{ "id": 9191157, "name": "DEBRA CIALINO, Employee, Plaintiff v. WAL-MART STORES, Employer; and INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Cialino v. Stores", "decision_date": "2003-03-18", "docket_number": "No. COA02-412", "first_page": "463", "last_page": "477", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "156 N.C. App. 463" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525952 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612018 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "medical evidence that doctor released plaintiff to return to unrestricted work rebutted presumption" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571653 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "medical evidence that doctor released plaintiff to return to unrestricted work rebutted presumption" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11655573 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798785, 798887, 798824, 798831, 798934 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0513-02", "/nc/343/0513-05", "/nc/343/0513-04", "/nc/343/0513-01", "/nc/343/0513-03" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915971 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "quoting Pittman v. Thomas & Howard, 122 N.C. App. 124, 130, 468 S.E.2d 283, 286, disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 513, 472 S.E.2d 18 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239226 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "quoting Pittman v. Thomas & Howard, 122 N.C. App. 124, 130, 468 S.E.2d 283, 286, disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 513, 472 S.E.2d 18 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11711886 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779801 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 92-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571831 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915261 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527802 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192", "parenthetical": "citing Sparks v. Mountain Breeze Restaurant & Fish House, Inc., 55 N.C. App. 663, 664, 286 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525056 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768", "parenthetical": "citing Sparks v. Mountain Breeze Restaurant & Fish House, Inc., 55 N.C. App. 663, 664, 286 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524766 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "Form 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497249 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557", "parenthetical": "Form 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367", "parenthetical": "Industrial Commission award" }, { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139539 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "Industrial Commission award" }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64", "parenthetical": "Form 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685096 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "Form 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190", "parenthetical": "presumption arose when \"defendant admitted liability . . . through approved settlements (Form 21 and Form 26)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522851 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "presumption arose when \"defendant admitted liability . . . through approved settlements (Form 21 and Form 26)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" }, { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565922 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" }, { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527187 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "quoting Watson v. Winston-Salem Transit Authority, 92 N.C. App. 473, 476, 374 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1988) and Watkins v. Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 137, 181 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11889375 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "quoting Watson v. Winston-Salem Transit Authority, 92 N.C. App. 473, 476, 374 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1988) and Watkins v. Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 137, 181 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572767 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569857 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575582 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433-34" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571678 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "680" }, { "page": "680" }, { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "680" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1161, "char_count": 34584, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9113641816893358e-07, "percentile": 0.7317476810424083 }, "sha256": "371c597e71d4b3f4341227accca0d4fec3650c7a06b90bb7c8285c4ef86657af", "simhash": "1:8e35e1aaf43b0455", "word_count": 5460 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:05:49.893248+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "DEBRA