{ "id": 9187259, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY RILEY JONES, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jones", "decision_date": "2003-05-06", "docket_number": "No. COA02-411", "first_page": "472", "last_page": "480", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "157 N.C. App. 472" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569971 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867709 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11634688, 11634848, 11634818, 11634787, 11635043, 11634759, 11634727, 11634921, 11635018, 11634704, 11635185, 11634993, 11635091, 11634969, 11635131, 11634878 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/1135-01", "/us/522/1135-07", "/us/522/1135-06", "/us/522/1135-05", "/us/522/1135-13", "/us/522/1135-04", "/us/522/1135-03", "/us/522/1135-09", "/us/522/1135-12", "/us/522/1135-02", "/us/522/1135-16", "/us/522/1135-11", "/us/522/1135-14", "/us/522/1135-10", "/us/522/1135-15", "/us/522/1135-08" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411", "parenthetical": "holding that the statute is applicable \"during the jury selection and guilt/innocence phases of criminal trials\" and \"[o]nce a case has reached the sentencing proceeding after the trial, fear that the jury's initial exposure to the case will result in a distorted view is no longer a concern\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" }, { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567260 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0213-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 835, "char_count": 18566, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.236411123653326e-07, "percentile": 0.6068017865134222 }, "sha256": "9f8ccf28acd03490ed68105e06a69655b837862b426b28bf6eb9db6e6835599d", "simhash": "1:026dbfe0d27b916e", "word_count": 2976 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:54:20.581695+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY RILEY JONES, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nDefendant, Larry Riley Jones, was indicted on 2 April 2001 for the following offenses: felony eluding arrest (00 CRS 56218); displaying a fictitious registration plate and resisting a public officer (00 CRS 56219); possession of over half an ounce of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia (00 CRS 56220); and for being an habitual felon (01 CRS 0070). All of the underlying cases came on together for trial at the 30 May 2001 criminal session of Buncombe County Superior Court. After jury selection, defendant pled guilty in the possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia case. The State prosecuted the remaining charges, and on 31 May 2001 the jury found defendant guilty of felony eluding arrest and resisting a public officer. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the fictitious registration plate charge, and the State ultimately dismissed that charge. The habitual felon case came on for trial at the same court session, and the jury found defendant guilty of having habitual felon status upon the felony eluding arrest conviction.\nThe trial court consolidated all the cases for sentencing and adjudged defendant to be an habitual felon. The parties stipulated that defendant had twenty-three prior record points and a prior record level of VI. The trial court sentenced defendant from the presumptive range to a minimum of 152 and a maximum of 192 months in prison. Defendant appeals from the convictions for felony eluding arrest, resisting a public officer, and having the status of habitual felon.\nAt trial, the parties presented very different accounts of the events which gave rise to these charges. The State\u2019s lone witness, Buncombe County Sheriffs Deputy T. K. Bradley (Deputy Bradley), testified that around dusk on 4 May 2000 he observed defendant operating a vehicle with a burned-out headlight on Deaverview Road in Asheville. Deputy Bradley pulled behind defendant in his marked patrol car, entered defendant\u2019s license plate number into his computer, and determined that the plate was not registered to defendant\u2019s vehicle. Deputy Bradley followed as defendant turned onto Hi-Alta Avenue, and their speeds increased to \u201cright at seventy and eighty miles per hour\u201d through a \u201cvery highly populated residential area\u201d with a posted speed limit of thirty miles per hour. As their speeds increased, Deputy Bradley activated his blue lights and siren and attempted to pull defendant over. Defendant responded by running a four-way stop on Hi-Alta Avenue and turning right onto Central Avenue, then left onto Hemlock Lane. Deputy Bradley .testified that these streets were curvy and \u201cvery narrow,\u201d with many cars parked along the roadside and with residences \u201cfairly close to the street,\u201d and that defendant was \u201cdriving very erratic [ly].\u201d According to Deputy Bradley, he \u201cslowed the [patrol] car sideways,\u201d \u201cwent off the edge of the roadway several times [,]\u201d and \u201calmost hit several parked vehicles\u201d while pursuing defendant. At one point, defendant\u2019s car almost left the roadway while rounding a sharp curve; Deputy Bradley testified that had it done so, it would have crashed into a residence situated near the road.