{ "id": 9186269, "name": "COUNTY OF MOORE, Plaintiff v. HUMANE SOCIETY OF MOORE COUNTY, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "County of Moore v. Humane Society of Moore County, Inc.", "decision_date": "2003-04-15", "docket_number": "No. COA02-562", "first_page": "293", "last_page": "302", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "157 N.C. App. 293" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 159-28", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N.C. App. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551656 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/18/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386", "parenthetical": "quoting Parker v. Pittman, 18 N.C. App. 500, 506, 197 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1973) (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11219873 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "quoting Parker v. Pittman, 18 N.C. App. 500, 506, 197 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1973) (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132035 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511108, 1511209, 1511504, 1511453, 1511422 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0160-02", "/nc/356/0160-05", "/nc/356/0160-03", "/nc/356/0160-01", "/nc/356/0160-04" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11354615 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9378971 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 6-18", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 814, "char_count": 21924, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.505411560535382e-07, "percentile": 0.6664448390620457 }, "sha256": "604ac81f64568271d6c14b3f35c4539984d52b2855c4242bc5097cbe60df0798", "simhash": "1:cbe113bc968cacf6", "word_count": 3630 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:54:20.581695+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "COUNTY OF MOORE, Plaintiff v. HUMANE SOCIETY OF MOORE COUNTY, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nPlaintiff, the County of Moore (\u201cMoore County\u201d or \u201cthe County\u201d) appeals from judgment entered 18 December 2001 by Judge Russell G. Walker, Jr. (\u201cJudge Walker\u201d) in Moore County Superior Court finding Moore County breached its agreement with defendant, the Humane Society of Moore County, Inc. (\u201cSociety\u201d) by not assisting the Society in locating a site for a new animal shelter. Judge Walker ordered Moore County to pay the Society $75,000.00 in damages. Judge Walker further issued a declaratory judgment that the reverter clause on property previously deeded from Moore County to the Society was not triggered by the termination of the contract between the parties.\nIn the early 1970s, the Society contracted with the County to operate an animal shelter to care for lost, stray and homeless animals and thereby fulfill the County\u2019s statutory obligations. The County permitted the Society to build an animal shelter on its property. In 1990, the parties renegotiated their contract. As part of the renegotiation, the County deeded the property to the Society. The conveyance was made subject to a reverter clause which provided \u201cin the event property described above ever ceases to be used as an animal shelter for lost, stray or homeless animals, then in such event The County shall have the right to immediately re-enter.\u201d In addition, the parties\u2019 contract provided that upon termination of the contract \u201cthe Society shall cease its activities within thirty (30) days of said termination.\u201d Therefore, pursuant to the 1990 contract, upon termination of that contract, the Society would cease operating the animal shelter and the County\u2019s right to re-enter would be triggered.\nIn 1997, the parties again renegotiated the contract, and the clause requiring the Society to cease operating an animal shelter upon termination of the contract was removed. The 1997 contract added provisions which required the County to \u201cassist the Society in locating a mutually acceptable site for a new animal shelter\u201d and upon completion of the new facility \u201cthe Society shall convey by Special Warranty Deed the remaining property upon which the Animal Shelter is located back to the County, and the County shall make a one-time contribution of Seventy-Five Thousand [dollars] ($75,000.00) to the Society at that time.\u201d The 1997 contract also required the Society convey to the County an easement. Thereafter, the easement was conveyed. In 1998, the parties again renegotiated the contract; it remained substantially the same.