CIALINO, Employee, Plaintiff v. WAL-MART STORES, Employer; and INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nIn this workers\u2019 compensation appeal, Debra Cialino contends that the full Commission erred in awarding her temporary partial disability because the record reflects her entitlement to a presumption of total disability. On the other hand, her employer, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. argues the full Commission erred by concluding Ms. Cialino had a compensable occupational disease attributable to her employment with Wal-Mart. After carefully reviewing the record, we hold the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence. Accordingly, \u201cthe [] Commission\u2019s findings of fact [are] conclusive on appeal.\u201d Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 682, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998). Furthermore, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Therefore, we affirm the Opinion and Award of the Industrial Commission. We remand, however, because the full Commission failed to address Ms. Cialino\u2019s request for attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 (2002).\nI. Facts\nThe evidence in the record tends to show that Ms. Cialiano began working for Wal-Mart on 3 February 1998. Lacking the financial resources to afford daytime childcare, Ms. Cialino worked Wal-Mart\u2019s night shift from 10:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. At Wal-Mart, her job duties involved the repetitive use of her hands, wrists, and arms; Ms. Cialino was required to unload boxes from delivery trucks, move the boxes to appropriate locations within the store, stock shelves with the contents of the boxes, and break down the boxes with box cutters. Over the course of her employment with Wal-Mart, Ms. Cialino began to experience pain and numbness in her hands, wrists, and arms. The symptoms were bilateral, but worse on the right side. For a few months, Ms. Cialino treated the pain by placing band-aids around her fingers, wrapping her wrists in bandages, and by applying ointment to inflamed areas.\nOn 23 June 1998, Ms. Cialino experienced and reported an infla-mation of her symptoms to her Wal-Mart assistant manager, Joe McDonald. A fellow employee escorted Ms. Cialino to Wal-Mart\u2019s company doctor at Knightdale Primary Care where Rena Hodges, a board certified Physician\u2019s Assistant, initially diagnosed Ms. Cialino with a bilateral repetitive motion injury consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome. Ms. Hodges prescribed the following work restrictions: (1) to lift no more than ten pounds, (2) to wear wrist splints, and (3) to limit the use of both hands to no more than forty minutes per hour.\nAfter receiving treatment, Ms. Cialino reported to the store Manager for Wal-Mart, Beatrice Floyd: \u201cThe doctor said it looks like carpal tunnel\u201d; Ms. Floyd responded: \u201cJust go home.\u201d Ms. Cialino went home; however, later that night, she called Ms. Floyd to inquire about her employment. According to Ms. Cialino, Ms. Floyd stated that Wal-Mart did not have a suitable position on the night shift; accordingly, Ms. Floyd offered her a position during the daytime as a greeter. However, Ms. Cialino refused that offer because of her childcare needs. Moreover, Ms. Floyd purportedly offered Ms. Cialino a temporary position monitoring a fireworks tent during the Fourth of July weekend. Ms. Cialino did not accept this position because of concerns for her safety. When Ms. Cialino did not accept the employment alternatives, Wal-Mart terminated her employment.\nOn 13 July 1998, Ms. Cialino returned to Knightdale Primary Care for a follow-up visit with Ms. Hodges. Although Ms. Cialino reported that her symptoms had improved, she was still experiencing pain in her hands, wrists, and arms. Based on three visits and a series of medical tests, Ms. Hodges testified on the issue of causation that the repetitive motion Ms. Cialino was exposed to at Wal-Mart was a substantial contributing factor to her symptoms. Unable to provide Ms. Cialino with relief, Ms. Hodges referred her to a board certified orthopedist with an expertise in the field of hand surgery, Dr. James R. Post.\nDr. Post\u2019s deposition testimony tends to show that: On 5 November 1998, he first examined Ms. Cialino who complained of bilateral hand pain from working with boxes at Wal-Mart. Dr. Post\u2019s initial examination revealed symptoms consistent with bilateral de Quervain\u2019s Tenosynovitis and mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Post prescribed anti-inflammatory medication, and used a splint to immobilize Ms. Cialino\u2019s thumb and wrist. Subsequent medical tests, ruled out the preliminary diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome. On 3 December 1998, Dr. Post examined Ms. Cialino for a second time, and noted an improvement in de Quervain\u2019s tenosynovitis. However, Ms. Cialino complained of numbness in the dorsum of her right hand and pain in the base of her left thumb. With respect to this pain, Dr. Post made a new diagnosis of \u201cSynovitis of the basial thumb joint.