\nAfter pursuing defendant for a total of \u201capproximately eight- to nine tenths of a mile[,]\u201d Deputy Bradley testified that defendant\u2019s vehicle ran out of gas on Hemlock Lane. Defendant exited the vehicle and ignored Deputy Bradley\u2019s commands to place his hands on the car, whereupon Deputy Bradley \u201chad to wrestle him for a few minutes\u201d before placing defendant under arrest. A subsequent search of defendant\u2019s person revealed four syringes and a small bag of marijuana. Deputy Bradley determined that defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been revoked and also issued him a citation for the misdemeanor offenses of displaying a fictitious registration plate and resisting a public officer. This citation was admitted into evidence at trial over defendant\u2019s objection, and was later published to the jury, at the jury\u2019s request, during deliberations. Defendant stipulated at trial that his license had been permanently revoked in 1997.\nDefendant testified at trial that on the evening in question he was returning home when he passed two patrol cars parked just off Deaverview Road. Defendant testified that both of his headlights were working and he was traveling thirty-five miles per hour, yet he saw Deputy Bradley look at him and \u201cknew he was coming after me.\u201d Defendant did not see Deputy Bradley behind him and did not see any blue lights when he turned onto Hi-Alta Avenue, and he denied running the four-way stop. As defendant proceeded around the curves on Hi-Alta, he \u201cmight have got [sic] over thirty-five\u201d but his speed never reached fifty miles per hour, much less seventy or eighty. Defendant testified that because of the curves and hills it would be impossible to drive that fast on Hi-Alta. As defendant was turning onto Central Avenue, the street on which he lived, he saw Deputy Bradley\u2019s blue lights behind him for the first time. At this point defendant\u2019s vehicle ran out of gas, and he coasted down Central past his house and onto Hemlock Avenue, where he pulled off the road. According to defendant, he coasted past his house because he did not want his dying mother to see or hear him being arrested. Defendant testified that despite exiting the car with his hands straight up and obeying Deputy Bradley\u2019s instructions, the deputy drew his service weapon, handcuffed him and \u201cgrabbed me by the hair of my head and just slammed me down on my car.\u201d\nDefendant presented testimony at trial from three witnesses who tended to corroborate various portions of defendant\u2019s testimony. Clyde Bugg, defendant\u2019s neighbor, testified that he saw defendant\u2019s car pass his house on the evening in question, followed by a police car flashing its blue lights but without a siren. Bugg also testified that he has never driven fast on Hi-Alta Avenue because it is \u201ctoo crooked.\u201d Geraldine Austin, defendant\u2019s sister, testified that she saw defendant\u2019s car pass the house on Central Avenue she shared with defendant and their sick mother, followed by a police car with blue lights on but no siren. Austin testified that she witnessed her brother\u2019s arrest and that it occurred in substantially the manner he described. Theresa Murphy, defendant\u2019s niece, likewise testified that she was at defendant\u2019s house and saw his car pass the house \u201cgoing no more than twenty or thirty miles an hour\u201d followed by a police car with blue lights activated, but no siren.\nDefendant brings forth thirteen assignments of error and argues that his habitual felon conviction should be vacated, and that he should receive a new trial on the felony eluding arrest and misdemeanor resisting a public officer charges. For the reasons discussed below, we agree.\nDefendant assigns error to the admission into evidence, and subsequent publication to the jury, of the citation Deputy Bradley issued to defendant for resisting a public officer and displaying a fictitious registration plate. Defendant interposed a timely objection to' both the admission and publication of this citation; the trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objections, admitted the citation, and allowed its publication to the jury without a limiting instruction. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s actions were analogous to admitting an indictment into evidence and publishing it to the jury and were therefore prohibited by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1221(b), and that these errors precluded defendant from receiving a fair trial. We agree.\nSection 15A-1221(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that \u201c[a]t no time during the selection of the jury or during trial may any person read the indictment to the prospective jurors or to the jury.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1221(b) (2001). Our Supreme Court has articulated the rationale behind this prohibition as follows: \u201cThe legislature apparently intended that jurors not be given a distorted view of the case before them by an initial exposure to the case through the stilted language of. indictments and other pleadings.\u201d State v. Leggett, 305 N.C. 213, 218, 287 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1982) (emphasis added); see also State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 35, 489 S.E.2d 391, 411 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135, 140 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1998).