{ "id": 9191271, "name": "SHELIA D.P. LEA, individually and as the President of the Guilford County Association of Educators, ELIZABETH H. SEEL, CATHERINE L. HAZELTON, EDWARD C. McMILLAN, III, GUILFORD COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, and the NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. DR. TERRY GRIER, SUPERINTENDENT, PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF GUILFORD COUNTY, in his Official Capacity Only, and GUILFORD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Dependants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Lea v. Grier", "decision_date": "2003-03-18", "docket_number": "No. COA02-538", "first_page": "503", "last_page": "512", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "156 N.C. App. 503" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12121554 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E. 948", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11255233 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/172/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 U.S. 71", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170912 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75-76", "parenthetical": "\"The Equal Protection Clause . . . [does not allow] States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53917 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 11237763 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628623 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4682052 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779714 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-254", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570024 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "897", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9248584 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693716 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170267 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11655250 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0435-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 903, "char_count": 22391, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.024231899522512e-07, "percentile": 0.9067490035133322 }, "sha256": "62bffface669737956ee9e26740a0bc505349682734ccda62937d791727dc117", "simhash": "1:89c5e5f2d703743c", "word_count": 3442 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:05:49.893248+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and LEVINSON concur." ], "parties": [ "SHELIA D.P. LEA, individually and as the President of the Guilford County Association of Educators, ELIZABETH H. SEEL, CATHERINE L. HAZELTON, EDWARD C. McMILLAN, III, GUILFORD COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, and the NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. DR. TERRY GRIER, SUPERINTENDENT, PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF GUILFORD COUNTY, in his Official Capacity Only, and GUILFORD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Dependants-Appellees" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nIn the aftermath of Hurricane Floyd, the Guilford County Board of Education (\u201cthe Guilford County School Board\u201d) restructured the school calendar to satisfy statutory requirements for the minimum hours of school instruction. Appellants, four Guilford County teachers and the North Carolina Association of Educators (collectively \u201cthe teachers\u201d), brought an action alleging the calendar restructuring violated their constitutional, statutory, and contractual rights. From the dismissal of their claims under Rule 12(b)(6), the teachers appeal to this Court. We find no error with respect to the dismissal of the teachers\u2019 statutory and constitutional claims; however, we remand with instructions to reinstate the teachers\u2019 breach of contract claims.\nI. Facts\nThe underlying facts to this appeal tend to show that at the outset of the 1999-2000 school year, the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2 (1999) provided that:\n(a) School Calendar \u2014 Each local board of education shall adopt a school calendar consisting of 220 days .... A school calendar shall include the following: (1) A minimum of 180 days and 1,000 hours of instruction .... (2) A minimum of 10 annual vacation leave days .... (3) The same or an equivalent number of legal holidays .... (4) Ten days, as designated by the local board, for use as teacher workdays ....\n(b) Limitations. \u2014 The following limitations apply when developing the school calendar: (1) The total number of teacher workdays . .. shall not exceed 200 days.\nAfter the devastation of Hurricane Floyd, the North Carolina General Assembly recognized that many school districts had lost a significant number of instructional days and faced problems in meeting the required minimum of 180 instructional days. Accordingly, the General Assembly enacted the \u201cHurricane Floyd Recovery Act of 1999\u201d which amended the school calendar by providing for \u201ca minimum of either 180 days or 1,000 hours of instruction.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(a)(l)(a) (1999) (emphasis added). The Floyd Recovery Act, however, did not amend any other provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2.