\u201d On 31 December 1998, tests performed by Dr. Post revealed that Ms. Cialino\u2019s tenosynovitis had completely resolved itself. However, Ms. Cialino still complained of diffuse pain in her hands, wrists, and arms.\nIn his deposition, Dr. Post expressed the opinion that: (1) the symptoms of de Quervain\u2019s tenosynovitis afflicting Ms. Cialino were related to her work at Wal-Mart; (2) Ms. Cialino\u2019s work duties at Wal-Mart were a substantial contributing factor in the development of these symptoms; and (3) members of the general public are not equally exposed to the repetitive activities which Ms. Cialino experienced while working at Wal-Mart. However, Dr. Post did express reservations about whether Ms. Cialino\u2019s synovitis of the left thumb was caused by her work at Wal-Mart. Dr. Post noted that the syno-vitis of the left thumb did not appear until 3 December 1998, and that it would not take five months for these symptoms to appear. Furthermore, because tests conducted on 31 December 1998 revealed that Ms. Cialino\u2019s tenosynovitis had completely resolved itself, Dr. Post testified that he was \u201cnot sure\u201d whether any of Ms. Cialino\u2019s symptoms after 31 December 1998 were related to her employment with Wal-Mart.\nBy the time of their final meeting and appointment on 11 March 1999, Dr. Post testified he had exhausted all non-invasive treatment options and made a diagnosis of bilateral hand pain. According to Dr. Post, Ms. Cialino\u2019s symptoms indicated a gradual progression from specific symptoms to a diffuse bilateral pain. Because Dr. Post was uncertain of the cause or diagnosis of these complaints, Dr. Post suggested a referral to the Cedar Neurology Pain Clinic.\nMs. Cialino was subsequently examined by an expert in the field of Neurology, Dr. Gregory M. Bertics. For some reason not explicated in the record, Dr. Bertics was unaware of (1) previous tests performed by Dr. Post and Ms. Hodges, and (2) the fact that many of Ms. Cialino\u2019s symptoms arose months after her'termination from Wal-Mart. Accordingly, Dr. Bertics duplicated many of the previous diagnoses and tests made by Dr. Post and Ms. Hodges, and based his medical conclusions on the mistaken belief that all of Ms. Cialino\u2019s symptoms arose at the same time. Ultimately, Dr. Bertics only contributed one substantial piece of evidence to the record: He testified on the issue of causation that the temporal relationship between Ms. Cialino\u2019s duties at Wal-Mart and her symptoms led to a \u201ccommon sense\u201d conclusion that a \u201ccause and effect relationship\u201d existed between Ms. Cialino\u2019s job duties at Wal-Mart and her complaints of diffuse pain. On 17 July 1999, Dr. Bertics released Ms. Cialino from his care.\nII. Procedural History\nOn 9 September 1998, Ms. Cialino filed a Form 18, notifying Wal-Mart of her injury and workers\u2019 compensation claim. On 20 July 1998, Wal-Mart filed a Form 61 denying the claim. On 3 September 1998, Ms. Cialino filed a Form' 33, requesting that her claim be set for a hearing before a Deputy Commissioner of the North Carolina Industrial Commission. On 12 November 1998, Wal-Mart filed a Form 33R denying that the injury afflicting Ms. Cialino arose from her course of employment with Wal-Mart. On 20 June 2000, a Deputy Commissioner filed an Opinion and Award concluding that: (1) Ms. Cialino acquired and aggravated her synovitis and tenosynovitis while performing job duties at Wal-Mart; and (2) Ms. Cialino \u201cis entitled to temporary total disability.\u201d\nOn 11 December 2000, Wal-Mart filed a Form 44, a notice of appeal from the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s Opinion and Award and an application of review to the full Commission. On 17 January 2001, Ms. Cialino filed a Motion with the Industrial Commission praying for the Commission to refer the matter to the Commissioner of Insurance to investigate Wal-Mart for apparent bad faith practices in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1. On 7 November 2001, the full Commission filed an Opinion and Award modifying the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner. Notably, in Finding of Fact 29 the full Commission found:\nHaving considered all the evidence, the Commission finds that the opinions of Dr. Post are entitled to greater weight than those of Ms. Hodges or Dr. Bertics. Ms. Hodges is not a physician .... Dr. Bertics did not see plaintiff until April 1999 ... [and] was not aware of the changes in plaintiffs reported symptoms as noted by Dr. Post. Further, Dr. Bertics\u2019 opinion concerning causation is based in large part, if not solely, on the temporal relationship between the work activity and the symptoms as related to him by plaintiff. His opinion is thus based on the inaccurate history that all plaintiffs symptoms started soon after she began her work activities with defendant-employer. The more credible evidence shows that the undiagnosed, more diffuse complaints did not arise until December 1998, several months after the initial onset and after plaintiff had ceased her employment with defendant-employer.