\nIn the case at bar, the citation stated in pertinent part that:\nThe undersigned officer has probable cause to believe that on or about [4 May 2000] . . . the named defendant did unlawfully and willfully operate a (motor) vehicle on a (street or highway) . . . [while] displaying] a registration plate number knowing the same to be fictitious . . . and . . . the named defendant did unlawfully and willfully resist, delay or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office[,] to wit: fighting with officer and arguing while being taken into custody after fleeing from officer in a vehicle pursuit.\nMoreover, the following language appeared in a section of the citation entitled \u201cMAGISTRATE\u2019S ORDER-MISDEMEANOR ONLY[:]\u201d\nThe named defendant has been arrested without a warrant and there is probable cause for the defendant\u2019s detention on the stated charges. This Magistrate\u2019s Order is issued upon information furnished under oath by the named officer.\nFinally, in a section of the citation entitled \u201cCOURT USE ONLY\u201d a handwritten instruction to \u201cTransfer to S. Crt[.] w/ related fel[.] case\u201d appears, under signature of District Court Judge Pope.\nWe hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1221(b), and our Supreme Court\u2019s interpretation of the statute as a means of protecting jurors from being influenced by \u201cthe stilted language of indictments and other pleadings[,]\u201d render the admission and publication of the instant citation erroneous. Leggett, 305 N.C. at 218, 287 S.E.2d at 836. We are mindful of our legislature\u2019s provision that a citation may serve as the State\u2019s pleading in all criminal cases save those initiated in the superior court division. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-921 (2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-923(a) (2001). While a citation is not an indictment, we find no distinction between the potential for prejudice resulting from the language of this citation and that found in \u201cindictments and other pleadings.\u201d\nThe citation in the case sub judice contains much of the same \u201cstilted language\u201d commonly found in indictments and pleadings. In fact, the language used in this citation is almost identical to that employed in defendant\u2019s later indictment for these offenses. The citation states there is \u201cprobable cause to believe\u201d defendant \u201cdid unlawfully and -willfully operate\u201d his car with a fictitious registration plate, and that he resisted, delayed or obstructed \u201ca public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office\u201d by fighting and arguing with Deputy Bradley \u201cwhile being taken into custody after fleeing from [an] officer in a vehicle pursuit.\u201d\nWe hold that the citation\u2019s recitation of the charges against defendant, phrased in the \u201cstilted\u201d language commonly found in indictments, gave the jury a \u201cdistorted view\u201d of the case against defendant. We find it significant that the citation also contained a signed portion entitled \u201cMAGISTRATE\u2019S ORDER-MISDEMEANOR ONLY\u201d stating \u201cthere is probable cause for the defendant\u2019s detention on the stated charges[,]\u201d as well as a section entitled \u201cCOURT USE ONLY\u201d with what appear to be instructions to transfer these offenses to superior court along with the related felony eluding arrest charge, since the jury could interpret these statements by two different judicial authorities as conclusive evidence that defendant is guilty of the offenses mentioned therein. This is especially true where, as here, no limiting instruction was given.\nWe are not persuaded by the State\u2019s argument that admission of the citation near the end of Deputy Bradley\u2019s direct examination, and its publication at the jury\u2019s request only after deliberations had begun, is not an \u201cinitial exposure to the case\u201d and therefore takes the citation outside the purview of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1221(b) and Leggett. See Flowers, 347 N.C. at 35, 489 S.E.2d at 411 (holding that the statute is applicable \u201cduring the jury selection and guilt/innocence phases of criminal trials\u201d and \u201c[o]nce a case has reached the sentencing proceeding after the trial, fear that the jury\u2019s initial exposure to the case will result in a distorted view is no longer a concern\u201d).\nHaving concluded that the trial court erred by admitting the citation into evidence and publishing it to the jury, we must now determine whether the error was prejudicial and thus warrants a new trial. The test for prejudicial error is whether there is a \u201creasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2001); State v. Frazier, 344 N.C. 611, 617, 476 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1996).\nAfter a thorough review of the record, we find that defendant has satisfied his burden of showing prejudicial error. The evidence in this case, which consisted almost entirely of witness testimony, was not overwhelmingly in favor of defendant\u2019s guilt on either the speeding to elude arrest or resisting a public officer charges. The State\u2019s lone witness, Deputy Bradley, presented a very different account of what happened after defendant\u2019s car passed him on Deaverview Road than did defendant and his three witnesses. The jury\u2019s verdicts essentially turned on which account the jury believed.