\nBy February 2000, the Guilford County School Board was forced to cancel a total of twelve instructional days because of weather conditions including Hurricane Floyd. Consequently, the existent school calendar dropped to 168 days and less than 1,000 hours of instruction. To meet the statutory hours minimum, the Guilford County School Board voted on 3 February 2000 to (1) add thirty minutes of instructional time to each school day, (2) alter six scheduled teacher workdays to instructional days, and (3) various other measures. These modifications allowed the Guilford County School Board to provide 1,000 instructional hours in 174 days.\nIn their 4 January amended complaint, the teachers alleged that as a result of the modifications, they were (1) required to work extra hours without compensation; (2) forced to forfeit planning periods in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-301.1; and (3) required to work 206 days, six more than permitted, respectively, by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2(4-5), 115C-84.2(a), and 115C-84.2(b)(l), because the \u201cBoard\u2019s actions brought the total number of teacher workdays to 26 days, [and] increased the school calendar to 226 days.\u201d Furthermore, the teachers alleged that a number of schools under the Guilford County School Board\u2019s authority \u201cacknowledged that the increase in instructional time of thirty minutes each day also increased teachers\u2019 overall workloads and thus allowed teachers to use this additional time to substitute for optional workdays.\u201d The teachers contended the failure of the Guilford County School Board to adopt a uniform policy applicable to all teachers contravened the equal protection guarantees of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions.\nBased on these modifications, the teachers initially sued the Guilford County School Board in 2000; voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice; and on 24 September 2001, re-filed the action under Rule 41(a) seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for alleged violations of statutory, constitutional, and contract law. On 26 November 2001, the Guilford County School Board filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of North Carolina\u2019s Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On 16 January 2002, the trial court granted the Guilford County School Board\u2019s motion to dismiss and dismissed all of the teachers\u2019 claims with prejudice. From that dismissal, the teachers timely filed a Notice of Appeal making four assignments of error.\nII. Statutory Claims\nBy their first two assignments of error, the teachers contend the trial court erred in granting the Guilford County School Board\u2019s motion to dismiss because the teachers stated a cognizable claim for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1. We disagree, and will address the standard of review, and the teachers\u2019 claims for declaratory and private relief, in turn.\nA. Standard of Review\nWe review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss. See e.g., McCarn v. Beach, 128 N.C. App. 435, 437, 496 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1998). A motion to dismiss made pursuant to ... Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See e.g., Harris v. NCNB Nat\u2019l Bank, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987). \u201cThe system of notice pleading affords a sufficiently liberal construction of complaints so that few fail to survive a motion to dismiss.\u201d Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 314 N.C. 477, 481, 334 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1985) (citations omitted). Accordingly, when entertaining \u201ca motion to dismiss, the trial court must take the complaint\u2019s allegations as true and determine whether they are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.\u201d Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 153 N.C. App. 25, 28, 568 S.E.2d 893, 897 (2002) (citations omitted). \u201cThis rule ... generally precludes dismissal except in those instances where the face of the complaint discloses some insurmountable bar to recovery.\u201d Ladd, 314 N.C. at 481, 334 S.E.2d at 755. However, where the \u201crequested relief [is] not authorized by statute, the [complaint is necessarily]\u201d defective because \u201cthe court [is] powerless to grant [the relief] regardless of what facts could be proved.\u201d Forrester v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 117, 122, 184 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1971).\nB. Declaratory Relief\nNorth Carolina\u2019s Declaratory Judgment Act provides that: \u201cAny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute . .. and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-254 (2002). \u201cAlthough the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act does not state specifically that an actual controversy between the parties is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action thereunder, our case law does impose such a requirement.\u201d Sharpe v. Park Newspapers of Lumberton, Inc., 317 N.C. 579, 583, 347 S.E.2d 25, 29 (1986). Accordingly, where \u201cthe complaint does not allege an actual, genuine existing controversy, a motion for dismissal under ... Rule 12(b)(6)\u2018will be granted.\u201d Gaston Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Harrison, 311 N.C. 230, 234-35, 316 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1984).