\nBased substantially on this credibility determination, the full Commission determined in Finding of Fact 31 that: \u201cFrom and after June 24, 1998, until and through December 31, 1998, [Ms. Cialino] was incapable because of her compensable injury to perform her former employment... or other suitable employment at the same wages for the same number of hours.\u201d However, the full Commission did note, in Finding of Fact 32, that Ms. Cialino was able to procure employment and work between sixteen and twenty-five hours per week during her bout with her compensable injury. Accordingly, the full Commission concluded, as a matter of law, that Ms. Cialino \u201cis entitled to temporary partial disability compensation at the rate of two-thirds of the difference between her pre-injury average of $304.99 and her wages earned at Gold\u2019s Gym and Ladies Fitness and Wellness, from June 24, 1998, and continuing through and including December 31, 1998.\u201d From this Opinion and Award, Ms. Cialino and Wal-Mart appeal.\nIII. Ms. Cialino\u2019s Appeal\nIn her appeal, Ms. Cialino assigns error to the full Commission\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law. \u201cUnder our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, \u2018the Commission is the fact finding body.\u2019 \u201d Adams, 349 N.C. at 680, 509 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Brewer v. Powers Trucking Co., 256 N.C. 175, 182, 123 S.E.2d 608, 613 (1962)). \u201c \u2018The Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.\u2019 \u201d Adams, 349 N.C. at 680, 509 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 433-34, 144 S.E.2d 272; 274 (1965)). The Commission\u2019s findings of fact \u201c \u2018are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence.\u2019 \u201d Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414 (quoting Gallimore v. Marilyn\u2019s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977)). Thus, this Court is precluded from weighing the evidence on appeal; rather, we can do no more than \u201c \u2018determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the [challenged] finding.\u2019 \u201d Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414 (quoting Anderson, 265 N.C. at 434, 144 S.E.2d at 274). \u201cHowever, the Commission\u2019s legal conclusions [drawn from competent findings of fact] are [fully] reviewable by\u201d this Court. Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1982) (citation omitted).\nBy her first argument, Ms. Cialino contends the Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law by limiting her compensation to partial disability benefits. Ms. Cialino argues she was entitled to a legal presumption of continuing total disability until she returned to work at suitable employment. After carefully reviewing the record, we disagree.\nIt is a well-established legal principle in North Carolina that \u201conce the disability is proven [by the employee], \u2018there is a presumption that [the disability] continues until the employee returns to work at wages equal to those [she] was receiving at the time [her] injury occurred.\u2019 \u201d Brown v. S & N Communs., 124 N.C. App. 320, 329, 477 S.E.2d 197, 202 (1996) (quoting Watson v. Winston-Salem Transit Authority, 92 N.C. App. 473, 476, 374 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1988) and Watkins v. Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 137, 181 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1971)) (emphasis added). In cases involving the Watkins presumption, the claimant can meet the initial burden of proving a disability in two ways: (1) by a previous Industrial Commission award of continuing disability, or (2) by producing a Form 21 or Form 26 settlement agreement approved by the Industrial Commission. See e.g., Watkins, 279 N.C. at 137, 181 S.E.2d at 592 (\u201cIf an award is made by the Industrial Commission, payable during disability, there is a presumption that disability lasts until the employee returns to work and likewise a presumption that disability ends when the employee returns to work at wages equal to those he was receiving at the time his injury occurred.\u201d); Radica v. Carolina Mills, 113 N.C. App. 440, 447, 439 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1994) (presumption arose when \u201cdefendant admitted liability . . . through approved settlements (Form 21 and Form 26)\u201d). See also Saunders v. Edenton Ob/Gyn Ctr., 352 N.C. 136, 139, 530 S.E.2d 62, 64 (2000) (Form 21); In re Stone v. G & G Builders, 346 N.C. 154, 157, 484 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1997) (Industrial Commission award); Dancy v. Abbott Labs., 139 N.C. App. 553, 557, 534 S.E.2d 601, 604 (2000) (Form 21).