\nIn March 2000, the Society notified the County of its intent to terminate the 1998 contract effective 30 June 2000. The County responded that upon termination the Society would have to vacate the premises, and the County would exercise its right to re-enter. The Society responded that it intended to continue operating an animal shelter, albeit not pursuant to a contract with the County, and therefore the reverter clause was not triggered. Until September 2000, pursuant to an oral agreement, the parties continued operating in accordance with the 1998 contract. In September 2000, the County began operating an animal shelter and sued the Society seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the reverter clause was triggered by termination of the contract. The Society answered and asserted counterclaims including a declaratory judgment to quiet title alleging that the reverter clause had not been triggered and breach of the animal shelter agreement. Summary judgment motions by both plaintiff and defendant were denied. At trial, held 15 October 2001 in the Moore County Superior Court, Judge Walker found the reverter clause was not triggered, and the County had breached the 1997 and 1998 contracts by failing to assist the Society in locating a new site for a new animal shelter. Judge Walker awarded the Society $75,000.00 in damages.\nMoore County appeals Judge Walker\u2019s judgment asserting the trial court erred in finding: (I) reverter clause was not triggered; (II) damages in the amount of $75,000.00 for breach of the 1998 contract; and (III) the Society was entitled to costs pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 6-18 and 6-19 (2001).\n\u201cInitially, we note that a trial court\u2019s findings of fact in a bench trial have the force of a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal if there is competent evidence to support them, even though there may be evidence that would support findings to the contrary.\u201d Biemann & Rowell Co. v. Donohoe Cos., 147 N.C. App. 239, 242, 556 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2001). On the other hand, \u201c[conclusions of law are entirely reviewable on appeal.\u201d Creech v. Ranmar Properties, 146 N.C. App. 97, 100, 551 S.E.2d 224, 227 (2001), cert. dismissed, 356 N.C. 160, 568 S.E.2d 190, cert. denied, 356 N.C. 160, 568 S.E.2d 191 (2002).\nI.Reverter Clause\nMoore County appeals asserting the trial court erred in finding the reverter clause, contained in the 1990 deed conveying the property from the County to the Society, was not triggered by the termination of the County and Society\u2019s contract. The County argues the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are unsupported by the evidence and the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are the result of errors of law.\nWe first address the findings of fact. The court found as fact:\n2. By deed dated April 26, 1990 (the \u201cDeed\u201d), the County deeded the Property to the Humane Society. The Deed was drafted by the attorney for the County and the transfer of the Property to the Humane Society pursuant to the Deed was unanimously approved by the Moore County Commissioners. The Property was transferred to the Humane Society pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-279.\n3. The Deed contained a reverter clause that provides that should the Humane Society cease to use the Property as an animal shelter for lost, stray or homeless animals, the County shall have the right to re-enter and take possession of the Property. The reverter clause did not state that the County\u2019s right to reenter the Property is triggered by the termination of the contractual relationship between the County and the Humane Society, does not define \u2018animal shelter\u2019 and does not refer to or incorporate any definition of \u2018animal shelter.\u2019 When it drafted the Deed, the County was aware that it could transfer the Property upon any conditions that it chose to impose.\nThe court went on to find the parties did not intend to incorporate any particular definition of animal shelter, but that the 1995 edition of Webster\u2019s College Dictionary \u201cdefines \u2018shelter\u2019 as \u2018a building serving as a temporary refuge or residence for homeless persons or abandoned animals.\u2019 \u201d The court made extensive findings of fact regarding the services the Society rendered and continued to render, including accepting stray animals, housing animals treated cruelly or taken from their owners, holding animals for adoption to the public, and euthanizing unadoptable animals.\nMoore County argues the findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence. The plain language of the deed reads:\nThis conveyance is made upon the condition that in the event property described above ever ceases to be used as an animal shelter for lost, stray or homeless animals, then in such event The County shall have the right to immediately re-enter upon said premises and take and hold possession of said premises without let or hindrance-, provided, however, the breach of any said conditions or any re-entry by reason of such breach or forfeiture of title to this property by reason of such breach shall not defeat or render invalid the lien of any mortgage or deed of trust made in good faith for value on any of said property; the said right to re-enter or declare a forfeiture of title shall be made subject to the lien of any such mortgage or deed of trust given and created by the Humane Society to secure a debt hereafter contracted or made.