\nIn this case, the teachers failed to allege \u201can actual genuine existing controversy.\u201d The teachers alleged that the Guilford County School Board violated the mandates of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1 during the 1999-2000 school year. Although the teachers state in their amended complaint that \u201cthe actions of [the Guilford County School Board], if allowed to continue, have created a legal controversy . . . and will lead to unavoidable litigation,\u201d the teachers failed to allege that the Guilford County School Board has continued, or will continue, violating the mandates of Sections 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1. Our Supreme Court has made it eminently clear that \u201ca litigant [who] seeks relief under the declaratory judgment statute, must set forth in [the] pleading all facts necessary to disclose the existence of an actual controversy between the parties.\u201d Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 118, 56 S.E.2d 404, 409 (1949). Here, the teachers did not meet this threshold burden. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the teachers\u2019 request for declaratory relief under the aforementioned statutes.\nC. Private Right of Action\nNext, the teachers sought injunctive and private relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2 or 115C-301.1. However, \u201c[o]ur case law generally holds that a statute allows for a private cause of action only where the legislature has expressly provided a private cause of action within the statute.\u201d Vanasek v. Duke Power Co., 132 N.C. App. 335, 339, 511 S.E.2d 41, 44 (1999). Here, neither Section 115C-84.2 nor Section 115C-301.1 expressly creates a private cause of action. Moreover, appellants have failed to make any arguments that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2 or 115C-301.1 implicitly create a private right of action.\nNonetheless, the teachers rely on our decision in Williams et. al. v. Alexander County Bd. of Educ., 128 N.C. App. 599, 495 S.E.2d 406, for the proposition that a private right of action exists under Sections 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1. In Williams, however, the statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15C-363 (1991) (repealed 1992), implicitly created a private right of action by requiring school boards to pay specific sums to teachers participating in the Effective Teaching Training Program. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-363.11 (repealed 1992) (providing that: \u201cIf the pilot programs established pursuant to the provisions of G.S. \u00a7 115C-363 are discontinued, any employee who has received a salary increment pursuant to the Career Development Plan shall continue to be paid the salary increment\u201d) (emphasis added). In Williams, the school board refused to pay teachers vested in the pilot program the salary, bonuses, and supplements which they were statutorily entitled to receive after the program was discontinued. We reversed the trial court\u2019s summary judgment, because \u201c[t]he statutes without a doubt enunciate the intent of the General Assembly ... to create statutory protection for teachers.\u201d Williams, 128 N.C. App. at 604,495 S.E.2d at 409. In the case sub judice, the statutes at issue do not enunciate an explicit or implicit intent on the part of the General Assembly to create a statutory protection for teachers. Accordingly, the teachers reliance on Williams is misplaced.\nWe, therefore, must hold that the trial court did not err by dismissing the teachers\u2019 requests for monetary and/or injunctive relief under the aforementioned statutes.\nIII. Constitutional Claims\nBy their third assignment of error, the teachers contend the trial court erred in dismissing their claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. We disagree.\n\u201cArbitrary and capricious acts by [the] government are [] prohibited under the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and the North Carolina Constitutions.\u201d Dobrowolska v. Wall, 138 N.C. App. 1, 14, 530 S.E.2d 590, 599 (2000); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, \u00a7 1; N.C. Const. art. 1, \u00a7 19. The equal protection \u201cprinciple requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike.\u201d Wall, 138 N.C. App. at 14, 530 S.E.2d at 599 (citing Richardson v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 345 N.C. 128, 134, 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996)). Accordingly, to state an equal protection claim, a claimant must allege (1) the government (2) arbitrarily (3) treated them differently (4) than those similarly situated.\nIn this case, the teachers allege that some schools (but not all) under the Guilford County School Board\u2019s authority decided to allow teachers to count the accumulation of time, caused by the extra thirty minute period, as optional workdays. The teachers allege that the Guilford County School Board\u2019s failure to adopt a uniform policy applicable to all teachers violates the equal protection guarantees of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. However, North Carolina statutes expressly authorize differential treatment among schools in the same administrative unit. For instance, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(a)(la) (1999) specifically provides that \u201cthe number of instructional hours in an instructional day may vary according to local school board policy and does not have to be uniform among the schools in the [same] administrative unit.