\nIn this case, Ms. Cialino does not claim that she satisfied the initial burden of proving her disability, thus spawning a presumption of continuing total disability, from a prior award of the Industrial Commission or a settlement agreement pursuant to a Form 21 or a Form 26. Instead, Ms. Cialino contends that a continuing presumption of total disability arose because she was injured at work, and, thereafter, she was unable to continue working or find suitable alternative employment at the same wages and for same number of hours. Seemingly, Ms. Cialino argues that there is a third method of establishing a continuing presumption of disability. Neither this Court nor our Supreme Court has ever applied a continuing presumption of disability in a context other than an award by the Industrial Commission, a Form 21, or a Form 26 settlement agreement. We decline to do so in this case. Therefore, the full Commission did not err; consequently, the corresponding assignments of error are overruled.\nBy her second and third arguments, Ms. Cialino contends the Industrial Commission made erroneous factual findings that: (1) Her symptoms after 31 December 1998 were not related to her compensable occupational disease, and (2) all of her hand, wrist, and arm problems were not related to her employment with Wal-Mart. After carefully reviewing the record we hold the Commission had competent evidence to make the challenged factual determinations, and, therefore, these factual findings are binding on appeal. See Adams, 349 N.C. at 682, 509 S.E.2d at 414.\nThroughout Findings of Fact 19, 20, 21, 28, and 29 the Commission noted the existence of conflicting evidence in the record regarding pain and symptoms afflicting Ms. Cialino after 31 December 1998. Specifically, where Dr. Bertics and Ms. Hodges testified that the symptoms after 31 December 1998 were caused by her employment with Wal-Mart, Dr. Post was \u201cnot sure.\u201d The Commission aptly summarized this testimony in Finding of Fact 19, 20, 21, 28, and 29:\n19. Dr. Post initially testified that [Ms. Cialino] had de Quervian\u2019s tenosynovitis of both hands and synovitis of the left thumb, both of which were caused by her employment with [Wal-Mart]. Dr. Post, however, subsequently testified that the synovitis of the left thumb did not appear until December 3, 1998, and that it would not take five months for these symptoms to appear; he thus concluded that the de Quervian\u2019s tenosynovitis is related to [Ms. Cialino\u2019s] employment with [Wal-Mart], but he was unable to relate her other symptoms to her employment.\n20. As found by Dr. Post, [Ms. Cialino\u2019s de Quervian\u2019s] tenosyn-ovitis had completely resolved and her tests for this condition were negative by December 31, 1998. . . .\n21. Although Dr. Post testified that [Ms. Cialino\u2019s] bilateral tenosynovitis was caused by [Ms. Cialino\u2019s] employment, he was unable to reach a diagnosis concerning [Ms. Cialino\u2019s] other, diffuse complaints. Dr. Post explained that these symptoms seemed to change with each visit and that he was unsure that these symptoms were related to her employment. Dr. Post testified that [Ms. Cialino\u2019s] current complaints could be psychogenic hand pain, rheumatologic problems, causalgia, or reflex sympathetic dystrophy. As he was uncertain of the diagnosis for these complaints, Dr. Post suggested that referral to a multi-disciplinary pain clinic . . . would be beneficial.\n28. Dr. Bertics rendered an opinion that [Ms. Cialino\u2019s] symptoms were related to her employment and testified that although he had not diagnosed the condition causing [Ms. Cialino\u2019s] symptoms, he related the symptoms to employment because of the temporal relationship between the activities and the onset of symptoms. Because Dr. Bertie did not have Dr. Post\u2019s records, he was not aware that [Ms. Cialino\u2019s] symptoms changed during the course of Dr. Post\u2019s treatment.\n29. Having considered all the evidence, the Commission finds' that the opinions of Dr. Post are entitled to greater weight than those of Ms. Hodges or Dr. Bertics. Ms. Hodges is not a physician .... Dr. Bertics did not see plaintiff until April 1999 .. . [and] was not aware of the changes in plaintiff\u2019s reported symptoms as noted by Dr. Post. Further, Dr. Bertics\u2019 opinion concerning causation is based in large part, if not solely, on the temporal relationship between the work activity and the symptoms as related to him by plaintiff. His opinion is thus based on the inaccurate history that all plaintiff\u2019s symptoms started soon after she began her work activities with defendant-employer. The more credible evidence shows that the undiagnosed, more diffuse complaints did not arise until December 1998, several months after the initial onset and after plaintiff had ceased her employment with defendant-employer.\nAlthough the testimony of all three medical professionals was competent evidence, the Commission decided that Dr. Post\u2019s opinions were more credible than the opinions of Dr. Bertics or Ms. Hodges. Our Supreme Court has made it eminently clear that: \u201c \u2018The Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.