\n(emphasis added). We find this is competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact that the deed provides for a right of re-entry only when the Society has ceased to operate an animal shelter. Moreover, the testimony of Susan Rowe, the executive director of the Society, amply supports the trial court\u2019s findings of fact regarding the Society\u2019s acceptance, boarding and adoption of lost, stray and homeless animals. Therefore, we hold the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and thus are binding on appeal.\nWe next address the County\u2019s assertion that the conclusion of law regarding the reverter clause was the result of an error of law. The court concluded as a matter of law:\nThe actions of the Humane society have not triggered the County\u2019s right to re-enter the Property, and the Humane Society holds the Property in fee simple on condition subsequent. The language of the reverter clause in the Deed must be strictly construed against the drafting party, the County, and must be strictly construed to limit forfeiture by the Humane Society. The Court finds that the language of the Deed is unambiguous and that under the plain language of the Deed, the Humane Society is currently using the Property as an animal shelter for lost, stray or homeless animals.\nMoore County asserts the trial court erred by not construing the deed in accord with the intention of the parties.\nIn construing the deed, although \u201cdiscerning the intent of the parties is the ultimate goal in construing a deed,\u201d we look to the language of the deed for evidence of this intent. Station Assoc., Inc. v. Dare County, 350 N.C. 367, 373, 513 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1999).\n\u2018The language of the deed being clear and unequivocal, it must be given effect according to its terms, and we may not speculate that the grantor intended otherwise. \u2018The grantor\u2019s intent must be understood as that expressed in the language of the deed and not necessarily such as may have existed in his mind if inconsistent with the legal import of the words he has used.\u201d When terms with special meanings or terms of art appear in an instrument, they are to be given their technical meaning; whereas, ordinary terms are to be given their meaning in ordinary speech.\nSouthern Furniture Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 133 N.C. App. 400, 403, 516 S.E.2d 383, 386 (1999) (quoting Parker v. Pittman, 18 N.C. App. 500, 506, 197 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1973) (citation omitted)). Here, the trial court properly considered the ordinary meaning of the term \u201canimal shelter\u201d and found the Society was still operating an animal shelter. Although it is apparent from the deed that the parties intended to continue their contractual relationship, with the Society providing the County with an animal shelter that fulfilled the County\u2019s statutory duties, any intention that termination of this relationship would trigger the reverter clause was not evidenced in the deed. The County certainly could have evidenced its intention in the deed, but chose not to, and this Court may not rewrite the deed in hindsight for the County. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not commit an error of law when concluding as a matter of law the reverter clause had not been triggered and the Society lawfully remains on the property operating an animal shelter.\nII. Breach of Contract\nMoore County appeals asserting the trial court erred in finding the County breached the 1997 and 1998 agreements with the Society and therefore owes the Society $75,000.00 in damages. Moore County asserts the following arguments: (1) the findings of fact regarding the breach of contract are unsupported by the evidence; (2) the findings of fact regarding the award of damages are unsupported by the evidence; and (3) the contracts are void for lack of a pre-audit certificate as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 159-28(a) (2001).\nWe first address the County\u2019s argument that the findings of fact determining the County breached the 1997 and 1998 contracts are not supported by the evidence. The contract provision provides:\n[t]he County, including its staff and the Board of County Commissioners, will assist the Society in locating a mutually acceptable site for a new animal shelter, except, with respect to the Board of County Commissioners, in such cases in which assistance could result in a conflict of interest, such as a contested zoning request.\nThe court made the following finding of fact:\n[t]he County did not provide any assistance to the Humane Society in locating an acceptable site for a new facility as required by the 1997 and 1998 contracts. The County located two potential sites for a new Humane Society animal shelter, one near the Moore County landfill and one on Joel Road; however, the County identified both sites to the Humane Society before entering the 1997 Contract.