\u201d Furthermore, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2(a)(4) and (5) provide that \u201c[a] school board may schedule different purposes for different personnel on any given day and is not required to schedule the same dates for all personnel.\u201d\nAccordingly, this differential treatment was permitted by North Carolina statutory law. Of course, this is not fatal to the teachers\u2019 equal protection claims. See e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (\u201cThe Equal Protection Clause . . . [does not allow] States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.\u201d). Nevertheless, because the teachers concede at oral argument that they are- not mounting a facial challenge to the statutes permitting differential treatment among teachers under one school board\u2019s authority, a presumption exists that this differential treatment, permitted by statutes duly enacted by the General Assembly, have a rational, rather than arbitrary, basis. See e.g., Peoples\u2019 Bank v. Loven, 172 N.C. 666, 670, 90 S.E. 948, 950 (1916).\nHowever, in their amended complaint, the teachers failed to allege that the Guilford County School Board exceeded its authority under the aforementioned statutes, acted arbitrarily, or that the challenged differential treatment was unrelated to the statutory objectives. Accordingly, the teachers\u2019 allegations, even when assumed correct and construed most favorably, merely express disconcert with actions wholly consistent with the Guilford County School Board\u2019s authority under state law. Because the teachers failed to allege an essential element of an equal protection claim, arbitrary or irrational state action, their equal protection claims were properly dismissed and this assignment of error is overruled.\nIV. Contract Claims\nBy their fifth assignment of error, the teachers argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their breach of contract claims. We agree.\nIn their complaint, the teachers allege that the Guilford County School Board\u2019s \u201cunlawful acts violated the terms of [the teachers\u2019] valid contracts of employment.\u201d Specifically, the teachers allege that their contracts with the Guilford County School Board \u201cmandate . . . compliance with state law,\u201d and, consequently, the Guilford County School Board\u2019s unlawful acts constituted a breach of contract. This breach caused damage, the teachers allege, because the Guilford County School Board\u2019s modifications of the school calendar required them to work six more days than required by law. Taking the teachers\u2019 allegations as true, \u201cwe conclude that the breach of contract claim as alleged in the complaint was sufficient to withstand [the Guilford County School Board\u2019s] . . . motion to dismiss.\u201d Brandis v. Lightmotive Fatman, 115 N.C. App. 59, 62, 443 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1994). Accordingly, we remand with instructions to reinstate the teachers\u2019 breach of contract claims.\nV. Association Standing\nFinally, the teachers argue the trial court erred by dismissing the North Carolina Association of Educators as a party-plaintiff for lack of standing. On appeal, the teachers contend the North Carolina Association of Educators is only seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2 and 115C-301. We held supra, however, that the teachers are entitled to neither declaratory nor private relief pursuant to Section 115C-84.2 or Section 115C-301.1. Accordingly, because the North Carolina Association of Educators concedes on appeal that it seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to these statutes for its membership, it is no longer necessary to resolve this assignment of error.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and LEVINSON concur.\n. The teachers allege in their amended complaint that the 174 days of instruction, when considered \u201cin light of the amended statute . .. [and] the facts of this case ... [should be considered]... the equivalent of 180 instructional days worked by the teachers regardless of the number of days in which they were completed.\u201d\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-301.1, provides that\nAll full-time assigned classroom teachers shall be provided a daily duty free period during regular student contact hours. The duty free period shall be provided to the maximum extent that. . . the safety and proper supervision of children may allow . . . and insofar as funds are provided for this purpose by the General Assembly.... Principals shall not unfairly burden a given teacher by making that teacher give up his or her duty free period on an ongoing period, regular basis without the consent of the teacher.\n. Again, the teachers arrive at these numbers by equating 1,000 hours of instruction in 174 days with 180 days of instruction. See supra.\n. On 17 July 2002, the teachers filed a motion to amend the record to include the following assignment of error: \u201cThe trial court erred in granting Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss because Defendants breached Plaintiffs\u2019 employment contracts.