\u2019 \u201d Adams, 349 N.C. at 680, 509 S.E.2d at 413. The Commission concluded that: (1) Ms. Cialino contracted de Quervian\u2019s tenosynovitis, a compensable occupational disease, through her employment with Wal-Mart; (2) Ms. Cialino\u2019s de Quervian\u2019s tenosynovitis condition was resolved by 31 December 1998; and (3) Ms. Cialino\u2019s diffuse complaints of pain after 31 December 1998, particularly Dr. Post\u2019s diagnosis of synovitis of the left thumb, were not related to Ms. Cialino\u2019s employment with Wal-Mart. Because the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence in the record, and because the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and weight to be given their testimony, this Court may neither revisit these findings nor re-weigh this evidence on appeal. Accordingly, these findings of fact are binding, and, therefore, the corresponding assignments of error are overruled.\nIn her fourth argument, Ms. Cialino contends the Industrial Commission erred by failing to address her request for attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree.\n\u201cThis Court has held that when the matter is \u2018appealed\u2019 to the full Commission. . . , it is the duty and responsibility of the full Commission to decide all of the matters in controversy between the parties.\u201d Vieregge v. N.C. State University, 105 N.C. App. 633, 638, 414 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1992). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1, the sanctions and attorney\u2019s fees statute:\nIf the Industrial Commission shall determine that any hearing has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground, it may assess the whole cost of the proceedings including reasonable attorney\u2019s fees ....\n\u201cThe purpose of [this] section is to prevent stubborn, unfounded litigiousness which is inharmonious with the primary purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to provide compensation to injured employees.\u201d Beam v. Floyd\u2019s Creek Baptist Church, 99 N.C. App. 767, 768, 394 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1990) (citing Sparks v. Mountain Breeze Restaurant & Fish House, Inc., 55 N.C. App. 663, 664, 286 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1982)). In support of her request for costs and attorney\u2019s fees, Ms. Cialino argues that Wal-Mart denied her claim without reasonable investigation \"and failed to accept the claim when liability became reasonably clear. The full Commission\u2019s failure to address this issue was error.\nMs. Cialino urges this Court to decide the issue of her entitlement to attorney\u2019s fees in this appeal; we decline to do so. Troutman v. White & Simpson, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 48, 50, 464 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1995). Instead, we believe the Commission is better suited, in this particular case, to determine whether Wal-Mart had a \u201creasonable basis\u201d to defend the claim. Accordingly, we remand this issue to the full Commission. We have carefully reviewed Ms. Cialino\u2019s remaining assignments of error and find them to be without merit.\nIV. Wal-Mart\u2019s Appeal\nOn appeal, Wal-Mart contends the Industrial Commission erred by concluding that Ms. Cialino developed a compensable occupational disease as a result of her employment. After carefully reviewing the record, we find no error.\nWal-Mart argues the full Commission erred in concluding that Ms. Cialino developed a compensable occupational disease as a result of her employment. Notably, Wal-Mart concedes that Ms. Cialino produced competent evidence that her employment with Wal-Mart aggravated symptoms, but argues that Ms. Cialino failed to present competent evidence that her employment with Wal-Mart caused the underlying occupational disease. This argument is without merit.\nOur Supreme Court has recognized that: \u201cIn the case of occupational diseases proof of a causal connection between the disease and the employee\u2019s occupation must of necessity be based on circumstantial evidence.\u201d Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 475, 256 S.E.2d 189, 200 (1979). The Booker Court noted that the Commission should consider the following circumstances when considering whether an occupational disease is caused, \u201c(1) the extent of exposure to the disease or disease-causing agents during employment, (2) the extent of exposure outside employment, and (3) absence of the disease prior to the work-related exposure as shown by the employee\u2019s medical history.\u201d Id.\nIn the case sub judice, the Commission was presented with competent evidence that Ms. Cialino was exposed to disease causing job duties while working for Wal-Mart, that Ms. Cialino was not exposed to these duties outside of her employment with Wal-Mart, and that her medical history did not reveal any problems with her hands, wrists, or arms. Moreover, the uncontroverted evidence from three medical professionals related the symptoms and disease afflicting Ms. Cialino to her employment with Wal-Mart. Thus, the Commission had competent evidence from which to find an occupational disease. Accordingly, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are binding on appeal. Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414.