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 114, 423 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1992) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984)).\nIn the case sub judice, during the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the State did not present evidence material to, nor did the trial court address, the inevitable discovery doctrine. Our Supreme Court has previously stated: \u201cWhether this exception [to the exclusionary rule] is applicable is initially a question to be addressed by the trial court....\u201d State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 116, 117, 423 S.E.2d 746, 746 (1992). Since the inevitable discovery doctrine was never raised in defendant\u2019s motion hearing not its applicability considered by the trial court, it is improper for this Court to determine that \u201ceven assuming defendant\u2019s statement was coerced, the cocaine would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine ....\u201d In addition, during the suppression hearing, the State failed to present any evidence that the cocaine would have been inevitably discovered. Thus, the State did not meet the necessary burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the cocaine would have been inevitably discovered by the law enforcement officers if it had not been found as a result of the Miranda violation. Therefore, I disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that even if the statement had been coerced, the evidence would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.",
        "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part",
        "author": "HUNTER, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Marc Bernstein, for the State.",
      "Marjorie S. Canaday for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DWIGHT RAYMOND PHELPS\nNo. COA02-149\n(Filed 18 February 2003)\n1. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 possession of crack cocaine \u2014 officer\u2019s statement \u2014 interrogation\u2014 defendant\u2019s response \u2014 absence of Miranda warnings\u2014 harmless error\nAn officer\u2019s post-arrest statement to defendant that defendant \u201cneeded to let me know right now before we went past the jail door if he had any kind of illegal substance or weapons on him, that it was an automatic felony no matter what it was\u201d constituted interrogation within the meaning of the Miranda decision because the officer knew or should have known that his statement was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response, and defendant\u2019s response that he had crack cocaine in his pocket was improperly admitted in defendant\u2019s trial because the officer failed to give defendant the Miranda warnings prior to the custodial interrogation. However, the admission of defendant\u2019s statement was harmless error because (1) the illegal substance was found in the pocket of the coat worn by defendant, and there was no evidence to suggest that defendant did not own the coat or that the coat had only recently come into his possession; and (2) there is no reasonable possibility that the exclusion of defendant\u2019s statement would have resulted in a different verdict.\n2. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 voluntariness \u2014 coercion\u2014failure to give Miranda warnings \u2014 exclusionary rule \u2014 motion to suppress cocaine\nThe trial court did not err in a felony possession of cocaine case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress cocaine obtained as a result of an alleged coerced statement without the benefit of a Miranda warning when an officer had a friendly conversation with defendant during the ride to jail explaining to defendant that defendant needed to let the officer know if defendant had any illegal substances or weapons on him and defendant told the officer he had crack cocaine in his coat pocket, because: (1) there was not any evidence of coercion on the part of the officer when during the ride to jail and prior to searching defendant, the officer did not threaten or promise defendant anything, and defendant was calm during the ride to the jail and while admitting to the officer that he had cocaine in his pocket; and (2) even if defendant\u2019s statement was coerced, the cocaine would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine which allows admission of evidence which was illegally obtained when the evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means since defendant\u2019s clothing would have been searched and the cocaine would have been found at the jail in accordance with police procedure.\nJudge Hunter concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 11 September 2001 by Judge Richard L. Doughton in Superior Court, Forysth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 November 2002.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Marc Bernstein, for the State.\nMarjorie S. Canaday for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0119-01",
  "first_page_order": 149,
  "last_page_order": 158
}