\u201d Herein, we grant this motion to amend, and will, consequently, consider appellants\u2019 revised and amended fifth assignment of error.\n. The Guilford County School Board argues this issue is inextricably bound to our resolution of the teachers\u2019 statutory and constitutional claims. For instance, the Guilford County School Board contends that if we find no private right of action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C, then we should find that appellants have failed to state a valid contract claim. However, we disagree. Rather, the teachers\u2019 contractual rights create a private right of action independent of statutes and constitutions.\n. Although in their amended complaint the teachers do not limit the North Carolina Association of Educator\u2019s participation in the class action to injunctive and declaratory relief, in a stipulation filed before the hearing on the Guilford County School Board\u2019s motion to dismiss, and again on appeal, the teachers expressly assert that the \u201cNorth Carolina Association of Educators as a plaintiff in this matter does not seek damages on behalf of the Association, but does seek declaratory and injunctive relief as set out in the complaint.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ferguson, Stein, Chambers, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, P.A., by John W. Gresham and Corie Pauling, for plaintiffs-appellants.", "Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Jill R. Wilson and James C. Adams, II, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHELIA D.P. LEA, individually and as the President of the Guilford County Association of Educators, ELIZABETH H. SEEL, CATHERINE L. HAZELTON, EDWARD C. McMILLAN, III, GUILFORD COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, and the NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. DR. TERRY GRIER, SUPERINTENDENT, PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF GUILFORD COUNTY, in his Official Capacity Only, and GUILFORD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Dependants-Appellees\nNo. COA02-538\n(Filed 18 March 2003)\n1. Schools and Education\u2014 restructuring school calendar\u2014 minimum hours of school instruction\nA de novo review revealed that the trial court did not err by granting the school board\u2019s motion to dismiss claims by teachers for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for alleged violations of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1 regarding defendant school board\u2019s restructuring of the school calendar to satisfy statutory requirements for the minimum hours of school instruction for the 1999-2000 school year, because: (1) the teachers failed to allege that the school board has continued or will continue violating the mandates of sections 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1 in order to get declaratory relief; and (2) the teachers\u2019 request for monetary or injunctive relief could not be fulfilled when N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1 do not enunciate an explicit or implicit intent on the part of the General Assembly to create a statutory protection for teachers.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 equal protection \u2014 differential treatment among schools\nThe trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff teachers\u2019 claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions alleging that defendant school board failed to adopt a uniform policy applicable to all teachers regarding the restructuring of the school calendar to satisfy statutory requirements for the minimum hours of school instruction for the 1999-2000 school year, because the teachers failed to allege an essential element of an equal protection claim that there was arbitrary or irrational state action.\n3. Schools and Education\u2014 breach of contract \u2014 restructuring school calendar\nThe trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff teachers\u2019 breach of contract claim regarding defendant school board\u2019s restructuring of the school calendar to satisfy statutory requirements for the minimum hours of school instruction for the 1999-2000 school year which caused the teachers to work six more days than required by law, because the teachers\u2019 contractual rights create a private right of action independent of statutes and constitutions.\n4. Parties\u2014 dismissal \u2014 lack of standing\nThe trial court did not err by dismissing the North Carolina Association of Educators (NCAE) as a party-plaintiff based on lack of standing because NCAE was only seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for violations of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1, and the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff teachers are not entitled to either declaratory or private relief under those statutes.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from Order entered 16 January 2002 by Judge Russell G. Walker, Jr., in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 February 2003.\nFerguson, Stein, Chambers, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, P.A., by John W. Gresham and Corie Pauling, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nBrooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Jill R. Wilson and James C. Adams, II, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0503-01", "first_page_order": 533, "last_page_order": 542 }