\nFurthermore, Wal-Mart contends the Commission erroneously concluded that Ms. Cialino was \u201cdisabled\u201d within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Under the Act, disability is an \u201cincapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 92-2(9). Our Supreme Court has consistently held that:\nIn order to support a conclusion of disability, the Commission must find: (1) [] plaintiff was incapable after [her] injury of earning the same wages [she] had earned before [her] injury in the same employment, (2) [] plaintiff was incapable after [her] injury of earning the same wages [she] had earned before [her] injury in any other employment, and (3) [] plaintiff\u2019s incapacity to earn was caused by plaintiff\u2019s injury.\nHilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 594, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982). See also, Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 345 S.E.2d 374 (1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(9).\nIn the case sub judice, competent evidence in the record reveals that Ms. Cialino reported an injury on the night of 23 June 1998 to her assistant manager; she was taken by a fellow employee to a doctor; she was advised not to continue working because of a disease contracted while working; she was subsequently terminated because her injury rendered her unable to perform the requisite job duties; and she was unable to procure alternative employment at the same wages for the same hours despite reasonable efforts. Although the Commission received evidence that Wal-Mart offered Ms. Cialino alternative employment, the Commission concluded that \u201cthe position^] [were] not suitable,\u201d and, in the alternative, that Ms. Cialino \u201cjustifiably refused.\u201d There is competent evidence in the record to support all of these findings. Accordingly, the Commission satisfied the requirements of Hilliard, and Wal-Mart\u2019s assignments of error are, consequently, overruled.\nWe have reviewed Wal-Mart\u2019s remaining assignments of error, and find them to be without merit.\nAffirmed in part, and remanded.\nJudges BRYANT and GEER concur.\n. Although the Commission found that Ms. Cialino used reasonable efforts to procure suitable employment, Ms. Cialino was unable to find employment at the same wage for the same hours. However, Ms. Cialino accepted a part-time job at Gold\u2019s Gym in August 1998 doing childcare at a decreased pay rate. At this job, Ms. Cialino earned $6.00 an hour and worked twenty-five hours a week. On 30 December 1998, Ms. Cialino ceased working for Gold\u2019s Gym and accepted a child care position at Ladies Fitness and Wellness Center on 20 January 1999. Ms. Cialino earned $6.00 per hour, worked approximately twenty hours a week, and continued working through 1 May 1999. Ms. Cialino gave un-controverted testimony that: (1) the childcare positions did not require the repetitive use of her hands, wrists, or arms; and (2) that she did not lift weights while working at either gym.\n. In fact, Wal-Mart filed a Form 61 denying Ms. Cialino\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim.\nMs. Cialino challenges this finding and relies on upon the workers\u2019 compensation presumption established in Parsons v. Pantry, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 540, 541-42, 485 S.E.2d 867, 869 (1997). The Parsons presumption applies to claims for additional medical compensation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25. Under the Parsons analysis:\nIn an action for additional compensation for medical treatment, the medical treatment sought must be \u201cdirectly related to the original compensable injury.\u201d ... If additional medical treatment is required, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the treatment is directly related to the original compensable injury and the employer has the burden of producing evidence showing the treatment is not directly related to the compensable injury.\nReinninger v. Prestige Fabricators, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 255, 259, 523 S.E.2d 720, 723 (1999) (quoting Pittman v. Thomas & Howard, 122 N.C. App. 124, 130, 468 S.E.2d 283, 286, disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 513, 472 S.E.2d 18 (1996)).\nWhile, under Parsons, there is a presumption that the medical care sought by Ms. Cialino for her hand is related to her workplace injury, this presumption is rebuttable. Pursuant to Stone v. G & G Builders, 346 N.C. 154, 157, 484 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1997), defendants can rebut this presumption (1) by producing evidence that Ms. Cialino was capable of returning to work at wages equal to those she was receiving at the time of injury, or (2) by offering medical evidence that she no longer retained any impairment as a result of the workplace injury. See also Harrington v. Adams-Robinson Enters., 128 N.C. App. 496, 500-01, 495 S.E.2d 377, 380 (Walker, J., dissenting), adopted per curiam, 349 N.C. 218, 504 S.E.2d 786 (1998) (medical evidence that doctor released plaintiff to return to unrestricted work rebutted presumption). Here, the record contains competent medical evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings, establishing that defendants rebutted the presumption, that the work related injuries resolved completely by 31 December 1998.