\nDuring the term of the 1998 Contract, the County owned a piece of property in Carthage. The County is currently building its new animal control facility on that property. However, the County never offered that property to the Humane Society or identified it as a potential site for the Humane Society\u2019s new facility.\nThe County\u2019s failure to assist the Humane Society in locating a site for a new facility is directly responsible for the inability of the Humane Society to find a location for and to construct a new facility. As a direct result of that failure, the Humane Society was unable to transfer the Property to the County during the term of the 1997 and 1998 Contracts and lost the opportunity to receive from the County the $75,000 payment required by those Contracts.\nThe court then concluded as a matter of law:\n[t]he County breached the 1997 and 1998 Contracts by failing to provide assistance to the Humane Society in locating a mutually acceptable piece of property on which the Humane Society could build a new facility. The Humane Society has been damaged by the County\u2019s breach of contract in the amount of $75,000.\nDespite these findings and conclusion, the evidence tended to show that although Moore County was not active in assisting the Society, the cause of the Society\u2019s failure to construct a new facility was not due to inability to locate land but rather conflicts in rezoning the land.\nWe note that the precise duty imposed upon the County by the clause \u201cassist in locating\u201d is open to interpretation. David McNeil, the Moore County Manager, testified he thought compliance with the provision required the County to \u201csee[] if we had any county-owned property\u201d and offer any such property to the Society. On the other hand, the Society asserted the County breached the contract by never providing assistance. Despite this assertion, the uncontradicted evidence demonstrated the Society never requested assistance from the County in locating property. Moreover, McNeil explained that although no one from the Society approached the County to request assistance in locating a new site, the County reasonably did not actively seek to assist the Society because:\nMcNeil: the Humane Society ha[d] zeroed in on a site on NC 73 that they were seeking re-zoning for. We pretty much thought that was the property they were going to try to acquire. So we didn\u2019t actively pursue any other properties. Then after that did not materialize, we later learned there was a property in Southern Pines they had zeroed in on and were seeking proper zoning for that and therefore we didn\u2019t pursue any other.\nCounty Attorney: Why wouldn\u2019t you pursue others?\nMcNeil: We didn\u2019t see a need. We thought they had identified property that they wanted to do this on and build their new facility.\nCorrine O\u2019Conner, President of the Society since 1998, explained the Society was not only looking for the County\u2019s assistance in locating properties but was \u201clooking at whatever assistance [the County] could give us.\u201d\nIn addition to the conflict of what the contract required from the County, the evidence established that inability to locate property did not cause the Society to be unable to build a new shelter. O\u2019Conner testified that the Society\u2019s trouble in erecting a new animal shelter was not due to difficulty in locating properties. Rather, having property rezoned was the obstruction. Richard Frye, the real estate broker for the Society, testified that at the conditional-use hearing for the NC 73 land, citizens from the neighboring area opposed it and there was a \u201cbig battle with the neighbors.\u201d Diana Douglas, President of the Society from 1996 through 1997, testified regarding the attempted rezoning of the NC 73 property, \u201cwe had it surveyed and were really hopeful for getting it, but there was \u2014 a doctor owned the property across the street and he was not thrilled to have us there, nor were the surrounding residents. As a consequence, it never came to fruition.\u201d\nThe Society sought assistance from the County solely on rezoning issues:\nO\u2019Conner: I spoke to him [the Chairman of the County Commissioners] in regard to the property we\u2019re trying to get in Southern Pines. He told me Southern Pines was difficult to work with and maybe we should look in Aberdeen.\nCounty Attorney: Do you think that [when he told you to check out Aberdeen] was advice?\nO\u2019Conner: I don\u2019t think it was very helpful. . . . Was that advice? Yes; I would say it was advice, but I didn\u2019t think it was helpful advice.\nIn addition to seeking advice from the County Commissioners, O\u2019Conner also sought advice from McNeil:\nSociety Attorney: Did you ever request of Mr. McNeil assistance in finding property for a new site for the Humane Society?\nO\u2019Conner: I wouldn\u2019t say I requested his assistance. I took him the map of the property on highway 73 and showed him what we were looking at trying to purchase and tried to get his feelings on it, and he said he didn\u2019t see a problem, but it was up to the planning board [for rezoning], it really wasn\u2019t his thing. I just told him I wanted to get his feelings on it.