\nSection 20-141.5 of the North Carolina General Statutes defines \u201cspeeding to elude arrest\u201d as follows:\n(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle on a street, highway, or public vehicular area while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer who is in the lawful performance of his duties. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, violation of this section shall be a Class 1 misdemeanor.\n(b) If two or more of the following aggravating factors are present at the time the violation occurs, violation of this section shall be a Class H felony.\n(3) Reckless driving as proscribed by G.S. 20-140.\n(5) Driving when the person\u2019s drivers license is revoked.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141.5 (2001). Our General Statutes also provide that \u201c[i]f any person shall willfully and unlawfully resist, delay or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office, he shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223 (2001).\nIn convicting defendant of felony eluding arrest, the jury obviously believed Deputy Bradley\u2019s testimony that defendant knew he was being pursued by Deputy Bradley and that defendant drove recklessly in attempting to elude him. Likewise, defendant\u2019s conviction for resisting a public officer indicates the jury believed Deputy Bradley\u2019s testimony that defendant was belligerent and uncooperative when Deputy Bradley tried to arrest him. The citation\u2019s language tended to corroborate Deputy Bradley\u2019s testimony with respect to each charge. Moreover, the very fact that it was issued by a police officer and contained comments attributed to both a magistrate and a district court judge imbued the citation with the imprimatur of the State, a circumstance likely to give it undue influence with the jury. Given the almost total reliance by both parties in this case on testimonial evidence, and the conflicting nature of that testimony, we find it reasonably possible that' the citation\u2019s improper admission and publication was a factor in the jury believing Deputy Bradley\u2019s testimony, thus tipping the scales in favor of conviction on the resisting a public officer and felony eluding arrest charges. Accordingly, we hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial on the felony eluding arrest and misdemeanor resisting a public officer convictions.\nNext, we turn to defendant\u2019s conviction for having habitual felon status, which was predicated on defendant\u2019s conviction on the felony eluding arrest charge. It is well settled that:\n[t]he only reason for establishing that an accused is an habitual felon is to enhance the punishment which would otherwise be appropriate for the substantive felony which he has allegedly committed while in such a status. . . . Being an habitual felon is not a crime but is a status the attaining of which subjects a person thereafter convicted of a crime to an increased punishment for that crime. The status itself, standing alone, will not support a criminal sentence.\nState v. Allen, 292 N.C. 431, 435, 233 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1977) (citations omitted). Since we hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial on the felony eluding arrest charge, which served as the \u201csubstantive felony\u201d underlying his conviction for having habitual felon status, defendant\u2019s habitual felon conviction must be vacated.\nBecause we hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial on his convictions for felony eluding arrest (00 CRS 56218) and resisting a public officer (00 CRS 56219), and that defendant\u2019s conviction for having habitual felon status (01 CRS 0070) must be vacated, we do not address defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error.\nNew trial in part; vacated in part.\nJudges HUNTER and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth N. Strickland and Special Deputy Attorney General William R Hart, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Aaron Edward Carlos, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY RILEY JONES, Defendant\nNo. COA02-411\n(Filed 6 May 2003)\n1. Evidence\u2014 citation \u2014 not admissible\nThe admission of a citation charging defendant with resisting an officer and displaying a fictitious registration plate was prejudicial error. While a citation is not an indictment, there is no distinction between the potential for prejudice from the language of this citation and that found in indictments and other pleadings that may not be read to the jury by statute. The error was prejudicial because the case consisted almost entirely of witness testimony and turned on which account the jury believed. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1221(b).\n2. Sentencing\u2014 habitual felon \u2014 underlying conviction reversed\nA conviction for being an habitual felon was vacated when defendant was granted a new trial on the underlying conduction.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 31 May 2001 by Judge James L. Baker in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 February 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth N. Strickland and Special Deputy Attorney General William R Hart, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Aaron Edward Carlos, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0472-01", "first_page_order": 504, "last_page_order": 512 }