\n. Furthermore, Ms. Cialino contends the Industrial Commission erred by failing to address her 17 January 2001 motion to have the underlying claim referred to the Department of Insurance for an investigation into Wal-Mart\u2019s alleged improper behavior. However, by not referring the matter to the Department of Insurance before hearing the case, the Commission implicitly, and effectively, denied the motion.\n. Although Wal-Mart cites Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596 (1995), and Guy v. Burlington Indus., 74 N.C. App. 685, 329 S.E.2d 685 (1985), for the proposition that the \u201cCommission is not required to make findings as to facts . . . not material to [Ms. Cialino\u2019s] claim,\u201d we find this argument unpersuasive. Whether Wal-Mart had a reasonable ground to deny Ms. Cialino\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim is material.\n. As noted, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are binding on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. Moreover, \u201c[t]he evidence tending to support plaintiff\u2019s claim is to be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.\u201d Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of George W. Lennon, by George W. Lennon and Michael W. Ballance, for plaintiff", "Young, Moore, and Henderson, P.A., by Joe A. Austin, Jr. and Dawn Dillon Raynor, for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DEBRA CIALINO, Employee, Plaintiff v. WAL-MART STORES, Employer; and INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA02-412\n(Filed 18 March 2003)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 temporary partial disability\u2014 continuing presumption of total disability\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by limiting plaintiff employee\u2019s award to temporary partial disability even though plaintiff contends that a continuing presumption of total disability arose based on the fact that she was injured at work and was unable to continue working or find suitable alternative employment at the same wages and for the same number of hours, because neither the Court of Appeals nor our Supreme Court has ever applied a continuing presumption of disability in a context other than an award by the Industrial Commission, a Form 21, or a Form 26 settlement agreement.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 findings of fact \u2014 symptoms not related to compensable occupational disease\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by finding as facts that plaintiff employee\u2019s symptoms after 31 December 1998 were not related to her compensable occupational disease, and that all of her hand, wrist, and arm problems were not related to her employment with defendant employer, because the findings are supported by competent evidence and the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 failure to address request\nThe Industrial Commission erred in a workers\u2019 compensation case by failing to address plaintiff employee\u2019s request for attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88.1 and the case is remanded to the full Commission to determine whether defendant employer had a reasonable basis to defend the claim.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 occupational disease \u2014 competent evidence\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff employee developed a compensable occupational disease as a result of her employment, because the Commission was presented with competent evidence that: (1) plaintiff was exposed to disease causing job duties while working for defendant employer; (2) plaintiff was not exposed to these duties outside of her employment with defendant; (3) plaintiff\u2019s medical history did not reveal any problems with her hands, wrists, or arms; and (4) there was uncontroverted evidence from three medical professionals relating the symptoms and disease afflicting plaintiff to her employment with defendant.\n5. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 disability \u2014 competent evidence\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff employee was disabled within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 92-2(9), because there was competent evidence in the record that: (1) plaintiff reported an injury on the night of 23 June 1998 to her assistant manager; (2) plaintiff was taken by a fellow employee to a doctor; (3) plaintiff was advised to cease working based on the disease contracted while working; (4) plaintiff was subsequently terminated based on her injury rendering her unable to perform the requisite job duties; (5) plaintiff was unable to procure alternative employment at the same wages for the same hours despite reasonable efforts; and (6) plaintiff justifiably refused defendant\u2019s alternative employment offers.\nAppeal by plaintiff and defendants from Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 7 November 2001. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 January 2003.\nLaw Offices of George W. Lennon, by George W. Lennon and Michael W. Ballance, for plaintiff\nYoung, Moore, and Henderson, P.A., by Joe A. Austin, Jr. and Dawn Dillon Raynor, for defendants." }, "file_name": "0463-01", "first_page_order": 493, "last_page_order": 507 }