\nThe evidence established that little action was taken by either party to effectuate the \u201cassist in locating\u201d provision of the contract. However, there is insufficient evidence for the court\u2019s finding that the County \u201cis directly responsible for the inability of the Humane Society to find a location for and to construct a new facility.\u201d Accordingly, we reverse the trial court.\nSince there was insufficient evidence for breach of the contract, we need not address the County\u2019s remaining assignments of error regarding the validity of the contracts and the insufficiency of evidence for the award of damages.\nIII. Award of costs\nMoore County appeals asserting the trial court erred in awarding the Society, as the prevailing party, costs pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 6-18 and 6-19. Section 6-18 provides that \u201c[c]osts shall be allowed of course to the plaintiff, upon a recovery, in the following cases: (1) In an action for the recovery of real property\u201d and section 6-19 provides the same for the defendant if the plaintiff is not entitled to costs. In this case, the Society recovered the real property. Therefore, pursuant to the statutes, the trial court properly awarded costs to the Society.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part.\nJudges McGEE and HUNTER concur.\n. For example, Richard Frye, the private real estate broker for the Society testified he never asked the County for assistance in locating property, although he testified: Tve talked with the county manager a couple of times in his office concerning Humane Society expenses, philosophies, different things concerning the Humane Society.\u201d Corrine O\u2019Conner, President of the Humane Society of Moore County since 1998, also testified that the only assistance she requested was for rezoning and not locating property.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Burley B. Mitchell, Jr., and Mark A. Davis and Moore County Attorneys Lesley F. Moxley, and Brannon Burroughs, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Adams, Kleemeier, Hagan, Hannah, & Fouts, P.L.L.C., by M. Jay D\u00e9Vaney, and Edward P. Lord, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COUNTY OF MOORE, Plaintiff v. HUMANE SOCIETY OF MOORE COUNTY, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA02-562\n(Filed 15 April 2003)\n1. Deeds\u2014 reverter clause \u2014 not triggered \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe evidence in a bench trial supported the court\u2019s finding that a reverter clause in a deed to property used by the Humane Society was not triggered by the termination of its contract with the County where the plain language of the deed provided a right to re-entry only when the Society ceased to operate an animal shelter and there was testimony about the services the Society continued to offer after termination of the contract with the County.\n2. Deeds\u2014 reverter clause \u2014 meaning of animal shelter \u2014 continued operation\nThe trial court correctly concluded in a bench trial that a reverter clause in a deed to property used by the Humane Society was not triggered by the termination of its contract with the County where the court properly considered the ordinary meaning of \u201canimal shelter\u201d and found that the Society was still operating a shelter. The deed did not reflect any intention that the termination of the relationship would trigger the reverter clause.\n3. Contracts\u2014 breach \u2014 animal shelter site \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThere was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find in a bench trial that the County had breached an agreement with the Humane Society to assist the Society in finding a new site for an animal shelter where the evidence showed that zoning conflicts were the cause of the Society\u2019s failure to construct a new facility.\n4. Costs\u2014 recovery of real property \u2014 reverter clause in deed\nThe trial court properly awarded costs to the Humane Society as the prevailing party under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-18 and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-19 where the County unsuccessfully claimed the right of reentry under a reverter clause in a deed to real property occupied by the Society.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 18 December 2001 by Judge Russell G. Walker, Jr. in Moore County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 January 2003.\nWomble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Burley B. Mitchell, Jr., and Mark A. Davis and Moore County Attorneys Lesley F. Moxley, and Brannon Burroughs, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAdams, Kleemeier, Hagan, Hannah, & Fouts, P.L.L.C., by M. Jay D\u00e9Vaney, and Edward P. Lord, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0293-01", "first_page_order": 325, "last_page_order": 334 }